D. K. SETH, J. Petitioners service was dispensed with by an order dated 6th February, 1990 contained in Annexure IV to the writ petition on the ground that when he was enrolled, on 15th November, 1989, as an Excise Constable, on the post of Driver, he was only 17 years, 2 months and a few days old. Therefore, the mini mum age having been prescribed as 18 years, he could not have been appointed and as such, his service was immediately dispensed with. 2. Mr. A. K. Gaur, learned Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the said. order, first on the ground that in the adver tisement contained in Annexure I, by which the applications were invited, no minimum or maximum age was presc ribed. Therefore, it is not open to the department to dispense with the petiti oners service on the ground that the petitioner did not attain the minimum age. He secondly contends that there was no allegation that the petitioner had con cealed his date of birth. On the other hand, he had applied with the High School Cer tificate as was provided in the said adver tisement and upon scrutinizing the same, the petitioner was called for as interview and was so selected with eyes of the select ing authority open and therefore, they are estopped from dispensing with the petitioners service on the said ground. Alternatively he contends that by reason thereof, the respondents had relaxed the necessity of minimum age in the case of the petitioner by conduct. By reason thereof, the service of the petitioner could not have been dispensed with. He next contends that since the petitioner was selected and found suitable and was engaged even if he was not eligible, when he was selected, still his case should be considered afresh after he completed 18 years of age and may be reinstated after, such time. In support of this contention, Mr. Gaur contended that by efflux of time, the petitioner has be come over aged for any other service. Therefore, a compassionate view should be taken in respect of the petitioners case. Mr. Guar had also relied on several decisions cited at the Bar in support of his contention, which I propose to deal with at appropriate stage. 3. Mr. Gaur contended that by efflux of time, the petitioner has be come over aged for any other service. Therefore, a compassionate view should be taken in respect of the petitioners case. Mr. Guar had also relied on several decisions cited at the Bar in support of his contention, which I propose to deal with at appropriate stage. 3. Mr. K. R. Singh, learned Standing Counsel on the other hand contends that with regard to the recruitment rules of an Excise Constable, the age prescribed is 18 years while maximum age is 30 years. It was so pasted in the Notice Board in the office, where the applications were to be deposited. Since the Rules prescribed minimum age and the notice was pasted in the Notice Board, omission or oversight on the part of the respondents till the appointment was made, cannot operate as a estoppel since there cannot be any estop pel against the law. Inasmuch 18 years being minimum qualifying age in law, there is no scope for pleading estoppel against it. He further contends that the petitioner even if had not concealed his age or may not be at fault, then he cannot be considered for being selected untill he completes 18 years of age. Before he com pletes the age of 18 years, he cannot ac quire locus standi or right to apply. By reason thereof, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right on the basis of such fact which is not disputed. Therefore, he justifies the order of termination of service and prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. I have heard both the learned Counsel at length. 5. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioners date of birth was 10th August, 1972 and the interview was fixed on 25th October, 1989 while. selection was made on 15th November, 1989 and the appointment was also given on the same date while his service was terminated on 6th February, 1990. Thus it appears that on the date when the applica tion was made or interview was held or till the selection and appointment was given, the petitioner remained below 18 years of age. He was even below 18 years on 6th February, 1990 when he was about 17 years, six months, less by two days. 6. Thus it appears that on the date when the applica tion was made or interview was held or till the selection and appointment was given, the petitioner remained below 18 years of age. He was even below 18 years on 6th February, 1990 when he was about 17 years, six months, less by two days. 6. On this background the question that is to be decided is as to whether the petitioner can claim any legal right to the appointment or how far the contention of Mr. Gaur can be accepted. 7. In paragraph 4 of the counter-af fidavit, it was pointed out that a notice was pasted in the Notice Board of the office, where the minimum and maximum age was prescribed as between 18 and 30 years. The said paragraph has been dealt within paragraph 8 of the rejoinder affidavit by denying the said statement emphatically and was stated to be misconceived. It was repeated that in the advertisement no age limit was prescribed. The only qualifica tion that was prescribed was the passing of the High School Examination or equivalent thereof together with the height and measurement of the chest. That the statements made in the counter-af fidavit is an after thought. But in the said paragraph, it has not been specifically denied that no such notice was pasted in the Notice Board or that the petitioner was not aware of any such notice to have been pasted in the Notice Board or even if the notice was pasted in the Notice Board, as alleged, did not contain the minimum or maximum age as prescribed. