JUDGMENT Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, A.C. J.—This writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the State of Himachal Pradesh to challenge the following interim order passed by Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal while allowing Review Petition No. 49/97 and setting aside its order dated 27.3.1998 passed in Original Application No. 323/89:— “In the meanwhile, it is ordered that none of the seniority lists under dispute be given effect to till the decision of the original application." 2. In Original Application No. 323/89, respondents 1 to.3 were the applicants, whereas, the State of Himachal Pradesh and respondents 4 to 18 were party respondents. The said Original Application was finally disposed of on 3.11.1997 with the following directions:— (i) Recruitment and Promotion Rules notified vide notification dated November 12, 1976 Annexures P-18 and P-19 insofar as these were made retrospective by para 3 of the notification were quashed and were declared prospective. (ii) The seniority list circulated vide Annexures P-20 and P-21 dated 7.7.1988 was also quashed. (iii) The State of Himachal Pradesh was directed to implement the judgment of the High Court by giving promotion to the respondents (now respondents 4 to 18) under the provisions of 1972 Rules, which were in force on the dates the applicants were recruited in service in 1974. The concession of learned Counsel for the applicants (now respondents 1 to 3) was also noticed that in case the respondents (now respondents 4 to 18) are promoted in accordance with the provisions of 1972 Rules, the applicants (now respondents 1 to 3) could not complain of any discrimination. 3. Respondents 4 to 18 challenged this order by filing Review Petition No.50 of 1997, which was allowed on the ground that none of them was ever served or had the occasion to appear on any of the actual dates fixed for hearing of the case. Besides setting aside the impugned order, the original application was also restored to its original number and interim direction, which is under challenge in this writ petition was passed. The State of Himachal Pradesh is aggrieved by the interim direction, as during its operation, it cannot make further promotions to the vacant posts of Superintending Engineers, which is adversely affecting the work of its Public Works Department. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The State of Himachal Pradesh is aggrieved by the interim direction, as during its operation, it cannot make further promotions to the vacant posts of Superintending Engineers, which is adversely affecting the work of its Public Works Department. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The first submission made by learned Advocate-General is that in the absence of any written request, as provided under Section 24 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the Act), no interim order could be passed. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 has urged that Section 24 of the Act is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case, as it applies at the inception stage, whereas, the interim order was passed while allowing the review application and setting aside the order passed in the original application. According to the learned Counsel, oral prayer was made by him on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 in the presence of learned Counsel for the State of Himachal Pradesh and respondents 4 to 18, which is not wrong and illegal in the absence of any provision in the Act barring the oral request for interim order. In order to counter the averments made in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3, on the affidavit of respondent No.1 Shri Baljeet Singh Rajpal, the State of Himachal Pradesh has filed supplementary affidavit of Smt. Purnima Chauhan, Joint Secretary (PW) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh stating that the present Assistant Advocate-General, Shri. R.C. Sharma has informed her vide his letter dated 26.6.1998 that upon verification from the records as well as from Shri P.M. Negi, Assistant Advocate-General, who was present on behalf of the State of Himachal Pradesh on 27.3.1998 when the review application was heard, that no such oral request was ever made for the stay of seniority list under challenge by the learned Counsel of respondents 1 to 3. 5. Be that as it may, we are of the view that the powers of the Tribunal to grant interim order are circumscribed by the restrictions imposed by Section 24 of the Act since it starts with non-obstante clause. 5. Be that as it may, we are of the view that the powers of the Tribunal to grant interim order are circumscribed by the restrictions imposed by Section 24 of the Act since it starts with non-obstante clause. In view of the first restriction that copies of such application and all documents in support of the plea for the interim order prayed for are to be furnished to the party against whom such application is made or proposed to be made, it is clear that oral prayer cannot be made for grant of interim order. We do not find any force in the submission made by learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 that application means an original application made under Section 19 as defined under sub-section (b) of Section 3 of the Act, therefore, the conditions prescribed under Section 24 of the Act are only applicable if interim order is prayed at the inception stage of filing the original application, in the prescribed pro forma of which there is a column for making interim prayer. We are of the view that what is not permissible at the inception stage cannot be permissible at any later stage of trial of the original application as it would defeat the very purpose of the restrictions provided under Section 24 of the Act for grant of interim stay. 6. The second condition provided under Section 24 of the Act that opportunity of hearing is to be given to the opposite party in the matter of granting interim order, further confirms that the prayer for interim order should be in writing to enable the opposite party to know the grounds on which the interim order is prayed for. In proviso to Section 24, it is also provided that the Tribunal may dispense with the requirement of supplying copies of the application and the documents in support of the plea for interim order and may not give opportunity to the opposite party before passing interim order in exceptional circumstances, if it is satisfied, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is necessary to do so for preventing any loss being caused to the applicant which cannot be adequately compensated in money. In the present case, in view of the spirit of this proviso, the Tribunal was required to give reasons why it had not only entertained but accepted the oral prayer of respondents 1 to 3 for staying the operation of seniority list in dispute without any application moved by them making such a request and giving copies thereof to the opposite parties i.e. the State of Himachal Pradesh and respondents 4 to 18 to enable them to oppose it. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the Tribunal has acted wrongly and illegally by making interim order dated 27.3.1998 without any written application filed by respondents 1 to 3 and without any opportunity to the State of Himachal Pradesh and respondents 4 to 18 to file reply thereto. Had this opportunity been given, the State of Himachal Pradesh would have pointed out its difficulty that in view of the stay of seniority list in dispute it would not be possible for it to make promotions to the vacant posts of Superintending Engineers, which would adversely affect the working of the Public Works Department and in turn the development of the State, as they I have pointed out in the present writ petition, 7. We also find that while passing this interim order the Tribunal has not kept in view that during the pendency of original application from 1989 to 1997 no interim order was ever prayed for. If the submission made by learned Counsel on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 is accepted that the interim order was granted in view of the fact that the order passed in favour of respondents 1 to 3 by allowing their original application was set aside, it would defeat the very purpose of allowing the review application and restoring the original application t6 its original number whereby the status quo ante was to be restored, otherwise, by granting interim order one of the reliefs in respect of setting aside the seniority list circulated vide Annexures P-20 and P-21 dated 7th July, 1988 would stand granted without final hearing of the original application on merits. 8. 8. In this background, we would have set aside the impugned directions and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for decision afresh in respect of grant of interim order, if respondents 1 to 3 prefer such an application, after giving opportunity to the State of Himachal Pradesh and respondents 4 to 18, but in view of the fact that no Bench is available to hear the matter, as out of three Members of the Tribunal the only Judicial Member, Shri Narender Singh Thakur, has shown his inability to hear the matter in view of the fact that he had earlier appeared on behalf of the State of Himachal Pradesh in the original application in his capacity as Additional Advocate, General, we have no alternative but to set aside the impugned interim direction and direct that any promotion made by the State of Himachal Pradesh during the pendency of the original application on the basis of impugned seniority list will be subject to the final decision in the original application, which would meet the ends of justice and equity. The writ petition is allowed in these terms. There is no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -