Judgment :- C. SHIVAPPA, J. 1. In this appeal, the appellant has challenged the order dated 24.4.1998 passed on Application Nos. 1457 and 1464 of 1998 in C.S. No. 201 of 1981, by the learned single Judge on the Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court, accepting the highest offer and directing the issue of sale certificate in favour of respondent No. 14, in respect of the property, viz. , House No. 1/110, Third Block, Java Nagar, Bangalore-11, inter alia contending that the appellants offer was the highest bid amount and the auction suffers from material mis-directions and illegality, and that the learned Judge failed to take note of the bona fides of the appellant and equities between the parties. Hence, in substance, he is seeking for setting aside the auction sale conducted and issuance of sale certificate in favour of J.P. Balasubramaniam and three others. 2. The respondents 1 to 13 who are decree-holders have filed an application bearing No. 3124 of 1993, seeking for a directing to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to sell two items of properties, which includesthe one that was bid by the appellant herein. The sale proclamation was issued and conditions of sale were enumerated in the sale proclamation. Though the sale was fixed on 16.3.1997, auction was postponed and parties were directed to submit their offers. On an earlier occasion, by order dated 23.3.1998, the Commissioner was directed to accept the highest offer of Rs. 67 lakhs given by Mr. Sathish D. Shah of Bangalore, with a direction that 25% of the sale consideration to be deposited by 27.3.1998 in the name of the Registrar and the entire sale consideration to be deposited within eight weeks. The intending purchaser deposited the entire amount within the time given by way of seven demand drafts, drawn on Centurian Bank. Then, few more persons came forward offering higher prices. The appellant is one of those who offered Rs. 85 lakhs, but sought for time for payment. Respondent No. 14 herein and three others offered Rs. 71 lakhs by way of five demand drafts on that day itself. Since the offer made by Respondent No. 14 was higher, the same was accepted and Respondent No. 14 and three others were directed to file the draft sale certificate, under Order 38, Rule 11 of the Original Side Rules, within three days. The amount deposited by Mr. 71 lakhs by way of five demand drafts on that day itself. Since the offer made by Respondent No. 14 was higher, the same was accepted and Respondent No. 14 and three others were directed to file the draft sale certificate, under Order 38, Rule 11 of the Original Side Rules, within three days. The amount deposited by Mr. Satish D. Shah was ordered to be returned with Rs. 50,000/- as compensation, by 27.4.1998 and the amount deposited by Respondent No. 14 was ordered to be kept in deposit in the name of the Registrar, to the credit of the suit. 3. The grievance of the appellant herein is that the appellant agency has offered the highest bid of Rs. 85,00,000/- and the sale ought to have been confirmed instead of the lesser bid. The appellant further contended that the learned Judge ought to have granted extension of time to deposit the sale consideration. The order rejecting the highest offer is vitiated by material irregularities and illegalities. 4. Respondents 1 to 13 are the sharers. The learned counsel appearing on their behalf submitted that the suit is of the year 1981 and many of the sharers are in their 80s and 60s, one of the plaintiffs already died and another plaintiff is admitted for serious illness at Jeslok Hospital in Munibai and if the process of closing the administration of the estate is delayed, it will cause irreparable injury and hardship. They also contended that it is almost an year that the sharers are in the same position as they were at the time when this Court was pleased to order sale of the two properties, and it is their grievance that the appellant herein has no locus standi to maintain the petition, since he did not deposit any money or complied with the conditions of the auction sale. 5. The question for consideration is whether the confirmed auction sale by the learned single Judge is valid in law or can it be reopened at the instance of the appellant in spite of non-deposit of the purchase-money? 6. The question whether an auction sale could be reopened inspite of non-deposit of purchase-money, has already been settled by this Court in several decisions. 