Honble YADAV J.–The present writ petition is posted today for disposal of the application moved under Article 226(3) of the Constitution. (2). Instead of disposing of the stay application in light of the application moved on behalf of respondent No.1 under Article 226 (3) of the Constitution, with the consent of learned counsel for both the parties I would like to decide the pre- sent writ petition itself on merits. (3). The present writ petition is directed against the order dated 16.1.98 (Annex.1) passed by Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan Circuit Bench Jodhpur (respondent No.2). The order impugned dated 16.1.98 (Annex.1) has been challenged by the petitioners on the ground inter alia that the appeal pre- sented before respondent No.2 under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunals) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1976) was barred by limitation. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, if any appeal, application or suit is filed before a Court of law then whether the question of limitation is raised or not the Court of law is required to take notice of the question of limitation. He invited my attention towerds memo of appeal (Annex.2) wherein respondent No.1 prayed following reliefs before the Tribunal: a) The respondents be directed to accord promotion to the appellant from the date persons junior to her were promoted, with all consequential financial benefits, fixation of pay, etc. b) to pay salary to the appellant for the period from 7.1.94 to 24.5.94 treating it as on duty. c) any other relief the Honble Tribunal deems fit, just and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case. d) costs of appeal may kindly be allowed. (4). In reply to the aforesaid argument it is strenuously urged by learned counsel for respondent No.1 that against her promotion order dated 3.12.93 respon- dent No.1 filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3472/95 which was finally disposed of on 27.9.96, directing her to approach to the Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1976. (5). In pursuance of the order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition no 27.9.96 respondent No.1 approached the Tribunal and filed the appeal which is at Annex.2 to the writ petition. (6). It is conceded by learned counsel for respondent No.1 Mr. (5). In pursuance of the order passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition no 27.9.96 respondent No.1 approached the Tribunal and filed the appeal which is at Annex.2 to the writ petition. (6). It is conceded by learned counsel for respondent No.1 Mr. Sawhney that the appeal filed before the Tribunal (respondent No.2) was accompanying with an application for condonation of delay. However, from perusal of the order passed by Tribunal (respondent No.2) it appears that before passing any order on the application moved for condonation of delay, the Tribunal (respondent No.2) has proceeded to decide the controversy on merits without addressing itself on the question of limitation. (7). It is to be imbibed that the present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution whereby every High Court has been empowered to have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territory in rela- tion to which it exercises its jurisdiction. The object of Article 227 of the Constitution is to keep the subordinate Courts as well as tribunals within its boundaries. (8). Here, in the present case it is borne out on the face of record that the Tribunal (respondent No.2) has proceeded to decide the appeal on merits without addressing itself on the question of limitation or before passing any order on the application moved for condonation of delay which is impermissible under Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. (9). It is true that under Section 9 of the Act of 1976 no appeal is entertainable before the Tribunal after the expiry of 60 days from the date of the order of the authority but in the proviso of the aforesaid Section 9 it is envisaged that an appeal may be deemed within the prescribed period if the appellant satisfy the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. It appears that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Section 9 of the Act of 1976 and the provisions contemplated under Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1963 escaped the notice of the Tribunal (respondent No.2) while deciding the appeal on merits. It appears that the mandatory provisions envisaged under Section 9 of the Act of 1976 and the provisions contemplated under Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1963 escaped the notice of the Tribunal (respondent No.2) while deciding the appeal on merits. Section 3 of the Limitation Act clearly provides that subject to the provisions of Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. It is held that whenever any suit, appeal or application is preferred after the prescribed period of limitation it has to be rejected by courts or tribunals unless delay is condoned in accordance with law even if limitation has not been taken as a defence by any of the party. (10). Learned counsel for respondent No.1 urged that since the appeal was preferred by respondent No. 1 before the Tribunal in pursuance of the order passed by learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3472/95 on 27.9.96 therefore it was no necessary for him to move an application for condonation of delay. It is stated by Mr. Sawhney that the application for condonation of delay in the appeal was filed in abundant caution and not as a legal requirement. (11). The aforesaid argument of Mr. Sawhney is attractive but fallacious for the reasons give hereinbelow. (12). It is true that in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the High Court is satisfied, it can condone the delay and direct any sub- ordinate Court or tribunal to entertain a matter treating it within limitation though the dispute was raised beyond limitation but if there is no such stipulation in the order passed by the High Court then the sub ordinate courts or tribunals are required to apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case after taking into account the mandatory provisions contemplated under Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act 1963. Here, in the present case a perusal of certified copy of the or- der passed by learned single Judge in S.B. Civil. Here, in the present case a perusal of certified copy of the or- der passed by learned single Judge in S.B. Civil. Writ Petition No. 3472/95 on 27.9.96 reveals that there was no such direction by this Court that in case any appeal is presented before the Tribunal then it shall be treated within limitation and therefore in such a situation it is to be understood that the writ petition was finally disposed of on the ground of alternative remedy with a direction to respondent No.1 to app- roach the Tribunal in accordance with law. If the order passed by this Court on 27.9.96 in the aforesaid writ petition would have been correctly interpreted by the Tribunal (respondent No.2) then question of limitation would not have been thrown away and the application for condonation of delay would have been disposed of by it in accordance with law. (13). For deeper understanding of the controversy involved in this case, I would like to make it clear that looking to the aforesaid peculiar situation it is not possible for this Court to presume that since the Tribunal (respondent No.2) has decided the matter on merits therefore it should be presumed that the delay has been condoned by necessary implication. In my considered opinion if any suit, app- eal or application is moved beyond limitation then unless specific order, condoning the delay is psssed such delay cannot be deemed to have been condoned. (14). Mr. Sawhney, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 during the course the argument invited my attention towards various documents in his possession to justify that in the present case, dely is to be condoned. I decline to take into account all these documents at this stage. As a matter of fact, it is the Tribunal (respondent No.2) who has to pass an order, condoning the delay or refusing to condone the delay. It is a condition precedent that before deciding the appeal on merits under the Act of 1976 the application for condonation of delay moved under Sec. 9 of the Act of 1976 is to be disposed of in accordance with law by the Tribunal. It is held that the Tribunal in the present case has no jurisdiction to decide the controversy between the parties on merits before condoning the delay in accordance with law. (15). As a result of aforementioned discussion, the instant writ petition is allowed. It is held that the Tribunal in the present case has no jurisdiction to decide the controversy between the parties on merits before condoning the delay in accordance with law. (15). As a result of aforementioned discussion, the instant writ petition is allowed. The order passed by Tribunal (respondent No.2) dated 16.1.98 (Annex.1) is hereby quashed.The Tribunal (respondent No.2) is directed to first decide the application for condonation of delay moved by respondent No.1 under Section 9 of the Act of 1976 and if it is satisfied about the cause shown by respondent No.1 for condonation of delay only them it has jurisdiction to entertain the controversy involved between the parties on merits not otherwise. In peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, both the parties are directed to bear their own costs.