D. K. SETH, J. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners who were Tracers, are claiming equal pay for equal work in comparison with those of Lekhpals. 2. Mr. Yogesh Agrawal assisted by Mr. S. K. Saxena, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contents that initially the scale of pay of Tracers as well as that of Lekhpals was equal until 1989 being scale of Rs. 75- 115. But in a letter dated 22-9-1989, the scale of Lekhpals was fixed in a scale higher than those of Tracers. The matter was represented through several repre sentations which are Annexures 3 & 4 to the writ petition. Mi. Agrawal contends that though the petitioners have been per forming almost equal job with those of Lekhpals, but they are being given a lesser scale of pay. At the same time, there is no promotion avenues open to the Tracers while Lekhpals had widely open for promotions. On the basis that they should be treated at part with Lekhpals, entire argument was advanced by Mr. Agrawal though however, he had referred to grant of scale of Rs. 950-1500 to the Tracers working in Agricultural Department while those In the Consolidation depart ments were being given the scale of Rs. 825-1200. On this basis, the claims that the writ petition should be allowed and the petitioners should be placed in the same scale of pay with those of Lekhpals. 3. Mr. K. R. Singh, learned Standing Counsel on the other hand contends that qualifications for the post of Tracers and those of Lekhpals are different. The job undertaken by the Tracers and Lekhpals are also different. The rules governing recruitment in the post of Tracers is dif ferent and distinguished from those of Lekhpals, therefore, by no stretch of im agination, it can be said that the principle of equal pay for equal work could be at tracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. So far as the tracers in other departments are concerned. Mr. K. R. Singh contends that this cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction. Whether scale in dif ferent department should be the same or not, that is to be decided at administrative level which is normally done by appoint ment of Pay Commission where all these questions and situations are gone into. Mr. K. R. Singh contends that this cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction. Whether scale in dif ferent department should be the same or not, that is to be decided at administrative level which is normally done by appoint ment of Pay Commission where all these questions and situations are gone into. He further contends that in between there having been reports of Pay Commission where questions were open to be agitated and subsequent decision of the Pay Com mission having not been challenged in this writ petition, the writ petition has become infructuous so far as that point is con cerned. 4. I have heard both Mr. Agrawal and Mr. R. K. Singh, learned Counsel for respective parties at length. 5. The concept or principle of equal pay for equal work as enshrined in Article 39 (d) does not only apply in cases between men and women i. e. differentiation on ground of sex, but also between men and men as also between women and women on the principle of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Principle of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right under the Constitu tion, since being enunciated in Part IV, but being a directive principle of State Policy, it is a constitutional goal which must colour the interpretation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, so as to be elevated to the rank of fundamental rights, the denial of which must result into an irrational classification. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879 and P. K. Ramchandra Iyer v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 341 paragraph 17. The matter is however, primary concern for a Pay Commission and the Court would not interfere while such a Commission has un dertaken the work, as has been laid down in the case of Delhi Veterinary Association v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1221 (Para graph 7a-b ). 6. In order to attract the above prin ciple the work should be identical or similar and under the same employer without being based on unreasonable or irrational classification. Such considera tion are not in existence in the present case since the cadre is different and the nature of the respective work are also dissimilar. 7. 6. In order to attract the above prin ciple the work should be identical or similar and under the same employer without being based on unreasonable or irrational classification. Such considera tion are not in existence in the present case since the cadre is different and the nature of the respective work are also dissimilar. 7. The question had attracted the at tention of the Apex Court and was deal with in various decisions. While attending to the question in the case of Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. Workmen, decided on 3-10- 1966 AIR 1967 SC 948 , no distinc tion was made on the basis of character of the employer namely, public and private sector industries since in direct the State to direct its policy towards securing equal pay for equal work and does not countenance the invidiuous distinction. 8. But in order to bring the case with in the compass of the said principle, the. workmen or the petitioner has to prove similarity in the nature of work. The bur den of proving that the nature of functions and the work are not dissimilar, rests on the workmen or the petitioner in order to at tract the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. Once such burden is discharged, the onus shifts on the respondent Government to prove otherwise. If the Govern ment fails to prove dissimilarity, then there is no alternative but to apply the doctrine. The court is concerned with the doctrine of equal pay for equal work only within the parameters of the case and the facts and situations emerging there out. The Court is not required to express any opinion in the context of employment of similar nature under different employers or in different cadres under the same or different employers. Nor is it concerned with the questions required to be dealt with by authorities like Pay Commission such as equations of cadres, determination of parity between different cadres or making assessment of work-loads or quali tative differential based on relevant con siderations and such other matters. Such a view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, decided on 31-7-87, AIR 1987sc2049. 