Judgment :- 1. The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents are the defendants before the trial Court. 2. The appellant/plaintiff filed the suit in O.S. No. 1115/79 on the file of Principal District Munsifs Court at Madurai for declaration that the institutions of the appellant/plaintiff are minority institutions protected under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution and for a consequential permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from passing any order affecting the administration of the institutions of the appellant/plaintiff invoking Sections 3, 8, 10 to 18, 21 to 26, 31, 34, 39 to 47, 51 and 56 (2)(f) of Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973 (Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974) and the Rules 9, 12, 13. 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, of the Tamil Nadu Private Schools Regulation Rules, 1974. 3. It is the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the plaintiffs society was duly registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 originally in the name of “Christian English School Society” and later the name of the Plaintiffs society was altered as “Christian Education Health and Development Society,” and the plaintiffs society was founded with the object of “Establishment, maintenance and development of educational, health, technical and other charitable institutions and preparation, implementation and follow up of other projects of similar developmental nature in and around Oddanchatram, Palani Taluk, Dindigul District in Tamil Nadu and for providing education and medical care ot the highest quality in the spirit of “Christ with emphasis on moral and spiritual values”, and in pursuance of the above object the plaintiffs society established (a) Christian English High School at Oddanchatram, (b) Shantiniketan Higher Secondary School at Ambilikkai, (c) Elementary School at Soraikkai Pattim and (d) Elementary School at Siruvattukkadu, and the plaintiffs society is administering the above mentioned institutions as a member of the minority community of Protestant Christians and they are entitled to the protection guaranteed in Article 30 (1) of Indian Constitution, and the respondent/defendants having knowledge about the character of the minority institutions run by the appellant/plaintiff refused to accept the status of the minority institutions run by the appellant/plaintiff and they are trying to interfere in the administration of plaintiffs institutions, and hence the present suit is filed. 4. 4. The 2nd defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the defendants 1, 3, and 4 raising the following contentions:— The momorandum of Articles of the Plaintiffs association and the by-laws of the plaintiffs society will have to be scrutinised for the purpose of finding out the objects for which the plaintiffs association was formed. Merely because one of the objects of the plaintiffs association was to run certain schools, it cannot automatically mean that the institutions are being run i n the interest of the minority community viz, Protestant Christians. The Management of the Schools run by the Plaintiffs society, even assuming it to be true, will not show that the schools are being administered for the promotion of Christian religion only. Merely because more than 65 per cent of teachers are Christians will not confer upon the schools run by the plaintiff the status of minority institutions. It is not admitted by the defendants that the plaintiffs society is being subsidised by West Germany Christian Organisations, that the schools established and administered by the plaintiffs society are in the interest of Christian Community alone. The plaintiffs society are not maintaining the schools for the purpose referred to in para 8 of the plaint. The allegations in paras 9 and 10 of the plaint that the plaintiffs institutions are minority institutions protected under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution and as such exempted from the various provisions of Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973 are not correct. The defendants in the lawful exercise of their duties have been acting in pursuance of the powers vested under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973. The Civil Court may not have jurisdiction to pass any decree for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from seeking to enforce the provisions of the above said Act of 1973. The plaintiff has misconceived his remedy and the suit as framed is not maintainable. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration that the institutions of the plaintiffs society are minority institutions and they are protected under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution. The suit is bad for want of proper and valid notice as required under Section 80 of C.P.C. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. The plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of declaration that the institutions of the plaintiffs society are minority institutions and they are protected under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution. The suit is bad for want of proper and valid notice as required under Section 80 of C.P.C. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. On the above pleadings and after considering the oral and documentary evidence pleaced before him, the learned Principal District Munsif at Madurai came to the conclusion that the institutions run by the plaintiffs society are minority institutions and they are protected under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution, and therefore the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for and ultimately he decreed the suit as prayed for without costs. 