JUDGMENT D. RAJU, C.J.—The plaintiff in Civil Suit No. 49/1987 on the file of Sub-Judge, Kullu, who succeeded before the learned Trial Judge but lost before the First Appellate Court has filed the above Second Appeal. The case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court was that the suit land was in his ownership and possession and as on 3.3.1986 he executed a gift deed in favour of Defendant No. 2 on the condition that in case the land was sold by Defendant No. 2, the plaintiff or his heirs as the case may be, will be entitled to get back the suit land on payment of reasonable price. In view of the fact that on 24.12.1986, the second defendant sold the land in favour of 1st defendant under a registered sale deed for a consideration of Rs. 25,000/- and on coming to know of the said fact the plaintiff came with the present proceedings seeking a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the suit land on payment of the sale consideration. 2. The 1st defendant filed the written statement in which though it was admitted that a gift deed was executed by the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant and possession was also given to him, it was contended that second defendant was competent to alienate the property and the defendant No.1 was also not bound by any conditions inter se defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff. The qift has become, on acceptance, a completed transaction and for that reason was irrevocable. The plea or being a bonafide purchaser and making further construction on the suit land was also projected. Reply was also filed by the plaintiff reiterating the stand taken in the plaint. 3. On the above claims and counter claims the suit came to be tried and both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The learned trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated 13.1.1988 held that the gift deed in favour of the second defendant is a conditional one and as the land has been sold by the defendant No.2, the plaintiff as per the condition in the gift deed is entitled to possession on payment of the sale consideration. The learned trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated 13.1.1988 held that the gift deed in favour of the second defendant is a conditional one and as the land has been sold by the defendant No.2, the plaintiff as per the condition in the gift deed is entitled to possession on payment of the sale consideration. The learned trial Judge further held that the first defendant cannot be held to be a bona fide purchaser without notice and finally the suit land came to be decreed for possession subject to the plaintiff paying sale consideration of Rs. 25,000/-. The Court also stipulated two months time for such deposit, from the date of judgment. 4. Aggrieved the first defendant-purchaser filed an appeal before the District Judge, Kullu and in Civil Appeal No. 60/98 and 138/88, the learned Additional District Judge, Kullu by his judgment and decree dated 26.6.1992 differed from the conclusion and findings arrived at by the learned Trial Judge and came to the conclusion that the condition imposed was hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently while reversing the judgment and decree of his Trial Court the learned appellate Judge dismissed the suit. Hence, the above second appeal. 5. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant while elaborating the substantial questions of law formulated in the above second appeal contended that on a proper construction of the gift deed it must be held that the plaintiffs suit should be decreed and though Section 10 and Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act have to be read together, Section 10 cannot be given an over-riding effect so as to nullify the condition incorporated in the gift deed. The learned Counsel further contended that such a condition could be enforced as a contract subsisting between the parties in an instrument drawn and acted upon and that the condition imposed in this case cannot also at any rate be considered to be an absolute restriction on the right of alienation but can be considered as a pre-emptive condition or clause creating a right in the appellant to purchase the property in case of sale and viewed thus the learned 1st appellate Judge committed an error of law in interfering with the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. 6. 6. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent while adopting the reasoning of the learned 1st appellate Judge contended that Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act must be construed to be a complete code by itself and once the gift has been made and accepted as a consequence of which it has become final it should be considered to be absolute in terms giving all rights in the property in favour of the done. It was also contended that the document as such did not reserve any right in the doner to revoke the gift and if that be the position the provisions contained in Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be attracted to the case on hand. On the above basis, the learned Counsel for the respondent contended that no exception could be taken to the well merited decision of the learned 1st Appellate Judge and the same does not warrant any interference in this Appeal. The learned Counsel, appearing on either side invited my attention to some of the judicial pronouncements to support their respective stand, to some of which a reference may be made hereinafter. The learned 1st Appellate Judge also has adverted to some of the decisions which also requires to be noticed. 