Honble Dr. CHAUHAN, J. (On behalf of himself, PALSHIKAR AND PARIHAR, JJ.)–In first two writ petitions, selection of respondents No. 3 to 12 (in writ petition No. 1704/1988), who have been appointed to the cadre of Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services vide order dated 20.4.1998 in pursuance of the advertisement dated 21.12.1996 and recommendations of the Rajasthan High Court dated 19.12.1997, has been questioned by challenging the validity of rules 3(b), 8(2) and 15(2) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred as the ``RHJS Rules, 1969) on various grounds and in Writ Petition No. 2179/1998, the selection has been challenged on the ground of being made in flagrant violation of the said Rules. A Division Bench referred the cases to a Larger Bench framing various issues. (2). In Writ Petition No. 1704/1998, Ganga Ram Moolchandani Versus High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and others, the facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the High Court issued an advertisement dated 21.12,1996 inviting applications for eleven posts in the cadre of R.H.J.S. to be filled-up in terms of the R.H.J.S. Rules, 1969. Petitioner, who is a practising Advocate in the District Court, Bareilly, a Court subordinate to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, applied in response to the said advertisement considering himself to be eligible though the said advertisement specifically provided that a candidate must have practised for seven years in Rajasthan High Court or courts subordinate thereto. He submitted his application through the District Judge, Bareilly. His application was processed by the Rajasthan High Court and he was called for interview. After interviewing, the Selection Committee found him meritorious and placed his name in the proposed select list. However, the Full Court, in its meeting held on l9th December, 1997, did not recommend the name of the petitioner as it was found to be dehors the Rules not being found eligible for the reason that he had not practised for seven years in the High Court of Rajasthan or the Courts subordinate thereto. Hence this writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the impugned Rules. (3). Hence this writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the impugned Rules. (3). In Writ Petition No. 1010/1998, Budh Deo Yadav Versus State of Rajasthan and others, the Petitioner had applied in response to the said advertisement dated 21.12.96 but he was not called for interview and his candidature was not considered on the ground that he was a full-time-salaried Deputy District Attorney in the State of Haryana. He has challenged the validity of the said Rules on the ground that it cannot be restricted to the persons practising in Rajasthan High Court or the Courts subordinate thereto. Moreover, the petitioner has to be considered as an Advocate taking into account the nature of service he is rendering to the State of Haryana. (4). The third Writ Petition No. 2179/1998 has been filed by the petitioner, who is a practising Advocate in the Courts at Deeg (district Bharatpur) which is a Court subordinate to the Rajasthan High Court. He had applied for the post in response to the said advertisement. He was interviewed. The Selection Committee did not find him suitable for appointment as Additional District & Sessions Judge in RHJS Cadre. His grievance is that two candidates, who had duly been selected and appo- inted, viz., Shri Seeta Ram and Shri Ram Singh Meena (though not impleaded as respondents) had been selected by allowing relaxation in the minimum marks fixed by the Selection Committee and as the Selection Committee was not competent to relax the minimum marks, their appointments are void, being dehors the Rules, and prayed that the entire selection process be quashed as the same stood vitiated. (5). All the three writ petitioners were heard together by the Division Bench of this Court. (5). All the three writ petitioners were heard together by the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench judgment of this Court in Daulat Raj Singhvi Versus State of Rajasthan, (1) and a Full Bench judgment approving the said judgment in Daulat Raj Singhvi in the case of Muni Lal Garg Versus State of Rajasthan,(2) where- in the validity of rules 8 and 15 had been up-held, were considered in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Panduranga Rao Versus Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, (3) The Division Bench raised doubt regarding the correctness of the Division Bench and Full Bench judgments of this Court referred to above and referred the matter to Five Judges, mainly on three questions: (i) whe- ther the provisions of rules 8 and 15 of the Rules are constitutionally valid; (ii) whether the Full-time-salaried Deputy District Attorney of the State of Haryana, may be deemed to be a `practising Advocate during the period of such appointment; and (iii) if the Rules are valid, whether there has been violation of the Rules in the recruitment process. (6). Having heard the parties, it was observed that instead of answering the question referred to the Bench, the writ petitions be finally decided alongwith the question of law referred to. Hence they were heard on the question referred to and also on other submissions made. (7). The R.H.J.S. Rules, 1969 have been framed by the Governor of Rajasthan in consultation with the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan in exercise of powers conferred under Article 233 and the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 3(b) defines the Court as the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. Rule 8 provides for Sources of Recruitment and Clause (2) of the said rule reads as under- ``8(2). -By direct recruitment from the Advocates who have practised in the Court or Courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. (8). Rule 15(2) provides that a candidate must be an Advocate who has practised in the Court or Courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. Rule 19 provides for channel of submission of the applications and requires that applications by the eligible candidates be submitted to the High Court through the concerned District Judges. Rule 20 provides for scrutiny of the applications received under rule 19. Rule 19 provides for channel of submission of the applications and requires that applications by the eligible candidates be submitted to the High Court through the concerned District Judges. Rule 20 provides for scrutiny of the applications received under rule 19. Sub-rule (2) of rule 20 provides for the interview of the eligible candidates by a Committee of the Judges of the High Court. Sub-rules (3) and (4) of rule 20 reads as under- ``(3) The recommendation of the Committee shall be placed before the Full Court with relevant record and the Court shall make the final selection of the candidate or candidates suitable for appointment to the Service in order of merit." ``(4) Notwithstanding hereinbefore contended, if the number of persons selected in accordance with the above mentioned provision is less than the number of posts required to be filled by direct recruit- ment, the Court may select persons to fill the remaining vacancies even from amongst those Advocates who have not applied under rule 19 but fulfil the qualification laid down in Clause (2) of rule 8 and are considered to be fit for appointment to the Service. (9). Rule 21 provides that the Court shall prepare the list of all the candidates whom it considered suitable for appointment to the Service, arranging their names in the order in which they are to be appointed, and shall recommend their names to His Excellency the Governor for appointment to the Service, having regard to the provisions of rule 9. (10). In Writ Petition No. 1704/1998, Mr. Jagdeep Dhankar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted various averments challenging the validity of the said Rules 8 and 15. It may be worth mentioning here that his entire submissions have been limited solely on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and reliance has been placed only on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Panduranga Rao case (supra). It may be worth mentioning here that his entire submissions have been limited solely on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and reliance has been placed only on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Panduranga Rao case (supra). He has contended that in Panduranga Rao, the Honble Supreme Court has found the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nallanthighal Bhaktvatsalam lyenger Versus Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, Kurnool(s) (4), not to be a correct law and further held that the petitioner therein, Panduranga Rao, should not have been found ineligible only on the ground that he had been enrolled in Mysore High Court and not in Andhra Pradesh High Court though he was practising in the Courts subordinate to the Andhra Pradesh High Court and, thus, the Rules in question are unconstitutional as the same have rendered the Advocates practising in other States ineligible for the posts in question, particularly when there is no such restriction for appointment in the Rajasthan Judicial Service under the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1954 (hereinafter called "the R.J.S. Rules, 1955"). (11). Mr. B.P. Agrawal, the learned Advocate General has submitted that in the instant case the rules do not require enrollment of a candidate in the Bar Council of Rajasthan. The only requirement is that he must have practiced for a minimum period of seven years in Rajasthan High Court or in Courts subordinate thereto. It has further been urged by the learned Advocate General that the earlier Full Bench judgment in Muni Lal Garg (supra) does not require reconsideration at all even if some legal points had not been urged and considered therein. It has further been urged by the learned Advocate General that the earlier Full Bench judgment in Muni Lal Garg (supra) does not require reconsideration at all even if some legal points had not been urged and considered therein. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on a Constitution Bench judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Ambika Prasad Versus State of Uttar Pradesh, (5) where- in the Honble Supreme Court has held that every new discovery of argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent for the reason that statutory provisions cannot be kept in constant uncertainty by judicial review otherwise it would paralyse, by perineal suspension, the legislative and administrative actions on vital issue ``deterred by the brooding threat of forensic blow-up and would be a kind of ``judicial destabilisation of State action too dangerous to be indulged in save where national crisis of great moment to the life, liberty and safety of this country and its millions are at stack, or the basic direction of the nation itself is in peril of a shake-up. The issue does not require to be reconsidered merely on the ground that it was ``badly argued, inadequately consi- dered and fallaciously reasoned. (12). Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Mahesh Kumar Sahariya Versus State of Nagaland and others, (6) wherein the Apex Court held that an issue does not require reconsideration at all when the earlier decision has been followed by the Court consistently and its binding effect cannot be disturbed merely on the ground that any particular aspect has not been considered therein. (13). It has further been urged by the learned Advocate General that at the time of framing of these Rules in 1969, the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Panduranga Rao case had been considered and the Rules have been framed in consonance with the said judgment. The Rules have stood the test of scrutiny for last three decades and have consistently been followed without any interruption. The validity of the said Rules had already been considered by the Division Bench and Full Bench of this Court, as referred to earlier, and it is well settled proposition of law that a settled position of law should not be disturbed unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The validity of the said Rules had already been considered by the Division Bench and Full Bench of this Court, as referred to earlier, and it is well settled proposition of law that a settled position of law should not be disturbed unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. To fortify this contention, reliance has been placed upon the decision in Attorney General of Onterio and others Versus Canada Temperance Federation and others, (7) wherein it has been held that the Court should seldom depart from the decisions of old standing on constitutional question, as the said judgments have been acted upon both by the Government and its subjects. (14). Same view has been taken in Thamma Venketasubhama Versus Thamma Rattamma and others, (8) wherein after considering a large number of the judgments, the Apex Court held that it was not desirable that the Court should up-set the settled legal position except under compelling circumstances as it was for the Legislature to consider whether it should change such law or not. Similarly, in lndramohan Lal Versus Ramesh Khanna, (9) the Apex Court explained that a different view would not only introduce an element of uncertainty and confusion but it will also have effect of unsettling the transactions which might have entered into on the faith of those decisions. On the basis of the earlier judgments, transactions have been completed which had never been doubted and not following the earlier judgment without any compelling reason, would create difficulties of unimaginable magnitude. (15). Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Assistant District Registrar, Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Versus Vikram Bhai Ratilal Dalal and others, (10) Ajit Singh C. Gaekwad and others Versus Dileep Singh D. Gaekwad and others, (11) In Collector of Central Excise, Madras Versus M/s. Standard Motor Products and others, (12) the Apex Court has observed that if the decision of the Court is holding the field for a long time, it is neither desirable to disturb the settled practice of the Court nor to refer the question to the Larger Bench for reconsideration. (16). In Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation Versus M. Guruvi Reddy and others, (13) the Court observed that ``if the Courts order is disturbed, it will, in fact, create complete ------- resorting a situation which has ceased to exist more than six years from now. (16). In Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation Versus M. Guruvi Reddy and others, (13) the Court observed that ``if the Courts order is disturbed, it will, in fact, create complete ------- resorting a situation which has ceased to exist more than six years from now. In Kattite Valappil Pathumma and others Versus Taluk Land Board and others, (14) the Apex Court observed as under- ``We concur with the reasoning and conclusion of the High Court. We are further of the view that even if another view is possible, we are not inclined to take a different view at this distance of time. Interpre- tation of law is not a mere mental exercise. Things which have been adjudged long ago, should be allowed to rest in peace. A decision rendered long ago can be over-ruled only if this Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong or unfair and not merely on the ground that another interpretation is possible and the Court should arrive-at a different conclusion........ These are weighty considerations to hold that even if a different view is possible, if it will have the effect of up-setting or re- opening past and close transactions or unsettling title all over the State, this Court should be loathe to take a different view. (17). On the basis of the judgments referred to above, the learned Advocate General has urged that as all the appointments of Additional District & Sessions Judges in R.H.J.S. cadre had been made under the Rules in question, the validity of the Rules, which had already been up-held by the Full Bench of this Court three decades ago, does not require to be reconsidered. (18). It has further been urged by the learned Advocate General and Mr. Sagar Mal Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing for some of the selected and appointed candidates that it is not obligatory for the Larger Bench to reply to the issues referred to it. In support of their submissions, reliance has been placed upon two judgments of the Full Bench of this Court in Habu Versus State of Rajasthan, (15) and the R.S.E.B. Accountants Association, Rajasthan Versus Rajasthan State Electricity Board, (16) (19). In support of their submissions, reliance has been placed upon two judgments of the Full Bench of this Court in Habu Versus State of Rajasthan, (15) and the R.S.E.B. Accountants Association, Rajasthan Versus Rajasthan State Electricity Board, (16) (19). On behalf of the respondents, it has further been urged that there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon the party challenging its validity to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. (20). In Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad Versus Jan Mohammed Usman Bhai and another (17), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under- ``There is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks in to show that there has been a clear violation of the constitutional principles. The Courts must presume that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciate the claim of its own people that its laws are directed against the problems made manifestly by experience and that its discrimination are based on adequate ground. It must be borne in mind that the Legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be a clearest and finally that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may take into consideration the matters of common knowledge, matters of rapport, history of the times and may assume every set of facts which can be conceived to be existing at the time of legislation. (21). In K. Anjaiah and others Versus K. Chandraiah and another (18) the Court has observed that it is the cardinal principle of construction that the statute and the rules or the regulations must be held to be constitutionally valid unless and until it is established that they violate any specific provision of the Constitution and the Court is under solemn duty to scrutinise the provisions of the Act, Rules or the Re- gulations within the set para-meters if the validity of the statutory provisions is challenged. Same view has been taken in Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanepravan Kalliani Amma Versus K. Devi, (19) and L.K. Lakshmanan Versus State of Tamil Nadu,(20) and New Delhi Municipal Council Versus State of Punjab and others, (21) (22). Same view has been taken in Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanepravan Kalliani Amma Versus K. Devi, (19) and L.K. Lakshmanan Versus State of Tamil Nadu,(20) and New Delhi Municipal Council Versus State of Punjab and others, (21) (22). It has further been urged on behalf of the respondents that a large num- ber of States have framed the Rules putting the similar condition. Our attention has been drawn to the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963. Rule 6(3) of the said Rules provides for eligibility and provides that no person shall be eligible for direct appointment to the Senior Branch of the Service unless he is able to speak, read and write Orria and he has passed a test in Orria equivalent to M.E. Standard. Rule 8(3) further provides that the candidate must have atleast seven years standing at the Bar. Further reference has been made to Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956 wherein Rule 4 provides for recruitment to the Junior Branch of the Service. Sub-rule 4(iii)(b) provides that a candidate must ordinarily have practised as an Advocate, Attorney or Pleader in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto, for not less than three years on the last date prescribed for submissions of the applications. The "High Court" has been defined as High Court of Bombay and this provision was brought by amendment with effect from 6.1.1973, i.e., after seventeen years of the enactment of the said Rules. Further, rule 5(ii)(b) provides for ap- pointment of District Judges and Judges of the Bombay City Civil Courts on the recommendation of the High Court from the members of Bar who have practised as Advocate or Pleader for not less than seven years in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto. (23). Thus, in view of the aforesaid back-drop we considered the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Muni Lal Garg (supra) in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Panduranga Rao. In Muni Lal Garg case, this Court has observed that the condition of practice in Rajasthan High Court or the Courts subordinate thereto, has been prescribed to more effectively secure the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge of local laws and to have experience in the administration of those laws and it was found that the. In Muni Lal Garg case, this Court has observed that the condition of practice in Rajasthan High Court or the Courts subordinate thereto, has been prescribed to more effectively secure the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge of local laws and to have experience in the administration of those laws and it was found that the. condition of qualification of seven years practice as an Advocate in Rajasthan High Court or Courts subordinate thereto, had a reasonable nexus with the object underlying the Rules, as seven years practice will enable a person to be recruited to have sufficient knowledge of local laws, local conditions as well as regional language which are necessary for the discharge of the duties of District & Sessions Judge efficiently and, thus, held that the Rules were based upon a reasonable classification founded on intelligent differentia having a reasonable nexus to the object to be achieved and, thus, were valid. (24). In Panduranga Rao case, before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court condition of enrollment, as the petitioner therein had been enrolled in Mysore High Court and was practising in the courts subordinate to Andhra Pradesh High Court, was in issue and the Court held that the petitioner therein should not have been discriminated on the ground of enrollment alone. However, the Court, in unambiguous and crystal clear words, has observed as under- ``(8). The object of the rule is to recruit suitable and proper persons to the Judicial Service in the State of Andhra with a view to secure fair and efficient administration of justice and so there can be no doubt that it would be perfectly competent to the Authority concerned to prescribe qualification for eligibility for appointment to the said service. Knowledge of local laws as well as knowledge of regional language and adequate experience at the Bar may be prescribed as qualification which the applicants must satisfy before they apply for the post................... ``15. In this connection, it may be permissible to point out that the se- cond condition in regard to three years actual practice might more appropriately have required that the said three years practice should be in the Civil or Criminal Courts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Andhra High Court. ``15. In this connection, it may be permissible to point out that the se- cond condition in regard to three years actual practice might more appropriately have required that the said three years practice should be in the Civil or Criminal Courts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Andhra High Court. That would have more effectively secured the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge of local laws and to have experience in the matter of administration of the said laws. (25). Therefore, the Constitution Bench has clearly laid down that in order to achieve the goal of recruiting the suitable candidates, well acquainted with the local laws, local conditions and local language, who would be able to administer justice, in an efficient manner, putting a condition that the candidate must have practised for a stipulated period in the concerned High Court or Civil/Criminal Court subordinate thereto, would serve the purpose. (26). The classification would not be violative of equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution as the classification is reasonable in the contest and the object for enactment of the provision. In adjudging the validity of the provision, the existing conditions in which the law is to be applied, cannot be ignored for the reason that it is relatable to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. (Vide Anukul Chandra Pradhan Versus Union of India and others, (22). (27). To attract the operation of the equality clause enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to show that the differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary and it does not rest on reasonable basis having regard to the object which has to be achieved. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment or inequality of punishment does not, per se, amount to discrimination and may bring the case within the zone of inhabition of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, the question for determination is not whether the law has resulted in equality but whether there is some differentiation which bears just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. For striking down the rules, it is necessary that the rule should be found to be intrinsically arbitrary or based on irrational classification or otherwise repugnant to the Constitutional principle. For striking down the rules, it is necessary that the rule should be found to be intrinsically arbitrary or based on irrational classification or otherwise repugnant to the Constitutional principle. Unless there is a clear transgration of Constitutional principle which is discernable from the object and scheme, the case will not fall within the ambit of Constitutional inhabition of Art.14. (28). We find no force in the submissions made that the object of recruiting suitable candidates knowing the local laws and local language could be achieved by holding a written test and interview providing eligibility to all Advocates practising for seven years through-out the country and assessing their merits. The Constitutional validity of the provisions of the rules can neither be challenged nor examined on the ground that an alternative mode, if provided, could sub-serve the cause better. It is well settled that where certain result is achieved by legislation, which, in itself, is not discriminatory, even if other modes are open and better to achieve that result, the legislation cannot be struck down for the reason that those other methods were not followed as the legislature is the sole Judge of the method to be adopted and for the same reason the contention of Mr. Dhankar that R.J.S. Rules, 1954 provides for an alternative method which ought to have been adopted in R.H.J.S. Rules, is untenable. Moreover, the two Rules provide for modes of employment in entirely two different services laying down different eligibility and providing for different modes of recruitment. Thus, it cannot be said that there is any discrimination while making recruitments in R.H.J.S. cadre. (29). It was then contended by Shri Dhankar, Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of rules 8 and 9 of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules are unconstitutional as they violate the provisions of Article 16, also. According to him, the petitioners are being rendered ineligible for consideration to the public employment as Additional District Judge in Rajasthan State on the ground that they are not residents of Rajasthan. According to him, the petitioners are being rendered ineligible for consideration to the public employment as Additional District Judge in Rajasthan State on the ground that they are not residents of Rajasthan. According to him, the requirement of practice for not less than seven years in any Court in Rajasthan is in effect requirement of residence in Rajasthan and it has been mandated by Article 16 Clause (2) that no citizen shall, on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State and hence the requirement of seven years, experience is bad in law. (30). The argument is unacceptable to us for the reason that the requirement does not violate Article 16 in any manner. The requirement of residence, as alleged by the petitioner, is not the requirement of the rules. All that is required by the rule is that a person, for being eligible for recruitment as Additional District Judge in Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service, should have practised for seven years or more in any of the Courts in the State of Rajasthan. He can well have his residence for that purpose in any other State. The argument is devoid of any substance as can be seen from the following illustrations, namely, a person is a citizen of India residing in Uttar Pradesh, bordering Dholpur area of Rajasthan State and practices at Courts in Dholpur having his permanent residence in Uttar Pradesh, there is no bar on such person from applying for the post of Additional District Judge and he is not ineligible because he i s resident of Uttar Pradesh. Conversely, a person residing permanently in Dholpur area is a citizen of India residing in Rajasthan State but he, for all practical purposes, practises only in the Court in Uttar Pradesh around Agra. Such person will be ineligible for applying for the post of Additional District Judge in Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service for the reason that he has not practised for more than seven years in Courts in Rajasthan. That is to say, a person who has his perma- nent residence in Rajasthan is, also, ineligible because he has not practised in Rajasthan. Such person will be ineligible for applying for the post of Additional District Judge in Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service for the reason that he has not practised for more than seven years in Courts in Rajasthan. That is to say, a person who has his perma- nent residence in Rajasthan is, also, ineligible because he has not practised in Rajasthan. The requirement of the rules of seven years practice in the State of Rajasthan is, therefore, a requirement of practice and not requirement of residence as alleged by the learned counsel. What Article 16(2) prohibits is that discrimination should not be made only and only on the grounds mentioned therein. This Article does not prohibit the State from making discrimination on the grounds other than those mentioned therein, or the grounds mentioned therein coupled with other considerations. (Vide Yusuf Abdul Aziz Versus State of Bombay and another (23) Javed Niaz Beg and another Versus Union of India and another (24), and Air India Versus Nergesh Meerza and others (25). (31). It will be seen from the judgment of the Supreme Court, particularly, the judgment in Pandurang Raos case, referred to above, that it may be permissible to lay down as a condition of acquisition of knowledge of local laws and adequate experience at the bar may be prescribed as conditions for recruitment and, therefore, the requirement of practice of seven years or more in the Courts of Rajasthan cannot be held to be a requirement which violates either Article 14 or Article 16 as alleged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. On this ground, therefore, the petitions must fail and are liable to be dismissed. (32). We had gone through the judgment of our esteemed brother Sharma, J. and we are unable to share his view for the reason that a very heavy reliance has been placed on the original record of the Selection Proceedings, which was not the part of the record. Placing reliance on documents, which do not form part of the record of the case and that too without giving an opportunity to the other side to furnish explanation for them, would be against all judicial norms and principles of natural justice. Petitioner himself has not taken the pleadings regarding his kno- wledge and acquaintance with the Local Laws. Placing reliance on documents, which do not form part of the record of the case and that too without giving an opportunity to the other side to furnish explanation for them, would be against all judicial norms and principles of natural justice. Petitioner himself has not taken the pleadings regarding his kno- wledge and acquaintance with the Local Laws. The issue, which has not been raised by the petitioner in the petition nor agitated by the counsel at the time of argument, ought not to have been decided. The petitioner has to plead and prove his case. In the instant case, what to talk of pleading and proving, there is not even whisper of such submissions in the pleadings. (33). It is pertinent to note at this stage that in Pandurang Raos, case, the Supreme Court struck down the Andhra Pradesh Rules for the reason that it require registration with the Andhra Bar Council as a condition. Such is not the requirement of Rajasthan Rules and consequently a Full Bench of this Court was correct in holding the rule to be valid and constitutional. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Full Bench of this court and we do hereby affirm the decision holding that the rules 8 and 15 of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 are valid and constitutional. (34). The Division Bench, while making the reference, has also referred the questions regarding (i) violation of the Rules in the recruitment process in calling for interview ineligible candidates and even selecting one of them by the Selection Committee; and (ii) whether the Selection Committee itself was equipped with the knowledge of Local Laws, dialects and legal conditions and if not, what would be its effect. (35). The issue of calling the persons ineligible as per the advertisement, for interview whether advertently or inadvertently, is of no consequence for the reason that even if such a candidate is selected, the appointment will be illegal being dehors the statutory rules. (Vide Smt. Ravindra Kaur Sharma vs. State of Punjab (26); Smt. Herpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Industries (27), State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shyama Pardhi, (28) Dr. S.K. Kacker vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and others, (29), State of Rajasthan Versus Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, (30); Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. (Vide Smt. Ravindra Kaur Sharma vs. State of Punjab (26); Smt. Herpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Industries (27), State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Shyama Pardhi, (28) Dr. S.K. Kacker vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and others, (29), State of Rajasthan Versus Hitendra Kumar Bhatt, (30); Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra, (31); Upenchandra Gogoi vs. State of Assam and others, (32) Union of India and another vs. Ravi Shanker and another (33); and State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs. Dharamveer (34). (36). Therefore, even if the Selection Committee has committed a mistake by calling a person for interview and selecting him though not eligible as per the advertisement, and the mistake has been rectified by the Full Court in its meeting held on 19.12.97, the issues does not warrant consideration. (37). Similarly, issue of equipment of the Selection Committee with the know- ledge of Local Laws etc., cannot be considered as there are no pleadings and it is beyond imagination how issue can be raised and referred by a Court suo moto when none of the parties involved has raised it nor such an issue was agitated by any of the counsel appearing for the parties. None of the counsel made a request to call for the record. Thus, in the absence of any pleading in this respect, the issue could not have been raised. (38). In New Delhi Municipal Council (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under- ``At the out-set, we must express our great reluctance to deal with this proposition for it is not based on any contention advanced by any of the counsel who appeared before us, either in their written pleadings or in their oral submissions. This is not because we feel constrained to restrict ourselves to the parameters by the submissions of the counsel but because we feel that the opposite side has not a fair opportunity to answer the line of reasoning adopted in that behalf....... We have only the rule of caution in mind which warrants that ordinarily, courts should, particularly in constitutional matters, refrain from expressing any opinion on the point not raised or not fully and effectively argued by the counsel on other side. (39). In view of the above, we feel that this issues does not require any consi- deration and we are not inclined to answer it. WRIT PETITION NO. (39). In view of the above, we feel that this issues does not require any consi- deration and we are not inclined to answer it. WRIT PETITION NO. 1010/1998, BUDH DEO YADAV VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS. (40). In this case the petitioner, who is a Deputy Government Attorney in Haryana, claims rejection of his candidature as illegal and unconstitutional in view of the fact that he, being a Deputy Government Attorney, was a person having not less than seven years practice as an Advocate and was, therefore, eligible for being appointed. (41). Mr. J.P Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a Deputy Government Attorney in Haryana and in view of the nature of his services, he is eligible to be appointed under the provision of Article 233 (2) which reads as under- ``A person not already in service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed as a District Judge if he has been, for not less than seven years, an Advocate or a Pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. (42). It has been submitted by Mr. Sharma that inspite of the fact that the petitioner is in the service of the State of Haryana he remains an Advocate and his seven years service in Haryana shall make him eligible for the post in question. In support of his contention he has placed reliance on the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Mukhtiar Singh Versus State of Punjab and others, (35) wherein a Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court interpreted the rules framed under Section 49 of the Advocates Act, 1961 which provides that the Advo- cate shall, not be a full-time-salaried person of any Government, person, firm, corporation or concern so long as he continues to practice. A proviso has been added to this rule which excludes its applicability to the Law Officers of Central or State Government or Public Corporation or Body constituted by a statute who is entitled to be enrolled under the Rules of the Bar Council made under Section 28 (2) (e) read with Section 24 (1) (e) of the Act. A proviso has been added to this rule which excludes its applicability to the Law Officers of Central or State Government or Public Corporation or Body constituted by a statute who is entitled to be enrolled under the Rules of the Bar Council made under Section 28 (2) (e) read with Section 24 (1) (e) of the Act. The Court held that despite the fact of his being a full-time-salaried employee, a Law Officer, for the purpose of this rule, means a person who is designated by the term of his employment and who, by the said term, is required to and/or plead in Court on behalf of