6. Aggrieved against the said findings of the trial Court, the Respondents/defendants herein filed the first appeal in A.S. No. 174/84 before the II Additional Subordinate Judges Court at Madurai and the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge came to the conclusions that the institution run by the appellant/plaintiff were commenced for the object of the public welfare and not only for the welfare of Protestant Christians and the plaintiffs society was founded only by the private institutions and not by persons belonging to minority community, and so the institutions run by the appellant/plaintiff are not minority institutions and as such, they are not protected under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, and so the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the findings of the trial Court and set aside the Judgment and decree of the trial Court and allowed the appeal with costs and dismissed the suit. 7. Not satisfied with the findings of the first Appellate Court the appellant/plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal. While admitting the Second Appeal my learned predecessor His Lordship Mr. Justice P.R. Gokulakrishnan, J. (as he then was) framed the following substantial questions of law that arise for consideration in this Second Appeal. (1) Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in concluding that the plaintiffs educational Institutions are minority Educational Institutions coming under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India reversing the judgment of the trial Court on the facts and circumstances of the case? (1) Whether the lower Appellate Court is justified in concluding that the plaintiffs educational Institutions are minority Educational Institutions coming under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India reversing the judgment of the trial Court on the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) Whether Court below is justified in holding that to claim the minority character as Christian Minority Educational Institutions the plaintiff Society should have got prior permission from the Church and there should be priests and Bishops as members of the Society? (3) Whether the Judgment of the Court below is opposed to and contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court reported in 1959 SCJ 321 and the order of this Madras High Court in WP. No. 4478 of 1974 dated 17.12.1975? (4) Whether the Court below is justified in its conclusions that individuals belonging to the minority community cannot claim the minority right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India? (5) Whether the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for? 8. Point No. 1 : The appellant/plaintiff filed the suit for the relief of declaration that the institutions of the plaintiffs society are minority institutions based on religion protected under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution and for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants and their servants from passing any orders affecting the administration of plaintiffs institutions invoking several Sections of Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973 shortly called as the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff contended that the Court below having found in Ex. A.1 that the basis of the society is faith and devotion to Jesus Christ and providing education in the spirit of Christ, erred in holding that the educational institutions of the plaintiffs society are not minority institutions having the protection under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution, and therefore it must be held that the institutions run by the plaintiffs society are minority institutions. 10. 10. The learned counsel for the respondents/defendants repudiated the above arguments and contended that the appellant/plaintiffs society was originally “Hill Tribes Development Society” and later on .10.74 it was formed and registered under the name and style of “Christian English School Society” and later it was registered on 15.7.1976 under the name and style of “Christian Education, Health and Development Society” as borne out by the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations marked as Ex. A1 and the letter of the Director of School Education dated 11.5.1978 marked as Ex. A.9, and so it must be held that the plaintiffs society is not minority institution and the institutions administered by the plaintiffs society are not minority institutions. 11. To appreciate the above contentions it is but necessary to refer to the documents marked as Ex. A9 and Ex. A1 in this case. Ex. A9 are the proceedings of the Director of School Education in R.Dis No. 17686/G2/78 dated 11.5.1978, wherein it is stated as follows:— “The transfer of management of Santhiniketan High School, Ambilikai from Harijan and Hill Tribes Welfare Society, Ambilikai to Christian Educational and Health Development Society, Ambilikai is approved with effect from 1.1.1978. So the Director of School Education simply approved the transfer of management of Shantiniketan High School at Ambilikai from the Management of Harijan and Hill Tribes Welfare Society to the Management of Christian Educational Health Development Society, which is the plaintiffs society. At no stretch of imagination it can be said on behalf of the respondents/defendants that this document marked as Ex. A9 indicates that at the inception the plaintiffs society was only a Harijan and Hill Tribes Welfare Society. 12. Now turning to the Memorandum of Association of the plaintiffs society marked as Ex. A1 in this case, it is the specific plea taken by the respondent/defendants themselves in para 3 of their written Statement that the memorandum of Association and the By-laws of the appellant/plaintiffs society will have to be scrutinised for the purpose of finding out the objects for which the plaintiffs association was formed. A perusal of the Memorandum of Association of the plaintiffs society marked as Ex. A perusal of the Memorandum of Association of the plaintiffs society marked as Ex. A1 i n this case will disclose that on 5.10.1974 it was registered as “Christian English School Society,” Oddanchatram under the Societies Registration Act of 1860 (Act 21 of 1860) and later the nomenclature of the plaintiffs society was changed as “Christian Educational Health and Development Society” as borne out by the certificate of alteration given by the Registrar of Assurances at Palani on 5.10.1974. The object of the appellants society is mentioned in Articles 2 to 4 of the Memorandum of Association in the following words:— “(2)Basis:— Faith in and Devotion to Jesus Christ. (3) The object of the society shall be the establishment, maintenance and development of educational, health and other Charitable institutions and preparation, implementation and follow up of other projects of similar development nature in or around Oddanchatram for providing education and medical care of the highest quality in the Spirit of Christ, with emphasis on moral and spiritual values. (4) In pursuance of the above charitable object, the society shall have the following powers”. 13. It is obvious from the object mentioned in the Memorandum of Association of the appellants society as evidenced by Ex. A.1, the appellants society was formed not only for the establishment and maintenance of educational institutions but also the establishment and development of charitable institutions in and around Oddanchatram. Therefore it is made clear in the very object itself that the institutions run by the appellants society was for the development of minority community viz., the Christians in the spirit of Christ and faith in Christ. 