D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners date of birth was entered into his service record as on 31st January, 1935 on the basis of his High School Certificate, wherein the same date of birth was recorded. Subsequently his date of birth as recorded in the service record was sought to be altered by reason of an enquiry made by the respondents from the Board with regard to the date of birth of the petitioner on the ground that the date of birth was recorded as on 1st January, 1933 in the records of the Board. The respondents had passed an order on 8th February, 1995, which is annexure-5 to the writ petition, whereby it was pointed out that it was ascertained from the records of the Board that the petitioners date of birth was recorded therein as on 31st January, 1933 and, therefore, he should have retired on 30th June, 1993 and, therefore, he is deemed to have retired on 30th June. 1993 and whatever, salary he had received after 30th June. 1993, should be refunded. This order has since been challenged in this writ petition. ( 2 ) DR. Daya Shankar, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that by reason of the relevant rules, the date of birth of the petitioner as recorded in the service record on the basis of High school Certificate cannot be altered. Inasmuch by the said Rules, the High School Certificate shall be the basis of the date of birth where a candidate has passed High School Examination. It does not refer to any records other than the High School Certificate and, therefore, it is immaterial whether any other date of birth is recorded in the records of the Board. He contends further that even on the counterfoil of the Board from which the certificate was granted, the same date of birth having been recorded, there is every likelihood of a presumption that the date mentioned in the tabulation sheet or in the gazette must be wrong and the certificate must have been prepared on the basis of the record available in the Board particularly, the form submitted by the petitioner, which is the basis on which the date of birth of the petitioner has been recorded in the records of the Board. Unless the documents submitted by the petitioner is produced the presumption should be adverse as against the Board and be in favour of the petitioner. He also contends that Rule 8 pursuant to which at the best the date of birth could be altered, does not apply beyond the state of initial appointment and then again he contends that this is not a circumstance exceptional to the extent, which might necessitate alteration in the age of the petitioner. According to him, the petitioner was not at fault and there is nothing to show conclusively that the certificate was incorrect. On the other hand, the presumption being adverse against the Board, the benefit should go to the petitioner. Since there exists doubt, it should be beneficially interpreted in favour of the petition. On these grounds, the petitioner claims that he should be paid his retiral benefits on the basis of his retirement with effect com 30th June, 1995 and all arrears of salary. If not paid to him till that date. ( 3 ) MR. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel of the other hand contends that the records of the board are those, which are preserved by the Board. It is only the tabulation sheet and the gazette, which are preserved and the gazette, being a public notice, the matter notified therein has an authenticity, which cannot be disputed unless the same is corrected and only when notification is issued correcting the notification already issued. There is no scope for resiling from that mentioned in the notification. Therefore, the gazette, which is a public notice, of which the petitioner is deemed to have notice, it was incumbent on the petitioner to get the same corrected. The petitioner has not taken any such step. There being nothing to show that the certificate certifying the date of birth recorded in the records of the Board, is not incorrect, the petitioner cannot claim any relief. On the other hand, relying on sub-rule (4) of Rule 8, relating to recording of date of birth, Mr. Singh contends that in exceptional circumstance, the date of birth recorded in the service record may be altered. On the other hand, relying on sub-rule (4) of Rule 8, relating to recording of date of birth, Mr. Singh contends that in exceptional circumstance, the date of birth recorded in the service record may be altered. According to him, the fact disclosed is an exceptional one, in that the certificate has certified the date of birth recorded in the record of the board, but the record of the Board is different from the date which has been certified in the certificate. The certificate is certification of the date of birth recorded in the records of the Board. It has no value without the records. It is only a certificate certifying the date of birth as recorded in the records of the Board. If there is any discrepancy, the records of the Board is to prevail. Thus, this is an exceptional circumstance, where sub-rule (2) can be invoked even at a stage later than the stage contemplated in sub-rule (1) of Rule 8. The petitioner having not produced any school Leaving Certificate in terms of sub-rule (2) it is presumed that the petitioner had no ground to sustain the objection raised by the respondents and as such. It is not necessary to hold an enquiry as contended by Dr. Daya Shanker. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order dated 8th February, 1995 and the writ petition, should, therefore, be dismissed. ( 4 ) I have heard both the learned counsel at length. ( 5 ) THE records of the Board were produced, which were extamined both by Mr. Singh as well as by Dr. Daya Shankar. I have also perused the said records. The records unmistakably show that in the tabulation sheet and the gazette notification, the date of birth of the petitioner has since been recorded as 31st January, 1933. There are certain other candidates, whose date of birth was also mentioned in the tabulation sheet and the gazette notification. From the said perusal, it does not appear that there was any mistake in the said notification or in the tabulation sheet. But at the same time, from the counterfoil of the certificate issued to the petitioner, it appears that the same date of birth as on 31st January, 1935 has been recorded both in the counterfoil as well as in the certificate. Admittedly the same is written by hand. But as contended by Dr. But at the same time, from the counterfoil of the certificate issued to the petitioner, it appears that the same date of birth as on 31st January, 1935 has been recorded both in the counterfoil as well as in the certificate. Admittedly the same is written by hand. But as contended by Dr. Daya Shankar that the same must have been prepared on the basis of the records of the Board, since the records have been destroyed and the only tabulation sheet and the gazette notification has been preserved, it is not possible at this stage to conclusively arrive at a conclusion definite that the contention of Mr. Singh is correct or that the contention of Dr. Daya Shankar is incorrect. In fact, as contended by Mr. Singh, it is apparent on the face of the record that there is a discrepancy with the record preserved by the Board and the High School Certificate. Thus, there has been a dispute with regard to the certificate. In such circumstance, whether the said certificate should be the conclusive proof fn accordance with the rules for determination of age is a question to be gone into. ( 6 ) IF there is a discrepancy, in that event, what would be the situation. The rule has been framed providing that the High School Certificate would be the conclusive proof of age on the basis that the said certificate certifies the age recorded in the record of the Board without contemplating that there would be any discrepancy with the record of the Board and the certificate. In case of a discrepancy, the authenticity of the certificate may be disputed. The certificate, as rightly contended by Mr. Singh, is the certification of the date recorded in the record of the Board. It has no independent existence or value. The certificate. In fact, is an exhibit at the hands of the candidates showing as to what has been recorded in the records of the Board in order to facilitate the information recorded In the Boards record to be proved by a candidate, if necessary, before the authority concerned when required in order to obviate the necessity to inspect the records of the Board at every time. Therefore, a certificate cannot be treated independent of the record of the Board, Thus, this discrepancy leads to an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of sub-rule (4 ). Therefore, a certificate cannot be treated independent of the record of the Board, Thus, this discrepancy leads to an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of sub-rule (4 ). ( 7 ) A certificate is a document or Exhibit certifying the content of the original record in order to facilitate the conveyance of the information appearing on the record necessitating the production or inspection of the record whenever necessary. This is required in the exigency of the situation in order to enable the people and the administration to make it administratively easier. The certificate being a certification of what is recorded in the record is a proof as an authentic document to show what is recorded in the record. If there is any discrepancy in the certificate and the record in that event it is necessary to examine the situation. Normal presumption would be to accept the record and not the certificate. Since the record is the basis on which the certificate is issued in case of discrepancy the records should prevail on the ground that the records were certified incorrectly. Certificate certifies the information recorded in the record. Certificate is not an independent or original document. In case the original record is disputed, in that event, that is a matter to be examined. Unless the original record is disputed, the same is to be accepted and the certificate is to be overlooked to the extent of discrepancy and to be presumed to be correct on the basis of the records. Therefore, in case of such discrepancy the certificate is not the authentic document on which reliance can be placed but as soon the original record is disputed, in that event, the situation requires an examination. In contemplation of such a situation, the rule itself provided for a remedy resolving such a situation in sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 as mentioned hereinbefore. ( 8 ) IN such a situation even though sub-rule (2) may have been incorporated in contemplation of the procedure to be carried for at the time of appointment, but yet it does not spend its force once the service record is prepared at the time of Initial appointment. It might even be resorted to when it is so necessary in terms of sub-rule (4); Rule 8 itself in its scheme included sub-rule (4 ). It might even be resorted to when it is so necessary in terms of sub-rule (4); Rule 8 itself in its scheme included sub-rule (4 ). The whole scheme of the rule is to be interpreted by reconciling each of the rule. In case It Is held that sub-rule (2) cannot be resorted to after the initial stage is over, in that event, sub-rule (4) would become redundant. If sub-ruie (4) can be applied, in that event, the dispute referred to in sub-rule (4) is to be resolved. In that event, there being no other provision, this sub-rule (2)has to be fallen back on. Therefore, in my view, sub-rule (2) does not lose its significance