his employer. Such a person, undoubtedly, can be termed as a Government Pleader within the meaning of Sub- section (7) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Public Prosecutor within the meaning of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in that capacity as he was required to act or plead in courts on behalf of the Government and, thus, for the period, during which he continues in services as such, he will be deemed to be practising as an Advocate. The Court further observed that in the provisions of Article 233(1) "Service of the Union or of State" means the Judicial Service and not any other service and the Government Advocate is, also, eligible for being considered for appointment to the State Higher Judicial Service cadre. (43). A constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Chandra Mohan Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (36) has categorically held that the expression ``service in Clause 2 of Article 233 of the Constitution means a service consisting exclusively the persons entitled to fill-up the post of District Judge and other Civil post inferior to the post of the District Judge. As the expression "exclusively and intended" emphasises the fact that the Judicial Service consists only of persons entitled to fill-up the post of the District Judges and other Civil Judicial Post and that is the exclusive service of Judicial Officers. (44). As the expression "exclusively and intended" emphasises the fact that the Judicial Service consists only of persons entitled to fill-up the post of the District Judges and other Civil Judicial Post and that is the exclusive service of Judicial Officers. (44). In Satyanarain Singh Versus Chief Justice of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and others, (37) the Apex Court has observed that Clause (1) of Article 233 was applicable only in respect of the person who has been an Advocate or Pleader for not less than seven years, meaning thereby that he should not be a Ju- dicial Officer and has been an Advocate or Pleader for not less than seven years and he has been recommended by the High Court for appointment as a member of the Judicial Service. In Satyanarain Singh Versus High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (39), the Allahabad High Court held that under Clause (1) of Article 233, only ``those who are in active practice at the Bar, are eligible for direct recruitment under rule 5(a) of the Rules in Higher Judicial Service. (45). A Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Oma Shanker Sharma and another Versus Delhi Administration and another, (39) held that a Public Prosecutor may not cease to be an Advocate on his appointment as a Public Prosecutor by virtue of the provisions of rule 49 framed under the Advocates Act, 1961, but he cea- ses to be a member of the Bar. An Advocate has a special responsibility as a member of the Bar and owes duty to the Court, to his client and to the profession to which he belongs. He has rights, privileges and duties not as an employee of the party he represents but because he belongs to the Profession of Law. His decision in the conduct of cases cannot be circumscribed, controlled or restricted by his client like a master and servant. On the contrary, Law Officers employed by the Government as whole-time servant with no right to engage himself in private practice, is not a person who is ordinarily referred to as a member of the Bar in common parlance notwithstanding that by way of exception to the said rule 49 such persons are allowed to appear in the Court only to represent the Government. The Court distinguished an Advocate from the Public Prosecutor as the former cannot be a servant of his client while the later is not an independent officer like an advocate. In fact Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, inter alia, provides for constitution of Delhi Higher Judicial Service and rule 7 provides for regular recruitment by two modes; (a) by promotion on the basis of selection from members of Delhi Judicial Service who have completed not less than ten years of service in the Delhi Judicial Service; and (b) by direct recruitment from the Bar. Rule 9 further provides the qualification for direct recruitment inter alia that he must have practised as an Advocate for not less than seven years. The Court considered various aspects, parti- cularly the provisions of Sub-Section (7) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 2(u) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court, also, considered the case of B.B. Chalapati Versus State of Andhra Pradesh (40), wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court had held that the Public Prosecutors were not holding the Civil Post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and it held that inspite of the fact that by virtue of the provisions of rule 49, framed under the Advocates Act, 1961, a Law Officer remains an Advocate of the Court even after appointment and the relationship between him and the State after appointment continues to be that of a counsel and a client. But no-one should lose sight of the fact that Public Prosecutors are appointed as the employees of the State in accordance with the Rules framed in exercise of the powers conferred under proviso to Article 309 and then assigned the duty of representing the State in criminal cases. The Court observed as under- ``The Advocates Act, 1961 is an Act to make and consolidate the law relating to Legal Practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Council and of All India Bar Council. The Act, in pith and substance, is an enactment dealing with qualification, enrollment, right to practice and discipline of an Advocate. Power has been conferred by Section 49 on the Bar Council of India to make rules for discharging these functions under the Act. The Act, in pith and substance, is an enactment dealing with qualification, enrollment, right to practice and discipline of an Advocate. Power has been conferred by Section 49 on the Bar Council of India to make rules for discharging these functions under the Act. Such rules may prescribe, inter alia, the standard of professional conduct and etiquette to be observed by Advocates. Rules have been framed under Section 49 (1) (c) of the Act read with proviso thereto laying down the standard of professional conduct and etiquetes. Section VII, in which rule 49 is enacted, relates to the restrictions on other employment. An advocate cannot personally engage in any business. He cannot be a full-time-salaried employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or a concern. He ceases to be an advocate so long as he continues in such employment. A proviso was added with effect from 19.2.1980 to rule 49. An Advocate does not become the servant of his client or party who en- gages him but the true position is that he is the servant or a limb in the administration of justice. He owes a duty to the Court to assist in the administration of justice and is one of its officers. Law Officers employed by the Government as a full-time servant with no right to engage themselves in private practice, are not the persons who are ordinarily referred to as the Members of the Bar in the common parlance notwithstanding that by way of exception to said rule 49, such persons are allowed to appear in the Court only to represent the Government. (46). Therefore, it was held that inspite of the fact that Public Prosecutors may not cease to be Advocates under the Advocates Act, 1961, yet they cannot be said to be the practising Advocates at the Bar. The issue was further considered by the Delhi High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition No. 353/1997, Sushma Suri and others Versus National Capital Territory of Delhi and another, decided on 31.1.97, (41) wherein placing reliance on the earlier Division Bench judgment, the Court held that Public Prosecutors are not eligible to be considered for the post of District Judge. (47). (47). In a Review Petition No. 245/1992, All India Judges Association and others Versus Union of India and others, (42) some interim applications were considered by the Honble Supreme Court and decided by the judgment and order dated 10.5.1995, wherein the question of interpretation of the Notification issued on 13.5.94 by the State of Rajasthan amending the R.J.S. Rules, 1954 was involved. Rule 11 prescribed that no candidate will be eligible for recruitment to the Rajasthan Judicial Service unless, inter alia, ``he has not less than three years practice as a lawyer. By reason of this provision, the Assistant Public Prosecutors were debarred from competing in the selection process. The Court held that ``there can be no doubt that an Assistant Public Prosecutor practices as a Lawyer and is eligible for selection to the Judicial Service provided he has not less than three years practice as a Lawyer. Such Assistant Public Prosecutors were allowed to compete in the selection process. The Court placed reliance on para 26 of its earlier judgment in All India Judges Association and others vs. Union of India and others, (supra) wherein the Court has observed as under- ``There is no doubt in our mind that what was intended by the provision was that a candidate for appointment to Judicial Officer sh- ould be a person who has at least three years experience of practice as an advocate. He must be a lawyer in the sense that he regularly practices before a Court or a Tribunal, who appears for his client before the Court or Tribunal. It may be that in a given case he may do so only for a client who is his employer. (48). Thus, according to this judgment, in fact, it depends upon the nature of work which they are regularly doing and whether such Assistant Public Prosecutors are regularly appearing in the Court, would be a determining factor. (49). In Mukul Dalal Versus Union of India (43), the Apex Court has held that ``Office of the Public Prosecutor is a public one and the primacy given to the Public Prosecutor under the Scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure has a special performance. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Mudrika Prasad Singh Versus State of Bihar (44). Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Mudrika Prasad Singh Versus State of Bihar (44). In Srilekha Vidhyarthi Versus State of Uttar Pradesh (45), the Court observed that as per the U.P Legal Remembrancer Manual, the appointment of a Public Prosecutor was merely a professional engagement. It is used therein to distinguish it from ``appointment to a post under the Government in the strict sense. This however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a government servant holding the post under the Government, does not hold any Public Officer and the engagement is purely provided with no public element attaching to it. While discussing the power of the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 Cr.P.C., the Court observed as under- ``The power of Public Prosecutor, incharge of the case, is derived from the statute and the guiding consideration for it, must be the interest of administration of justice. (50). There can be no doubt that the functions of the Public Prosecutor relate to a public purpose entrusting him with the responsibilities of so acting only in the interest of administration of justice. In the case of Public Prosecutor, this additional public element flowing from the statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, undoubtedly invest the Public Prosecutor with the attribute of holder of a public office which cannot be vitalled down by the assertion that their engage- ment is purely professional between a client and his lawyer with no public element attaching to it. The nature of appointment of the Government Advocate was further considered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Versus U.P Government Law Officers Association, (46) wherein the provisions of Section 5 of the U.P Legal Remembrancer Manual were interpreted and appointment of Government Advocates in the High Court, was considered to be purely a professional engagement. (51). In a recent decision in Civil Appeal No. 3021/1997, Sushma Suri Versus Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and another, decided on 8.10.98,(47) the Apex Court has considered the issue and observed that it cannot be appropriate to restrict the employment in Higher Judicial Service only to the Advocates who are engaged in private practice as it would be too narrow a view, for the object of recruitment is to get persons of necessary qualification, experience and knowledge of life. A Government Counsel may be a Public Prosecutor or Government Advocate but he has experience in handling various types of cases a- part from dealing with Government Officers. The experience gained by such persons cannot be said to be irrelevant or detrimental to the selection in Higher Judicial Service. In a very general sense, an Advocate is a person "who acts and pleads for another in a Court," and if a Public Prosecutor or a Government Counsel is on the roUS of Bar Council, he acquires the description of an Advocate. The Apex Court has observed as under- ``An Advocate employed by the Government or a Body Corporate as its Law Officer, even on terms of payment of salary, would not cease to be an advocate in