Judgment :- This is a petition filed by the petitioners/ accused 1 to 4 in Sessions Case No.369 of 1997 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. and to quash the charges framed against the petitioners/accused in Sessions Case No.369 of 1997 on the file of Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai and to prevent further abuse of the process of the court and to secure the ends of justice. 2. The facts which has led to the filing of this petition are as follows: The 1st accused is a watchman in the Government High School at Saptur, and the 2nd accused was the Noon Meal Organiser in the said school, and the 3rd accused is a retired Tamil Teacher in the said school, and the 4th accused was a friend of the accused 1 and 2. Originally the F.I.R. in this case was registered under Sec. 174 of Crl.P.C. with regard to suspicious death of the deceased person by name Sundaresan in this case and after investigation a charge sheet was laid by the respondent police against the accused for the offence for causing the death of the deceased by doing rash and negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide punishable under Sec.304-A of I.P.C. The case was taken on file as C.C.No.813 of 1997 by the learned District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Usilampatti, and at the trial of the case in C.C.No.813 of 1997. it seems that six witnesses were examined, and after examination of the 6th witness the Assistant Public Prosecutor filed a petition before the learned Magistrate to alter the section from 304-A of I.P.C. to the offence under Sec.302 of I.P.C. on the basis of the evidence of P.W.2 Rajendran, P.W.3 Rajkumar and P.W.6 Kumbalingam and to commit the case to the Sessions Court at Madurai. After hearing the learned Magistrate allowed the petition filed by the Assistant Public Prosecutor and converted the C.C.No.813 of 1997 into P.R.C.No.33 of 1997 and committed the case to the Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai, which was taken on file as Sessions Case No.369 of 1997 by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai. After hearing the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai framed two charges against the accused. After hearing the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai framed two charges against the accused. It seems that the 1st charge framed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai reads that on 20.2.1993 at about 4.30 p.m. all the four accused are said to have asked the deceased Sundaresan to get down into the well in the premises of the Government High School at Saptur and to remove the rubbish blocking the pipe, which was preventing the flow of water through the electric motor pumpset and while the deceased Sundaresan was in the well and removing the rubbish, the 4th accused by name Sundarapandian with the intention of murdering the deceased Sundaresan, is said to have inserted the electric fuse, which was removed earlier and thereby the deceased Sundaresan sustained electric shock as a result of which the deceased Sundaresan died and so the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai framed a charge for the offence under Sec.302 of I.P.C. as against the 4th accused and framed the second charge under Sec.302 read with 34 of I.P.C. as against the petitioners/accused 1 to 3 for having shared the common intention with the 4th accused Sundarapandian to commit the murder of the deceased Sundaresan. The charges were framed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai as early as on 20.11.1997 and the case was posted for trial before the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai on 212. 1997, and thereafter the present petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court was filed on 112. 1997. 3. Originally the office of the High Court raised an objection by stating as to how the petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. to quash the charges framed against the petitioners by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai is maintainable in view of the judgments reported Ramachandra v. State of M.P., 1989 Crl.L.J. 162 and Priya Sharon v. State of Maharashtra. Originally the office of the High Court raised an objection by stating as to how the petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. to quash the charges framed against the petitioners by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai is maintainable in view of the judgments reported Ramachandra v. State of M.P., 1989 Crl.L.J. 162 and Priya Sharon v. State of Maharashtra. 1995 Crl.L.J. 3683 and so this application was returned for defects, and there upon the learned counsel for the petitioner represented the petition with an endorsement stating that in the case cited by the office, there is no order barring quash petition being filed under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. It is relevant to note that the judgment reported in 1989 Crl.L.J. 162 was decided by a single Judge of Indore Bench of M.P. High Court for the proposition that the order of framing charge is not an interlocutory order and the revision against the same is maintainable and the other decision cited by the office reported in 1995 Crl.L.J. 3683 was decided by a single Judge of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court for the proposition that the revision as against the order framing of charge is maintainable. Then the office has pout up an office note about these aspects and this Court ordered to file this petition as Crl.O.P. under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. subject to the question of maintainability being decided later. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I feel that this application under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. can be maintained even as against the order framing the charges by the Sessions Court. This view gains support from the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners and they are as follows: 4. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court consisting of two Judges in the decision reported in Dhanraj Jain v. B.K.Biswas, 1976 Crl.L.J. 1297 laid down as follows: "Framing of charge is an interlocutory order and the same cannot be quashed or interfered with under the revisional power of the court in view of Sec.397(2)." 5. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court consisting of two Judges in the decision reported in Dhanraj Jain v. B.K.Biswas, 1976 Crl.L.J. 1297 laid down as follows: "Framing of charge is an interlocutory order and the same cannot be quashed or interfered with under the revisional power of the court in view of Sec.397(2)." 5. The decision reported in Stale of Karnutaka v. L.Muniswamy, 1977 Crl.L.J. 1125 relates to a case where the Sessions Court held that there was no case as against the accused 11, 12 and 16 and so they were discharged and after discharging the accused Nos.11, 12 and 16 the learned Sessions Judge turning to the case as against the remaining accused observed that there was some material to hold that they have had something to do with the occurrence and so the learned Sessions Judge adjourned case to a further date for framing the specific charges as against the rest of the accused persons, and two revision petitions were filed against this order, one by accused Nos.10, 13, 14 and 15 and the other by accused Nos.17 to 20 and these two revision petitions were allowed by the High Court on the view that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners before him and the High Court accordingly quashed the proceedings in regard to the accused Nos.10. 13 to 15 and 17 to 20 which led to the filing of the appeals before the Supreme Court, which stated at pages 1128, 1129 and 1130 as follows: "In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. .....In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice ....It is undisputed that the respondents were nowhere near the scene of offence at the time of assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. What is alleged against them is that they had conspired to commit that assault. This we think is one of those cases in which a charge of conspiracy is hit upon for the mere reason that evidence of direct involvement of the accused is lacking. We have been taken through the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation and the other materials.....We are therefore in agreement with the view of the High Court that the material on which prosecution proposes to rely against the respondents is wholly inadequate to sustain the charge that they are in any manner connected with the assault on the complainant. We would however like to observe that nothing in our judgment or in the judgment of the High Court should be taken as detracting from the case of the prosecution, to which we have not applied our mind, as against accused Nos.l to 9. The case against those accused must take its due and lawful course. 