Honble YAMIN, J.–This revision petition has been directed against the order passed by Additional District Judge No.1, Udaipur in Civil Misc. Appeal No.52/93 per which he upheld the order of Munsif, Mavli in Civil Misc. Case No.141/92. (2). 20 plaintiffs filed a civil suit against defendants, Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2, before the Munsif Mavli to the effect that the Higher Secondary School is situated in Fatehnagar and its main gate opens on Udaipur Chittaur Road. There were three different side ways each one being about 30 feet wide for the entry of the school children because there was heavy rush of the traffic on the main road. The public way marked as `A, `B and `C is situated ever since the school was constructed. The Municipal Board, respondent No.2, regarded it as a strip of land measuring 750 sq. ft. which was decided to be sold to the respondent No.2 on 12.4.88. The S.D.O. Vallabhnagar confirmed the order. A revision was filed before the Divisional Commissioner, Udaipur and the same was dismissed on 30.1.1992. A review petition was filed which was also dismissed. (3). It was further averred in the plaint that Nakshatramal, plaintiff No.20 was having his residential house near the disputed land and he was allowed to open his doors, windows and other apertures towards this land because it has always been regarded as `rasta aam. It was averred in the plaint that the Municipal Board was a trustee to keep it as a way. It was prayed that the defendant respondent No.2 had put his stones and constructed a temporary structure of `chhapra which may be removed. An application for temporary injunction was also moved. The defendant No.2 denied all the averments of the plaintiffs and pleaded that the plaintiffs have not followed the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 CPC and, therefore, the suit can- not be regarded as representative suit. It was further averred that the defendant had a residential house in Ward No.10 and on its western side the disputed land was situated where the defendant had constructed a chabutari and had a `dhalia for more than 40 years where he used to tie his animals. The rest part of the plot was being used by the defendant for various purposes. He had his apertures, doors etc. opened towards this land ever since the time of his ancestors. The rest part of the plot was being used by the defendant for various purposes. He had his apertures, doors etc. opened towards this land ever since the time of his ancestors. This plot of land was never a part of way. On one side (eastern side) school has constructed a boundary wall of 12 feet heigh which meant that it was not a way leading towards the school. There were other ways open in order to go to the school. The defendant had purchased the strip of land from the Municipal Board Fatehnagar which has been sold to him on the market rate. Defendant No.2 purchased it in order to avoid complication and the Municipal Board has sold it in order to increase its income. None of the plaintiffs had any right or title over it. Then the Municipal Board sold it to the defendant No.2 after issuing a notice on 8.2.88 against which no objection was filed by any of the plaintiffs or by anybody. The land was a strip of land which has been sold to the defendant by the Municipal Board for Rs. 14,910/-. It was prayed that the application/suit of the plaintiffs may be dismissed. (4). The learned munsif, after having heard the parties at length and after having discussed almost all the aspects of the matter in his order dated 19.8.93, did not find the prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. He did not find all other po- ints in favour of the plaintiffs and dismissed the application for temporary injunction. An appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, Udaipur which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge and he upheld the order of learned Munsif. Hence this revision. (5). Learned counsel first submitted that trial Court be asked to decide the suit early. He cited Mangilal Vs. Aamra Ram & Ors. (1). He also submitted that a time may be fixed within which the Court may decide the suit. I have gone through the order in Mangilal vs. Amra Ram (supra). The revisional Court did not find any jurisdictional error or material irregularity committed by the courts below in deciding the application for temporary injunction. But the order to decide suit early was passed because it was found that the right of way granted by the appellate Court was being used by the non-petitioner for quite some time. (6). The revisional Court did not find any jurisdictional error or material irregularity committed by the courts below in deciding the application for temporary injunction. But the order to decide suit early was passed because it was found that the right of way granted by the appellate Court was being used by the non-petitioner for quite some time. (6). Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that no such order should be passed in the present case because the petitioners have obtained a stay order and the defendant was restrained from making construction over his land vide order dated 24.1.1996. According to him, it will mean further continuation of the stay order. I also feel that no such order need be passed in this case as the matter has been heard in detail on merits and should be decided on merits. (7). Learned counsel for the petitioner first submitted that the appellate court did not allow an application of the petitioners plaintiffs filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC which should have been allowed. He cited Prabhudayal Vs. Ramswaroop & Ors. (2) and has submitted that as per provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, the court hearing the matter in appeal has ample jurisdiction to allow additional evidence in order to decide the real controversy. He also cited Temjenkaba and another vs. Imyachanga and others (3), wherein it has been held that the appellate Court must give cogent reasons for rejecting application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. He further cited M/s Rajendra Industries & Metal Works and another vs. State Bank of India & Anr. (4), in which certain postal receipts and postal certificate were allowed to be taken during appeal. He also cited Jaipur Develop- ment Authority vs. Smt. Kailashwati Devi (5) in which it has been held that the party who wants to produce additional evidence as per Rule 27(aa) must satisfy the Court that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him in the trial Court. It is not one of the conditions that this party must have also been one who has led some evidence in the trial Court. It is not one of the conditions that this party must have also been one who has led some evidence in the trial Court. None of these citations apply to the present case because the documents which the petitioners wanted to produce are a resolution of the Municipal Board dated 14.10.93 and the site plan which is an uncertified photostat copy signed by Executive Officer on 25.8.93 and cuttings of newspaper. (8). The learned appellate Judge in para No. 17 of his order has dealt with the application. The documents were shown to me during the arguments. The newspaper cuttings are irrelevant. There is a plan which does not show as to when it was prepared. The true copy presented shows that it was attested by Executive Officer of the Municipal Board Fatehnagar on 25.8.93. So there is nothing on record to show as to when it was prepared and it it was in possession of the petitioners plaintiffs why it was not submitted before the trial Court. The learned appellate Judge has rejected the application on the ground that the documents were not showing the correct position of the place at the time of filing suit before the learned Munsif. A resolution of the Municipal Board dated 14.10.93 was also such, which did not exist at the time when the suit was filed before the learned Munsif. Accord- ing to Order 41 Rule 27 CPC additional evidence can be produced before the appellate Court when the party seeking to produce additional evidence established that notwithstanding the exercise of due deligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due deligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed or the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. A question arose whether such objection be taken in this revision. Learned counsel for both the parties agreed that in given cases revision can be entertained on this ground and as such the point could be agitated in this revision. I have heard both of them on this point. A question arose whether such objection be taken in this revision. Learned counsel for both the parties agreed that in given cases revision can be entertained on this ground and as such the point could be agitated in this revision. I have heard both of them on this point. From the bare perusal of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC it is clear that the additional evidence can be produced regarding such documents which were existing but were not within the knowledge of a party after exercise of due diligence. So far as cuttings of newspaper and the resolution of 1993 are concerned, they were not existing at the time when the order by the Munsif was passed. So far as plan, copy of which bears the signature of Executive Officer of 25.8.93, does not show as to when it was prepared and whether it existed at the time when the learned Munsif passed order on 19.8.93. The date of attestation is 25.8.93. It clearly means that the document has been prepared after the decision on temporary injunction. So sub-clause (aa) of clause (1) of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC would not apply in this case. The case would have fallen under sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC and the appellate court has ordered that it did not require the document to be produced before it. The learned appellate Judge has given sound reasons to reject the additional evidence. I do not find any infirmity in the order of rejecting the application of the petitioners under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Therefore, I hold that the learned appellate Judge did not commit any error of jurisdiction in rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. (9). Learned counsel for the petitioners then submitted that the land is not a strip but has been used as a common way to go to the school. He also submitted that the Municipal Board had no authority to sell it to the respondent defendant. He also submitted that in such a situation the plaintiffs who belong to the town had prima facie case as the way is a common way for the use of all the residents of the town. He also submitted that the Municipal Board had no authority to sell it to the respondent defendant. He also submitted that in such a situation the plaintiffs who belong to the town had prima facie case as the way is a common way for the use of all the residents of the town. He also submitted that the trial Court as well as appellate Court committed mistake in holding that the petitioners had no prima facie case on the basis that the land was sold to the defendant respondent by the Municipal Board and the objections raised before Sub Divisional Officer as well as before the Divisional Commissioner were rejected. (10). On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendant respondents has supported the judgments of the two Courts. He has submitted that the suit is not in the representative capacity and that it is Shankarlal who wanted to purchase this strip of land but when it was not Sold to him he arranged to collect the people of town and then filed the suit. He also submitted that Nakshatramal was also interested in the property and, therefore, he has joined as plaintiff No.19 in the suit while the suit is not at all in the representative capacity. Ten-twenty persons collected and filed suit to support Shankarlal and Nakshatramal. He also submitted that the strip of land was never a part of the way as is discovered from different documents available on record. He drew my attention to the affidavit filed by Nakshatramal before the Divisional