Judgment : 1. The above revision is directed against the order of conviction and sentence dated 26. 94 in S.T.C.No.2202 of 1994 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.2, Poonamallee, convicting the petitioner for the offences punishable under Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act and punishing him with a fine of Rs.250 on the basis of his pleading guilty. .2. The petitioner was facing a trial for the offence punishable under Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act with regard to an alleged occurrence said to have taken place on 26. 94 at 9.30 A.M., when the petitioner was found in a drunken state and was using abusive words in the public place, and therefore, the petitioner was immediately arrested by the police and was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.2, Poonamallee, on the same day, where, the petitioner pleaded guilty. Therefore, the learned Magistrate, recorded his pleadings that he was guilty and convicted him under Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act and imposed a fine of Rs.250, in default of which, to undergo two weeks simple imprisonment. 3. Mr.D.Rajagopal, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the procedure laid down under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C was not followed by the learned Judicial Magistrate before convicting the petitioner under Section 75 of the Tamil Nadu City Police Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the petitioner ought to have been given sufficient time before he was questioned whether he was guilty or not. .4. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decisions in: .(i.) Chinnasamy, in RE, 1972 L.W.(Crl.) 146; (ii.) Sivaguru, in RE, 1974 L.W.(Crl.) 199 and (iii.) Ramalingam v. State by S.H.O. ,1989 L.W.(Crl.) 485. 5. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate, even though contends that the Magistrate has rightly recorded the statement of the petitioner/accused that the petitioner has pleaded guilty, and therefore, rightly, by an order dated 26. 94, convicted and imposed a fine of Rs.250, in default of which, directed the petitioner to undergo two weeks simple imprisonment by his order dated 26. 94, could not satisfy this Court that the respondent had complied with the procedure laid down in the decisions, namely, i. Chinnasamy, in RE, 1972 L.W.(Crl.) 146; ii. Sivaguru, in RE, 1974 L.W.(Crl.) 199 and iii. 94, could not satisfy this Court that the respondent had complied with the procedure laid down in the decisions, namely, i. Chinnasamy, in RE, 1972 L.W.(Crl.) 146; ii. Sivaguru, in RE, 1974 L.W.(Crl.) 199 and iii. Ramalingam v. State by S.H.O. , 1989 L.W.(Crl.) 485. 6. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 7. In Chinnasamy, in RE, 1972 L.W. (Crl.) 146, Mr.K.N.Mudaliyar, J., has held as follows: “The Magistrate ought to have recorded the substance of the accusation, read out to the accused and made the accused understand the implications of his pleading “guilty”. This substance of the accusation ought to have been properly stated to the accused, and the plea of the accused also properly recorded. The entire proceedings against the accused have been marred by a hap-hazard and perfunctory recording.” “In such cases, the Presidency Magistrate would do well, in the interests of justice, to exercise their judicial discretion and take up the case for further hearing after one day’s interval so that the accused may be enabled to contact either the lawyers or their relatives or friends for proper arrangements for their defence. In a number of cases this Court is left with a preponderant feeling that the accused have had no chance of arranging for their defences. Such an unsatisfactory state of affairs may be easily ended by a proper exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the Presidency Magistrates by postponing the inquiry or trial by one day.” 8. Mr.Paul, J., in Sivaguru, in RE, 1974 L.W. (Crl.) 199, has held as follows: “Section 243, Crl.P.C., requires that if the accused admits that he has committed the offence of which he is accused, his admission shall be recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by him, and if he shows no sufficient cause why he should not be convicted, the Magistrate may convict him. Here, the admission of the revision petitioner has not been recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by the revision petitioner. In fact, the Special Honorary Presidency Magistrate has not even mentioned which offence he has found the revision petitioner guilty of. Here, the admission of the revision petitioner has not been recorded as nearly as possible in the words used by the revision petitioner. In fact, the Special Honorary Presidency Magistrate has not even mentioned which offence he has found the revision petitioner guilty of. No entries also appear to have been made in the Summary Trial Register which contains various columns, one of which relates to the plea of the accused and another, to the reasons for his conviction and the provisions of law under which he is convicted, and the last, to the sentences meted out to him for that offence. Under these circumstances, the conviction in this case is illegal.” 9. Similarly, in Ramalingam v. State by S.H.O. , 1989 L.W. (Crl.) 485, Mr.Arunachalam, J., has held as follows: “The acceptance of the plea of guilt by the trial Magistrate is not in consonance with law and necessarily the conviction and sentence on the petitioners will have to be set aside. The petitioners had not been afforded sufficient opportunity to acquaint themselves as to what the prosecution case against them was, or understand the same, take legal advice and prepare themselves either to claim a trial to defend themselves or take a decision to plead ‘guilty’.” “When the 1973 Code was ushered in, in Section 251, Cr.P.C. which governs the trial of summons cases, there is a positive change in the wording. In both the old and new Code, there is no need to frame a formal charge. However, the sum and substance of the accusation is to be stated to the accused.” “The questioning in this case is rather strange, for, the accused have been asked to show cause why they should not be punished. Punishing the accused can arise only after they are found guilty. The questioning under Section 251 Crl.P.C., can only go to the extent of asking the accused as to whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make, but cannot make them feel that conviction is pre-conceived and they have to answer only about the sentence to be imposed. Punishing the accused can arise only after they are found guilty. The questioning under Section 251 Crl.P.C., can only go to the extent of asking the accused as to whether they plead guilty or have any defence to make, but cannot make them feel that conviction is pre-conceived and they have to answer only about the sentence to be imposed. Such an impression is feasible from the nature of question framed by the trial Magistrate, which cannot be outright overlooked, since in my view, prejudice to the accused is writ large, in the very questioning itself.” “That a conviction under Section 292-A, I.P.C., may have far-reaching consequences in respect of running of the theatre itself, cannot also be easily brushed aside. In case where the accused are produced from police custody, if the object of a fair, reasonable and just trial is the mandate of law, one should expect that the accused are given sufficient time, after the records are handed over to them not before they can make up their mind to answer a plea, which will have to necessarily follow, before the commencement of the trial. There must be a time gap between the furnishing of the records and the questioning of the accused, which time gap may depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and a rigid formula cannot be laid down for universal application. This time lag is all the more necessary when the accused are sought to be produced from police custody, before the trial court.” “Since the violation is one of procedure and necessarily a re-trial has to be ordered to furnish them with sufficient opportunity to decide their nature course of action, in the de novo trial, the matter has to be remitted to the trial Magistrate.” 10. I have also pursued the relevant records, but I fail to see that the learned Magistrate had recorded the admission of the accused as nearly as possible in the words used by him. That apart, the learned government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent is not in a position to satisfy this Court that the learned Judicial Magistrate had followed the procedure laid down in the said decisions, before convicting and punishing the petitioner, on the statement of pleading guilty by the petitioner. 11. Therefore, I am obliged to set aside the order of conviction and sentence dated 26. 11. Therefore, I am obliged to set aside the order of conviction and sentence dated 26. 94 in S.T.C.No. 2202 of 1994 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.2, Poonamallee, and remit the matter to the learned Judicial Magistrate No.2, Poonamallee, with a direction to conduct a de novo trial and pass appropriate orders within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. 12. In the result, the above revision is allowed. however, there will be no orders as to costs.