Judgment : The petitioner, Smt.Hariram Singh alias K. Kanniamah challenged the order of detention passed in G.O.No.SR-I/407/3/97 in F.No.675/1410/ 97 - Cus. VIII misused by the second respondent under Sec.3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). She prays for quashing the same and to set her at liberty. 2. It is alleged in the affidavit that the petitioner is a Singapore Citizen. Her husband died in the year 1976 and after his death, she lost interest in worldly affairs and is spending her time in visiting various temples and places of religious importance. It is stated that he joined Gnananda Seva Samajam in Singapore and that she used to come to India every year either for medical treatment or for visiting ashramam and temples. During April, 1997 she came to India stayed in an ashramam near Vandavasi and she took treatment at Chennai. For such visits one Swami helped her. When she was about to return to Singapore the said Swami handed over a bag to her stating that it contained religious literature and requested her to hand over the same to his friend at Singapore. It is alleged that she came to know she concealment of the foreign currencies in the bundles only from the customs officers. She alleges that she had no knowledge about the concealment of foreign currencies. 3. The petitioner challenges the order of detention on the grounds that no sufficient time was given to make representation before the Advisory, Board, that he written proposal, along with the documents, was not furnished to her, that in the impugned order of detention, the Detaining Authority had mentioned the bail application of the detenu was pending, wherein it was dismissed on 28.4.1997 itself, which shows the non-application of mind of the Detaining Authority and that the petitioner was involved only in a single and separate isolation and as such, the order of detention is illegal, unfair and unjust. 4. Petitioner filed H.C.M.P.No.32 of 1998 praying to implead the Advisory Board as a party, on the ground that it has not acted as one unit. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent denying the allegations made in the affidavit. 4. Petitioner filed H.C.M.P.No.32 of 1998 praying to implead the Advisory Board as a party, on the ground that it has not acted as one unit. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent denying the allegations made in the affidavit. It is stated that the bags belonging to the petitioner were found containing foreign currencies of different countries and travellers cheque which were attempted to be smuggled out of India by way of concealment without declaring them to customs and without permission from the competent authority. Data-war particulars were given in the counter-affidavit, stating that there is no delay in disposing of the representation. It is submitted that considering the material and after applying the mind with subjective satisfaction, the detention order was passed as per law. 6. The first respondent also filed additional counter-affidavit denying the allegations made by the petitioner praying for impleading the party. It is further stated that the detention order was passed on 6.5.1997 under Sec.3(3) of the Act. The second respondent issued declaration under Sec.9(1) of the Act, on 30.5.1997 and the same was served on the petitioner on 11.6.1997. However, notice informing about the meeting of the Advisory Board to be held on 16.6.1997 was served on 31.4.1997 itself. The detenu made a representation on 15.6.1997 through Jail Superintendent which was received on 16.6.1997 on the date of meeting. The detenu personally appeared was examined by the Advisory Board. It is stated that the members of the Advisory Board have considered the representation and have taken the decision unanimously. The report was govern to the petitioner on 23.6.1997. It is also stated by the first respondent that it is highly objectionable and condemned on the part on the petitioner to state incorrect facts and to say without any basic material that representation was considered individually and not collectively. He submits that this petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. 7. The second respondent has filed a counter-affidavit, stoutly denying the allegations made. It is stated that there is no delay in disposing of the representation of the petitioner. It is further stated that the representation was considered independently without any influence of the opinion of the Advisory Board. 8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials on record (and also the case laws cited by the learned counsel. It is further stated that the representation was considered independently without any influence of the opinion of the Advisory Board. 8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials on record (and also the case laws cited by the learned counsel. We have also perused the original records submitted by the Additional Public Prosecutor and the Additional Central Government Standing Counsel. 9. So far as the legal position is concerned it is well settled and not in dispute. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with the case. However, each case depends upon the facts of its own. 10. Undoubtedly, there is no time limit to dispose of the representation as provided under Art.22(5) of the Constitution, but as it involves the liberty of citizens, it should be decided at the earliest, Each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances, and in the context of necessity of a particular fact situation, it is also incumbent upon the Government to refer the case of the detention to Advisory Board and to obtain reported and to give an earliest opportunity to make representation and consider expeditiously. The representation of the detenu has to be decided independently as there are two distinct obligations, independent to each other. At the same time, the Central Government is not debarred to consider the report of the Advisory Board if it is available in reasonable time, without answering the representation. The confirmation of the detention order, without considering the representation, will also not no invalidate if made by applying mind independently. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that no reasonable opportunity was given to the detenu to appear before the Advisory Board and to make an effective representation. He relies on the decisions in Rajendrakumar Verma v. State of Tamil Nadu Rajendrakumar Verma v. State of Tamil Nadu , 1993 Crl.L.J. 2590 and Parammal Siddik v. Union of India Parammal Siddik v. Union of India , (1987)2 Crimes 621 . He relies on the decisions in Rajendrakumar Verma v. State of Tamil Nadu Rajendrakumar Verma v. State of Tamil Nadu , 1993 Crl.L.J. 2590 and Parammal Siddik v. Union of India Parammal Siddik v. Union of India , (1987)2 Crimes 621 . In reply to this argument, while referring to the counter, learned Additional Public Prosecutor argues that the detenu had the knowledge, sufficiently well in advance through the grounds of detention itself, which was served on her on 9.5.1997 itself, wherein she was asked to make representations before three different authorities, including State Advisory Board, It is further stated, that by declaration dated 30.5.1997, issued under Sec.9(1) of the Act, which was served on 11.6.1997, the petitioner was informed that she can make representations before three different authorities. It is further argued that in the declaration under Sec.9(1) itself, it had been stated that the detenu was likely to smuggle goods out of Chennai International Airport which is an island area fifty kilometres in which from be coast of India falling within the State of Tamil Nadu and can be detained beyond the period of three months, but the detenu did not make any representation, having full knowledge of the same material at the earliest point of time, as stated above, Now the petitioner cannot contend that for personal hearing on 16.6.1997, she received notice only on 11.6.1997 and the five days’ time was not sufficient to make an effective representation. Our attention had been drawn to the decision in Hawabi Arif Sayed Hanif v. L.Hmingliana Hawabi Arif Sayed Hanif v. L.Hmingliana , 1993 S.C.C. (Crl) 305 wherein it has been held that there is no statutory period prescribed under Sec.9(1) of the Act for serving the declaration to the detenu. Learned A.P.P. also submits that the petitioner made a representation on 26.5.1997 of 16 pages and now she cannot agitate in the garb of getting personal hearing notice from Advisory Board and for that also she made a representation. Considering the relevant materials and having gone through them, it is seen that the petitioner made representation one on 26.5.1997 and again on 16.6.1997 which were considered and decided. In view of this, it cannot be said that no sufficient time was given to the petitioner to make an effective representation. Considering the relevant materials and having gone through them, it is seen that the petitioner made representation one on 26.5.1997 and again on 16.6.1997 which were considered and decided. In view of this, it cannot be said that no sufficient time was given to the petitioner to make an effective representation. Under such circumstances, the petitioner cannot take advantage of , 1993 Crl.L.J. 2590 pertaining to an order passed under Sec.3(1) of the Act and also , (1987) 2 Crimes 621 , wherein it was held that no sufficient time was given to make an effective representation, on the facts of that case. So, we are of the firm view that the petitioner had full knowledge on 9.5.1997, 31.5.1997 and 11.6.1997 itself. So, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no sufficient time was given, is not accepted, especially, when materials considered under Secs.3(1) and 9(1) are one and the same except vulnerability, as stated. