JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner was employed with M/s. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd. (hereinafter called as Company). The post of Chairman-cum-Managing Director is being held by an officer of IAS Cadre having been so appointed by the Government on deputation. The other Directors of the Company are either nominees of the State of Rajasthan or of I.F.C.I. or of Employees Co-operative Societies. Because of certain circumstances, the Company was acquired by the State of Rajasthan by enacting the Act i.e. Jaipur Metals and Electricals (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1986 which received President's assent on 20-11-1986. All the shares of the Company are deemed to have been transferred and vested in the State Government under the provisions of S. 3 of the Act. The Management of the Company was vested in the State as per S. 4 of the Act. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed in the Company on 26-11-1969 vide Annexure-1 as Supervisor and was ultimately promoted as Foreman on 10-2-1975 vide Annexures-2 and 3. Terms and conditions of the service of the petitioner were mentined in the respective orders of appointment/promotion. He was again promoted in July 1988 vide order dated 27-6-1988 as Superintendent and again as Senior Superintendent on 13-4-1994 vide Annexures 4 and 5 respectively. He was removed from service on 14-5-1994 vide order Annexure-6. On the representation made by the petitioner, he was reinstated in service on 9-6-1994 vide Annexure-8. It is stated that his services were appreciated as outstanding. He was even given the cash prise on two occasions on 24-4-1995 and 22-7-1995. But all of a sudden vide Annexure-11, his services were terminated by one line order on 2-9-1995 stating that his services are no more required. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has moved this writ petition for quashing Annexure-11 on the ground that the termination of services of the petitioner is wholly illegal and unjustified and violative of Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is further stated that Clause 12 of the order of appointment as Supervisor as mentioned in Annexure-3 to the effect that the services of the petitioner can be terminated at any time without assigning any reason by giving one month's notice or on payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice is illegal and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. 3. 3. A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondent to the effect that no writ petition is maintainable on the ground that the respondent-Company is not a `State' under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. However, to support the contention the respondent-Company relies on the decisions in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna v. The National Council of Educational Research & Training, AIR 1992 SC 76 , Division Bench decision of this Court in Dahra Gram Sewa Sehkari Samiti Ltd. v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Ltd., 1992 (3) WLC 237 ; Ajay Singh v. The Board of Technical Education, 1988 (1) RLR 196 ; Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Kanti Sengupta, AIR 1986 SC 1571 : 1986 Lab IC 1312 . 4. It is further submitted by the non-petitioner that in regard to this very company in the case of Ishaq Mohammad etc. v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., 1988 (1) RLR 157 , even though on the same facts the Division Bench of this Court had already held that the respondent-Company is a `State' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India which has also been followed by a single Bench of this Court in the case of J. K. Goyal's case reported in 1996 (2) WLC 396. The respondent wants to submit that Ishaq Mohd.'s case had not been decided properly and, therefore, is not binding on the respondent and further wants to submit that the reasons given in Ishaq Mohd.'s case in para 27 of the judgment go contrary to the pronouncement made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various decisions wherein certain test has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for covering an institution to be `State' under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. The preliminary objection of the respondent has no force for the reason that a Division Bench of this Court in a well detailed judgment as reported in 1988 (1) RLR 157 after taking notice and discussing almost all the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other Courts as well available at the time of pronouncement of the judgment had come to a finding that the respondent-Jaipur Metal and Electrical Company is a `State' within the ambit of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. After going through the plethora of judgments and the test laid down by the various Courts including the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Division Bench of this Court in Ishaq Mohd.'s case had come to a finding that the Company is managed by the Directors nominated by the Government or financial institutions which are the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government. The Company is financed by the various financial institutions which are the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government. The amount of loan had been guaranteed by the State Government. The plenary control of the Company resides in State Government as per the provisions of the Act and also as per the terms o the agreement dated 12-8-1977. In view of the preamble, objects and reasons of the Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. (Acquisition of Shares) Act, 1986, and also because of the admission of the Company as referred in Brochure, it was found that there was a board of persons of the State behind the respondent-Company and, therefore, the respondent-Company was held to be `State' under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 6. There is a definite finding by the Division Bench of this Court that the respondent-Company falls within the ambit of State. 7. The case of Ishaq Mohd. (supra) was challenged by the respondent by way of filing a SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP No. 7918-28 of 1988/Civil Appeal Nos. 2488-98/ 88. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not feel it necessary to decide the question in the appeals at that stage and the appeals were disposed of in view of the fact that the impugned judgment of the High Court was duly complied with. 2488-98/ 88. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not feel it necessary to decide the question in the appeals at that stage and the appeals were disposed of in view of the fact that the impugned judgment of the High Court was duly complied with. The net result of the Division Bench decision of this Court to the effect by way of elaborate judgment stands as res judicata between the parties in regard to the fact whether the respondent-Company is a `State' or not and I am bound by the finding given by the Division Bench which had become final. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, the preliminary objection is not maintainable. 9. Apart from above, in Civil Writ Petition No. 1632/95 decided on 11-3-1996. Hon'ble Justice N.L. Tibrewal in J.K. Goyal v. Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. who was earlier removed from service by the respondent-Company, had while discussing the preliminary point of the respondent in regard to its not being State had held as under : "The contention of Shri C.N. Sharma, learned counsel for the Management, cannot be accepted that this Court is not bound by the aforesaid Bench decision of this Court, as in a subsequent matter the Apex Court of the country in Special Leave Petition against the respondent-Company kept this question open for its decision as to whether respondent-Company is amenable to writ jurisdiction and falls within the definition of `State' in the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution or not? Another contention of Shri Sharma that in view of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court on Art. 12 of the Constitution this question requires reconsideration cannot be accepted. While sitting in a single Bench I am bound by the judgment of the Division Bench and in the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find that this matter requires reconsideration. Consequently, the preliminary objection raised on behalf, of the respondent Company is hereby rejected." 10. While sitting in a single Bench I am bound by the judgment of the Division Bench and in the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find that this matter requires reconsideration. Consequently, the preliminary objection raised on behalf, of the respondent Company is hereby rejected." 10. In the written statement filed by the respondent in defence of the impugned order Annexure-11 which only states that the Management regrets to inform him that his services are no longer required and stands terminated with immediate effect and he could collect one month's notice pay, the counsel for the respondent submits as averred in the written statement that earlier also in the year 1994 he had committed certain serious lapses and his services were terminated in the same manner in May 1994 but was again reinstated in June 1994 vide Annexure R-2 and for the reason that the petitioner had refused to carry out the verbal orders by saying that he was not prepared to work on the dotted lines, therefore, for such a misconduct when no alternative was left with the Chairman-cum-Managing Director but to terminate the service on mutually agreed term No. 12 of the appointment letter dated 10-2-1975. Clause 12 contains an arbitrary power to terminate the services of the permanent and confirmed employee by one line order and in view of expanding laws, clause 12 of the order Annexure-3 in question cannot be sustained in the eye of law. A similar clause of appointment in the case of J.K. Goyal (supra) was held to be arbitrary by the single Judge of this Court on 11-3-1996 and the order of termination was set aside being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and S. 23 of the Indian Contract Act. 11. Apart from above, the counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision in the case of Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, AIR 1998 SC 1681 , wherein it was held that the permanent status on an employee guarantees security of tenure and his services cannot be terminated abruptly and arbitrarily either by giving one month's or three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under (at page 1683-1684) : "In pursuance of the above powers, the petitioner framed its own Standing Orders which have been duly certified. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under (at page 1683-1684) : "In pursuance of the above powers, the petitioner framed its own Standing Orders which have been duly certified. Clause 17(g) of the Certified Standing Orders, which constitutes the bone of contention between the parties, is quoted below : "The services of a workman are liable to automatic termination if he overstays on leave without permission for more than seven days. In case of sickness, the medical certificate must be submitted within a week." Conferment of `permanent' status on an employee guarantees security of tenure. It is now well settled that the services of a permanent employee, whether employed by the Government, or Government Company or Government instrumentality or Statutory Corporation or any other "Authority" within the meaning of Art. 12, cannot be terminated abruptly and arbitrarily, either by giving him a month's or three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof or even without notice, notwithstanding that there may be a stipulation to that effect either in the contract of service or in the Certified Standing Orders." 12. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that admittedly the order in question has been passed by way of punishment which could not have been passed being violative of the principles of natural justice. It is admitted in the written statement by the respondent in the `Additional pleas' that there was no alternative left with the respondent but to terminate the service of the petitioner under the contract in view of refusal of the petitioner to sign on the dotted lines. The impugned order is punitive in nature. 13. In view of the fact that Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd. has already been held as `State' by the Division Bench of this Court by a very detailed judgment, there is hardly any necessity to go into this matter once again by me, in the present case. 14. So far, the impugned order Annexure-11 is concerned, the arbitrariness of the respondent is writ large on the face of it being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The order Annexure-11 cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is quashed. 15. 14. So far, the impugned order Annexure-11 is concerned, the arbitrariness of the respondent is writ large on the face of it being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The order Annexure-11 cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is quashed. 15. Before parting with the judgment, I am constrained to notice that the respondent-Company despite having two judgments against it on the finding that the respondent-Company is `State', one by Division Bench and another by single Bench in Ishaq Mohd.'s case and J. K. Goyal's case respectively has come up once again with the same plea in the written statement knowingly well that this Court by a very detailed judgment had given finding against it. It was open for the respondent to have challenged the judgment before the appropriate higher Courts which also stood challenged but SLP/Civil Appeals were dismissed. Despite the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court had repeatedly held the termination of the services under such term of contract to be illegal, the respondent had chosen to once again defend the impugned action and also to justify the same. In the year 1994-95 vide Annexures-9 and 10 the petitioner has been rewarded and his services have been appreciated as outstanding and just after 5 months and 2 months of such certificates, the petitioner is being removed from service. It leaves an impression that the termination of service of the petitioner who had put in more than 25 years by writing one line order was the highest degree of arbitrariness on the part of the respondent in view of the settled law by this Court in the case where the respondent-Company itself was a party. 16. For the reasons mentioned above, the impugned order Annexure-11 cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is quashed. The petitioner shall be deemed to be reinstated in service with all back benefits which would be available to him had he not been removed from service and in case the petitioner has superannuated in the mean time, in that situation, the petitioner shall be entitled to the benefits up to the age of superannuation as applicable to other employees of the Company. The order shall be implemented within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order. The respondent shall pay a cost of Rs. The order shall be implemented within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order. The respondent shall pay a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to the petitioner.Order accordingly. *******