after the initial recording is over. It remains dormant for being activated In case of uncertainty provided by sub-rule (4) which can be attracted when a situation arising therefrom emerges. ( 9 ) DR. Daya Shanker, relied on the decision in the case of Shicaji Malviya v. Central Bank of india and others, 1990 (3) UPLBEC 1652, in support of his contention that the High School certificate is the only document on which reliance is to be placed for recording the date of birth and no other document can at all be looked into. If there is any dispute or discrepancy, in that event, the benefit must go to the petitioner. ( 10 ) THE said decision, if scrutinised, appears to be distinguishable on facts as well as the ratio laid down therein appears to be different from what has been advanced by Dr. Daya Shankar. Inasmuch as in the said case, the date of birth as entered In the High School Certificate of the petitioner therein was not disputed by the respondents though the petitioner claimed his date of birth as in 1932 while the respondents claimed it to be in 1930. But this dispute was with regard to the record of the date of birth in the service record. There was no dispute with regard to the date of birth recorded in the certificate and that in the records of the Board. In the said case in the service record, the date of birth was alleged to be as of 29. 6. 1932 which was interpolated subsequently as of 29. 6. 1930. In the said decision it was found that the date of birth of the petitioner, was 29. 6. 1932. In the said case in the service record, the date of birth was alleged to be as of 29. 6. 1932 which was interpolated subsequently as of 29. 6. 1930. In the said decision it was found that the date of birth of the petitioner, was 29. 6. 1932. Thus, there being no dispute with regard to the date of birth recorded in the certificate and there being no discrepancy between the date recorded in the record of the board and that in the certificate, the ratio decided in the said case cannot be attracted to support the contention of Dr. Daya Shankar in the fads and circumstances of the case. ( 11 ) THEN he relies on the decision in the case of U. P. S. R. T. C. and others v. U, P. Public service Tribunal and others. 1990 (3) UPLBEC 1601. In the said case it was found that the date of birth of the petitioner therein should be deemed as 15. 11. 1932 as mentioned in the service book wherein the same was changed and another date i. e. , 19. 1. 1924 was entered. It was stated that the same was done on the basis of a medical certificate issued on 19. 11. 1966 but the said change was made without associating the employee whose date of birth was changed. Subsequently the employee was again medically examined in 1979 with a conflicting report. The two medical certificates contradicted each other. In these circumstances it was held that no change of date of birth in the service record could be made without giving opportunity to the employee concerned. Thus, the said decision does not help the contention of the petitioner to the extent that the date of birth is to be taken as has been mentioned in the High School Certificate. Inasmuch in the said case it was not the High School Certificate but two medical certificates contradicting each other was involved. Therefore this ratio cannot be attracted in support of the contention of petitioner as observed earlier. But however Dr. Daya Shankar has rightly contended that it can be utilised by him for drawing inspiration in support of his contention that the change in the record with regard to the date of birth can be made only by associating the employee concerned. Any change made without associating the employee concerned cannot be sustained. But however Dr. Daya Shankar has rightly contended that it can be utilised by him for drawing inspiration in support of his contention that the change in the record with regard to the date of birth can be made only by associating the employee concerned. Any change made without associating the employee concerned cannot be sustained. However, we may deal with the said question at a later stage. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Dr. Daya Shankar had also relied on in the case of Onkar nath Sriuastava v. State of U. P. and others, 1990 (2) UPLBEC 1087. Honble B. L. Yadav, J. , as lordship then was speaking for the Division Bench had held that Rule (2) of U. P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of Birth) Rules, 1974 is quite explicit and requires no external aid for interpretation. It provides that the date of birth as entered in the High School Certificate would be determinative, provided he has passed High School Examination at the time he joined the service and in case the employee concerned has not passed the High School examination at the time he joined service, in that event, the date of birth indicated by him and entered in the service record would be decisive for the purposes of promotion, retirement, etc. This provision was further clarified by the Amendment Rule of 1980 and it was made explicit in column II that in case an employee has not passed his High School examination before he joins service, in that event the date of birth indicated by him and entered in the service record shall be relevant and be the final date of birth, whereas in case an employee has passed High School examination and thereafter he joins service, in that event, the date of birth entered in the High School Certificate shall be determinative and no application for correction of the same can be entertained. In the said case, the petitioner has not passed his High School examination when he entered in service and the date of birth indicated by him was 5. 1. 1929. However, subsequently when he passed his high School Examination his date of birth by inadvertence of the authorities of the Board of high School and Intermediate Education was indicated as 5. 1. 1926, and the authority had accepted 5. 1. 1. 1929. However, subsequently when he passed his high School Examination his date of birth by inadvertence of the authorities of the Board of high School and Intermediate Education was indicated as 5. 1. 1926, and the authority had accepted 5. 1. 1926 as the relevant date of birth of the petitioner therein but in view of Rules of 1974 and 1980 when the employee did not pass High School examination when joining the service, the date of birth Indicated in the service record shall be decisive and determinative and that the said correction in the service record was made without affording opportunity to the petitioner. In the said case, it was held that if there is, power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, the authorities are required to act judicially. If the essentials of justice affording reasonable opportunity of hearing before passing an order affecting rights of a person in service are ignored, such order would be a nullity. It is a basic concept of the rule of law that no person should be condemned unheard. While deciding the said case the Division Bench has observed relying on the decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Beena Pai Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 that in case the date of entered in service record at the time when the employee joins her service was sought to be changed by the relevant authorities. In that event, all the investigations made and irregularities committed must be communicated to the employee and he must have been afforded opportunity of hearing before the date of birth entered in the service record was changed. In the said judgment the relation between sub-rule (2) and sub-rule (4) was not attended to. Then again in the said case, there was no discrepancy with regard to the certificate and the records of the Board. On the other hand, it was a discrepancy with regard to the service record and the certificate. Here in this case, there is no dispute with regard to the service record and the certificate. On the other hand, it is a dispute with regard to genuineness of the date certified in the certificate having regard to the date Incorporated in the certificate. Therefore, the ratio decided therein also does not help us to decide the issue involved in the present case. On the other hand, it is a dispute with regard to genuineness of the date certified in the certificate having regard to the date Incorporated in the certificate. Therefore, the ratio decided therein also does not help us to decide the issue involved in the present case. ( 13 ) ON the same analogy, the decision pointed out by the Division Bench in the case of Roop singh Yadav v. State of U. P. 1987 UPLBEC 607, which was also referred to in the case of onkar Nath Sriuastava (supra) does not help us. Inasmuch in the said case there was no discrepancy with regard to the High School Certificate and the records of the Board and that the date of birth is to be recorded under rule (2) on the basis of the High School Certificate since the petitioner therein had passed High School in 1947 and his date of birth was so recorded in the said certificate as on 10. 11. 1929 and that the petitioner had entered into service in 1948. On the other hand the said decision supports the view which I had taken viz. , that if a case of exceptional circumstances is made out, in that event, the service record should be corrected. In the said case by reason of the date of birth mentioned in the High School Certificate the date of birth was wrongly recorded in the service record as on 20. 3. 1929 instead of 10. 11. 1929 was held to be an exceptional circumstance which was made out for correcting the date of birth recorded in the service record from 20. 3. 1929 to 10. 11. 1929 on the basis of the High School certificate. Admittedly in the said case there was no discrepancy with regard to the record of date of birth in the High School Certificate and that of the Board. ( 14 ) THE High School certificate being a document certifying the date of birth recorded in the records of the Board, the same can be relied upon for entering the date of birth in the service record. ( 14 ) THE High School certificate being a document certifying the date of birth recorded in the records of the Board, the same can be relied upon for entering the date of birth in the service record. In case there is dispute with regard to genuineness of the date of birth recorded in the high School certificate itself having regard to the fact that a different date of birth is recorded in the records of the Board, in that event, it gives rise to an exceptional circumstance necessitating correction of the date of birth in the service record. Thus, the same being a dispute within the meaning of sub-rule (4), the same has to be resolved according to the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) and such a step can be taken even at a later stage than the stage when the date of birth was so recorded initially. Such a view is supported by the ratio laid down in the case of roop Singh Yadav (supra ). ( 15 ) THE facts in the case of Nagar Palika, Laharpur v. State of U. P. and others, are wholly distinguishable. The ratio decided therein does not help us to arrive at a correct decision. Inasmuch as in the said case earlier the service book was lost and the date of birth was sought to be recorded on the basis of the medical certificate regarding the age which was asked to be produced by the employee and such step was approved but subsequently the service book having been traced out, the rules requiring determination of age was very much applicable. Thus, the said decision has no bearing in the present case where there is a discrepancy