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit, it has been. pointed out that under the rules, the mini mum and maximum age limit is between 18 and 30 years. The said paragraph 6 has been dealt with in paragraph 10 of the rejoinder affidavit stating the same to be incorrect and hence emphatically denied. In the said paragraph, it was pointed out that no conditions were at all pasted in the Notice Board and that there was no jus tification of prescribing age limit on the Notice Board when it was duly published and circulated through newspapers. The statements made therein has been stated to be an after thought. 8. In the said paragraph, it was pointed out that no conditions were at all pasted in the Notice Board and that there was no jus tification of prescribing age limit on the Notice Board when it was duly published and circulated through newspapers. The statements made therein has been stated to be an after thought. 8. From the above statements, it ap pears that the petitioner had never denied that the minimum age prescribed in the rules in 18 years. 9. That apart, the post which was ad vertised was that of a Driver. Even if no minimum age is mentioned in the adver tisement, a person applying for the post of Driver must hold a driving licence and since no person below the age of 18 years can hold a driving licerice, the age 18 years was implicit and implied in it. 10. Be that as it may. The employ ment in service in effect, is a contract of service. Said contract might be governed by the statutory provisions. The condi tions of the service may be confined to the rules framed therefor. Even if a person is selected, the moment he enters into an employment, he enters into a contract with the employer. In order to be eligible to enter into a contract as provided in Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a person competent to contract must be of the age of majority according to law to which he is subject. There is no dispute with regard to the law to which the petitioner is subject prescribes 18 years as the age of majority. The petitioner being Hindu subject to Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, which in Section 4 (a) prescribes 18 years as the age till a Hindu remains minor. The Indian Majority Act, 1875 (Act 9 of 1975) in Sec tion 3 prescribes that a person domiciled in India remains minor till he attains 18 years of age. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioner did not attain majority till 6th February, 1990. 11. In Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas, ILR 30 Cal. 539 PC, infancy was held to make a person incompetent to contract and a contract entered by a person not attained majority, as void and not violable. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioner did not attain majority till 6th February, 1990. 11. In Mohori Bibee v. Dhurmodas, ILR 30 Cal. 539 PC, infancy was held to make a person incompetent to contract and a contract entered by a person not attained majority, as void and not violable. In the case of Dharmeshwar v. Union of India, AIR 1955 Assam 86, it was held that in the matter relating to con tracts, it is necessary in view of Section 11 of the Contract Act that the person must have the capacity or competence to enter into a contract, which is defined in Section 11 as inherent competence to enter into a contract. In case a person is incapable to enter into a contract, he cannot enter into a contract of employment of service. Neither during the said minority, he can apply for being qualified for any post without being sponsored through the guardian. The minority of a person dis qualified him even from agreeing to enter into the contract which he had sought to enter by means of submission of his ap plication. Since the law forbids even sub mitting of the application, even if there is oversight or overlooking on the part of the respondents, still then the same cannot remove the disqualification of the petitioner, which is a disqualification prescribed in law and any such oversight or ignorance or otherwise cannot operate as estoppel, since it would be an estoppel against law, namely, Section 11 of the Con tract Act read with Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act and Section 4 (a) of the Hindu Guardianship and Minority Act. 12. Then again, the rules itself prescribe minimum age between 18 and 30 years. Omission to indicate the age in the advertisement or even on the Notice Board will not entitle or empower the authority to overlook the prescribed qualification. A person can only be recruited if he is eligible upon fulfillment of the qualification prescribed. Unless the person qualifies for the prescribed eligibility, which is an inherent dis qualification, the same can never be relaxed. 13. There is a distinction between illegality and irregularity. If a person is below the age of 18 years, then any ap pointment is not an irregular appoint ment. But is an illegal appointment. Unless the person qualifies for the prescribed eligibility, which is an inherent dis qualification, the same can never be relaxed. 