Commissioner which is dated 5.8.88. In the affidavit it has been mentioned that there was a plot of land adjacent to his house and was in joint possession of himself and the respondent defendant No.2. It is further mentioned in the affidavit that the plot was as important for him as was to the respondent No.2 and that the plot should have been sold by auction. It is found that a notice was issued by the Municipal Board on 8.2.88 in which this strip of land was mentioned as a plot of the size of 20x30 was proposed to be sold, and objections were invited. But it is on record that nobody raised objection before its sale to respondent No.2. It is found that a notice was issued by the Municipal Board on 8.2.88 in which this strip of land was mentioned as a plot of the size of 20x30 was proposed to be sold, and objections were invited. But it is on record that nobody raised objection before its sale to respondent No.2. So far as Shankarlal is concerned, he claims it to be a part of common way but Nakshatramal was first regarded it as a plot. The record of the Municipal Board shows that it was a strip of land and when the objections were invited one Kalyan Singh Pokarna had submitted an objection that the strip of land may be given to the hospital but the Municipal Board found that it was not suitable for the hospital purposes because an independent referal hospital was going to be constructed at different place. Then the Municipal Board sold the land to the respondent. According to the learned counsel when Shankarlal was not able to obtain the land for himself, he started saying that it was a part of common way. Nakshatramal was un- able to obtain it and then he started saying that it was a part of way. Since the suit is not in a representative capacity in compliance of Order 1 Rule 8, it are only Shankarlal and Nakshatramal who can be said to be interested. Nakshatramal in his affidavit, as discussed above, has admitted that it was a plot of land and Shankarlal, when was unsuccessful in getting the plot, started saying that the same was a part of common way. (11). Learned trial Judge did not find prima facie case of the plaintiffs because after having seen the various documents it has come to the conclusion that the strip of land was not a part of common way instead it was a strip of land and was sold to the respondent defendant No.2. The trial Court came to the conclusion that there existed school boundary wall on the eastern side of the strip of land and this wall was 12 feet high. Behind the boundary wall, various rooms of the school exist, therefore, it could not be treated as a way. The trial Court came to the conclusion that there existed school boundary wall on the eastern side of the strip of land and this wall was 12 feet high. Behind the boundary wall, various rooms of the school exist, therefore, it could not be treated as a way. It has been observed by him that after a dispute arose between the parties an iron gate has been fixed on the wall of the school which allows the children of the colony to enter in school from this gate. Plot in question was never used as a common way by the general public of the town. The learned trial Judge has also come to the conclusion that it was Nakshatramal who was very much interested in purchasing this strip of land but when he was not successful in doing so then a case of common way was created after loo- sing case before the Divisional Commissioner in his revision. The strip of land has always been in possession of the defendant and later on he purchased it for Rs. 14,910/- from the Municipal Board. The sale granted by the Municipal Board has not been cancelled and, therefore, plaintiffs petitioners had no prima facie case. (12). So far as legal position is concerned, this Court can interfere only when it finds that there is any error of jurisdiction committed by the trial Court or by the appellate Court but it is not so in the present case. (13). Learned counsel for the petitioners cited Firm Pyarelal Satpal and others vs. Santlal and others (6). A judgment in special appeal, in which it was held that though the public highways vest in the Municipality it cannot let out the parts of pu- blic highways for setting up stalls. He also cited Citizens of Bundi & Ors. vs. Municipal Board Bundi & Ors. (7), in which it was held that where a place is a park or chowk or maidan or public square etc. It cannot be sold by local authority or State. It was a case in which the Municipal Board was going to auction certain property which was a part of way. In those facts it was observed that the Municipal Board had no authority to sell the property. But in the case in hand the land has already been sold to the respondent. It was a case in which the Municipal Board was going to auction certain property which was a part of way. In those facts it was observed that the Municipal Board had no authority to sell the property. But in the case in hand the land has already been sold to the respondent. Defendant has already raised some construction and there is no suit for cancellation of the sale by the Municipal Board. The trial Court as well as the appellate Court have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs petitioners had no prima facie case. To me, there appears to be no reason to interfere in the finding of the two courts as it is based on the sound principles of law and there is no error of jurisdiction. The trial Court and the appellate Court refused to grant interim injunction. It is unjustified to interfere in the finding regarding prima facie case. (punicipal Corporation vs. Suresh Chandra (8). (14). Learned counsel for the respondents in the end submitted that the reso- lution dated 14.10.93 which the plaintiffs wanted to produce during the appeal itself mentions that the Municipal Board wants to acquire the land. He submitted that if any proceeding to that effect take place, the defendant respondent will look after his interest at the proper time. (15). On the basis of above discussion, I find that there is no force in this revi- sion petition and the same is hereby dismissed. No orders as to costs.