Judgment :- Y. VENKATACHALAM, J. Invoking Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner herein has filed the present writ petition, seeking for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the petitioner on the file of the first respondent in Case No. 1241-11(73 & 74) 1987 and to quash the order dt. 18th September, 1989 and to consequently direct the first respondent to grant relief of waiver of interest to the petitioner for the asst. yr. 1983-84. 2. In support of the writ petition, the petitioner herein has filed an affidavit wherein he has narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced them to file the present writ petition and prayed that the writ petition may be allowed as prayed for. On behalf of the respondents no counter-affidavit has been filed. However, they argued the matter. 3. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also that of the learned senior counsel appearing for the Department. I have also perused the contents of the affidavit and all other relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers. I have also taken into consideration the various points raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties during the course of their arguments. 4. In such circumstances of this case, the only point that arises for consideration in this writ petition is, as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow this writ petition or not. 5. The brief facts of the case of the writ petitioner, as seen from the affidavit are as follows: The relevant assessment years is 1983-84 and the accounting year ended on 31st March, 1983. For the said assessment year the petitioner filed a return of income on 31st December, 1985 declaring a total income of Rs. 2, 30, 600. In the meantime the 3rd respondent served a notice under s. 148 of the IT Act on the petitioner in August, 1985. The assessment was completed on 28th February, 1986, under s. 147 of the Act and determined the total income at Rs. 3, 16, 390. While completing the assessment the 3rd respondent levied interest under s. 139(8) of the Act to the extent of Rs. 50, 926 and Rs. 14, 523 under s. 215 of the Act. Later the amounts were revised under s. 139(8) and s. 215. 3, 16, 390. While completing the assessment the 3rd respondent levied interest under s. 139(8) of the Act to the extent of Rs. 50, 926 and Rs. 14, 523 under s. 215 of the Act. Later the amounts were revised under s. 139(8) and s. 215. Against the order of assessment, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the first appellate authority. Regarding levy of interest, the petitioner preferred as waiver petition before the IAC, Range I, contending that the petitioner was unable to file a return in time because of the books were with the Department consequent to a raid took place on 4th November, 1981. The advance tax was paid by the assessee in accordance with law. Hence, interest cannot be levied under s. 139(8) as well as under s. 215 of the Act. The said waiver petition was considered and he reduced the interest by 50% in respect of interest levied under s. 139(8) and in respect of interest levied under s. 215 the respondent rejected the petition. Aggrieved by the order of the 3rd respondent the petitioner filed two separate petitions to the CIT contending that interest cannot be levied in reassessment proceedings under s. 147. It was also contended that since all the materials are with the Department, the petitioner was unable to file a return in time. Also in respect of levy of interest under s. 215 of the Act, the advance tax estimated by the assessee was true and fair and because of the huge addition made by the AO, the assessed tax was determined at higher figure. In respect of the addition made by the officer, the petitioner has taken up the matter to the first appellate authority. The first respondent after considering the petition, without giving any proper reasons, rejected the petition filed by the petitioner and confirmed the order of the 3rd respondent. The first respondent has also stated in the impugned order that there is no jurisdiction to interfere with the order on the ground that the petitioner has preferred an appeal against the assessment order. The first respondent considered the case on merit without going into the detail and dismissed the case on merit. Further he merely confirmed the order of the 3rd respondent without giving any proper reasons. Therefore, the impugned order of the first respondent dt. The first respondent considered the case on merit without going into the detail and dismissed the case on merit. Further he merely confirmed the order of the 3rd respondent without giving any proper reasons. Therefore, the impugned order of the first respondent dt. 18th September, 1989 is contrary to law and facts and hence the same is liable to be quashed. 6. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the impugned order the first respondent has stated that he has no jurisdiction to consider the order passed under s. 264 of the IT Act and the reason given by him is that the petitioner filed an appeal to the CIT(A). It is significant to note that under s. 264, sub-s. (4) there is an appeal provision available and in fact the petitioner availed the said provision and appealed against the original assessment. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the Department thereafter he cannot seek revision before the CIT invoking r. 64 (sic-s. 264). Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard fails. Even otherwise, the impugned order has not been passed only on the above technical ground. It is significant to note that it has been passed on merits also. The first respondent has also considered the merits of the case and then only has passed the impugned order. Therefore, it is futile for the learned counsel for the petitioner to argue that the reason given by the first respondent in not considering the case is contrary to law, illegal, wrong and without any basis and justification. 7. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the first respondent has not considered the case in detail and merely he confirmed the order of the 3rd respondent without making any enquiry into the facts of the case. He also states that it is seen from the above impugned order that because already the issue was considered by the lower authorities, it is not necessary to interfere with the order of the lower authorities. He also states that it is seen from the above impugned order that because already the issue was considered by the lower authorities, it is not necessary to interfere with the order of the lower authorities. In this regard it is also argued that in this case the first respondent has not exercised the judicial discretion vested in him and without considering the contention raised by the petitioner and he merely confirmed the order of the lower authority without giving proper reasons. It is his grievance that in all cases, relating to levying of interest, mechanically the ITO imposed the interest and without affording an opportunity to the assessee. In this regard, it is contended by the learned senior counsel for the Department that the ITO has given reasons and an elaborate order is passed and hence the appellate (sic) authority need not give elaborate reasons. He also argues that if he says that I accept the reasons assigned by the original authority, it is sufficient. There is force in the said argument of the learned senior counsel for the Department. Because the only ground on which the petitioner challenges the levy of interest is that the petitioner was unable to file a return in time because of the books were with the Department in consequence of the raid took place on 4th November, 1981, and that the advance tax was estimated and paid by the assessee in accordance with law. This is the one and only ground put forward by the petitioner hereinbefore all the authorities. Even in this writ petition they have put forward only this lone ground. It is also not his case that he has raised so many other grounds but the concerned authority has failed to discuss the same in the impugned order and that is why the impugned order is bad. That is not their case. When they have not raised any other grounds and repeating the same ground before the authorities, they cannot expect that each and every authority has to discuss the said ground and to give a finding. They can do so only when the lower authority had failed to discuss all the grounds raised by the petitioner before him. When they have not raised any other grounds and repeating the same ground before the authorities, they cannot expect that each and every authority has to discuss the said ground and to give a finding. They can do so only when the lower authority had failed to discuss all the grounds raised by the petitioner before him. Therefore, it cannot be contended by the petitioner herein that the first respondent considered the case on merit without going into the case in detail and dismissed the case on merit and he merely confirmed the order of the 3rd respondent without giving any proper reasons. Such contention of the petitioner also fails. 8. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the assessment is reopened, the Department has no jurisdiction to levy interest under s. 139 as well as s. 215 of the Act. In support of such contention he relied on the decisions in Charle's D' Souza vs. CIT and 1988 (169) ITR 86 [sic - CIT vs. Padma Timber Depot. In this regard it is vehementally argued by the learned senior counsel for the Department that it is not a reopened assessment but it is an original assessment, and that being so for original assessment under s. 143(3) there is no s. 148 application. He also stated that there is no mention at all as 'reopening of assessment' anywhere and further the officer has not given notice for reopening of assessment. His categoric case is that notice was given only for assessment. Therefore he contended that in such circumstance, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is a reopening of assessment is not correct. In the above facts and circumstances of the case I am of the the clear view that there is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Department. Because the assessee was due to file the return even on 31st July, 1983. But it is significant to note that the petitioner did not file its return of income within the statutory time allowed under s. 139(1) of the Act. Therefore, as the ITO had reason to believe that the assessee's income had escaped assessment on its failure to file its return under s. 139(1) he issued a notice under s. 148 on the assessee in August 1985. Therefore, as the ITO had reason to believe that the assessee's income had escaped assessment on its failure to file its return under s. 139(1) he issued a notice under s. 148 on the assessee in August 1985. Only thereafter, the petitioner filed a return of income on 31st December, 1985 declaring a total income of Rs. 2, 30, 600. There is no dispute with regard to this fact. Thereafter the assessment was completed on 28th February, 1986, determining the total income at Rs. 3, 16, 390. Therefore, in this case the levy of interest is mandatory and reasons have also been given for levying such interest. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that once the assessment is reopened, the Department has no jurisdiction to levy interest under s. 139 as well as s. 215 of the Act cannot at all be entertained for the aforesaid reasons. Further at this juncture, it is relevant to point out that return has to be filed under s. 139(1) within time and notice under s. 139(2) is issued if no return is filed. Notice under s. 139(1) is given for cases where return is submitted voluntarily. If return is not filed in time, notice under s. 139(2) is to be issued before the end of assessment year. After 31st March, 1984, no notice under s. 139(2) can be issued. In such cases, notice under s. 148 is issued and for the purpose of reassessment but not for the purpose of original assessment. There is a distinction between original assessment and reassessment. Admittedly this case is of original assessment and so interest can be levied. 9. Yet another grievance of the petitioner herein is that while passing the order the petitioner was not given an opportunity and without giving an opportunity to the petitioner, the order was passed and that, therefore, the same amounts to violation of natural justice and hence the order passed by the first respondent is contrary to law and without any justification. In this regard it is contended by the learned senior counsel for the Department that even though no opportunity was given to the assessee no prejudice has been caused to him as he had gone on appeal. There is force in the said contention of the learned senior counsel for the Department. Therefore such contention of the petitioner also cannot be entertained. 10. There is force in the said contention of the learned senior counsel for the Department. Therefore such contention of the petitioner also cannot be entertained. 10. Therefore, for all the above reasons and in the facts and circumstances of this case, and also in view of my above discussions with regard to the various aspects of this case, I am of the clear view that the impugned order of the 1st respondent herein is a well considered order apart from being a speaking order. That apart in the impugned order, the first respondent has clearly observed that "as the assessee has already been given relief to the extent of 50% and since the points made out in the petition under s. 264 have already been considered by the IAC. I see no reason to interfere in this case." Therefore, I do not see any reason whatsoever to interfere with the said well considered order of the first respondent. Thus, the petitioner herein has failed to make out any case is his favour and that therefore, the writ petition fails and the same is liable to be dismissed for want of merits. 11. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently MP. No. 22248/1989 also is dismissed.