13. There is a distinction between illegality and irregularity. If a person is below the age of 18 years, then any ap pointment is not an irregular appoint ment. But is an illegal appointment. Had it been merely an irregularity on fulfillment of certain conditions without being in herent disqualification, in that event the same can be overlooked or relaxed. There is no authority vested in any person to change the law prescribed in Section 11 or Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act or Section 4 (a) of the Hindu Minority or Guardianship Act and Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. There cannot be any relaxation contrary to such provisions of law. 14. Mr. Guar had relied on a decision in the case of Lalita Rani v. Union of India and another, 1990 (12) ATC664, delivered by Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi. In the said case the applicant was found in eligible to appear in the regularisation examination on the ground that the petitioner was short of the mini mum prescribed period of ad hoc service of one year by 1 month few days, which she had explained in her application and prayed for relaxation of the said qualifica tion by the department for onward trans mission to the Commission. The depart ment had transmitted the same to the Commission, which has been held to be an acceptance of the petitioners prayer for relaxation by implication and conduct on the authority that the Commission is not competent to look into the eligibility when the department has regularised the same. But in the said case the said qualification is not an inherent disqualification. It is not disputed that she was below 18 years of age. Therefore, the said decision does not throw any light on the question involved in the present case. 15. Mr. Gaur then relied on the decision in the case of Pratap Singh Rawat v. State of U. P. and others, 1993 AWC 319. In the said case the petitioner was ap pointed as a clerk and then promoted to the post of clerk Grade I in the scale of Rs. 15. Mr. Gaur then relied on the decision in the case of Pratap Singh Rawat v. State of U. P. and others, 1993 AWC 319. In the said case the petitioner was ap pointed as a clerk and then promoted to the post of clerk Grade I in the scale of Rs. 430-685/- where he worked for about 5 years and thereafter, he was selected to the post of Assistant Accountant By reason whereof, he resigned from the post of clerk which he had held before the selection. By reason of such resignation, he was not en titled to hold that post again. His appointment as Assistant Accountant was can celled on the ground that his appointment in scale of Rs. 430-685 was irregular. Such irregularity was discovered after 8 years. On this background, the disqualification was held to be irregular and, therefore, the order of termination was quashed. The said decision also does not help us in the facts and circumstances of the case since it was only on the ground that the petitioner had continued for 5 years before his selec tion in the post of Grade I which was regular, which was not an inherent dis qualification and the very fact was very much present when the petitioner had ap plied and there was no allegation of con cealment. But then the said decision has not laid down anything as to what would be the situation if the disqualification is in herent disqualification, namely, that he was a minor at the time when he applied and was selected and when his service was dispensed with. Therefore, this decision does not also help us. 16. Mr. Gaur had relied on the decision in the case of Har Govind Singh v. State Bank of India, 1995 ALJ 1710. In the said case, the petitioner was declared un successful in the written test for appoint ment to the post of clerk and was called for the interview. But there was only 5 posts and as the name of the petitioner was placed at serial 54 on the merit list, he was not appointed. In the said case, the petitioner was declared un successful in the written test for appoint ment to the post of clerk and was called for the interview. But there was only 5 posts and as the name of the petitioner was placed at serial 54 on the merit list, he was not appointed. On this background, it was held that once he is selected and was placed in the panel, the selection list can not be held to become invalid after the prescribed period and that the said vacan cy of 5 persons in one zone could not be a ground for denying the appointment. This case also does not deal with the question with which we are concerned, namely, as to what would happen if a person selected is of the age below 18 years. Therefore, this decision also does not help us. 17. Mr. Gaur relies on a decision in the case of Committee of Management and another v. Sree Kumar fiwary and another, 1997 (4) SCC 388 , In the said case, the petitioner was appointed as an ad hoc teacher against a short-term vacancy on 1st August, 1986, which was terminated with effect from 30th June, 1988. This order having been challenged an interim order was issued. In the meantime, the service of the petitioner was regularised by the District Inspector of School on 27th October, 1995. While considering the question as to whether in such cir cumstance the petitioner therein was en titled to the benefit of Section 33-B (1) (a) (i) of the U. P. Secondary Education Ser vices Commission Act, 1982, namely in respect of the candidates who were ap pointed on ad hoc basis before 13th May, 1989 against a short-term vacancy which has since converted into substantive vacancy. The short-term vacancy on which the petitioner was appointed was con verted into substantive vacancy on 30th June, 1988. It was also found that though the petitioner had obtained stay order and continued to be in service, but it was not by virtue of his own right but under an order of this court. He continued in the office with the permission of the management which made recommendation before the Selection Committee. It was also found that though the petitioner had obtained stay order and continued to be in service, but it was not by virtue of his own right but under an order of this court. He continued in the office with the permission of the management which made recommendation before the Selection Committee. In such a cir cumstance, the order of the Division Bench of this Court was not approved on the ground that it had no right in giving direction that his regularization would be subject to further orders since the regularization order itself means that it was subject to the result of the writ peti tion. In such circumstances, the writ peti tion was dismissed with the observation that if there is provision for further ap pointment according to rules, the bar of age may be relaxed appropriately. Thus, it appears that the said case did not excuse the irregularity. On the other hand, alter natively directed that if there is any provision for further appointment, in that event, the case of the petitioner may be considered on relaxation of age. Thus this decision also does not help us with regard to the point involved. Though, it may throw some light with regard to the alter native suggestion as pointed out by Mr. Gaur. 18. Mr. Gaur then relied on the decision in the case of Krishan Kumar, As sistant Secretary, Market Committee, Bhiwani District Bhiwani (Haryana) v. Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, Panchkula, 1997 (4) SCC 577 . In the said case, the termination was on the ground that the petitioner did not qualify the three years continuous service in a Government office/semi-Government body though he had worked from time to time for some time with intermittent breaks in Haryana Warehousing Corpora tion. On the ground that by the time the termination was effected, the petitioner had crossed the age bar for any fresh ap pointment. The irregularity in the qualification was overlooked, on the ground that when the order of termination was passed the petitioner had acquired sufficient experience and there was no allegation that he was incompetent and thus the absence of three years continuous ser vice was held in the facts and circumstan ces only to be an irregularity and not an illegality. The irregularity in the qualification was overlooked, on the ground that when the order of termination was passed the petitioner had acquired sufficient experience and there was no allegation that he was incompetent and thus the absence of three years continuous ser vice was held in the facts and circumstan ces only to be an irregularity and not an illegality. Thus this decision also does not through any light on the question with which we are concerned accepting that a compassionate attitude was taken. 19. Mr. Gaur relies on the decision in the case of Jahar Singh v. Union of India and others, 1997 SCC (L & S) 84. In the said case the petitioner was allowed to participate in the examination for the post of Accountants in the post office and Rail way Mail Service. The petitioner who was in the post of PA in SBCO was not eligible for being appointed on the post of PAs RMS. On this ground, the petitioners ap pointment was sought to be cancelled. In the said case, it was alleged that two other PAs and SBCO were also allowed to ap pear in the test for the appointment to the post of Accountant in PO and RMS. This ground was taken as an additional ground to justify the cancellation of the candida ture by means of subsequent affidavit, which was not alleged in the first one. It was found that the respondents did not state the correct fact in advertantly. Per mission was granted on the basis of the record where the petitioner has disclosed that he was designated as PA SBCO and that two known persons working in the post of PA of SBCO were also permitted to appear. This was also held not to be an illegality but irregularity. Thus this decision also does not help us on the ques tion we had discussed earlier. 20. Therefore, the appointment which was given to the petitioner cannot be sustained and there is no reason to interfere with the order dated 6th February, 1990 since on the ground of in herent disqualification and competence to enter into a contract and by reason of eligible minimum age the appointment it self was void and cannot be continued. 21. 20. Therefore, the appointment which was given to the petitioner cannot be sustained and there is no reason to interfere with the order dated 6th February, 1990 since on the ground of in herent disqualification and competence to enter into a contract and by reason of eligible minimum age the appointment it self was void and cannot be continued. 21. Then again, it appears from An-nexure II to the petition by which the petitioner was asked to appear in the in terview that he was asked to produce his driving licence when he was appointed on the post of Driver. It is not known as to how the petitioner could produce driving licence when he did not attain the age of 18 years for the purpose of driving a car. Since the appointment was in the post of Driver, he was supposed to hold a driving licence. Section 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 prescribes that "no person shall drive a motor vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . unless he holds an effective driving licence. . . . . . . . . " Section 4 in sub- section (1) thereof prescribes that "no person under the age of 18 years shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place. " Sub section (3) provides that "no learners licence or driving licence shall be issued to any person to drive a vehicle of the class. . . . . . . unless he is eligible to drive that class of vehicle. . . . . . . . "section 5 there of prohibits the owner or the person in-charge of the vehicle from permitting "any person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 to drive the vehicle". Thus, the petitioner could not hold even a learners licence. Therefore, he could not be qualified for the post of Driver and claim to have been legally ap pointed. 22. Be that as it may, in case the petitioner has not been engaged anywhere gainfully, in that event in respect of any future vacancy, if any recruitment is sought to be made in the post of Driver, the petitioners candidature may also be considered alongwith other candidates in accordance with law, according to the recruitment rules if he applies in respect of any such vacancy in future. 23. 23. The writ petition, therefore, fails and, is accordingly, dismissed. No. costs. Petition dismissed. .