S. K. PHAUJDAR, J. In the above applications the same order dated 11. 8. 98 recorded by the City Magistrate, Mathura, under Section 144, Cr PC has been chal lenged and as such the two matters were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The first mentioned application was initially filed as a writ petition bearing No, 26633 of 1988 and was accordingly pre sented before a Division Bench. Subse quently, it was converted to one under Section 482, Cr PC and has been regis tered under the present number. 3. The second mentioned application was initially filed under Section 482, Cr PC jurisdiction. It was then made a writ petition and was again converted to one under Section 482, Cr PC and the present number has been attributed to it. 4. The order impugned in both these applications stand annexed in Annexure A-1 to the second mentioned application. Through this order the City Magistrate, Mathura. indicated that he had perused the reports of the police officers and was of the opinion that it was necessary to stop busi ness transactions in certain shops within the Krishna Janambhoomi premises at Mathura, wherein an Idgah is also situated as a question to upkeep of peace and law and order was involved. It was stated in the order that the shops, 31 in number, for which the order was issued were situated within the Janambhoomi premises at Mathura and the traders in those shops used to bring their commodities even day from outside and carry them back again. Checking at the main gate was there but it was not feasible to check every material brought in, especially those which were in closed receptacles. It was apprehended that as a result of failure of full checking a se rious threat to the security of the Janambhoomi Premises and the Shahi Idgah Masjid might arise (ghambhir khatra uttpann ho gayan ho sakta hai. ). It was further indicated that if any explosion or other serious instance occurred within the premises, it will not only disturb the security of the premises but also of the State and the whole coun try, giving rise to communal tension. ). It was further indicated that if any explosion or other serious instance occurred within the premises, it will not only disturb the security of the premises but also of the State and the whole coun try, giving rise to communal tension. It was indicated that the shops in the Krishna Janambhoomi premises were un der the occupation of the traders of the Hindu community owing allegiance to different Hindu Organisations and it was possible that some particular organisations (fa ^fpitfi) for the purpose of achieving its own end could use these shop keepers and traders as medium of their activities. It was also indicated in the order that in the name of saleable commodities, explosives could be brought in and persons having extremist movements could sneak into the premises and could cause damage to the Krishna Janambhoomi and Shahi Idgah Masjid. 5. Only upon these apprehensions the City Magistrate felt that all these 31 shops should stop their business completely and should vacate the shops in view of the maintenance of security and peace and the Magistrate expressed satisfaction with the opinion of the Superintendent of Police Mathura that a great rush of pilgrims was expected on the Janamashtami day (15. 8. 98) and, as such, it was absolutely necessary to stop with immediate effect any business transaction in these shops and to get them vacated on a priority basis. The order also indicated that the Supreme Court had directed in writ petition No. 131 of 1997 that for protection of the Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Shahi Idgah Masjid any necessary steps could be taken by the State Government and any order to the contrary by a court subordinate to the Su preme Court would not be effective. The order also indicated that the Supreme Court had directed in writ petition No. 131 of 1997 that for protection of the Krishna Janam Bhoomi and Shahi Idgah Masjid any necessary steps could be taken by the State Government and any order to the contrary by a court subordinate to the Su preme Court would not be effective. By this order, the City Magistrate had forbid den the following : (1) Running business in the aforesaid 31 shops bearing specific numbers as indicated therein; (2) Opening the shops or bringing any commodities thereto or taking out the same therefrom; (3) Entry into the Janambhoomi premises with firearms and other dangerous arms or materials for instigating anybody from doing it, barring the officers deputed for keeping law and order; (4) Organising any meeting within the premises or outside, making out exciting speeches or publishing pamphlets or papers or printing any material to give vent to religions sentiments or communal tension; and (5) Spreading any rumour or allowing oth ers to spread rumours. As a question of public security and peace was involved, the order was passed ex pane indicating therein that the same would be effective from 12. 8. 1998 till 11. 10. 98. In their application the appli cants in the above two cases indicated that the Krishna Janambhoomi premises are managed by a committee known as Krishna Janamsthan Seva Sansthan (in short, sansthan), it was stated that the Sansthan was out to evict the shop keepers by hook or crook. Suits were filed before the Small Causes Courts for evicting these shop keepers from the aforesaid shops on the ground of termination of their licenses. The court found that the applicants were not licencees or trespassers but were ten ants in respect of the premises under their possession and the suit was not maintain able under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. The Sansthan want up in ap peal before the District Judge but the lower Courts order was confirmed. Subse quently, the order under Section 145 (1) of the Cr PC (in short the Code) was passed by the City Magistrate, Mathura, in March, 1995 on the basis of the police report. The High Court was approached in a criminal revision and the order of the City Magistrate was stayed. 