Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order dated 16.5.98, contained in Annexure 3 to the petition, by which the Disciplinary Authority has directed to hold a de-novo enquiry against the petitioner under rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred as ``the Rules,1958). (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet on 25.5.96, contained in Annexure 1 to the petition, while she was serving as a warden of the hostel in the Government College for Physical Education, Jodhpur, wherein the allegations made against her had been of a very serious nature as she was alleged to have indulged in hatching a conspir- acy for exploiting some girl students sexually. (3). Preliminary enquiries were made against the petitioner and others. Ultimately, the respondents decided to hold a regular joint enquiry against them. Petitioner was put under suspension vide order dated 12.1.96. Mr. R.N. Saxena, Additional Commissioner, was appointed as Enquiry Officer, who submitted the in- quiry report to the Disciplinary Authority and the said Authority was not satisfied with the inquiry report and the impugned order dated 16.5.98 has been passed directing to hold the enquiry de-novo. The Commissioner of the Departmental Enquiry, Rajasthan, Jaipur has been appointed as the Enquiry Officer. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the petitioner has preferred the instant petition. (4). Heard Mr. R.K. Bhatiya, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents. (5). Mr. Bhatiya has submitted that the impugned order has been passed for extraneous considerations and it is nullity for want of competence of the Disciplinary Authority to hold fresh/second enquiry and at the most the Disciplinary Autho- Authority could have remanded the inquiry to the same Enquiry Officer and the Authority was not competent to appoint a new Enquiry Officer. (6). On the other hand, Mr. P.C. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents, has submitted that there is ample power under the statutory rules to the Disciplinary Authority to pass the impugned order. Reliance has been placed upon rule 16.9 of the Rules, 1958, which reads as under :- ``16 (9).- The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Au- thority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. Reliance has been placed upon rule 16.9 of the Rules, 1958, which reads as under :- ``16 (9).- The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Au- thority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on each charge. The Disciplinary Authority may while considering the report of the Enquiring Authority for just and sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing remand the case for further/de-novo enquiry, in case it has reason to believe that the enquiry already conducted has been laconic in some respect or the other. (7). It has been further urged by Sri Sharma that the impugned order met all the requirements of the said statutory provision. The Disciplinary Authority has considered the report as in the instant case the said Authority was not the enquiry officer and after considering the record of the enquiry it recorded sufficient reasons in writing for holding the enquiry de-novo as there was sufficient reasons to believe that the enquiry held earlier has been laconic in various respects. The Presenting Officer closed the evidence without examining the complainants and the officers, who had held the preliminary inquiries. (8). The issue of holding the fresh enquiry has been considered by the Courts from time to time. In Keshab Chand Sharma vs. State of Assam and Others (1), the Assam High Court has held that in a case where a government employee faces the enquiry, it is open to the Government or the Disciplinary Authority to collect the materials in such a manner as it liked. Even if an enquiry report is submitted to the Disciplinary Authority, it has a power to refuse to accept the report and sent back the matter to the Enquiry Officer for making further enquiry into the matter if the Authority is satisfied that inquiry held earlier has been laconic. The delinquent employee is entitled only to be given a fair opportunity to defend himself when the fresh enquiry is held, but he cannot have any grievance against such an order. (9). In Pradyat Kumar Bose vs. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court (2), the Honble Supreme Court placed reliance on the judgment of the House of Lords in Board of Education vs. Rice. (9). In Pradyat Kumar Bose vs. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court (2), the Honble Supreme Court placed reliance on the judgment of the House of Lords in Board of Education vs. Rice. (3), wherein it has been held that a functionary, which has to decide an administrative matter can obtain the material on which he is to act in such manner as may be feasible and convenient, provided only the affected party ``has a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant and prejudicial material. (10). In Mohd. Abdul Alim vs. Director, Survey Training Institute (CST & MP) Survey of India (4), the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the power for setting at naught the previous enquiry and ordering a fresh enquiry must be provided under the rules, in absence of which such a fresh enquiry cannot be ordered. Moreover, while passing the order for fresh enquiry, the Authority must record the reasons in writing for directing a fresh enquiry. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 7.4.72 passed in Civil Appeal No. 612/1967 wherein it has been held that it is possible to provide for second enquiry if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defects have crept into the enquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some other reason. (11). In State of Assam and another vs. J.N. Roy. Biswas (5), the Apex Court has held that in absence of any specific power to review or revise the earlier order passed in a disciplinary proceeding, the second enquiry cannot be ordered to be held for the reason that ``the basic of the rule of law cannot be breached without legal provision or other vitiating factors invalidating the earlier enquiry. Similar view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Dinesh Chandra Sarkar vs. State of West Bengal and Others (6). The courts held that such a course is not barred by the Rule of Double Jeopardy but the absence of power under a rule inhibits a second enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority after the delinquent had once been absolved. Similar view has been taken in the case of State of Punjab vs. Kashmir Singh (7). (12). The courts held that such a course is not barred by the Rule of Double Jeopardy but the absence of power under a rule inhibits a second enquiry by the Disciplinary Authority after the delinquent had once been absolved. Similar view has been taken in the case of State of Punjab vs. Kashmir Singh (7). (12). However, those were the cases where after conclusion of the enquiry the delinquent employee had been exonerated and consequently reinstated. The in the instant case are different. The inquiry report has not been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and, thus, petitioner cannot claim to have been absolved from the charges levelled against her. The charges levelled against the petitioner are of a very serious nature. Rule 16.9 of the Rules, 1958 specifically empowers the Disciplinary Authority to pass the order of de-novo enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority has complied with all the requirements of the said rule and recorded valid reasons for holding the enquiry de-novo. It has, also, initiated the disciplinary proceedings against some of the persons who were responsible for not conducting the enquiry properly as Mr. Danodiya, who was the Additional Presenting Officer in the earlier enquiry, has closed the evidence after examining himself and did not examine the complaint and other officers who had held the preliminary enquiry and, therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in passing the impugned order. (13). There is no substance in in the argument of Mr. Bhatiya that the Disciplinary Authority could have simply remanded a case to the same Enquiry Officer who had conducted the enquiry earlier, for the reason that once the enquiry is directed to be held de-nove, the petitioners grievance has to be examined on the touch stone of the Doctrine of Prejudice. (Vide Managing Director, ECIL Ltd. vs. B. Karu- nakar (8); State Bank of Patiala vs. S.K. Sharma (9), Major G.S. Sodhi vs. Union of India (10); S.K. Singh vs. Central Bank of India (11); and Monika Jain vs. State of Rajasthan, (12). (14). It was not a case where a large number of witnesses had been examined in the earlier inquiry. Even the complainants and officers, who had held the preli- minary inquiry, were not examined. (14). It was not a case where a large number of witnesses had been examined in the earlier inquiry. Even the complainants and officers, who had held the preli- minary inquiry, were not examined. Thus, in the fact-situation of the instant case, no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner by an order appointing another Enquiry Officer for the reason that if the inquiry is to be held de-novo, it is immaterial whether the inquiry is held by officer who held the inquiry earlier or by some other officer. (15). It is settled proposition of law that even if the impugned order is technically wrong, illegal or even without jurisdiction, the writ Court may refuse to interfere if it is satisfied that the impugned order has met the ends of justice. In Mohd. Swaleh and Others vs. Third Additional District Judge, Meerut and another ( AIR 1988 SC 94 ), the Apex Court has observed as under :- ``It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lies from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set-aside by the Dis- trict Judge. On that ground, the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same should not be set-aside. But the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, justice has been done, though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had the point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting-aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, then no exception can be taken. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting-aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set-aside, no objection can be taken. (16). The ratio of the aforesaid judgment squarely applies to the facts of this case. Looking to the gravity of the charges against the petitioner and the manner in which the earlier enquiry has been held, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. (17). In view of the above, I find no merit in the petition and it is accordingly dismissed. The interim order passed earlier stands vacated. No order as to costs.