Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, Namakkal in A.S. No. 80 of 1984 dated 30.3.1985, partly reversing the judgment of the learned District Munsif, Namakkal in O.S. No. 239 of 1981. The first plaintiff in the suit is the appellant in the above Second Appeal. 2. The suit was filed for a preliminary decree for partition dividing 5/6 of the suit schedule properties and to put the plaintiffs in separate possession and enjoyment of their portions of the suit schedule property and for a permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from in any way alienating the suit schedule properties in favour of any third parties. The plaintiffs contended that the properties prescribed in the suit schedule are the joint family ancestral properties and the same originally belonged to the great-grandfather of plaintiffs 2 and 3 by name Kali Gounder. He had purchased the property on 22.9.1898. He was also put in possession of the property. He had a son by name Palaniappan. He (Palaniappan) met with a Car accident on 27.10.1940. The said Kali Gounder was a resident of Line Street and he left behind the first plaintiff apart from his son, the third defendant herein. The first plaintiff in pursuance of maintenance, was in possession of half of the suit properties and other properties left by her husband. Half of the properties was enjoyed by plaintiffs 2 and 3 and third defendant, who is the son of the first plaintiff and the father of the plaintiffs 2 and 3. According to the plaintiffs, as per Hindu Succession Act, 1956, since the first plaintiff was possessed of half share of the suit properties her limited right of enjoyment of the property towards her maintenance became absolute property as per Section 14 (1) of the Act 30 of 1956. The plaintiffs further contended that the third defendant had incurred illegal debts due to the second defendant, and the first defendant became a Court auction purchaser and the said debts would not bind the plaintiffs. It was contended by the plaintiffs that so far as half of the property was concerned they were properties belonging to the first plaintiff by virtue of Section 14 of the Act 30 of 1956. It was contended by the plaintiffs that so far as half of the property was concerned they were properties belonging to the first plaintiff by virtue of Section 14 of the Act 30 of 1956. The first plaintiff was not the borrower and hence the second defendant had no business to sell away her property for any alleged debt due to the second defendant. The first defendant is the wife of the second defendant. The first defendant is the Court auction purchaser, the first defendant being the maternal aunt of plaintiffs 2 and 3. Second defendant was the maternal uncle of plaintiffs 2 and 3. According to the plaintiffs, defendants 1 and 2 had played a fraud on the third defendant representing that they would save other properties from the other creditors and reconvey the same when the amount was repaid to them. But the plaintiffs understand that the third defendant had appealed to them to reconvey the properties as promised and the first defendant has given a go-bye to his promise. The plaintiffs contended that a fraud has been played by defendants 1 and 2 against the third defendant and there was a conspiracy by defendants 1 and 2 and to a certain extent the third defendant was also trying to cheat the plaintiffs 2 and 3 of their legitimate shares. It was further represented by the plaintiffs that the third defendant was an agriculturist and he was given to bad habits and entangled himself in speculative business like film distribution which was foreign to their family and they were mainly involved in agriculture operation. In the plaint certain facts have been put forth to the effect that the third defendant was incurring debts which were illegal and immoral and the debt incurred by the third defendant in favour of the second defendant will not be binding and that consequently the Court auction purchaser, the first defendant will not get any title to the suit property. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff was entitled to 3/6th share and plaintiffs 2 and 3 are entitled to 1/6th share and hence the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for partition relating to 5/6th share of the plaintiffs. It was also stated that the first defendant has brought about 38 alienations in respect or the properties over which the defendants have no title over the property. It was also stated that the first defendant has brought about 38 alienations in respect or the properties over which the defendants have no title over the property. There were certain other alienations and defendants 7, 11, 13 and 15 have further alienated portions of the suit property in favour of defendants 14, 18 and 19 and others. As there was no response for the demand made to the first defendant, for partition, the suit came to be filed. 3. In the written statement filed by the first defendant while denying the allegations contained in the plaint, the defendants also denied the fact that Palaniappan died on 27.10.1940 in a car accident. According to the defendants, the first plaintiff had no right of maintenance and that in pursuance thereof, she was in possession of half of the suit properties and other properties. The suit properties were brought to sale only for valid and binding debts and the same was purchased by the first defendant and the allegations to the effect that the debt was illegal etc., were not correct. There was also no question of defendants 1 and 2 having played fraud on the third defendant. There was no oral agreement as pleaded by the plaintiffs. The allegation of fraud having been played either on the third defendant or others by the first defendant was also denied. There was no conspiracy as alleged between the defendants. The allegation of bad management and immoral activities of the third defendant was also denied. The shares as claimed by the plaintiffs were also denied. According to the defendants, the suit properties in fact belonged to the third defendant and they were attached before judgment in O.S. No. 601 of 1970 filed by the second defendant. In execution thereof in E.P. No. 54 of 1971 properties were brought to sale and the third defendant had paid Rs. 200/- and got adjournment of sale. Thereafter he defaulted and therefore, the properties were sold for a sum of Rs. 9,010/-. The third defendant had filed a petition to set aside the sale under Section 47 C.P.C. The said petition was also dismissed on 19.4.1972. As against the said order, the third defendant filed an appeal in C.M.A. No. 36 of 1972 which was also dismissed on 7.9.1972 by the. 9,010/-. The third defendant had filed a petition to set aside the sale under Section 47 C.P.C. The said petition was also dismissed on 19.4.1972. As against the said order, the third defendant filed an appeal in C.M.A. No. 36 of 1972 which was also dismissed on 7.9.1972 by the. District Court, Salem, and even after the dismissal of the petition, the third defendant had filed I.A. No. 783 of 1972 for stay of delivery of possession. The defendant also claimed that the first plaintiff was never in possession of any portion of the suit properties and a right, if any, under the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act did not extend to agricultural lands in 1940. Therefore, according to the defendants, the first plaintiff did not derive any right in the suit properties which were agricultural property till recently on the death of her husband. As she was not in possession, her right cannot become absolute under Act 30 of 1956. The plaintiffs were also precluded from claiming any share as the suit was not filed within 12 years as on the date of suit. The defendants further pleaded that the first plaintiff can make her claim only when the partition takes place and she cannot ask for partition of the properties which was not available in the family. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any injunction as most of the plots have been sold to various purchasers who have also put up houses in the remaining plots. It was also pleaded that it was the third defendant who was at the bottom of the mischief and having failed in his attempt to set aside the sale and finding that the value of the property has gone up with a view to make unlawful gains, he has set up his mother and his sons to file the vexatious suit. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings and the evidence both oral and documentary, learned trial Judge held that the first plaintiff was entitled to a decree for partition of her share and for possession of the same and that if properties have already been alienated and converted into house sites, while effecting partition equities may be adjusted in favour of the said parties. A decree for injunction was also granted as against the first defendant from effecting any alienation of the suit properties. A decree for injunction was also granted as against the first defendant from effecting any alienation of the suit properties. However, on appeal, the learned appellate Judge allowed the appeal to a very limited extent and the first plaintiff was given only declaration that she has got a right of maintenance as against the joint family properties in the hands of the first defendant. The learned appellate Judge also recorded a categoric finding that since Palaniappan died in the year 1940 itself and as per the law then in force, the plaintiff was entitled to only maintenance right. In the present case, Palaniappan having died in the year 1940 itself the first plaintiff had only a right of maintenance against the joint family properties. The trial Court therefore, held that the first plaintiff has no share to the suit properties as against the maintenance. The learned appellate Judge also held that the controversy with regard to the estate of Palaniappan being agricultural or non-agricultural did not arise for consideration in the present case. As such the appeal was partly allowed holding that the first plaintiff was entitled to be given a declaration that she has got a right of maintenance against the joint family properties in the hands of the first defendant. Hence, the present Second Appeal by the plaintiff. 5. Mr. G. Rangarathinam, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the facts brought out in the evidence would undoubtedly entitle the first plaintiff to claim protection under Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied on several decisions which are as follows:— A.I.R. 1941 Federal Court 72 = 54 L.W. 22; In re Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act , it was held that the word “property” as used in Section 3 of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937 will not include agricultural land and the Act would operate only to regulate devolution of survivorship of the property other than agricultural land. Learned counsel for the appellants relied on this decision to emphasise that the provisions of Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act was a remedial Act and therefore, should receive beneficial interpretation. Learned counsel for the appellants also referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 1, ( Laxmi Debi v. Surendra Kumar ). Learned counsel for the appellants also referred to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in A.I.R. 1957 Orissa 1, ( Laxmi Debi v. Surendra Kumar ). The Division Bench held that the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act was to confer absolute ownership on the Hindu female in respect of properties left by a male Hindu which was in her or their possession on the date of the commencement of the Act, even though the husband might have died long prior to the commencement of the Act. 6. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of Punjab High Court reported in A.I.R. 1960 Punjab 666 ( Amar Singh v. Baldev Singh ). The Full Bench while upholding the legislative competence in enacting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act also held that Section 14 enlarges the Hindu females limited interest in the property inherited or held by her, to be an absolute owner provided she was in possession of the property. 7. Reference was also made to a judgment of the learned single Judge in A.I.R. 1964 Allahabad 165 ( Shakuntala Devi v. Beni Madhav ). In that judgment it was held that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would apply to agricultural land also. 8. In A.I.R. 1968 Allahabad 419 ( Ram Jag v. Director of Consolidation ) a learned single Judge of Allahabad High Court held that Hindu widow given in possession of the land for maintenance under family arrangement was entitled to the benefits of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 9. In A.I.R. 1971 Mysore 151 ( B. Gouda v. Smt. Channabasawwa ), a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court held that in a case where the widow had requested the Revenue Authorities to enter the name of her adopted son (adoption subsequently held invalid), it was not sufficient to show that she was either dispossessed or lost possession of the property so as to disentitle her very claiming the benefits of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied on the leading judgment of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of Section 14 (1) (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944 = 90 L. W. 89 S.N. ( V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddy ). 10. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied on the leading judgment of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of Section 14 (1) (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944 = 90 L. W. 89 S.N. ( V. Tulasamma v. V. Sesha Reddy ). Learned counsel extensively cited from the said judgment of emphasise that Section 14 (1) contemplates acquisition of property by Hindu family was calculated to achieve a beneficent purpose by bringing about a change in the social and economic position of women in Hindu society and therefore, the said provision should be construed strictly so as to give effect to the object of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The provision cannot be interpreted in a manner which would take away efficacy and deprive a female Hindu of the protection sought to be given under Section 14 (1)of the said Act. Learned counsel would also emphasise that possession by the female need not be actual physical possession. The possession can be constructive and also presumed in her favour if she had a subsisting right for maintenance as on the said date. 11. The effect of Section 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act have come to be and continues to be interpreted by several judgments even till today by the Supreme Court and the conclusion that any right of a Hindu woman for maintenance would ripen into an absolute estate in terms of Section 14(1) of the Act cannot be disputed. 12. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the claim of the first plaintiff has to be considered. 13. Firstly, on the date of the death of the first plaintiffs husband Palaniappan namely, in 1940, the succession in favour of the first plaintiff opened. As on that date all that the first plaintiff could claim was a right to maintenance as against the joint family properties, but no right to claim either to be in possession or to claim partition of the joint family property. Secondly, the nature of the property in 1940 when succession opened in her favour, was that the entire suit property was agricultural lands. Secondly, the nature of the property in 1940 when succession opened in her favour, was that the entire suit property was agricultural lands. As held by the Federal Court in A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 72=54 L.W. 22 (supra) the word “property” used in Section 3 of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, did not include agricultural land and that the Act would operate only in respect of devolution by survivorship of property other than the agricultural land. Subsequent change in law of inclusion of agricultural lands as regards the right of a female under 1937 Act was given effect to only by virtue of Act 30 of 1947, and also by the interpretation placed on the provisions, subsequent to the coming into force of the Constitution in 1950. S. Natarajan, J., as he then was, in A.S. Subbu Naidu v. Rajammal (1976 II M.L.J. 205=89 L.W. 628) has held that death of a male member in 1939 leaving behind agricultural land and surviving him two wives and a daughter, also a son, claimed by the son of other widow of the property, held that the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 did not apply to the agricultural lands. 14. The crucial time to test the acquisition of the right of a widow would be only at the moment when the succession opens in her favour, namely, in the present case in the year 1940. In the year 1940 since she had no enforceable right and also as against the agricultural lands, the claim of the first plaintiff cannot be sustained. In this context, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that only presently the property has been converted into house sites and therefore, cannot be treated as agricultural lands. I am unable to accept the contention so raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The nature of the land as on the date when the succession opened is the only relevant factor and not as on date, after four decades when the suit came to be filed. In fact, P.W.1 herself had admitted in the evidence that the land was always agricultural land and that it was converted into house sites, only two or three years prior to the filing of the suit. 15. In fact, P.W.1 herself had admitted in the evidence that the land was always agricultural land and that it was converted into house sites, only two or three years prior to the filing of the suit. 15. It is also not disputed that the first plaintiff had never exercised her right of maintenance throughout nor had she obtained any property from the persons who had succeeded to her husbands estate so as to claim that she was in possession of any property which was referable to her right of maintenance. If at least, she had obtained a decree for maintenance and in enforcement of the said decree if she had obtained any properties, it may give rise to different considerations. Therefore, the first plaintiff is not entitled to claim for maintenance as against the joint family properties and she will not be entitled to any partition of half share in the property. 16. The other allegation of the first plaintiff, namely that the debts incurred by the third defendant was illegal, etc.. was also not substantiated nor accepted by the Courts below In the said context it is also to be noted that in O.S. No. 601 of 1970 the property was attached and subsequently brought to sale in E.P. No. 54 of 1971. The Courts below have also taken into account that the first defendant filed a petition under Section 47 C.P.C. to set aside the sale and the same was dismissed on 19.4.1972 and the subsequent appeal filed before the District Court was also dismissed and that therefore, the contention of the first plaintiff that the entire transaction was collusive, cannot be accepted. Nor has the plaintiff proved any fraud on the part of the defendants, in the proceedings ultimately culminating in the first defendant purchasing the suit properties under Execution Petition mentioned above. The first plaintiff cannot be heard to say that she was totally unaware of those proceedings. On the other hand, she has chosen to file the suit only in the year 1981, without even praying either for setting aside the proceedings under E.P. No. 54 of 1971 or praying for a declaration that the property continued to be the joint family property. 17. On the other hand, she has chosen to file the suit only in the year 1981, without even praying either for setting aside the proceedings under E.P. No. 54 of 1971 or praying for a declaration that the property continued to be the joint family property. 17. The learned appellate Judge has rightly held that the first plaintiff was entitled to a declaration of her right to maintenance and in the circumstances stated above had rightly rejected the claim of the first plaintiff for partition of her alleged half share in the joint family properties which had been subject matter of Court auction sale under E.P. No. 54 of 1971. The learned appellate Judge has also declared the right of the first plaintiff to proceed against the joint family properties in the hands of the first defendant. 18. Therefore, I do not find any grounds to interfere with in the above Second Appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.