6. Subse quently, the order under Section 145 (1) of the Cr PC (in short the Code) was passed by the City Magistrate, Mathura, in March, 1995 on the basis of the police report. The High Court was approached in a criminal revision and the order of the City Magistrate was stayed. 6. It was asserted in the instant appli cations that having failed to achieve their goal, the Sansthan got the State machinery moved to make an amendment in the rent control legislation and the amendment was also challenged in CM. W. P. No. 10833 of 1995 and the Sansthan was restrained from dispossessing the tenants otherwise than in accordance with law. It was stated that the attempt to oust them has taken the worse shape by way of making an order under Section 144 of the Code. 7. It was further stated that no case of particular emergency was at all made out nor did the Magistrate indicate such a sat isfaction before recording the order in question. It was further argued that the Supreme Courts order spoken of in the impugned order could not be interpreted to mean that even a non-maintainable pro ceeding could be drawn up for the prem ises. The order was described as tainted with mala fide. 8. On behalf of the State again the above, if any directions are necessary it would be open to either lo of the Government or the concerned (sic) to approach this Court. . . . . . " (8&9 para missed ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Upon a subsequent application filed by Mohd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10. Upon a subsequent application filed by Mohd. Aslam alias Bhurey, (1997) 5 SCC 475 , the Supreme Court further observed that an order recorded by a sub ordinate Court for maintenance of status quo had caused some difficulty as the ad ministrative and police officials thought that on account of me status quo order they were not in a position to strengthen the barricades, add to them or improve the upon them. The Supreme Court expressed an opinion that there was no reason why the authority should have thought that the status quo order prevented them from strengthening the barricades. The Supreme further observed. ". . . . . . . . we had in no uncertain terms per mitted them lo do everything that is necessary to protect the place of worship. No order of any subordinate Court can be construed to run counter to this Courts order. . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . judgment of the Supreme Court was relied. Court further observed, upon and it was stated further that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate who is the keeper of the law and order at the spot to draw up a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code and if materials were there before him by way of reports from the police or otherwise, the High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . extra m. 11. Another order was passed by the Supreme Court in W. P. (C) No. 611 of 1993 wherein a prayer for taking steps to safeguard religious places like Gyanvyapi Masjid and Vishwanath temple at Varanasi and the Krishna temple and Idgah at Mathura were made. The Supreme Court directed the Stale and the Union of India Government to take all necessary steps for safeguarding the religious places as prayed for in the above prayer. Court could not interfere into his satisfac tion. It was stated further that the appli cants had ample opportunity of alternative remedy by way of applications under Sec tions 145 (5) and (6) of the Code as also by way of revision and, in fact, one of the parties affected by the order had already preferred a revision before the Sessions Judge at Mathura. There is, however, no dispute that none of the present applicants have preferred any revision or any appli cation under Section 144 (5) or (6) of the Code. 9. The judgment of the Supreme Court appears to be the sheet anchor of the ac tion taken by the Magistrates as also of the argument of the Slate. The judgment was recorded in W. P. (Civil) No. 541 of 1995 and the Supreme Court had observed : "we have no doubt that the State and the Central Government will do everything that is necessary to protect the places of worship i. e. , the two mosques in question and if for that purpose they need and directions from this Court on account of impediment, they would be at. liberty to move this Court.- 12. These orders were passed in re spect of maintaining peace in the tem ples/mosques at Kashi and Mathura. liberty to move this Court.- 12. These orders were passed in re spect of maintaining peace in the tem ples/mosques at Kashi and Mathura. The tenor of the order of the Supreme Court and the clear directions indicated that it was the job of the administration to protect the places of worship and they were free lo take such steps as were necessary for that end. The order of the Supreme Court must be read to mean that only necessary legal steps were allowed to be taken and not beyond the legal provisions. Thus the very existence of the Supreme Courts order may not be read to forbid a challenge lo the legality of the order under Section 144 of the Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We for the present; therefore, do not deem necessary to give any direction but as stated (ext m.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . On the question as to what is the true it scope of an order under Section 144 of the Code Several case- laws were relied upon by the learned State counsel. In the case of Saved Asraf Husain v. State, IT 1998 (4) SC at 314, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court was right in observing that in sensitive issues covering communal, tension, suitable orders were required to be passed by the Government so that har mony was maintained in the society. Con firming the view of the High Court, the Supreme Court directed that proper repre sentation be made by the appellants be longing to Shia Community to the State Government. It was argued by the State that the court did not want to interfere with the power of the Government to keep peace. 13. Reference was also made to a de cision of the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Bal Behari Nurserv, School, 1990 Crl. It was argued by the State that the court did not want to interfere with the power of the Government to keep peace. 13. Reference was also made to a de cision of the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Bal Behari Nurserv, School, 1990 Crl. Law Journal 422. It was held. herein that an order under Section 144 of the Code was an executive order made for preserving peace and reasonable apprehensions on carrying on trade could, also be imposed for preservation of peace. 14. In the case of Ishtiaq Hussain Farooqui, 1988 (25) ACC 566 (SC), a question of right to profess a religion was involved as it was curtailed by an order under Section 144 of, the Code. It was ob served that the right to profess a religion was not an absolute one but was subject to maintenance of public order and it was for the District Magistrate to exercise his powers in consonance with the provisions of Section 144 of the Code. 15. In the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 2198 , the Supreme Court observed that an order under Section 144 of the Code was administra tive in nature and was not judicial or quasi-judicial and it was amenable to writ jurisdiction if it violated any fundamental right. These words were spoken in a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitu tion of India and in paragraph 23 the Court explained that after separation of judiciary and executive after the 1974 Code the function of the Executive Magis trates were essentially of executive nature. In the same judgment however in para graph 26 the Court had observed that Sec tion 144 of the Code does not confer any power on the Executive Magistrate to ad judicate or decide upon a dispute of civil nature of question of title of properties or entitlement to the rights and if civil court had already recorded a judicial pro nouncement regarding such right the ex ecutive court must have due regard to such established right subject of course to paramount consideration of the public peace and tranquility. 16. Reliance was also placed on another Division Bench decided of the Allahabad High Court as reported in 1994 AWC 1752. 16. Reliance was also placed on another Division Bench decided of the Allahabad High Court as reported in 1994 AWC 1752. In this ease the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court ruled that when an order under Section 144, Cr PC is issued a person aggrieved by such order might seek redressal from the State Government under sub-clauses (6) and (7) of this Section and no writ could be issued. 17. In the oft quoted decision of the Supreme Court in Modhu Limayes case, AIR-1971. SC at p. 2486, the apex-Court has explained as to what was public ordey and had ruled that Section 144, Cr PC when properly applied is not unconstitu tional as offending Article 19 of the Con stitution. It was observed that the Section was concerned with freeing the society from menace of serious disturbances of grave character. It is directed against those who attempt to prevent the exercise of legal rights of others or imperil public safety and health. In paragraph 25 of this judgment it was further observed "the gist of action under Section 144 is the urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harm ful occurrence. In paragraph 29 again it was observed. "all these matters were considered also by this Court in Babu Lal Paroles case, 1961 (3) SCR 423 : AIR 1961 SC 884 . In that case the Court em phasised that the restraint is temporary, the power is exercised by senior Magis trates who have to set down material facts, in other words, to make an enquiry in the exercise of judicial powers with reasons for the order, with an opportunity to an aggrieved person to have it rescinded ei ther by the Magistrate or the superior Courts. " 18. Reference was also made to a de cision of the Allahabad High Court as reported in 1988 AWC 616 wherein it was observed that the powers under Section 482. Cr PC was not to be exercised when express powers were there on the subject matter. " 18. Reference was also made to a de cision of the Allahabad High Court as reported in 1988 AWC 616 wherein it was observed that the powers under Section 482. Cr PC was not to be exercised when express powers were there on the subject matter. The same view was taken in the case of Kailash Choudhury by this High Court, as reported in 1993 AWC 1621 , observing, "where there were express provisions barring a particular remedy, the High Court could not resort to exercise of its inherent powers and alternative remedy having been there, the powers under Sec tion 482, Cr PC could not be invoked. In this very case the Court had ruled that the provisions of Section 151, CPC and 482, Cr PC were in pari materia with each other and were identical worded. 