D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner alleges that he was appointed in the post of clerk in the institution pursuant to a resolution dated 31. 8. 1997 passed by the Committee of Management. An appointment letter was issued to him on 1st September, 1997, which stipulates that the order of appointment would be enforceable only with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools as is apparent from annexure-5. The petitioner joined the school on 2nd September. 1997. On 7th September, 1997, the papers were forwarded by the Committee of Management to the District Inspector of schools. By an order dated 22nd September, 1997, the District Inspector of Schools had refused to grant approval to the appointment on the ground that no approval could be granted under the rules. This order was challenged by means of Writ Petition No. 33547 of 1997 since been disposed of by an order dated 13lh October. 1997. By the said order, the District Inspector of schools was directed, to reconsider the question of approval and specify the defects In the appointment and communicate the reason to the petitioner within the stipulated time. Despite communication of the said order, the District Inspector of Schools decided the question long after by the order dated 27th February, 1998. The reason as given in the said order dated 27th february, 1998 was that the post was filled up without the prior permission of the District inspector of Schools and, therefore, the approval was not granted and the papers were returned. Pursuant to the order dated 13th October, 1997, passed by this Court, no approval could be granted since there has been a ban on every kind of appointment by reason of a Government order dated 3rd November, 1997. This order was communicated to the petitioner by a letter dated 28th February, 1998, which have since been challenged in this writ petition. ( 2 ) MR. Arun Tandon. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the earlier refusal to grant approval having been quashed, the same ground cannot be taken once again and in effect in the order dated 27th February, 1998 that ground was not the ground for refusal of approval, on the other hand a different ground has been set up which on the facts and circumstances of the case, is inapplicable. Therefore, the District Inspector of Schools should be directed to grant approval to the appointment of the petitioner. He also contends that the reason that the appointment was given without permission cannot sustain in view of the stipulated condition in the order of appointment that the same would be effective oniy on receipt of the approval. This non-approval does not prevent a person from working in (he school but it would only entitle the appointee to receive salary only after the approval is granted. Therefore, according to him, the objection raised by Sri V. K. Rai, learned counsel for the respondents cannot be acceded to. ( 3 ) MR. V. K. Rat, learned Brief Holder for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that since the appointment of the petitioner was in violation of the Regulation 101, Chapter III of the regulations framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and the same being a question of law can very well be raised even at this stage. The question of approval having been considered after the ban is imposed, the ban is very much applicable. Alternatively, he contends that even if the ban cannot be applicable in case of the pelitioner. still then in view of the infirmity in the appointment itself, no approval could be granted. According to him the appointment being void, it Is not open to the petitioner to question the order passed by the district Inspector of Schools. ( 4 ) I have heard both the learned counsel at length. ( 5 ) THE facts remain that the earlier order dated 22nd September, 1997 was subject-matter of challenge in Writ Petition No. 33547 of 1997, wherein the said order was quashed pursuant to the order dated 13th October, 1997 passed on the said writ petition. In the said order, the District inspector of Schools was directed to communicate the Committee of Management specific defects/short-comings in the appointment of the petitioner as a clerk in the said college due to which she declined to approve petitioners appointment. The same ground could have been taken by the District Inspector of Schools by reason of the specific direction contained in the order dated 13th October. 1997. The order dafed 22nd September, 1997. only pointed out that approval cannot be given according to the Rules. The same ground could have been taken by the District Inspector of Schools by reason of the specific direction contained in the order dated 13th October. 1997. The order dafed 22nd September, 1997. only pointed out that approval cannot be given according to the Rules. In fact she did not specify the specific defect as to why under trie Rules, approval could not be given. After the order dated 13th October- 1997. it was open to her Co specify the defects in detail. But from the order dated 27th February, 1998. it appears that the District Inspector of Schools had herself given-up the said point though she has mentioned that this was the ground for which it was refused namely ; that the appointment was not made according to the procedure without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools but that ground has not been made a ground for refusal of approval, it was only a reference or elaboration of the reason given earlier, on the other hand the reason that has been put forth is the reason of ban imposed on 3rd November, 1997. ( 6 ) THE order dated 22nd September, 1997, was issued when the ban imposed by the order dated 3rd November. 1997 was not in existence. The question is to be decided on the basis of the law as is applicable on the date when the appointment was sought to be made or when the question of approval was taken into consideration. In the present case, at best the date could be related to 22nd September, 1997. when the ban was not there. Therefore, the ban imposed by the order dated 3rd November, 1997. cannot be attracted in the present case. The ground which was available and could have been specified in detail having been waived, the same operates as an estoppel to raise the same question once again in view of the specific observations/directions contained in the order dated 13th October, 1997. The District Inspector of Schools having based her consideration altogether on a different ground had waived the other ground. It is no more open lo the learned counsel for the respondents to agitate the same since it was not a ground taken by the District Inspector of Schools. ( 7 ) MR. The District Inspector of Schools having based her consideration altogether on a different ground had waived the other ground. It is no more open lo the learned counsel for the respondents to agitate the same since it was not a ground taken by the District Inspector of Schools. ( 7 ) MR. Arun Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, relied on a decision in the case of Janta Higher Secondary School Society v. Aniruddh Prasad Dwivedi. 1978 ALJ 828. In the said decision, it was held that if an appointment is made without prior approval then till the approval is granted the same will be in-effective. However, if approval is subsequently granted in that event, the same would be operative with effect from the date of approval. It was not the law that if appointment is made without prior approval, then Inspector cannot grant approval subsequently. Such an approval if granted subsequently it may not be effective in respect of the post but will certainly be effective in respect of the future. ( 8 ) IN the present case, the appointment itself specify that it would be effective only when the approval is granted, therefore, it is no more open to the District Inspector of Schools to refuse approval on the ground that-the prior approval was not sought for. on the other hand, the appointment was made with specific condition that it would be enforceable only after (he approval is granted. ( 9 ) THUS, it appears, that the ground on which the approval was refused by the order dated 22nd september, 1997. also does not stand to reason. Since the consideration was sought to be made on 22nd September, 1997, pursuant to a selection made on 1st September, 1997, the ban imposed by the order dated 3rd November, 1997 could not be attracted since no executive order could be effected retrospectively. Even if the question is to be reconsidered pursuant to the order dated 13th October. 1997, the law as existing after the order dated 13th October, 1997, could not be applied. At best the law as it stood can be stretched as on the date 13th October. 1997, though the said contention presumably may not be correct. ( 10 ) IN that view of the matter, the order dated 27th February, 1998. cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. At best the law as it stood can be stretched as on the date 13th October. 1997, though the said contention presumably may not be correct. ( 10 ) IN that view of the matter, the order dated 27th February, 1998. cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed. ( 11 ) THE District Inspector of Schools, therefore, shall consider the question of grant of approval afresh in the light of the observations made above and the appointment of the petitioner shall be effective from the date such approval is granted. The respondent District Inspector of Schools shall consider the question as early as possible preferably within four weeks from the date a copy of this order is furnished to her. ( 12 ) THE writ petition is thus, disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. .