JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J.- This appeal under section 10 (F) of the Companies Act arises from an order of the Company Law Board under sections 397 and 398 of the Act. The appeal has been filed beyond time. The appellants have accordingly filed an application for condonation of delay. 2. The facts relevant to the question of limitation are as follows. On 30.8.93 the Company Law Board passed the impugned order. The appellants received copy sometime in the month of November, 1993. They filed writ petition, CWJC No. 8860 of 1994, on 3.10.94. On 4.7.96 the writ petition was disposed of with the observation that the order of the Company Law Board being appealable under Section 10 (F), it is open to the appellants to prefer an appeal. The present appeal was thereafter filed on 9.8.96. 3. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in view of the express provisions of section 10 (F) this court can condone delay in filing the appeal but not beyond the period of sixty days. In other words even though the discretion in favour of the appellants can be exercised and the period of limitation can be extended if this court is of the view that the appellants have made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay, such extension cannot exceed the period of sixty days. He placed reliance on Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh Vs. M/s Parson Tools & Plants, AIR 1975 SC 1039 and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner Vs. Kedarnath Jhunjhunwalla, 1983 PLJR 237 . In the present case the appeal having been filed after about three years the Court has no power to condone the delay. The submission of the counsel appears to be well-founded. Section 10(F) runs as follows: "Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Company Law Board may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Company Law Board to him on any question of law arising out of such order: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a period of not exceeding sixty days." 4. The case of Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. The case of Commissioner of Sales Tax Vs. M/s Parson Tools & Plants (supra) arose out of U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. Section 10 of that Act confers powers on the revising authorities, either on its own motion or on the application of the Commissioner of Sales Tax of the person aggrieved, to call for and examine the record of any case for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any appellate or assessing authority and pass such order as it many think fit. Sub-Section (3B) lays down that "the application under sub-section (3) shall be made within one year from the date of service of the order complained of but the Revisional Authority may on proof of sufficient cause entertain an application within a further period of six months". The Supreme Court observed that while there is no limitation for suo motu exercise of jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction is exercised on application by the aggrieved party, and such application is filed beyond time the Revisional Authority has no discretion to extend the period beyond a further period of six months, even on sufficient cause shown. The submission that time was lost on account of pendency of proceeding before wrong forum and therefore the benefit of section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act should be extended, was rejected. It was observed that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filling a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown may be extended, in maximum, only upto specified time limit and no further. then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in the statute by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. 5. The point at issue is squarely covered by the decision in the above-noted case and, I am afraid, there is hardly any scope for argument. 5. The point at issue is squarely covered by the decision in the above-noted case and, I am afraid, there is hardly any scope for argument. The order of the Company Law Board having admittedly been communicated to the appellants in November, 1993, they were required to file the appeal within the period of sixty days thereafter and, on sufficient cause being shown for not filing such appeal within that period, this court could extend the period provided it had been filed within further period of sixty days. That unfortunately for the appellants was not to be. As a matter of fact, the writ petition itself was filed after over ten months. The present appeal therefore is hopelessly barred by limitation and has to be dismissed as such. 6. This appeal accordingly stands dismissed as time barred.