terms of rule 49 if the condition is that such Advocate is required to act or plead in Courts on behalf of the emplo- yer. The test, therefore, is not whether such person is engaged on terms of salary or by payment of remuneration but whether he is engaged to act or plead on its behalf in a Court of law as an Advocate. In that event, the terms of engagement will not matter at ail. What is of essence is as to what such Law Officer engaged by the Government does. Whether he acts or pleads in Court on behalf of his employer or otherwise. If he is not acting or pleading on behalf of his employer then he ceases to be an advocate. If the terms of engagement are such that he does not have to act or plead but does other kinds of work then he becomes a mere employee of the Government or the Body Corporate. Therefore, Bar Council of India has understood the expression "Advocate" as one who is actually practising before the Court which expression would include even those who are Law Officers appointed as such by the Government or Body Corporate. (52). However, this decision of the Supreme Court of India is of no assistance to the petitioner as inspite of being eligible for applying for the post, is not eligible under the second Clause, namely, seven years or more practice in any Court or Courts subordinate to the High Court of Rajasthan as admittedly the petitioner has not practised in any Court or Courts subordinate to the Rajasthan High Court. (53). (53). The learned counsel Shri J.P Sharma, therefore, relied mutatis mutandis on the submissions made by Shri Dhankar, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in other cases and adopting arguments regarding Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India, claimed that his petition is liable to be allowed and the selections made are liable to be quashed. We have already found that the submissions made by Shri Dhankar are unsustainable and, therefore, unacceptable for the proper interpretation of the constitutional provisions. For those very reasons, therefore, this petition is also liable to be dismissed. WRIT PETITION NO. 2179/1998, SHIV CHAND SHARMA VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS - (54). In the instant case petitioner has made a bald assertion that the two sele- cted candidates, viz., Shri Seeta Ram and Shri Ram Singh Meena, had not secured the minimum marks fixed by the Selection Committee and the said Committee has exceeded its competence by relaxing the said minimum marks and, thus, their appointments are vitiated being dehors the statutory rules. The petitioner has not disclosed as what were the minimum marks fixed by the Selection Committee nor he has mentioned as what were the marks obtained by them and how these two officers had been given relaxation and appointed. The respondents, in reply, have denied this allegation and have submitted that there has been no relaxation whatsoever in favour of the said candidates and as there was no minimum marks fixed by the Committee, the question of relaxation of the said rules did not arise. Mr. J.P Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the news- paper cutting dated 16.12.96 contained in Annexure-2 to this writ petition, wherein it has been mentioned that the Full Court would also, consider the issue of relaxation of minimum marks in case of the candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes for appointment on the post of the Additional District & Sessions Judges. No other material has been placed in support of the said contention. The High Court has specifically denied the allegation as there was no such item in the Agenda for relaxing the minimum marks reserved for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates, nor was it considered and there was no minimum marks fixed by the Selection Committee, by the Full Court in its meeting held on 19.12.1997. The High Court has specifically denied the allegation as there was no such item in the Agenda for relaxing the minimum marks reserved for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates, nor was it considered and there was no minimum marks fixed by the Selection Committee, by the Full Court in its meeting held on 19.12.1997. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that in absence of any material to substantiate the said averment, no reliance can be placed on the news-paper cuttings. Contrary to the assertion of the petitioner, reply filed by the High Court revealed that against two vacancies reser- ved for Scheduled Caste and three vacancies reserved for Scheduled Tribes, only one member from Scheduled Caste and one member from Scheduled Tribes were found suitable and, thus, rest three vacancies were filled up from General Category. (55). In Bharat Singh Versus State of Haryana (48), the Supreme Court has held as under- ``When a point, which is ostensibly a point of law, is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in sup- port of such fact is not annexed to, the writ petition or the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. . . . . . There is distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. While in pleading, that is, a plaint, or a written statement, the facts and not evidence, are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit, not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. . . . . . . ." (56). Similarly, in Larsen & Tubro Ltd. Versus State of Gujarat and others, (49) the Court observed as under- ``It is not enough to allege that a particular rule or any provision has not been complied with. . . . . . . ." (56). Similarly, in Larsen & Tubro Ltd. Versus State of Gujarat and others, (49) the Court observed as under- ``It is not enough to allege that a particular rule or any provision has not been complied with. It is a requirement of good pleading to give details, i.e., the particulars as to why it is alleged that there is a non-compliance with the statutory requirement, ordinarily, no notice can be taken on such an allegation which is devoid of any particulars. No issue can be raised on a plea, the foundation of which is lacking. Even where rule nisi is issued, it is not always for the department to justify its action when the Court finds that the plea has been advanced without any substance......... (57). In the instant case, as the petitioner failed to place any material to subs- tantiate the allegations except the news-paper cuttings which certainly cannot be given any credence, the allegations made in the petition fall-short in making any grievance and the respondents are more justified as they have stated that the allegations are baseless as neither the minimum marks had been fixed by the Selection Committee nor was there any question of relaxation of marks to them. (58). There is another aspect of the matter. The petitioner has chosen not to implead the said two persons who had allegedly been given relaxation. Thus, the question of maintainability of the writ petition itself is doubtful, particularly in view of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Udai Narain Singh Malapahria Versus Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (50); Ishwar Singh Versus Kuldeep Singh (51); Bhagwati and others versus Subordinate Service Selection Board, Haryana and another (52); J. Jose Dhanapaul Versus Thomas and others (53); Arun Tiwari and others Versus Zila Mansari Shikshak Sangh and others (54), and Azhar Hasan and others Versus District Judge, Saharanpur (55). In all these cases it has been held that a person, who may be aggrieved by the judgment, is a necessary party and a writ petition is not maintainable unless the necessary parties are impleaded therein. (59). In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao Versus Mr. In all these cases it has been held that a person, who may be aggrieved by the judgment, is a necessary party and a writ petition is not maintainable unless the necessary parties are impleaded therein. (59). In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao Versus Mr. K. Parasaran and others (56) the Apex Court has observed as under- ``No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and pu- blic money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be mis- used as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (60). The instant petition has been filed without nay sense of responsibility. The petitioner has made an application in response to the advertisement.- He was called for interview. As he could not succeed, he has come with a petition making wild and scandalous allegations without verifying the veracity thereof. The writ petition is not only frivolous and vexacious but amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. (Vide All India State Bank Officers Federation vs. Union of India & Anr. (57). As the petitioner has filed the instant petition with utmost irresponsibility, his conduct is reprehensible. He has filed an affidavit in support of the writ petition stating that the facts mentioned therein are true to his personal knowledge. Though none of his averment has any basis whatsoever. Petitioner is a practising advocate of long standing, filing, a writ petition in such a cavalier manner by him has shocked the judicial conscious. Petition is dismissed with costs, which is quantified to the tune of Rs. 5000/-. The learned District Judge, Bharatpur is directed to recover the said amount of Rs. 5000/- from the petitioner treating it as a Decree of that Court, and deposit it with the Rajasthan Legal Aid Services Authority, Jaipur. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned District Judge, Bharatpur for compliance. (61). Honble DALELA, J.–With respects, I find myself unable to agree with the views taken in the majority judgment in respect of the validity of Rules 8 (ii) & (15(ii) of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 (hereinafter called, ``the Rules of 1969). (62). Rule 3(b) defines the expression Court, occurring in the Rules of 1969. According to it, the expression ``court means the High Court of Judicature for Raj- asthan. (62). Rule 3(b) defines the expression Court, occurring in the Rules of 1969. According to it, the expression ``court means the High Court of Judicature for Raj- asthan. There is nothing wrong or legal infirmity in it. It cannot be said to be bad in law, if the expression ``Court used in the rules, means the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan for the purposes of the Rules of 1969. Rules 8 & 15 of the Rules of 1969, read as under- ``8. Sources of recruitment : Recruitment to the Service shall be made (i) by.promotion from amongst the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service; or (ii) by direct recruitment from the advocates who have practised in the Court or courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. 15. Qualifications : A candidate for direct recruitment to the service:— (i) must be a citizen of India, and (ii) must be an Advocate who has practised in the Court or courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. (63). Rules 8 (ii) & 15 (ii) of the Rules of 1969, require that direct recruitment to Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service (RHJS), is to be made from the Advocates, who have practised in the Rajasthan High Court or Courts subordinate thereto, for a period not less than seven years, and a candidate for the direct recruitment, must be an Advocate, who has practised in the Rajasthan High Court or courts subordi- nate thereto, for a period not less than seven years. The provisions of these rules thus bar an Advocate, practising in other High Courts or courts subordinate to those High Courts, from being recruited to RHJS. Rules 8 (ii) & 15 (ii) virtually have introduced classification between one class of Advocates (i.e., Advocates, who practise in the Rajasthan High Court or courts subordinate thereto) and the rest. (64). Honble Supreme Court, in the case of J. Pandurangarao etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission & another (Supra), has held as under- ``............All the High Courts have the same status; all of them stand for the same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice, and advocates enrolled in all of them are presumed to follow the same standards and to subscribe to the same spirit of serving the cause of the administration of justice. Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned rule has introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest, and the said classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules. It further held : ``Therefore, in our opinion, there does not appear to be any rational basis for differentiating the advocates belonging to Andhra Pradesh High Court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do. (65). In the aforesaid case before the constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court, the petitioner, J. Pandurangarao belongs to a family, settled down in the District-Guntur in Andhra Pradesh. After obtaining LL.B. Degree from the Nagpur University, he got himself enrolled as an Advocate of Mysore High Court and set- up his practice in the court in Guntur District. The Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission invited applications for the post of District Munsifs. He applied. But, his application was rejected on the ground that he did not fulfil the condition, set out in paragraph 4-A(1) of the Commissions notification, which provides that at the time when the candidate applies. "(1) he is practising as an Advocate of the High Court; (2) he has been actually practising in courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in India, for a period not less than three years," the relevant Rule-12 in Andhra Pradesh provides qualifications for direct recruitment as District Munsif. One of them, is that the applicant must be practising as an Advocate of the High Court, and the other is that he must be actually practising in the courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction, for a period not less than three years. This rule and the corresponding paragraph of the Commissions notification were challenged, in case the expression ``the High Court means Andhra Pradesh High Court. The constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court, while holding that the expression ``the High Court occurring in the rules and the notification, means Andhra Pradesh High Court, proceeded to examine the vires of the said rule and the paragraph and came to the conclusion : ``In the result, the impugned rule and the corresponding portion of the paragraph of the notification based on it must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional.......... The effect of our decision is that the applications of the persons like the petitioners cannot be rejected on the preliminary ground that they are not persons practising as Advocates in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that they should be considered on the merits along with the rest of the applications. The petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. (66). Thus, the ratio and the decision of the constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court, in the case of J. Pandurangarao (supra), is that the impugned rule of Andhra Pradesh, providing that for direct recruitment of District Munsif, the applicant must be, inter alia, practising as an Advocate of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, is ultra vires and unconstitutional and it was directed that the application cannot be rejected on the ground that the applicant is not practising as an Advocate in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. (67). As a result of the relevant Andhra Pradesh rule and the corresponding paragraph of the notification issued by the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, persons, who are not practising as Advocate in the Andhra Pradesh High Co- urt, are disqualified to be recruited as District Munsifs. Here, in the instant matter, Rules 8 (ii) & 15 (ii) of the Rules of 1969 have the same consequence namely, the persons who have not practised in the Rajasthan High Court or Courts subordinate thereto, are disqualified to be recruited to the RHJS. Thus, the effect of the impugned rule of Andhra Pradesh and the Rules 8 (ii) & 15 (ii) of the Rules of 1969, is the same and similar. The ratio and decision of the constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court, is, therefore, fully applicable to Rules 8 (ii) & 15 (ii). These rules, restricting the direct recruitment to the RHJS from amongst the Advocates having practised in the Rajasthan High Court and courts subordinate thereto, therefore, cannot be said to be constitutional and valid, in view of the ratio and decision of Honble the Supreme Court in the case of J. Pandurangarao (supra). (68). It is well-known in law that the decision of the High Court, not in consonance with the ratio and decision of Honble the Supreme Court, cannot be held to be good in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. (68). It is well-known in law that the decision of the High Court, not in consonance with the ratio and decision of Honble the Supreme Court, cannot be held to be good in the case of Commissioner of Income-Tax Vs. Kerala State Industrial Development Corporation (58), the decision of the Karnataka High Court, dissenting from the view taken by the Patna High Court, has been held by Honble the Supreme Court to be not correct being contrary to the decision of the Patna High Court which stands affirmed by the Supreme Court in an appeal. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Munilal Garg Vs. State of Rajasthan & others (supra), upholding the validity of Rules 8 (ii) and 15 (ii) of the Rules of 1969, cannot hold the field being contrary to the ratio and decision of the constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court, in the case of Pandurangarao (supra). Needless to say that ratio overrides the obiter. Even if the decision of the Full Bench relies on some obiter of Honble the Supreme Court, the position would not change, because, what has been held by the Full Bench, is contrary to the ratio. and decision of Honble the Supreme Court. (69). It is well-settled in law that a decision rendered long ago, is liable to be overruled, if it is contrary to the ratio and decision of Honble the Supreme Court. In the case reported in AIR 1997 SC 1115 , (supra) Honble the Supreme Court has observed, ``a decision rendered long ago can be overruled, if this Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong or unfairable. Obviously, it would imply that a decision rendered long ago, can be overruled if it is contrary to the ratio and decision of the Apex Court. The decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Munilal Garg (supra), so far as it upholds the validity of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969, is not sustainable being contrary to the ratio and the decision of the constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court in the case of J. Pandurangarao (supra). (70). (70). The validity of the impugned Rules 8(ii) & 15(ii) has been sought to be justified and upheld on the ground that the rules, putting a condition that the candidates must have practised for a stipulated period in the concerned High Court or courts subordinate thereto, would achieve the object of selecting the candidates knowing local law, local language, local conditions etc., so that, they may administer justice in an efficient manner. (71). The constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court, in the case of J. Pandurangarao (supra), has, however, observed- ``....... Besides, study of general laws prevailing in the country as a whole, and the study of important local laws are generally included in the curriculum prescribed for the Law Degree, and obtaining a Law Degree which would entitle a person to be enrolled as an Advocate, in substance, meets the requirement of knowledge of important local laws. (72). After the said observations, Honble the Supreme Court, in relation to the impugned rules of Andhra Pradesh, held : ``.............. Therefore, the main argument that the object intended to be achieved by the impugned rule is that the applicant should possess knowledge of local laws, cannot be sustained. (73). The admitted facts of Writ Petition No. 1704/98 completely break down the theory that the impugned Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) serve the purpose of requiring the applicant to possess knowledge of local law etc. Admittedly, petitioner Gangaram Moolchandani is a practising Advocate in the District Court, Bareilly (U.P)-a court subordinate to Allahabad High Court. He applied for recruitment to the RHJS. After due process of his application, he was called for interview. After the interview, the Selection Committee found him fit and meritorious, and consequently, the Se- lection Committee placed him in the proposed select-list. However, the Full Court did not recommend his name for appointment, because, he was found not eligible, for the only reason that he has not practised for seven years in the Rajasthan High Court or court subordinate thereto. (74). Admittedly and obviously, petitioner Gangaram Moolchandani was exa- mined by the Selection Committee at the interview. Therefore, he must have also been examined with regard to his possession of knowledge of local laws, local languages, local conditions etc. The Selection Committee found him fit and meritorious, including in the knowledge of local laws etc. That is why he was placed in the proposed select-list, by the Committee. Therefore, he must have also been examined with regard to his possession of knowledge of local laws, local languages, local conditions etc. The Selection Committee found him fit and meritorious, including in the knowledge of local laws etc. That is why he was placed in the proposed select-list, by the Committee. The Full Court declined to approve his name for appointment, obviously, not because he did not possess the knowledge of local laws etc., but, because, he has not practised in the Rajasthan High Court or courts subordinate thereto, for seven years. Evidently, the theory that the impugned Rules 8(ii) & 15(ii) serve the object of selecting the candidates possessing the knowledge of local laws etc., has completely broken down by the High Court itself. Therefore, the argument, that the object intended to be achieved by the impugned rules, is that the applicant should possess the knowledge of local laws cannot be sustained. (75). The admitted facts of Writ Petition No. 1704/98, as discussed above, go to indicate that the petitioner was rejected by the Full Court, only on the ground that he has not practised in the Rajasthan High Court or courts subordinate thereto, for seven years. Obviously, the basis of his rejection, the classification made by the impugned rules between the Advocates practising in the Rajasthan High Court or courts subordinate thereto and the rest. But, the constitution Bench of Honble the Supreme Court has clearly held that the Rules, which makes a classification betw- een one class of Advocate and the rest, is irrational and there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved. (76). Evidently, the impugned Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, being irrational and arbitrary in making a classification by differentiating the Advocates. The impugned rules are, therefore, ultra vires and deserve to be struck down. (77). In the result, the impugned Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969, are held ultra vires and they stand struck off. The Writ Petition No. 1704/98, therefore, stands allowed. One post of Additional District & Sessions Judge in the RHJS, has been kept vacant by the interim order dated 31.3.98, of this Court. (77). In the result, the impugned Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969, are held ultra vires and they stand struck off. The Writ Petition No. 1704/98, therefore, stands allowed. One post of Additional District & Sessions Judge in the RHJS, has been kept vacant by the interim order dated 31.3.98, of this Court. The respondent-High Court, is, therefore, directed to recommend the name of the petitioner, Gangaram Moolchandani, to the Governor, for his appointment to the RHJS, in accordance with his merit with the other candidates, as placed by the Selection Committee. (78). The Writ Petition No. 1010/98 stands partly allowed in so far as the impugned Rules 8(ii) & 15(ii) are held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. In view of the recent decision dated 8.10.98 of the Apex Court, in Civil Appeal No. 3021/97 (Sushma Suri Vs. Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Another), (supra) the petitioner, Budh Deo Yadav, is an Advocate and was eligible to be called for inter- view, and it was not proper on the part of the respondent-High Court, not to call him for interview. The Apex Court, in the case of Sushma Suri (supra), has, however, held .. ``However, we are not in a position to give any relief to the appellant before us now because when she commenced this litigation, recruit- ment process was still going on and it has gone too far ahead. Now that the same is complete and the selected candidates have already been appointed and they have reported to duty at different places........ it would not be proper to upset such appointments. All that we can now do is to direct the authorities concerned including the High Court and Government to process the applications for recruitment of candidates in future in the light of the position as explained above. (79). Therefore, looking to the fact in the instant case that the selected candidates, though impleaded, have already been appointed and have joined their duties at different places, and that the petitioner is yet to be interviewed and it is not certain that he would be selected in interview, it would not be proper to quash the entire selection and upset the appointments. Consequently, no relief can be given to the petitioner, Budh Deo Yadav. Consequently, no relief can be given to the petitioner, Budh Deo Yadav. However, the respondent-High Court is directed to process the applications of the candidates for direct recruitment to the RHJS in future, in the light of the observations, indicated hereinabove. This writ petition therefore, stands disposed of accordingly. (80). So far as Writ Petition No. 2179/98 of Shiv Charan Sharma is concerned, I agree with the majority judgment. (81) Honble SHARMA, J.