19. The Supreme Court ruled in the case reported in AIR 1962 SC 527 , that an order of injunction could have been passed if not under Order XXXIX, under Section 94. CPC as well and if the provisions of Section 94 were not there, still the court could issue temporary injunctions in exer cise of its powers under Section 151, CPC. With all regards to the judgment in Kailash Chodhurys case, it can only be observed that Section 482, Cr PC speaks of retention of inherent powers of the High Court while Section 151, CPC gives the inherent powers to every court exercising civil jurisdiction. In that it is more wide than Section 482 of the Code. 20. The Supreme Court again ruled in the case reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185 , that when revision against an order is barred under Section 397 (2), Cr PC the powers under Section 182, were not to be exercised to defeat that bar. 21. The main tenor of the argument of the State is that the Magistrate is to be subjectively satisfied for initiating a pro ceeding under Section 144, Cr PC and once that satisfaction is arrived at on the basis of reports the same is not to be inter fered with as it was an executive order and not a judicial or quasi- judicial order. It was further stated that when alternative remedies were available to challenge the order the extra-ordinary and inherent powers would not be exercised. It was further stated that when alternative remedies were available to challenge the order the extra-ordinary and inherent powers would not be exercised. In this context the case laws have already been referred and although the Supreme Court had ruled that the order recorded under Section 144, Cr PC is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, it had also observed that the power under Section 144, Cr PC was to be exercised by senior Magistrates who have to set down the material facts, in other words to make an enquiry in exercise of judicial power with reason for the order. Section 482, Cr PC provides exercise of the inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary : (1) to give effect to any order under the Code, (2) to prevent abuse of the process of any court and (3) otherwise to secure the ends of Justice. 22. We may confine to the second as pect, i. e. to prevent abuse of the process of any court. It is true that the new Cr PC of 1973 separates the powers between the executive and the Judiciary and in that sense, as observed by the Supreme Court, the functions of the Magistrates are police functions in recording an order under Sec tion 144, Cr PC. But under the frame of the Cr PC, in Chapter II, the Executive Magistrates also form a class of criminal courts. Thus, when an action under the Code, to be precise under Section 144, Cr PC is taken by an Executive Magistrate, it is an order by a court and by norm and practice and by law as well we have kept those orders open to revision before a competent Court. Thus the order recorded by a Magistrate for action under Section 144, Cr PC is always open to judicial scrutiny by all higher courts and that was precisely stated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 29 of Madhu Limays case. 23. This Section 144, Cr PC appears in Chapter X covering maintenance of public order and tranquility and in Part C thereof this Section is the only provision under the heading of "urgent cases of nui sance or apprehended danger". 23. This Section 144, Cr PC appears in Chapter X covering maintenance of public order and tranquility and in Part C thereof this Section is the only provision under the heading of "urgent cases of nui sance or apprehended danger". The lan guage also speaks that in cases where in the opinion of the Executive Magistrate there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this Section and immediate preven tion or speedy remedy is desirable such Magistrate may by an urgent order stating the material facts of the case direct any person to abstain from certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed or dagger to human life, health or safety or a disturbance of public tranquility, riot or affray. 24. The Magistrate is certainly to form his opinion before proceeding under this section. The opinion or satisfaction may not be a subjective one as the section itself requires that there should be suffi cient ground and the Magistrate is to state the material facts of the case. Together with these requirements, there is the scope of judicial review by higher courts and that suggests that the opinion or satisfaction cannot but be objective. It is the urgency of a case of apprehended danger that gives a jurisdiction to a Magistrate to proceed un der Section 144, Cr PC and not a remote probability of apprehension of breach of peace or a farfetched link between the ac tion prohibited and a probable breach of peace. 25. If there be a lack of material to read this urgency from the face of the averments, certainly the Magistrate will be deemed not to have a jurisdiction under this section. Once the order suffers from initial lack of jurisdiction, it must be open to intervention under Section 482, Cr PC despite there being avenues for getting it rescinded. The powers under Section 144 (5) and (6) could be invoked when there is an order within the jurisdiction but when an order is without jurisdiction the powers under Section 482, Cr PC cannot be barred simply for existence of an alternative rem edy. 26. The powers under Section 144 (5) and (6) could be invoked when there is an order within the jurisdiction but when an order is without jurisdiction the powers under Section 482, Cr PC cannot be barred simply for existence of an alternative rem edy. 26. Back to the impugned order in question, we find that the Magistrate was informed by senior police officers about the alleged apprehension of breach of peace and in these reports the police offi cers had described the dispute as (dispute over shops ). This was not just a stray of inadvertent heading as there had been earlier litigations between the Sansthan and these shop keepers on the question of vacation of the shops and these litigations were decided against the Sansthan. Vacation was not sought in these actions on the ground of safety or security of the shrines. Security of the Krishna Janam Bhoomi and the Idgah were allegedly threatened, as per the order under Section 144, Cr PC, as the authori ties were apprehending that extremists might infiltrate into the premises. They might woo the Hindu shop keepers to fol low their ideologies and thereupon agree to smuggle and arms and ammunitions and dangerous materials, which would at the end disturb the sensitive situation at the Krishna Janambhoomi-Shahi Idgah premises by damaging these shrines and that might ultimately result in country wide communal disturbances. 