14. That apart, the society was formed by 7 Christian persons with three co-opted members as mentioned at page 4 of Ex. A.1and in Article 9 of the Memorandum of Association of the appellants society. 15. The lower appellate Court has stated that the appellants society was not intended to serve the minority community because Article 2 relating to the Rules and Regulations of the appellants society in Ex. A1 under the heading “Membership” says that Membership can be given to any man or woman, single or married, who subscribe to the aims and objects of the society, and so it included every one of the public, and hence the institutions run by the appellant/plaintiffs society are not minority institutions . A1 under the heading “Membership” says that Membership can be given to any man or woman, single or married, who subscribe to the aims and objects of the society, and so it included every one of the public, and hence the institutions run by the appellant/plaintiffs society are not minority institutions . The above reasoning of the lower Appellate Court is not well-founded for the simple reason that the object as mentioned in the Memorandum of Association makes it clear that the appellants society was formed only for the establishment, maintenance and development of educational and charitable institutions in the spirit of Christ and in the faith of Christ. More so, the appellants society was formed not by the general public but only by the Christian persons as mentioned at page 4 of Ex. A1 in this case. It is also spoken to by P.W.1 Richard and P.W.2 Andi, and their evidence is not discredited on any score, and there is no contra evidence let in on the side of the respondents/defendants to rebut their testimony. In the fact of the unimpeachable testimony of P.Ws 1 and 2 coupled with the Memorandum of Association of the appellants society marked as Ex. A1 in this case, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the lower Appellate Court was not justified in concluding that the appellants educational institutions are not minority institutions and per contra the educational institutions tune by the appellants society are minority Educational Institutions coming under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution and I answer this point in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and as against the respondents/defendants. 16. Point No. 2: The lower Appellate Court also stated that to claim the minority character, the appellant/plaintiff should have got permission from the Church and there should be priests and Bishops as members of the Society. Such a view is also untenable because nowhere either in the Indian Constitution or in any other law, it is stated that to claim the minority status, the Bishops and Priests should be the members of the society to claim minority status. The real test is whether the institution is established and administered for the benefit of the minority irrespective of the fact that it is started by an individual of the minority community or by a group of individuals belonging to the minority community. The real test is whether the institution is established and administered for the benefit of the minority irrespective of the fact that it is started by an individual of the minority community or by a group of individuals belonging to the minority community. It is not necessary that the Priests and Bishops of the said minority community should be made as members of the appellants society to run the educational institutions, as held by the lower Appellate Court. The word “Minority” is not defined in the Constitution of India, and in the absence of any special definition it must be taken that any community, religious or linguistic is numerically having less percentage of the total population, can claim to be minority and the protection guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. In the present case according to the testimony of P.Ws 1 and 2 some of the Protestant Christians joined together and formed the appellants society, and the institutions are run by the appellants society on behalf of the Protestant Christian Community, and as such the institutions run by the appellants society are minority institutions. In order that the appellant should succeed in their claim for declaration based on Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution, the appellant has to prove by satisfactory evidence that the institutions or the schools run by them are one established or administered by a minority whether based on religion or language. In other words the institutions of the appellants society must be shown to be one established and administered by or on behalf of a particular minority community. In the present case there is satisfactory evidence in the testimony of P.Ws 1 and 2 to show that the institutions run by the appellants society were founded and administered by the Protestant Christians and as such they can claim the minority character. Hence I find that the first Appellate Court was not justified in holding that to claim the minority character the appellants society should have got prior permission from the Church or there should be Priests and Bishops as members of the appellant society, and consequently I answer this point also in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and as against the respondents/defendants. 17. 17. Point No. 3 :— The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Kerala Education Bill (1957) In the Matters of (1959 SCJ 321 = AIR 1958 SC 956 ) laid down as follows:— The protection given under Article 30(1) of the Constitution is not limited to educational institutions of the minorities, religious or linquistic, established after the Constitution commended, it extends to such schools started prior thereto. Nor can it be said that it applies only to those schools where there are no outsiders as scholars for Article 29(2) precludes aided schools from denying admission to members of other communities on grounds only of religion, language, taste, race or any of them-Article 39(1) gives all minorities two rights: (1) the right to establish educational institutions of their choice; and (2) the right to administer them. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught therein. It is left to their choice (i.e.) it contemplates real institutions which will effectively serve the needs of their community and of the scholars who resort to them. The ambit of the rights conferred by the Article 30(1) has therefore to be determined on a consideration of the matter from the point of view of the institutions themselves. There may be classed into three categories: (i) those which seek neither aid nor recognition from the State, (ii) those which want aid and (iii) those which want recognition but not aid. The third category comprises the educational institutions established by the minorities, who seek only recognition but not aid. The right to establish educational institutions of their choice must mean the right to establish real institutions, which will effectively meet the needs of their community as well as the scholars who resort to those institutions; scholars of unrecognised institutions are not permitted to avail themselves of the opportunity of higher education and are not eligible for entering public services. The right to establish educational institutions of their choice must mean the right to establish real institutions, which will effectively meet the needs of their community as well as the scholars who resort to those institutions; scholars of unrecognised institutions are not permitted to avail themselves of the opportunity of higher education and are not eligible for entering public services. To deny recognition to those schools, though there may be no fundamental right to recognition except on terms tantamount to surrender of their constitutional right of administration of schools of their choice is in truth and in effect to deprive them of their rights under Article 30(1) Article 45 no doubt requires the State to provide free and compulsory education for all children; but there is nothing to prevent the State from discharging the solemn obligation through Government and aided schools, The duty of the Supreme Court is to uphold fundamental rights in Part III Clauses 7 and 10 of Kerala Educational Bill of 1957 may well be regarded as permissible regulations, which the State is entitled to impose as a condition for according its recognition to any Educational Institution but that clause 20 extended by clause 3(5) to newly established recognised schools in so far as it affects Educational Institutions established and administered by the minority communities is violative of Article 30(1)”. - 18. However the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has not placed the order of the Madras High Court dated 17.12.1975 pronounced in W.P. No. 4478/74 in this case for the perusal of this Court in this Second Appeal. However, it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973 came into force on 1.12.1974, and all the minority Educational Institutions challenged this Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 in a batch of Writ Petitions in W.P. Nos. However, it is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973 came into force on 1.12.1974, and all the minority Educational Institutions challenged this Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 in a batch of Writ Petitions in W.P. Nos. 4478/74, 1641/75 and other Writ Petition Numbers, and a Division Bench of Madras High Court by Judgment dated 17.12.1975 declared that Sections 8(1)(a) 8(1)(b) and 8(1)(c), 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45 and 46 of Tamil Nadu Act 29 of 1974 may be struck down as violative of Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution, and those Writ Petitions were allowed by an order dated 17.12.1975, and in those circumstances the lower Appellate Courts Judgment is opposed to the order dated 17.12.1975 passed in W.P. No. 4478/74. The learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents/defendants countenanced the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff by stating that as against the order dated 17.12.1975 in W.P. No. 4478/74 and other Writ Petitions, the State of Tamil Nadu preferred a special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court and the same is still pending adjudication before the Supreme Court, and it has not reached a finality. Present suit is O.S. No. 1115/79 on the file of Principal District Munsifs Court at Madurai, and the present suit was filed after five years from the date of Writ Petitions filed earlier before this Madras High Court. This statement of the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents/defendants was not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. In those circumstances and in view of the pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the Judgment of the High Court dated 17.12.1975 in W.P. No. 4478/74 and other connected Writ Petitions, I do not propose to go into this question and say one way or the other, and this point is’ left open to be decided in appropriate proceedings before the Supreme Court, and I answer this point accordingly. 19. 19. Point No. 4 :— The mere fact that the founders of the plaintiffs institutions happen to be Christians by itself is not sufficient or conclusive proof of the fact that Educational Institutions run by the appellants society can claim to be established and administered by minority community or as minority institutions. It is open even to a single member of a minority community to establish and maintain an Educational Institution but before an institution can claim to be a minority institution, it should be shown that it serves and promotes the interest of the minority community in the same manner. Therefore the institution itself cannot serve the religion or the language but it should in some manner serve the interest of that minority community. Therefore it cannot be said that merely because the members of the appellants society, which established the educational institutions, belonged to a particular community, the institutions established by them automatically become, the minority institutions. In my view the materials produced by the appellant/plaintiffs society in this case would go to show that the respective institutions have been established and administered by minority community for the benefit of and for promoting the interest of the minority community of Protestant Christians. The testimony of P.W.1 and 2 which is not rebutted by adducing any evidence on the side of the respondents/defendants would establish that the institutions run by the appellants society are administered by an association belonging to a minority community, and there are proper mix of students of different communities in all these institutions, and it is not as if only the Protestant Christian students are admitted in these institutions. In those circumstances, I am of the view that the Court below is not justified in its conclusion that the appellants institutions belonging to the minority community cannot claim the minority status under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution and I answer this point in favour of the appellant/plaintiff and as against the respondents/defendants. 20. Point No. 5 : So far as the relief of declaration is concerned, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the institutions of the appellants society are minority institutions based on religion and they can claim protection under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. 