between the date mentioned in the certificate and that in the records of the Board. ( 16 ) THE view that was taken in the U. P. S. R. T. C. and others (supra) finds support in the decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Beena Pai Dei (supra ). In the said case the employee was sought to be retired on the basis of a report regarding her age submitted at a later stage without associating the employee therein. (Miss) Beena Pai Dei (supra ). In the said case the employee was sought to be retired on the basis of a report regarding her age submitted at a later stage without associating the employee therein. Such a step was disapproved by the Apex Court with the observation to the effect that "we think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. " ( 17 ) IN the present case, admittedly, no notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner and he was never subjected to any disciplinary proceedings. Since the order has the effect of penal consequence on the petitioner, it Is incumbent on the respondents to arrive at a conclusion after initiating proper proceedings, giving sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case when they have taken an extraordinary step in an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of sub-rule (4 ). Then again this order has not been passed immediately after 31st January. 1993 or before 30th June. 1993. On the other hand, the order has been passed on 8th January, 1995 when the petitioner was deemed to have attained the age of superannuation on 31st January. 1995. Thus, after the petitioner has attained the age of 60 years, though by virtue of the rules, the petitioner sought to be retired on 30th January, 1993. No order having been passed retiring the petitioner on 30th June, 1993. The impugned order cannot be said to have any retrospective effect. The order Is an executive/administrative order, which can never conceive of any, retrospective operation. The petitioner having been allowed to continue till 8th February, 1995. Even if he had attained the age of superannuation on 31st January, 1993, in absence of any active or effective order passed, the petitioner may be deemed to have continued on extension even after superannuation till 31st January. 1995. ( 18 ) BE that as it may. The petitioner having been allowed to continue till 8th February, 1995. Even if he had attained the age of superannuation on 31st January, 1993, in absence of any active or effective order passed, the petitioner may be deemed to have continued on extension even after superannuation till 31st January. 1995. ( 18 ) BE that as it may. The question is as to whether the petitioners date of birth was 31st january. 1933 or 31st January. 1935. Since sub-rule (2) has not been resorted to in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in such an extraordinary situation, the said sub-rule (2)should be resorted to as a post-decisional hearing in which the petitioner should be given an opportunity to defend his case by producing a certificate from the school from which he had appeared in the Board examination, showing the date of birth recorded in the school record in order to substantiate his case and it is only on the basis of such record, a decision can be arrived at in terms of sub-rule (2 ). Such enquiry should be concluded by the authorities concerned within a period of 6 months from the date of this order after issuing a show-cause notice to the petitioner and giving him an opportunity to participate in such enquiry and to produce relevant documents in terms of sub-rule (2) to substantiate his case. After the enquiry Js over and a decision is arrived at, the petitioners case should be decided on the basis of such decision. But in case the petitioners date of birth is found to have been recorded as on 31st January, 1935, in the school record, then he should be deemed to have continued till 30th January, 1995 and shall be entitled to all salary till that date and retiral benefits on that basis. In case his date of birth is recorded as 31st January, 1933 In the school record? in that event, he should be deemed to have retired on 30th June, 1993 on the basis of his date of birth as on 31st January, 1993 and he should be entitled to all salaries and retiral benefits on that basis. But, however, since he had continued till 31st January. 1995. in that event, he should be deemed to have retired on 30th June, 1993 on the basis of his date of birth as on 31st January, 1993 and he should be entitled to all salaries and retiral benefits on that basis. But, however, since he had continued till 31st January. 1995. In such event, he will be allowed only the pay which is available to a person, who is employed on extension after retirement according to the relevant government Orders existing, though he has retired on 30th June, 1993 and his retiral benefits would be paid on the basis of said retirement on 30th June. 1993. All increments and other benefits, which are not available to a person, who is employed on extension may be recovered through adjustment against the retiral benefits payable to the petitioner. In any event, in either of the cases, the retiral benefits of the petitioner should be paid as early as, possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of the decision in terms of this order. The gratuity and other retiral benefits, including General Provident Fund, Insurance, etc. may be paid to the petitioner, if undisputed, as early as possible preferably within a period of six months and in case of any dispute, it may be calculated on the basis of 30th June. 1993 and be paid to the petitioner on that basis subject to final adjustment in terms of this order. It will be open to the respondents to pay provisional pension to the petitioner. ( 19 ) THIS writ petition is, thus, allowed. No costs. .