27. It is true that the Supreme Court had given a clear direction that the State could take any steps towards securing the safety of these and other religious sites, but this direction must be read as one to pro ceed according to law and, if necessary, to thereby curtail certain rights of the citizen. The order of the Supreme Court may not be read to mean that extra-legal powers would be exercised or even legal powers could be exercised in an extra-legal man ner. The order in question does not say that a situation had arisen whereby the Krishna Janambhoomi or the Idgah were threatened It simply states that, "ghambhir khatra uttpan ho gayan hai. " (a serious danger had arisen) and the reason for that con clusion is that due to failure in the check ing system at the entry gate, dangerous materials might be brought in through the closed receptacles, as the same could be indented in the name of bringing saleable wares in those shops. " (a serious danger had arisen) and the reason for that con clusion is that due to failure in the check ing system at the entry gate, dangerous materials might be brought in through the closed receptacles, as the same could be indented in the name of bringing saleable wares in those shops. It appears that the authorities had already made arrangement for checking entry and exit and to check the materials brought in and taken out. That itself is sufficient to prevent smug gling into the premises any unwanted ma terial. The checking could further be strengthen entry of any unwanted person also, but to say that without closing the business of those shops the end may not be achieved, simply suggests an acceptance on the part of the administration that their checking system is not fool-proof. It is true that reasonable restrictions may be put in on the fundamental right of a person to carry on a business but these reasonable restrictions may not be expended unrea sonably so as to take away the right in toto. 28. In the operative portion of the im pugned order, as quoted earlier, actions under five heads were prohibited. While those in head numbers 3, 4 and 5 were proper and justified, the same view may be taken of the directions in head numbers 1 and 2. These directions, it may be reiterated, are that (1) the shops numbers 1 to 8 B, 9, 10 and 21 to 30 and shops 11 to 20, total 31 shops, should stop all business transactions and (2) the shop keepers of these shops would not open these on and from 12. 8. 98 and would not collect any material for sale in these shops nor bring in any material thereto for the purpose of business nor shall carry any material out side. When direction No. 3 had prohibited taking into the premises any fire-arm or other dangerous material, these two direc tions, i. e. 1 and 2, were not at all necessary. More so, when no immediate con nection between the running of business in those shops and the apprehended threat was established. 29. The problem may be seen from another view point the Supreme Court had directed the State to take all necessary steps to secure the safety of the two relig ious sites. More so, when no immediate con nection between the running of business in those shops and the apprehended threat was established. 29. The problem may be seen from another view point the Supreme Court had directed the State to take all necessary steps to secure the safety of the two relig ious sites. These necessary steps must be read as necessary legal steps, as observed earlier and we should read another word in these directions that the steps must be sufficient as well, i. e. ineffective and in sufficient steps would lead to confusion and unnecessary exercise of administrative powers. An order under Section 144, Cr PC remains effective only for 60 days and the restraint on business may not stay be yond 60 days i. e. 11. 10. 98 and there may not be a repetitive order under Section 144, Cr PC. The State must, therefore, evolve some effective solution for protec tion of the two religious sites as the shops may not be vacated by a mere order under Section 144, Cr PC. At this Juncture the past litigations at the instance of the Sansthan to evict the tenants become an important point for consideration as a mala fide has been urged. 30. In view of the above discussion it is felt that the impugned order is liable to be interfered with under Section 482, Cr PC only to that extent where it is an abuse of the process of the Court and those are in. relation to restrictive, directions 1 and 2 in the impugned order. 31. The applications stand allowed in part. The 144, Cr PC order dated 12,8. 98 recorded by the City Magistrate, Mathura, shall remain operative for restrictive di rections 3, 4 and 5 only and it is quashed so far restrictive directions 1 and 2 in the impugned order are concerned. However, it will be open for the State to take such effective measures as may achieve the end of protecting the two religious sites in question. Applications allowed partly. .