6. The decision of the Supreme Court reported in Madhu Limayee v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 Crl.L.J. 165 relates to a case where the Sessions Judge rejected the contentions raised by defence and framed a charge against the accused/appellant under Sec.500 of I.P.C. and thereupon the accused/appellant challenged the order of the learned Sessions Judge in the revision filed by him before the High Court, and the High Court upheld the preliminary objection on the ground that the revision tiled by the appellant was not maintainable in view of the provision contained in Sec.297(2) of Crl.P.C. and as against the said order of the High Court of Bombay a criminal appeal was filed before the Supreme Court, which held at pages 169, 170 to 172 as follows: “The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Sec.482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible......On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and on the other hand, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutoiy order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression”interlocutory order’“as invariably being converse of the words”final order“. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case, A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 1 but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fail in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders ....It is neither admissible, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may however indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory order so as to attract the bar of Subsec.(2) of Sec.397. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may however indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory order so as to attract the bar of Subsec.(2) of Sec.397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course......Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec.397(2) ...Jn our opinion whether the type of the order aforesaid would be a final order or not surely it will not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.397 of the 1973 Code.” Thus the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the order of framing a charge as against the accused is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and such an order falls in the middle course between interlocutory order and final order, and the label of the petition filed by the accused is immaterial and the High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure even assuming that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. 7. Therefore it follows from the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in State of Karnataka v. Munisamy, 1977 Crl.L.J. 1125 and Madhu Limayee v. State of Maharashtra, 1978 Crl.LJ. 165, that in appropriate cases the charges framed by the Sessions Court can be questioned before the High Court by invoking the inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. and there need not be necessarily a revision petition, and so the objections raised by the Office cannot be sustained and this petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. can be maintained by the accused as against the order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai framing the charges under Sec.302 and 302 read with 34 of I.P.C. as against the revision petitioner/accused. 8. 8. Now turning to the question of framing of charges in this case the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the belated testimony of P.W.2 Rajendran, P.W.3 Rajkumar and P.W.6 Kumbalingam during the trial before the Magistrate in C.C.No.813 of 1997 runs counter to the early versions and their testimony is patently false and inherently improbable, and so there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and absolutely there was no motive that can be attributed to any one of the accused even to think of causing the slightest harm to the deceased Sundaresan, who had promptly responded to the request of the accused for his service, and the materials on record are insufficient to frame the charges under Secs.302 and 302 read with 34 of I.P.C. as there was no intention of causing the death or causing such bodily injury which was likely to cause the death to the deceased Sundaresan, and so the charges framed against the petitioners/accused by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai have to be quashed to prevent the abuse of process of the Court and the secure ends of justice. 9. I am unable to uphold the above contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners on the question of framing of charges for the following reasons. 10. There is substantive evidence on record in the shape of the testimony of P.Ws.2, 3 and 6 which I do not propose to go and consider as to whether they are reliable or unreliable at this stage, and it is for the trial court to consider their evidence and come to the conclusion that the version of P. Ws.2, 3 and 6 are false or not. But it must be stated that there are sufficient materials on record to frame charges under Secs.302 and 302 read with 34 of I.P.C. as against the petitioner/accused herein. In the decision reported in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, A.I. R. 1977 S.C. 2018, the Supreme Court observed that at the initial stage of framing of a charge if there is a strong suspicion-evidence, which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 11. 11. In the decision reported in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 366. the Supreme Court laid down that where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been property explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. 12. In the decision reported in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 52. The Supreme Court observed in para 18 of the judgment as under: “The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Secs.227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 13. Following these decisions it is well-settled that at the stage of framing the charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out as to whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into weighing and balancing the evidence and probabilities. But the Sessions Judge may evaluate the materials to find out as to whether the facts at their face value establish the ingredients constituting the said offence. In those circumstances the evidence of P.Ws.2, 3 and 6 cannot be decided and come to the conclusion one way or other as to whether their evidence can be believed or cannot be believed or as to whether their evidence is false or inherently improbable, and these are matters to be agitated at the time of trial before the Sessions Court for appreciation of evidence. Suffice it to say that there are materials placed before the Sessions Court to say that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused under Secs.302 and 302 read with 34 of I.P.C. in this case, and the question as to whether the accused have acted with intention to cause death or causing such bodily injury which was likely to cause death are all matters to be decided by the Sessions Court after the completion of the trial. In those circumstances I am of the view that there is no abuse of process of the court and the charges framed against the accused in this case cannot be quashed even to secure the ends of justice as there are sufficient materials on record to frame the charges as against the accused in the light of the testimony of P.Ws.2, 3 and 6 even though their evidence may be suspicion evidence. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case I am to hold that the petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed for in this petition viz., to quash the proceedings in S.C.No.369 of 1997 on the file of Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai and to discharge them from the charges framed against them by the learned Principal Sessions Judge at Madurai in S.C.No.369 of 1997 and so this petition has to be dismissed, and consequently I answer this point as against the petitioners. 14. In the result this petition is dismissed. Consequently, the stay petition in Crl.M.P.No.602 of 1998 is also dismissed as unnecessary.