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that the petitioner next submits that there is inordinate delay of 37 days in disposing of the representation of the petitioner, by the Central Government. He relies on the decisions in R.D.Borade v. V.K. Saraf R.D.Borade v. V.K. Saraf 1989 Crl.L.J. 2119 and Arulsamy Sebrastian v. Secretary to Government, Hyderabad Arulsamy Sebrastian v. Secretary to Government, Hyderabad , 1998 Crl.L.J. 1516 (A.P.) wherein their Lordships had not accepted the contention that the delay had occurred as the officers were busy in Advisory Board Meeting. On the other hand, learned ACGSC submits that the matter in question involved question of foreign exchange, and as such, it was quite natural to expect, waiting for comments of various authorities and the opinion of the Advisory Board, for passing orders Learned ACGSC also pointed out that there was a possibility to come to the conclusion that the representation could have been accepted by the Advisory Board itself. He also submits that though the opinion of the Advisory Board is not binding on the Central Government the fact that it is only a supplementary, cannot be brushed aside. Learned ACGSC also submits that when the question, which might affect the foreign exchange to a larger extent, is involved, it is quite natural to expect that the authorities concerned will take some extra care in deciding the representation. 13. Learned ACGSC also submits that when the question, which might affect the foreign exchange to a larger extent, is involved, it is quite natural to expect that the authorities concerned will take some extra care in deciding the representation. 13. We have gone through the materials on record and also the case laws cited by learned counsel on either side. Though, without waiting for the comments of the Advisory Board, the Central Government is free to pass orders on the representation, as per the counter it is seen that they were waiting for the opinion of the Advisory Board to know as to whether the detention itself had been quashed or was in existence and the possibility cannot be ruled out. So, in the facts of the case in hand, delay as alleged cannot be said to be a vital one. More so, the foreign currency and the travellers cheques seized, the time imperative for consideration of the representation can ever be absolute or bsessive and so also the confirmation of the detention. Considering the overall aspects of the case, we are satisfied with the explanation offered by the learned ACGSC and the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner falls to ground and is rejected. 14. So far as the time taken by the State Government in disposing of the representation, as explained in the counter and the additional counter-affidavit, we are satisfied with the explanation offered and as such, held that the time taken by the State is a reasonable one in the circumstances of the case. As such, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in this respect, is rejected. 15. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Advisory Board did not consider the representation collectively as one unit, but decided individually, These allegations had been denied in the counter-affidavit stating as to how the learned counsel had argued without placing any material on record, which is also objectionable and deprecable as per reply. The learned counsel for the petitioner had not been able to show the source and to substantiate the argument. As already stated, we have perused carefully the original file also. We find that the this argument devoid of any force and is rejected. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner had not been able to show the source and to substantiate the argument. As already stated, we have perused carefully the original file also. We find that the this argument devoid of any force and is rejected. 16. Counsel for the petitioner next argued that the bail application dated 19.5.1997 and the counter was supplied to the detenu without any concerning letter and she could not understand the contents of the documents and on that ground the detention order can be quashed. He relied on the decision of this court in Mrs.Marikandu v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Secretary to Government, Madras, H.C.P.No.1953 of 1997 decided on 9.7.1998 stating that when the detenu has moved for bail then the earlier application and the order thereon refusing bail, if not placed before the Detaining Authority, it is vital, He also relied on the decision in Sajitha Bhanu v. Joint Secretary to Government Sajitha Bhanu v. Joint Secretary to Government , (1995)1 I. W. (Crl.) 356. In reply to this, learned A.P.P. submits that no such plea was raised in the affidavit and so the State could not file its objection specifically in the counter. In this aspect. He submits, under such circumstances the petitioner is not entitled to raise this plea afresh now. It is brought to out notice that the petitioner had represented in her representation dated 26.5.1997 about the bail application filed by her on the file of Principal Sessions Court, Chennai and as such, she cannot say now that without the covering letter she could not be able to understand the contents of the documents supplied to her, at a latter stage. It is further stated that it is only a communication and it had not at all been relied. Further, no representation, representation of the petitioner. Learned A.P.P. further submits that the case law cited supra and H.C.P.No.953 of 1997 relied on, in this regard are not applicable to the case on hand. So also, the non-supply of the documents does not amount to suppression of relevant material and in a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention. Then the Detaining Authority has to necessarily rely upon it as a vital document and not other wise. 17. So also, the non-supply of the documents does not amount to suppression of relevant material and in a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention. Then the Detaining Authority has to necessarily rely upon it as a vital document and not other wise. 17. It is no doubt, true, if any document is material and relied upon while passing the detention order, then the non-supply of such document would become a fatal one. But, at the same time, if incriminating material, neither used nor made basis for formulating the ground in cases connected to, furnishing copies of such documents would not be a vital deliver and vitiate the detention order. 18. On a careful perusal of the record, it could be seen that he petitioner had reiterated her earlier submissions in the first application, regarding retraction of the confession, which was dismissed. So, not considering the second application which was raised on the same ground raised earlier and rejected, cannot amount to a further development and so, there is no question of any prejudice. Nor the counsel for the petitioner has shown anything. The decision in H.C.P.No.953 of 1997 is not helpful, as in that case, there was a further development and it had not been considered in the subsequent decision, which vitiated the impugned order. So the petitioner cannot take advantage of the above decision, Similarly, petitioner cannot take advantage of the decision in M.Ahamedkutty v. Union of India and another M.Ahamedkutty v. Union of India and another , 1990 S.C.C (Crl.) 258. More particularly, this case was considered in the latter decision reported in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and others Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India and others , 1992 S.C.C. 1wherein, while distinguishing, it had been held that failure to supply bail application and the order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice. As such, the learned counsels argument, does not held good in the facts of the present case. 19. Learned counsel vehemently argues that the confirmation was done mechanically while representation was pending. He relied on the decision in Manjit Singh Dhillon v. Union of India Manjit Singh Dhillon v. Union of India , 1998 Crl.L.J. 1837. As such, the learned counsels argument, does not held good in the facts of the present case. 19. Learned counsel vehemently argues that the confirmation was done mechanically while representation was pending. He relied on the decision in Manjit Singh Dhillon v. Union of India Manjit Singh Dhillon v. Union of India , 1998 Crl.L.J. 1837. As already stated, the confirmation cannot be invalidated, only on the ground that the representation was considered subsequent to the order of confirmation. A reference can be made to the decision in K.N.Abdulla Kunchi v. Union of India K.N.Abdulla Kunchi v. Union of India , 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.) 613: 1991 S.C 574. As such, this argument also has not force. 20. Learned counsel also argues that the petitioner had been detained under the Act, on a solitary instance and this is bad. To counter this argument, it is stated that it came to light that she is an active member of the Ashramam and visited India number of times which is clear from various entries in the passport and in the absence of explanation to her frequent visits to India and the purpose of the same, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the above mentioned decision, more particularly, when she was found concealing foreign currencies and travellers cheques to the value of several lakhs of rupees, for consideration of money. Though we do not want to go into the merits of the case and decide the relevancy of the facts at this stage, however, under the circumstances, the argument of the petitioner that she cannot be detained on the basis of solitary instance has no substance and the same is rejected. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the Central Government has rejected his representations on 2.7.1997 prior to confirmation of order dated 16.7.1997, it will be difficult to seek revocation. The argument of the learned counsel has no substance, a reference to the decisions in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India , 1991 S.C.C (Crl.) 613 can be made. 22. The argument of the learned counsel has no substance, a reference to the decisions in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India K.M. Abdulla Kunhi v. Union of India , 1991 S.C.C (Crl.) 613 can be made. 22. It is true that strict law of pleadings is not applicable in H.C.P. matters and such petitions, merely on the ground of imperfect pleadings, cannot be thrown out, as the burden of proof lies on the state, but at the same time, the petitioner cannot make out a case and argue without there being any material and foundation, as in this case, regarding the decision of the Advisory Board by not one unit, as stated, we highly deprecate such practices, and H.C.P.No.32 of 1998 is liable to be dismissed. 23. No other point is urged before us. 24. In view of what we have stated above, no interference is called for. H.C.P.No.818 of 1997 is dismissed H.C.M.No.32 1998 also dismissed.