–I regret I am unable to agree with the view taken by my learned brother Honble Shri Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. I therefore deliver my separate judgment. (82). In exercise of powers conferred by Rule 20 of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules 1969 (for short the Rules of 1969) the Full Court had constituted a Committee consisting of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge and two Judges to be nominated by the Chief Justice. Justice V.S. Kokje and Justice P.P. Naolekar were nominated as members of the Committee by the Chief Justice. It was decided by the Committee in its meeting held on May 16, 1997 that "Advocates practicing outside the State of Rajasthan may also be called for interview". The proceedings of the meetings were signed by the then Chief Justice Mr. M.G. Mukh- erjee, the then Administrative Judge Mr. Justice M.P Singh and Mr. Justice P.P. Naolekar. Thereafter in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 15 of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan 1952, the Chief Justice, treating the matter as urgent, got it circulated amongst the Judges of this Court. The note which was circulated amongst the Judges reads thus - ``The Committee on scrutiny of the 436 application forms received, has found 307 candidates fit for being called for interview. The Committee also decided aforesaid candidates for interview from 3rd November 1997 onwards till all the candidates are interviewed. The Full Court notes the progress and grant approval to the aforesaid action of the Committee. Twenty Nine Judges of this Court put their signatures in approval of the action of the Committee. (83). It is thus evident that Committee constituted under Rule 20 of the Rules of 1969 took the decision also to call for interview the Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan and the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani was found fit by the Committee for being called for interview. (83). It is thus evident that Committee constituted under Rule 20 of the Rules of 1969 took the decision also to call for interview the Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan and the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani was found fit by the Committee for being called for interview. Thereafter Twenty Nine Judges of this Court approved the action of the Committee and this is how the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani was called for interview. Thus there cannot be any doubt that the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani was called for interview by the Full Court in accordance with Rule 20(1) of the Rules of 1969, which provides thus- ``20. SCRUTINY OF APPLICATIONS AND INTERVIEW (1) The Court shall scrutinise the applications received in accordance with the provisions of rule 19 and thereafter call for interview only those who in its opinion, are fit to be called for that purpose. Rule 3(b) of the Rules of 1969 defines Court as the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan and Rule 19 provides the procedure for submitting the applications according to which the application has to be submitted through the District Judge of the District in which the candidate is practising. The application was submitted by petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani in accordance with Rule 19 and after scrutiny of his application this court was of the opinion that he was fit to be called for interview. (84). Undeningly Shri Moolchandani did appear before the Committee constituted under Rule 20(2) of the Rules of 1969 and his name was recommended by the Committee and placed before the Full Court for final selection. The Full Court did not recommend his name to the Governor for his appointment as per Rule 21 read with Rule 9 of the Rules of 1969 on an interpretation of the eligibility criteria laid down in sub-rule (ii) of Rule 8 and 15 alongwith clause (b) to Rule 3 of the Rules of 1969 that the petitioner Shri Moolchandani was not eligible for appoint- ment since he had not practised in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan or any Court or Courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. (85). In the reply submitted on behalf of the respondent High Court it was pleaded that an error was committed while scrutinising the application of the petitioner Moolchandani. (85). In the reply submitted on behalf of the respondent High Court it was pleaded that an error was committed while scrutinising the application of the petitioner Moolchandani. The very decision of the Committee in calling Shri Mool- chandani for interview was contrary to the provisions of Rules of 1969 but by mistake he was considered and called for interview and his suitability was examined by the selection committee for selection and appointment for the post of the Additional District Judge. When after recommendation of the Committee the name of Shri Moolchandani was placed before the Full Court, it was pointed out that he was not eligible in view of Rule 8(ii) read with Rule 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969 for the reason that he had not practiced in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan or any Court subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years as such the very selection process, so far as the case of petitioner Moolchandani is concerned was in violation of the scheme of the Rules of 1969. Therefore in exercise of power under Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 20 the Full Court did not approve his name. (86). It was also averred by the respondent High Court that the basic object of the Rules of 1969 is to recruit a suitable and proper person to the Higher Judicial Service in the State with a view to secure efficient administration therefore the qualification of seven years practice as an Advocate in Rajasthan High Court and Courts subordinate thereto has a reasonable nexus, which in fact enables a person, to be recruited to secure efficient knowledge of local laws, local conditions as well as regional language which are necessary for discharging the duties of District Judge efficiently and only by putting such condition of practising at least seven years, which is reasonable period as an Advocate in the Rajasthan High Court or Courts subordinate thereto alone will fulfil the object. The classification which has been fixed by the rule making authority has got a reasonable basis and have a relation to the object which is sought to be achieved by the rule in question. (87). The classification which has been fixed by the rule making authority has got a reasonable basis and have a relation to the object which is sought to be achieved by the rule in question. (87). Rule 8 of the Rules of 1969 provides for two sources of recruitment- (i) by promotion amongst the members of the Rajasthan Judicial Service, or (ii) by direct recruitment from the Advocates who have practised in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. (88). Rule 15 of the Rules of 1969 prescribes the qualifications for a candidate for direct recruitment to the service. Sub-rule (ii) states that a candidate must be an Advocate who has practised in the High Court or Courts subordinate thereto for a period of not less than seven years. (89). On May 16, 1997 the Committee ignoring the mandate of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969, took decision to call the Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan for interview and Full Court did approve the aforesaid action of the Committee. From the proceedings of the Committee recorded on May 16, 1997, it appears that Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) were deliberately ignored. As many as six decisions were taken by the Committee on the said date and decision No. 3 was that Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan may also called for interview. As already stated, the then Chief Justice Mr. M.G. Mukherjee, the then Administrative Judge Mr. Justice M.P Singh and Justice P.P. Naolekar put their signatures in approval of the said decisions. It may thus be inferred that the Committee was of the opinion that Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification must be said to be irrational in as much as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of the Rules. The Full Court also approved the decision of the Committee and the Rules 8(ii) and l5(ii) were treated as redundant at the time of scrutiny of the applications. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the arguments canvassed on behalf of the High Court that an error was committed while scrutinising the application of petitioner Shri Moolchandani. The Full Court also approved the decision of the Committee and the Rules 8(ii) and l5(ii) were treated as redundant at the time of scrutiny of the applications. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the arguments canvassed on behalf of the High Court that an error was committed while scrutinising the application of petitioner Shri Moolchandani. A look at the record demonstrates that not only Shri Moolchandani but other Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan were also called for interview. (90). In Ram Kishan Dalmia Vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (59) their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded that Article 14 of the Constitution forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classifications for the purpose of Legislation. When any impugned rule of statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group; and the second is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. (91). Confining the eligibility for direct recruitment to the Advocates who have gained seven years experience at the Bar in Rajasthan, in my considered opinion, has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. I am unable to agree that only the Advocate, who has gained seven years experience at the Bar in Rajasthan is likely to equip himself with the fair knowledge of local laws as well as knowledge of local dialects and the local conditions so that he will be a suitable person to hold a higher judicial post and should be able to discharge his duties efficiently. Other Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan may also have the fair knowledge of local laws, local dialects and local conditions of the State of Rajasthan. Petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani, who gained more than seven years experience at the Bar in Uttar Pradesh has smashed this myth that only the Advocates practising in Rajasthan, possess fair knowledge of local laws, local dialects and the local conditions. Petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani, who gained more than seven years experience at the Bar in Uttar Pradesh has smashed this myth that only the Advocates practising in Rajasthan, possess fair knowledge of local laws, local dialects and the local conditions. Selection Committee found Shri Moolchandani fully equipped with the knowledge of local laws, local dialects and local conditions of Rajasthan and recommended his name for final selection. Can it be said reasonable to exclude following persons from consideration - (i) A person born, brought up and educated in Rajasthan and after taking Law degree started practice in the Chamber of a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court and continued as such for a period of more than seven years. (ii) Son or daughter of employee of Central Government, born, brought up and educated in Rajasthan and after taking law degree, he or she had to leave Rajasthan because of transfer of his father to some other State. He or she started practice in that State and gained seven years experience at bar. In both the instances the Advocates are likely to equip themselves with the fair knowledge of local laws as well as knowledge of local dialects and the local conditions of Rajasthan and they can not be said unsuitable to hold a higher judicial post as would be able to dis- charge their duties efficiently and the exclusion in view of Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969 can not be said to be reasonable. (92). The ratio of J. Pandurangrao case (supra) propounded in para 16 that ``All the High Courts have the same status, all of them stand for the same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice, and advocates enrolled in all of them are presumed to follow the same standards and to subscribe to the same spirit of serving the cause of the administration of justice has not at all been discussed by the Full Bench of this Court in Muni Lal Gargs case (supra). (93). (93). In J. Pandurangraos case (supra) the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission invited applications for selection for the posts of District Munsiffs in the State of Andhra Pradesh, The application of J. Pandurangrao was rejected by the Commission on the ground that he did not fulfil the condition set out in paragraph 4-A(1) of the Commissions Notification by which applications had been invited- The said paragraph reads as follows- ``That at the time when the petitioner applies : (1) he is practising as an Advocate of the Andhra Pradesh High Court: (2) he has been actually practising in courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in India for a period not less than three years. J. Pandurangrao who was born, brought up and educated in Andhra Pradesh took his LL. B. degree from Nagpur University and was enrolled as an Advocate in Mysore High Court and he set up his practice in the Court of Tenali (Distt. Guntur). Application of J. Pandurangrao was rejected on the ground that he did not satisfy the first condition since he had not been practising as an Advocate of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court declared the impugned rule and the corresponding portion of the paragraph of the notification of the Com- mission as ultra vires and unconstitutional. In Para 16 of J. Pandurangraos case (supra) it was observed by their Lordships thus - ``If the basis of the impugned rule is that a person who applies for appointment to the post of a District Munsif, should have been enrolled as an Advocate of a High Court that basis can be satisfied even if the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the Andhra Prades High Court but of any other High Court. All the High Courts have the same status, all of them stand for the same high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice and advocates enrolled in all of them are presumed to follow the same spirits of serving the cause of the administration of justice. Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned rule has introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification must be said to be irrational in as much as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classi- fication and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules. Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned rule has introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification must be said to be irrational in as much as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classi- fication and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules. (94). Dealing with the argument that a person who has been enrolled as an Advocate of the Andhra Pradesh High Court would have feelings of attachment for the institution of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and would be subject to the disci- plinary jurisdiction of the said High Court and that would afford a rational basis for differentiating the class of Advocates of the Andhra Pradesh High Court from the rest of the Advocates in this country, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 14 of J. Pandurangraos case (supra) observed that neither of the two grounds can be said to have any nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the rule. Their Lordships indicated that "what is relevant and more important in the matter of recruitining persons to Judicial Service is not only the applicants loyalty and attachment to the institution of a particular High Court but their loyalty and sense of dedication to the cause of judicial administration and this feeling and sense of dedication would be present in the minds of the persons enrolled as Advocates in the Andhra Pradesh High Court as much in the minds of other persons enrolled as Advocates in the other High Courts. The test of disciplinary jurisdiction is hardly relevant because Advocates of other High Courts would likewise be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of their High Courts, and if a person who continues to be on the roll of the Andhra Pradesh High Court can be presumed to be a person wor- thy to belongs to the profession of law and so eligible for the judicial post, so can a person who continues on the roll of any other High Court be entitled to claim the same status. Therefore in our opinion, there does not appear to be any rational basis for differentiating the advocates belonging to the Andhra Pradesh High Court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do. (95). Therefore in our opinion, there does not appear to be any rational basis for differentiating the advocates belonging to the Andhra Pradesh High Court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do. (95). In continuation of the aforesaid finding their Lordships in para 15 further indicated thus- ``In this connection, it may be permissible to point out that the second condition in regard to three years actual practice might more appropriately have required that the said three years practice should be in the civil or criminal courts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. That would have more effectively secured the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge of local laws and to have experience in the matter of the administration of the said laws. As it happens, the said condition under the relevant rule enables advocates practising in civil or criminal courts all over India to apply and so the requirement about the knowledge of local laws cannot invariably be satisfied by the said condition. But as we have just pointed out, the said test cannot be said to be satisfied by the impugned rule as well. (96). Full Bench of this Court in para 12 of Munni Lal Gargs case needed to extract only the observations of their Lordships, made in para 15 of Pandurangraos case and concluded that Rules 8 and 15 of the Rules of 1969 are based upon a reasonable classification founded on intelligible differential having a rational relation to the objects to be achieved. (97). In para 15 of J. Pandurangraos case their Lordships have dealt only with the second condition according to which all the Advocates who were actually practising in courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in India were eligible to apply. It is thus evident that condition was not restricted to three years actual practice by the Advocates in the Courts of Andhra Pradesh. In this context their Lordships in para 15 have made observations using the words such as ``it may be permissible to point out, ``might more appropriately have required and ``That would have more effectively secured the object. It is thus evident that condition was not restricted to three years actual practice by the Advocates in the Courts of Andhra Pradesh. In this context their Lordships in para 15 have made observations using the words such as ``it may be permissible to point out, ``might more appropriately have required and ``That would have more effectively secured the object. But the first condition which required that a person who applies for appointment to the post of a District Munsif, should have practised in the Andhra Pradesh High Court had, in the opinion of their Lordships introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification was irrational in as much as there was no nexus between the basis of said classification and the object intended to be achieved. Therefore the said condition was declared ultra vires and unconstitutional. (98). Their Lordships in para 8 of Pandurangraos case held that in order to recruit suitable and proper persons to the Judicial Service, authority concerned may prescribe knowledge of local laws as well as knowledge of regional language and adequate experience at the Bar as qualification for eligibility for appointment to the said service. As their Lordships were dealing with the second condition indi- cated as hereinabove, the words adequate experience at the Bar were used in the contest of India and not in respect of a particular State. (99). The principle that may be deduced from the authorities cited by learned Advocate General is that the court should not depart from the decisions of old standing except under compelling circumstances. J. Pandurangaraos case is the decision of old standing and ratio propounded by their Lordships in the said decision should be followed. (100). As already stated that Committee constituted under Rule 20 of the Rules of 1969 as well as the Full Court took decision to ignore Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) and Advocates practising outside the State of Rajasthan were called for interview, out of which name of petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani was recommended for selection, but the Full Court after found him fit initially did not select him. It is the Committee and the Full Court which had departed from the decision of Munni Lal Gargs case and treated Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) as redundant at the time of scrutiny of the applications. (101). It is the Committee and the Full Court which had departed from the decision of Munni Lal Gargs case and treated Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) as redundant at the time of scrutiny of the applications. (101). In view of what I have discussed above I am of the considered opinion that Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules 1969 have introduced a classification between one class of Advocates and the rest and the said classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus between the basis of the said classification and the object intended to be achieved. Thus Rules 8(ii) and 15(ii) of the Rules of 1969 in so far as they exclude the Advocates of other High Courts are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. (102). Resultantly, the writ petition No. 1704 of 1998 instituted by the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani stands allowed and I hold that the Full Court after initially finding the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchandani fit to be called for interview was wrong in not selecting him for the post of Additional District Judge. This Court vide interim order dated March 31, 1998 kept vacant one post of Additional District Judge in general category and directed that seniority of the candidates shall be subject to the decision of the writ petition. It is therefore directed that the respondent High Court shall recommend the name of the petitioner Ganga Ram Moolchan- dani to the Governor for his appointment to the Service as per Rule 21 read with Rule 9 of the Rules of 1969 for placement in the cadre of Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service in the State of Rajasthan in accordance with his merit with other candidates. (103). Before parting with I intend to record my feeling of astonishment which I experienced during the argument of Shri B.P Agrawal, learned Advocate General. Before the Division Bench learned Advocate General vociferously contended that matter required reconsideration by a Larger Bench. But before the Full Bench Mr. B.R. Agrawal suddenly took U-turn and whispered that matter ought not have referred to the Full Bench. (104). Before the Division Bench learned Advocate General vociferously contended that matter required reconsideration by a Larger Bench. But before the Full Bench Mr. B.R. Agrawal suddenly took U-turn and whispered that matter ought not have referred to the Full Bench. (104). In view of my order in Ganga Ram Moolchandanis case (Writ Petition No. 1704/98) writ petition of Shri Budh Dev Yadav (Writ Petition No. 1010/98) is partly allowed and Rule 8(ii) of the Rules of 1969 is held to be ultra vires and uncon- stitutional. It is not necessary to strike down Rule 3(b) as it only defines the word court. Ratio propounded by their Lordships in Sushma Suris case (Civil Appeal No. 3021/1997 decided on October 8, 1998) is fully applicable in the instant petition and I hold that the petitioner Budh Dev Yadav was fit person to be called for interview and his application was not properly scrutinised by the High Court under Rule 20(i) of the Rules of 1969. But looking to the fact that the selected candidates have been appointed and they have reported to duty at different places, it would not be proper to quash entire selection process and to upset the appointments of the selected candidates. Following the ratio of Sushma Suris case all that I can now do is to direct the High Court to process the applications for recruitment of candida- tes in future in the light of the observations as indicated hereinabove. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly. (105). In so far as writ petition No. 2179/98 of Shri Shiv Charan Sharma is concerned I endorse the view expressed by my Brother Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. ORDER In view of the majority judgment, the writ petitions are dismissed. As an interim order, it was directed in Writ Petition No. 1704/1998 that one post be kept vacant for the possible appointment to be made if the petitions are allowed. The petitions are dismissed, as the rules are held valid by the majority, hence it is directed that the High Court should immediately recommend the name of the next meritorious candidate kept in the merit list for his appointment to His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan as early as possible. The petitions are dismissed, as the rules are held valid by the majority, hence it is directed that the High Court should immediately recommend the name of the next meritorious candidate kept in the merit list for his appointment to His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan as early as possible. The incumbent shall be entitled to seniority from the date of appointment of other already appointed persons in pursuance to the selections made by the High Court, but he/she shall not be entitled to any monetary benefit arising out the grant of seniority. He/she shall get all the monetary benefits including deemed annual grade increments from the date he/she joins as the Additional District Judge. __________