(1) SUBSTITUTION allowed. (2) THE appellant is the tenant. The respondent is the landlord. The respondent filed an application under clauses 13(i), (ii) and (vi) of subsection (3) of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter "the Rent Control Order") seeking permission of the Rent Controller to issue notice to the tenant for terminating lease on various grounds contained in the application. The application was resisted and it was denied that the landlord was in bona fide need of the premises. It was also denied that the tenant was a habitual defaulter in payment of rent. The stand taken by the tenant in that behalf was that the landlord used to come and collect the rent according to his convenience and since this practice had developed and rent was paid as and when demanded by the landlord, the tenant could not be said to be a defaulter or in arrears of rent by not sending the rent to the landlord. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the application, accepting the stand taken by the tenant to the effect that the landlord used to come and collect the rent at his convenience and that this practice was being followed throughout. On an appeal filed by the landlord, the appellate authority set aside the findings recorded by the Rent Controller and held the tenant to be a defaulter. The tenant approached the High Court through a writ petition which was allowed and the order of the appellate authority was set aside. The matter was remanded to the appellate authority to return findings on the question of bona fide need of the landlord. The landlord filed an appeal before the Division Bench which was allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside and that of the appellate authority restored. By special leave, the tenant is before us. (3) AN answer to the question whether any practice had developed between the parties according to which the landlord used to come and collect the rent at his convenience would decide the fate of this case. (4) A bare perusal of the evidence of the landlord and in particular his cross-examination by the tenant shows that there was no such practice in existence insofar as the present landlord is concerned. During his cross-examination, the landlord stated: "Non-applicants used to come to our house with rent. (4) A bare perusal of the evidence of the landlord and in particular his cross-examination by the tenant shows that there was no such practice in existence insofar as the present landlord is concerned. During his cross-examination, the landlord stated: "Non-applicants used to come to our house with rent. I did not used to collect rent by going to their shops. I never went to their shops for rent collection." (5) AGAIN, he denied the suggestion that he used to go to recover the rent from the shop under the tenancy of the tenant. There is no evidence in rebuttal. In the face of this evidence, we fail to understand how the Rent Controller or the learned Single Judge could come to the conclusion that any practice had developed between the landlord and the tenant to the effect that the landlord used to collect the rent at his convenience by going to the shop of the tenant. In the absence of any evidence of the existence of the alleged practice, it is futile to contend that the tenant was not a habitual defaulter when admittedly he did not pay the rent regularly. It is settled law that in theabsence of any express or implied contract, to the contrary, in a monthly tenancy, (as is the position in the instant case) the rent is payable at the end of each month of tenancy. In the present case, a perusal of the schedule filed in the Court of the Rent Controller shows that the rent was not being paid regularly and, therefore, the appellate authority as well as the Division Bench were justified in holding that the tenant was a habitual defaulter. This being the position, there is no merit in this appeal, which fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.