6. The question whether an auction sale could be reopened inspite of non-deposit of purchase-money, has already been settled by this Court in several decisions. They are: — (1) In Vannisami v. Periayaswami (AIR 1917 Madras 176), it has been held that under 0.21, R. 89, deposit is a condition precedent to the making of an application for setting asidethe sale. The words “on his depositing” in 0.21, R. 89, C.P.C. qualify the term “apply” and a deposit is a condition precedent to the making of an application. Under Rule 92(2) of O. 21, the Court has no power to entertain an application for setting aside the sale, because the requirement being not merely directory but mandatory. It has also been held that the court has no power to extendthe time for makingthe deposit. (2) In Krishan Ayyar v. Arunachalam (AIR 1935 Madras 842 = 42 L.W. 307, F.B.), this Court has held “where an application was made by person interested in the property sold in execution, requesting the court to set aside the sale and the required deposit was also made by him”. (3) In Krishnama Naicken v. Sivasami Chettiar (AIR (3) 1943 Madras 709 = 56 L.W. 490), this Court has held “Under O. 21, R. 89, it must be shown that the applicant has an interest in the property itself which has been sold. It is not enough that he is indirectly affected by the sale when he has no interest in the usual sense such as the interest of a judgment-debtor, mortgagee or even a lessee. 0.21, R. 89, contemplates that the title derived from the judgment-debtor must be in the property, the sale of which is sought to be set aside: () 15 AIR 1928 Mad. 1191, Approved)”. Following the decision reported in AIR 1928 Madras 1191, it has been held that the appellant had no locus standi to apply under 0.21, R. 89, because, he was not a person deriving title from the judgment-debtor or a person holding an interest in the property. The same view was taken in () 26 AIR 1939 Madras 250 (F.B.). Following the decision reported in AIR 1928 Madras 1191, it has been held that the appellant had no locus standi to apply under 0.21, R. 89, because, he was not a person deriving title from the judgment-debtor or a person holding an interest in the property. The same view was taken in () 26 AIR 1939 Madras 250 (F.B.). (4) In Jagannatha Iver v. Krishna Iyer (AIR 1962 Madras 99 = (1961) 74 L.W. 450 ), it has been held that me rule statutorily provides for setting aside the sale in execution while the jurisdiction thereunder can be exercised only if the prescribed conditions are satisfied; it would be wrong to call it a mere privilege or indulgence. It is further held that “In our opinion, a deposit under 0.21, R. 89, C.P.C. should be unconditional in this sense, namely, that it should not contravene the terms of that rule or frustrate its object, i.e. The deposit should not be accompanied by any request or statement to prevent the decree-holder and auction-purchaser from unconditionally drawing the respective amounts payable to them under the rule; the sale is deemed to have been conducted without any material irregularity and no application to set aside a sale under R. 90 could lie; therefore, there could be no reservation of any right to challenge the sale under that rule”. 7. The same view was taken in Rukminibai v. Gajadhar (AIR 1955 Nagpur 185), wherein it has been held that the provision of 0.21, R. 89(1), when is in the nature of indulgence to the judgment-debtor, must be strictly complied with. In Raman v. Authrose (AIR 1952 Travancore-Cochin 321), it has been held that the responsibility for paying the correct amount within the time lies with the person who seeks to set aside the sale, following Kalidasa Chetty v. Dodda Siddha Chetty (AIR 1947 Madras 56 = (1946) 59 L.W. 409 ). So also, in Amritlal Narsilal v. Sadasiv (AIR (31) 1944 Bombay 232), the High Court of Bombay held that the deposit under Rule 89, Order 21 is intended not merely for the benefit of the auction-purchaser and decree-holder, but also to maintain solemnity of court sales. Equitable principles cannot over-ride imperative provisions of Rule 89. Rule 89(1), Order 21 is being intended to guard the interests of the decree-holder and to ensure the judgment-debtor an opportunity to recover his property. 8. Equitable principles cannot over-ride imperative provisions of Rule 89. Rule 89(1), Order 21 is being intended to guard the interests of the decree-holder and to ensure the judgment-debtor an opportunity to recover his property. 8. In Jaswanthlal Natvarlal Thakkar v. Sushila Ben Manilal Dangarwala ( AIR 1991 S.C. 770 ), the Apex Court has taken the view that under O. 21, R. 90, it is not sufficient for the appellant to contend that there was illegality or irregularity in me conduct of the sale; he must also prove that some substantial injury has been caused to him as a result of the order viz. not granting him time to deposit the amount, or in confirming the auction. 