Judgment : 1. The plaintiff/appellant who failed before the courts below in getting the decree as prayed for, has filed the above Second Appeal. .2. The suit properties were part of the estate of Thavasilingam Pillai who died on 212. 1914 leaving behind him his widow Nagammal, and they did not have any issues. .At the time of the marriage, Nagammal was minor and she became major in the year 1921. She alienated some of the properties from the estate of Thavasilingam Pillai. The plaintiff and his brothers on the basis that they are reversioners to Thavasilingam Pillai filed O.S. No. 212 of 1953 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruchirapalli challenging the said alienation. The said suit ended in compromise between the parties and the decree is marked as Ex.A-14. As per the said compromise, admittedly, certain properties were given to the said Nagammal. After the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, claiming that she is the absolute owner of the suit properties, Nagammal executed a settlement deed under Ex.B-6 in favour of the fourth defendant. The fourth defendant sold the said properties to the defendants 1 to 3 under Exs.B.11 and B.12 on 16. 1969. Thereafter the plaintiff/appellant claiming that he is entitled to succeed to the suit properties as reversioners to the estate of Thavasilingam Pillai filed the present suit in O.S. No. 407 of 1979 for recovery of possession of the suit properties with mesne profits. The same was resisted by the defendants/respondents stating that the suit properties are the absolute properties of Nagammal and so she is entitled to execute the settlement deed in favour of the fourth defendant and thereby the defendants 1 to 3 got valid title to the suit properties. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief. Aggrieved against the same the plaintiff/appellant filed appeal in A.S. No. 2 of 1983 on the file of the Sub-Court, Karur. The lower appellate court also dismissed the appeal confirming the findings given by the trial court. Still aggrieved the appellant has filed the above Second Appeal. 3. Aggrieved against the same the plaintiff/appellant filed appeal in A.S. No. 2 of 1983 on the file of the Sub-Court, Karur. The lower appellate court also dismissed the appeal confirming the findings given by the trial court. Still aggrieved the appellant has filed the above Second Appeal. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has mainly argued that under the guise of the compromise Nagammal took restricted estate of Thavasilingam Pillai and so she cannot get absolute right over the suit properties on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. .4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in support of his submission has relied on the decision in Hussain Uduman v. Venkatachala Mudaliar, 1974 (II) M.L.J. 275 . In the said case a compromise decree came up for interpretation with respect to the scope of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The terms of the compromise decree showed that the first and second schedule of the properties were allotted to one Gomathi Ammal, widow of the original owner for her maintenance to be enjoyed for her life and after her lifetime, Palaniandi and his heirs should become absolutely entitled to the said properties; it is also stated that the said Gomathi Ammal should not alienate the said items during her lifetime. On the basis of the said clause in the said compromise and also the rejection of the case of the third defendant therein that the said Gomathi Ammals restricted estate got enlarged into absolute estate, the learned counsel has submitted that the principle set out in the said decision will apply to the facts of the present case. I am not able to accept his submission. The contention of the third defendant therein was not accepted only because of the factual finding that the said Gomathi Ammal was not in possession with respect to Survey No.60/1 and not on the basis of the said compromise alone. In view of the above, the said decision will not be of any assistance to the case of the appellant. 5. In view of the above, the said decision will not be of any assistance to the case of the appellant. 5. In the present case, to appreciate the right of the widow, it is necessary to extract the relevant clause in the compromise decree, which is as follows:- "That the properties described in B and C schedules to the plaint to the exception of the properties described from making any kind of alienation in respect of those properties save, those that have been alienated by her prior to this date". According to the abovesaid clause, only the right of the widow relating to alienating the suit properties is restricted. Though originally, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the suit properties were given to the widow to be in possession of the same, after setting aside the sale in O.S. No. 212 of 1953, he is not in a position to establish the said fact. As submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents the properties given to the widow are not the properties already conveyed by her. But the other properties which were in possession of the widow were allowed to continue to be in possession of the said widow, under the compromise decree. The only restriction under the said clause of the compromise decree is not to alienate the said properties. 6. While considering similar facts of the case, the Apex Court, in V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddy, AIR 1977 S.C. 1944 , has held as follows:- "It will be seen from these observations that even though the property was acquired by Subharai Bai under the instrument of partition, which gave only a limited interest to her in the property this Court held that the case fell within sub-section (1) and not subsection (2). The reason obviously was that the property was given to Subharai Bai in virtue of a pre-existing right inhering in her and when the instrument of partition provided that she would only have a limited interest in the property, it merely provided for something which even otherwise would have been the legal position under the law as it then stood. The reason obviously was that the property was given to Subharai Bai in virtue of a pre-existing right inhering in her and when the instrument of partition provided that she would only have a limited interest in the property, it merely provided for something which even otherwise would have been the legal position under the law as it then stood. It is only when property is acquired by a Hindu female as a new grant for the first time and the instrument, decree, order or award giving the property prescribes the terms on which it is to be held by the Hindu female, namely, as a restricted owner, that sub-section (2) comes into play and excludes the applicability of sub-section(1). The object of sub-section (2), as pointed out by this court in Badri Parsads case, while quoting with approval the observations made by the Madras High Court in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad. 387 is only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees, etc. by virtue of which a womans right was restricted and, therefore, where property is acquired by a Hindu female under the instrument in virtue of a pre-existing right, such as a right to obtain property on partition or a right to maintenance and under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act, she would have no more than limited interest in the property, a provision in the instrument giving her limited interest in the property would be merely by way of record or recognition of the true legal position and the restriction on her interest being a disability imposed by law would be wiped out and her limited interest would be enlarged under sub-section (1). But where property is acquired by a Hindu female under an instrument, for the first time without any preexisting right solely by virtue of the instrument, she must hold it on the terms on which it is given to her and if what is given to her is a restricted estate, it would not be enlarged by reason of subsection (2). The controversy before us, therefore boils down to the narrow question whether in the present case the properties were acquired by the appellant under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right or they were acquired for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise alone and to nothing else". In the abovesaid decision it is further held as follows:- "Applying the principles enunciated above to the facts of the present case, we find - .(i) that the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified by this Court; .(ii) that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the properties and there was a clear restriction prohibiting her from alienating the properties. (iii) that despite these restrictions, she continued to be in possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 1956 came into force; and (iv) that the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in the properties. It is therefore clear that the compromise by which the properties were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma in lieu of her maintenance were merely in recognition of her right to maintenance which was a pre-existing right and, therefore, the case of the appellant would be taken out of the ambit of Section 14(2) and would fall squarely within Section 14(1) read with the Explanation thereto. Thus the appellant would acquire on absolute interest when she was in possession of the properties at the time when the 1956 Act came into force and any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored. This being the position, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant Tulasamma would have only a limited interest and in setting aside the alienations made by her. We are satisfied that the High Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on an erroneous view of the law". 7. In view of the above, there cannot be any doubt that the widow was permitted to retain possession of the properties as mentioned in the compromise decree and the same should be in recognition of her right to maintenance which was a pre-existing right and, therefore, the said Nagammals right was enlarged, in view of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, read with explanation thereto. So, the courts below are correct in rejecting the case of the plaintiff/appellant. 8. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merits in this Second Appeal. The same is dismissed accordingly. No costs.