20. Point No. 5 : So far as the relief of declaration is concerned, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the institutions of the appellants society are minority institutions based on religion and they can claim protection under Article 30(1) of the Indian Constitution. However the only crucial question that is to be answered in this Second Appeal is as to whether the respondents/defendants can be restrained by means of permanent injunction from passing any orders affecting the administration of the plaintiffs institutions by invoking several Sections of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder. At the risk of repetition, it must be stated that the Writ Petitions are pending before the Supreme Court awaiting the final adjudication in respect of this matter. Besides there are two decisions to be taken note of on this aspect and they are the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 1389 and AIR 1980 SC 1042 . 21. In the Full Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported in St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1974 SC 1389 ) it was pointed out as follows:— “Article 30(1) covers institutions imparting general secular education. The object of Article 30 is to enable children of minorities to go out in the world fully equipped. It will be wrong to read Article 30(1) as restricting the right of minorities to establish and administer Educational Institutions of their choice only to cases where such institutions are concerned with language, script or culture of the minorities Therefore measures, which will regulate the courses of study, the qualifications and appointment of teachers, the health and hygiene of students, facilities for libraries and laboratories are all comprised in matters germane to affiliation of minority institutions. These regulatory measures for affiliation are for uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses and do not violate any fundamental right of the minority institutions under Article 30 The right conferred on the religious and linquistic minorities to administer Educational Institutions of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. The right to administer is not the right to mal-administer. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration. The right to administer is not the right to mal-administer. The appointment of teachers is an important part in Educational Institutions. The qualifications and the character of teachers are really important. The right of minority institutions to administer institution implies the obligation and duty of the minority institutions to render the very best to the student. In the right of administration, checks and balances in the shape of regulatory measures are required to ensure the appointment of good teachers and their conditions of service. Regulations are, therefore, necessary to see that there are no divisive or disintegrating forces in administration”. 22. In another decision of the Supreme Court reported in All Saints High School v. Government of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1980 S.C. 1042 ) it was observed as follows:— “Article 30(1) enshrines a fundamental right of the minority institutions to manage and administer their Educational Institutions which is completely in consonance with the secular nature of democracy and the Directives in the Constitution itself. Although unlike Article 19 the right conferred on the minorities is absolute, unfettered and unconditional, but this does not mean that this right gives a free licence for maladministration so as to defeat the avowed object of the Article, namely, to advance excellence and perfection in the filed of education It is therefore open to the Government or the University to frame Rules and regulations governing the conditions of service of teachers in order to secure their tenure of service and to appoint a high authority armed with sufficient guidance to see that the said Rules are not violated or the members of the staff are not arbitrarily treated or innocently victimised. In such a case the purpose is not to interfere with the internal administration or autonomy of the institution but it is merely to improve the excellence and efficiently of the education because a really good education can be received only if the tone and tempor of the teachers are so named as to make them teach the students with devotion and dedication and put them above all controversy”. 23. 23. In the light of the abovesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court it is open to the Government and the Director of School Education to regulate the administration of the institution run by the appellants society herein.. In other words regulatory measures are imperative for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration or the educational institutions run by the appellants society. In those circumstances even though the appellants society may claim the status minority educational institutions run by them, the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in the plaint, wherein it is stated that the Respondents/defendants should be restrained from passing any orders affecting the administration of the institutions of the appellant/plaintiff by invoking several Sections of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act of 1973. In those circumstances I am of the view that the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the relief of declaration but not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for, and hence the second appeal has to be allowed in part, and the Judgment and decree of the II Additional Subordinate Judges Court at Madurai in A.S. No. 174/84 dated 26.11.1984 are to be modified, and the suit in O.S. No. 1115/79 on the file of Principal District Munsifs Court at Madurai is partly decreed for the relief of declaration only, and the relief of permanent injunction is negatived, and in the circumstances of the case the appellant/plaintiff is directed to pay the costs of the Respondents/defendants and to bear their own and I answer this point accordingly. (24) In the result the Second Appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and decree of the II Additional Subordinate Judges Court at Madurai in A.S. No. 174/84 dated 26.11.1984 are modified. The suit in O.S. No. 1115/79 on the tile of Principal District Munsifs Court at Madurai is decreed partly for the relief of declaration only and the relief of permanent injunction as prayed for in the plaint by the appellant/plaintiff in para 16(b) is negatived. In the circumstances of the case the appellant/plaintiff is directed to pay the costs of the respondents/defendants throughout and to bear his own costs in all the Courts.