9. It is obvious that an execution sale primarily affects the interest of three parties, although their interests may be different and conflicting, namely, the decree-holder, judgment-debtor and the auction-purchaser. The appellant herein, since he failed to comply with the requirements of law by depositing 25% of the amount of the offer he made, he does not come in any one of these categories. Therefore, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal whether “interests” in O. 21, R. 90, means only proprietary or possessory interest or will include even pecuniary interests. The application itself being defective from its inception, it must be deemed that there was no proper application under O. 21, R. 89, C.P.C. Even in the affidavit annexed to the Application No. 1464, at para 4, it is stated thus: “I state that the applicant is interested in purchasing the said property and willing to make the offer before this Honble Court. I state that the applicant may be permitted to hand over his offer in a sealed cover in the open court through my counsel”. He did not assert that he was prepared to pay 25% of the offer as required under Rule 84 of Order 21, C.P.C. It is in this context, the contention of respondents 1 to 13 that the appellant has no locus standi to maintain the petition, assumes relevance and force. 10. Under Rule 92 of Order 21, C.P.C. a sale cannot be set aside unless there is fraud. Even material irregularities do not constitute sufficient ground for avoiding sale, as has been held in Dayashanker v. Khubchand (AIR 1973 Rajasthan 304). 10. Under Rule 92 of Order 21, C.P.C. a sale cannot be set aside unless there is fraud. Even material irregularities do not constitute sufficient ground for avoiding sale, as has been held in Dayashanker v. Khubchand (AIR 1973 Rajasthan 304). Though there is a general averment that the sale conducted was shrouded with illegalities and material irregularities, it was not made clear which mandatory requirement was violated in conducting the sale. The Apex Court in Jcmaki S. Menon v. Dr. V.R.S. Krishanan (1997) 2 S.C.C. 623 ), held that in the absence of any procedural infraction, it would not be proper to interfere with such sale. When the application is no application in the eye of law, complaining of non-exercising discretion to grant time to deposit the amount is a lame cry, and such a situation does not warrant exercise of discretion providing time. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, Article 127 of the Limitation Act has no application. 11. The next grievance of the appellant is that his bid of Rs. 85 lakhs was the best offer and the sale ought to have been confirmed in his favour than in favour of respondent No. 14. It is not the grievance of respondents 1 to 13 that the offer of respondent No. 14 was in any way gross or inadequate or such bid was accepted adopting unfairness or impropriety in the conduct of sale. Sale cannot be set aside on mere inadequacy of price. The court sale being an involuntary sale, it cannot fetch the same price expected out of regular voluntary sale. There is a presumption that the price fetched in auction sale is adequate. Inadequacy of price fetched is not an injury or far less a substantial injury. 12. In Kayjay Industries v. Asnew Drums ( AIR 1974 S.C. 1331 ), the Supreme Court held, after discussing the principles applicable to court sales, that where the court had exercised a conscientious and lively discretion in concluding the sale, mere inadequacy of price cannot demolish every court sale. 13. On the point that inadequacy of price is a sufficient criterion to invalidate the auction sale, the learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Bancorex S.A. v. Ocean Marine Services Co. Ltd., Korea (AIR 1998 Madras 225 = 1998 2 L.W. 468). 13. On the point that inadequacy of price is a sufficient criterion to invalidate the auction sale, the learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Bancorex S.A. v. Ocean Marine Services Co. Ltd., Korea (AIR 1998 Madras 225 = 1998 2 L.W. 468). In that case, this Court held that the price offered was grossly inadequate, having regard to the minimum price fixed by the court. It was that criteria which weighed with the court on the principle that the court should be satisfied about the adequacy of price before confirmation of the sale. We wish to add here that it is settled in law that mere inadequacy of price, without the least impropriety in the conduct of the auction sale, is no ground to set aside the sale. The question of inadequacy of the consideration must of course be