7. The decision in AIR 1988 Bom 116, Manohar Shivram Swami v. Mahadeo Guruling Swami and others, is one wherein a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, dealing with a condition incorporated in the sale deed of a property that it should not be sold to anybody outside the family of the vendor, held the same to offend Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore was void. The decision in AIR 1935 All 493, Gayasi Ram and others v. Shahabuddin and others, is that of a Division Bench of the High Court wherein the validity of a clause in a sale-deed that the vendee should not transfer the property by mortage, gift or sell to anyone excepting vendor or his heirs came up for consideration and the Division Bench held that such a condition is contrary to Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore void. 8. 8. In A.I.R. 1971 P&H 87, Smt Lilawati and others v. Firm Ram Dhari Suraj Bhan and another, a learned Single Judge of the said High Court held that a vendee is entitled to ignore a condition which cuts down his absolute right of enjoyment over the property and any direction in the sale-seed which is contrary to the enjoyment of such absolute estate is void and unenforceable. 9. In 1988 (2) Sim. L.C. 126, Brahama Nand and another v. Roshani Devi, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the stipulation in a document of sale regarding non-alienation and not to have any right to dissipate or alienate but rather only get benefit there from, from generation to generation as desired by the vendor was void for being in violation of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act besides being hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act and consequently the vendor was not entitled to file a suit for revocation of the sale deed. 10. In A.I.R. 1927 All 170, Aulad AH and others v. Syed Ali Athar and another, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court had an occasion to deal with a condition in a deed of transfer that if any of the vendee wish to transfer the whole or part of their share in the village they might do so by transferring it from one to other but if either of them desired or in fact attempted to transfer, the same to a third person the other party has the right to pre-empt. Such a clause was considered to be an agreement between the parties and was held to be valid and enforceable against the legal representatives of the parties and the same did not offend rule against perpetuities. 11. The decision in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 744, Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra and others, is that of the Apex Court wherein it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that a pre-emption clause in an award of partition was not merely a personal covenant between the contracting parties but was a covenant binding on assignees or successors-in-interest of original contracting parties and that the Rule against perpetuities cannot be applied to covenant for pre-emption even though there is no time limit within which such right of pre-emption has to be exercised. 12. 12. In A.I.R. 1939 All 221, ML Brij Devi v. Shiva Nanda Prasad and others, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the provisions contained in Sections 10 and 12 are purely general and refer to all transfers, viz., transfer by gift, sale or otherwise and a condition imposed upon a donee of a gift must, before it can be held to be valid, should be consistent with the general principles in regard to conditions an transfers contained in Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. On the peculiar facts and circumstances and the recitals contained in the document construed therein the learned Judges of the Division Bench also held that the gift deed conferred upon the donee full proprietary title to the property gifted and hence the condition restraining the donors right of alienation being a condition repugnant to the estate created in him was void and inoperative. 13. In A.I.R. 1939 Mad 509, Official Receiver, West Tanjore v. Samudravijayan Chettiar and others, a Division Bench of Madras High Court held that in case where the instrument contains recitals that the donor conveyed property to the donees on account of affection and in consideration of service and also for the reason because they are the donors only heirs and with power to enjoy the same with all rights, the intention of the donor was only to create absolute estate and any subsequent words which are repugnant to an absolute title must be ignored. 14. In A.I.R. 1962 H.P. 4, Smt Gaurju v. Tara Chand, it was held that the gift under consideration in that case was an unconditional gift that had been completed, and, therefore, Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act had no application to the case to enable the donor to revoke the gift. The donor attempted to revoke the gift in that case alleging that though she had gifted the suit land on the condition that the donee would maintain her during her lifetime but the donee ceased to maintain. While rejecting the claim of the donor it was also pointed out that the gift deed as such contained no provision for cancellation or suspension of the gift in case of violation of any of the conditions. 15. While rejecting the claim of the donor it was also pointed out that the gift deed as such contained no provision for cancellation or suspension of the gift in case of violation of any of the conditions. 15. In A.I.R. 1995 H.P. 117, a learned Single Judge of this Court held in construing a gift deed executed for past and future services that there is no scope for revoking the same since the deed did not contain any clause as such providing for revocation on the failure of the donee to render service to the donor or maintain the donor. 16. In A.I.R. 1982 Pat 32, Jagdeo Sharma v. Nandan Mahto and others, a learned Judge of the Patna High Court had an occasion to deal with the respective scope and operation of Sections 10 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act and it was ultimately held that Section 126 is a General Section which is controlled by Section 10 and therefore, Section 126 could not be read in isolation and has to be read with Section 10 which says that any stipulation completely restraining the donee from transferring the gifted property is void and therefore the gift deed cannot be cancelled on account of the alienation of the gifted land. It was also held that the stipulation in the gift deed restraining alienation was void. 17. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side in the light of the facts on record and the decisions relied upon before me. Chapter VII of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the law relating to gifts and while defining gift and providing for the manner in which a gift of immovable property can be effected, Section 126 of the Act provides for the suspension or revocation of gifts made and the circumstances when such suspension or revocation is permissible. Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act stipulates that where a property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void except in respect of cases which are not relevant for the purpose of the present case. Section 11 also mandates that where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, the transferee shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction. 18. A careful analysis of the scope and purport of the restrictions contained in Sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act would go to show that there cannot be any total or absolute restriction on the enjoyment of the property transferred and any such restriction, absolute in terms, would be rendered void if such restriction is found to have been created after an absolute interest has been created in a document, it has to be ignored and the transferee will get the property without in any manner his rights being curtailed by the restrictive clause. At the same time it is by now well settled that Section 10 will not be attracted in case the restriction or condition incorporated in any deed of transfer is only partial in nature. As held by the apex court in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1967 SC 744, the Rule of perpetuity concerns rights of property only and does not affect the making of contracts which do not creates rights of property and that the Rule does not also applied to personal contracts which do not create interest in property even though the contract may have reference to the land. It was also held by the apex Court that a covenant for pre-emption, be it even unlimited in point of time does not offend the rule against perpetuity. In the light of above position of law it becomes un-necessary for me to enter into an exercise to decide the larger issue as to the impact of Section 10 on Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act for the reason that the case before me does not concern with any claim for cancellation or revocation and suspension of a gift made. On the other hand the clause the validity of which falls for adjudication in this case is one stipulating that if the donee purports to sell the property to anyone else the donor shall have the right to purchase the same for a reasonable price. On the other hand the clause the validity of which falls for adjudication in this case is one stipulating that if the donee purports to sell the property to anyone else the donor shall have the right to purchase the same for a reasonable price. It may be pointed out that unlike the stipulation which I have noticed in some of the cases placed before me, the price is not of an arbitrarily fixed sum but the stipulation in this case is for "reasonable price" and the plaintiff has evinced the interest to pay the entire sale consideration to get back the property. The observations found to have been made in some of the decisions noted supra in the context of a sale deed or relating to a stipulation absolutely restraining alienation or cancellation of a document in case of such alienation in violation of the condition restraining such alienation, cannot be of any avail to support the case of the first defendant purchaser. As noticed earlier neither the clause in the deed of gift in question nor the assertion of the plaintiff can be said to be of a right to cancel the document of gift and there by get back the property for nothing. Viewed this, on the peculiar terms of the document under consideration in this case and the provision for getting back the property for a reasonable price which in this case happens to be the very consideration for which the property was said to have been parted with by sale in violation of the condition of the very gift, the same can be and has to be necessarily only construed as a pre-emptive clause than a restrictive covenant and that too of an absolute nature totally prohibiting any alienation. Consequently, in my view the learned 1st appellate Judge committed a grave error in coming to a different conclusion from the one arrived at by the learned trial Judge. The judgment and conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge appears to be more inconformity with the position of law prevailing, particularly having regard to the peculiar nature of the covenant in the gift deed in question for our consideration. The judgment and conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge appears to be more inconformity with the position of law prevailing, particularly having regard to the peculiar nature of the covenant in the gift deed in question for our consideration. Such a clause, in my view, having been held to be one in the nature pre-emption which can be enforced as part of a subsisting contract is not in violation of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act the and consequently the same could be enforced as a contract subsisting between the parties to the document and their privies. Therefore, I am of the view that the judgment of the learned 1st Appellate Judge which suffers from a serious error and proceeds on a total mis-conception of law as also proceeded on mis-construction of the suit a document deserves to be and is hereby set-aside. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge shall stand restored and the stipulation of two months regarding the deposit to be made by the learned trial Judge would come into operation from this day. No costs. Appeal allowed.