decided at the time of contract and not by the light of subsequent events. No purchase made bona fide and without fraud, or unfair dealing of any interest in the property should thereafter be opened or set aside merely on the ground of undervaluation. The inadequacy of price should shock the conscience of the court and the court should opine coupled with other circumstances of oppression and unfairness, in which event, inadequacy of the price assumes relevance to reopen the auction. Though impropriety in the conduct, was not adverted to in the ship case , cited supra, but while setting aside the sale, it was viewed that inadequacy of price was of that magnitude which was too gross in its nature, which implied impromptu conduct in the auction sale. But that is not the situation in the given case. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on a decision in Baghla Briquette Industries v. Punjab Financial Corporation, Chandigarh (AIR 1986 Punjab and Haryana 80). That was a case where the appellant was the judgment-debtor whose property was auctioned by the respondent and the appellant filed a petition against the sale on 6.9.1982. Then the judgment debtor filed an appeal contending that his interests are adversely affected by the sale and sought for setting aside the sale on the grounds specified thereon; which is not the fact situation in the instant case and this case also has no bearing. 15. Then the judgment debtor filed an appeal contending that his interests are adversely affected by the sale and sought for setting aside the sale on the grounds specified thereon; which is not the fact situation in the instant case and this case also has no bearing. 15. When we view the case on hand, having regard to the two earlier auctions not fructified and if the offer in favour of respondent No. 14 had not been confirmed, there was every possibility for the buyers being afraid of hurdles ahead and the property not getting a proper value. If the court sales are too frequently adjourned with a view to obtaining a higher price, it may prove a self-defeating exercise and persons may intend to lose faith in court sales and even it may result in yielding less price or no price at all and may add to the agony of the decree-holders. 16. In Motor & Investments Limited v. The New Bank of India and others (1996 (4) SCC 272 = 1997 2 L.W. 543), the Apex Court held that “When the court was inclined to bring the property to sale, the endeavour of the court should be to sustain the court sale and equally, though court sale is compulsive sale, equal endeavor should be made to fetch adequate price”. In the instant case, the price for which the auction had been confirmed can not be styled as grossly for inadequate price. The learned single Judge, in our view, did the right thing taking a conspectus of the circumstances and avoiding the ominous maybes of future auctions at the instance of the person like the appellant herein. 17. In the present case, though possession was not handed over after confirmation, but is stated to have been handed over during the pendency of the appeal and, consequently, the sale proceedings have reached finality It is equally well settled that if in a court auction sale, in execution of a decree, properties are purchased by a bona fide purchaser, who is a stranger to the court proceedings, the sale in his favour has to be protected, and, it cannot be upset at the instance of an offer or who did not comply with the conditions of the auction sale. The contentions urged by the learned counsel for the appellant on this aspect are unsustainable in law and on facts and they are rejected. Therefore, we hold that this is not a case where there are overwhelming circumstances as can enable us to hold that not providing time amounts to an irregularity or illegality which has caused substantial injury to the appellant in the eye of law or on the facts of this case. At the same time, the price fetched at the auction camiot be termed as grossly inadequate, due to impropriety or irregularity or fraud in the process of conducting the auction. In view of our aforestated reasonings, we decline to interfere with the auction sale, which had reached its finality. Hence, the appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed. 18. Having regard to the consequences of the proceedings, which resulted in depriving the respondents 1 to 13 from withdrawing the amount in deposit, leading to incurring expenses of the litigation at the cost of inconvenience, we think it proper to award a total sum of Rs. 14,000/-, Rs. 1,000/- being the cost of this proceeding to each one of the respondents, payable by the appellant.