9. Such a view was taken by the Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, decided on 31-7-87, AIR 1987sc2049. 9. In the case of Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, decided on 5-5- 1988 AIR 1988 SC 1291 , the Apex Court had held that equal pay must depend upon the nature of the work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work, there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judg ment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment, is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation. Such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. 10. Having applied the above test in the present case, it appears that the nature of the work between the two groups are completely different and the respon sibilities undertaken make a wide dif ference. Nothing has been shown that the element of value judgment have been fixed without any reasonable or intelligible criteria denuded or any rational nexus or that there is any absence of bona fide. 11. In the case of Jai Pal v. State of Haryana, decided on 2-6-88 AIR 1988 SC 1504 , the Apex Court had held that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work ensh rined in Art. 39 though included in the chapter of Directive Principles of State Policy, is fundamental in nature. The Ar ticle fixed certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination be tween people doing similar work in mat ters relating to pay, which has been imple mented in the case of Randhir Singh (supra), Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U. P, 1986 (1) SCC637 and Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD, 1986 (1) SCC639. 12. The Ar ticle fixed certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination be tween people doing similar work in mat ters relating to pay, which has been imple mented in the case of Randhir Singh (supra), Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U. P, 1986 (1) SCC637 and Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD, 1986 (1) SCC639. 12. In the case of All India Sainik Schools Employees Association v. Sainik Schools Society, decided on 4- 10-1988, AIR 1989 SC 88 , it was held that to main tain a claim for equal pay on the allegation of equal work requires clear material to support the basis that the work. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is the same. In the present case, the materials that have come before us, does not show that the works are equal or functions are similar or that the responsibilities carried on had any similarity between them. 13. In the case of , the Apex Court had held that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared a fundamental right under the Constitution, but Article 39 (d) read with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution declares the constitutional goal enjoining the State not to deny any person equality before law in matters relating to employ ment including the scales of pay. The ap plication of the doctrine would arise where employees are equal pay in every respect but they are denied equality in matters relating to the scale of pay. 14. In the case of Harbans Lalv. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 1-8-1989, 1989 (4) SCC 459 , the Apex Court held that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not one of the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The principle was incorporated only under Article 39 (d ). It was in Randhir Singh case (supra) that the Supreme Court held that the said principle was to be read into Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, there are in built restrictions in that principle as pointed out in various decisions of the Supreme Court. 15. The principle was incorporated only under Article 39 (d ). It was in Randhir Singh case (supra) that the Supreme Court held that the said principle was to be read into Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. However, there are in built restrictions in that principle as pointed out in various decisions of the Supreme Court. 15. This doctrine was also applied even when the persons are employed in two different organisations which are two distinct legal entities under the Govern ment on the ground that the duties and functions of the persons holding cor responding posts in two organisations, were identical and similar, in the case of Employees of Tannery and Footwear Cor poration of India Limited v. Union of India, decided on 7-12- 1990, AIR 1991sc1367. 16. In the case of Grin Kalyan Kendra Workers Union v. Union of India, decided on 9-1-1991, AIR 1991 SC 1173 , the Apex Court had expressed the same view as was expressed in Randhir Singh (supra), ob serving that the said doctrine has assumed the status of a fundamental right in service jurisprudence having, regard to the con stitutional mandate of equality in Articles 14 and 16, by reason of its being incor porated in Article 39 (d), directive prin ciple of the State Policy creating a man date for the State to fulfill the constitution al goal towards socialistic pattern. It has ceased to be a judge made law as it is the part of the constitutional philosophy which ensures a welfare socialistic pattern of a State providing equal opportunity to all and equal pay for equal work for similarly placed employees of the State. Supreme Court has zealously enforced the fundamental right of equal pay for equal work in effectuating the constitutional goal of equality and social justice in a num ber of decisions. 17. In the case of State of M. P. v. Pramod Bhartiya, decided on 8-10-1992, AIR1993 SC 286, the Apex Court had held that equal pay for equal work is a principle of, a facet of Articles 14 and 16 (1), the burden of establishing such right lies on the person claiming the same. Such prin ciple is inapplicable where distinction is based on qualitative difference in func tions and responsibilities. 18. Such prin ciple is inapplicable where distinction is based on qualitative difference in func tions and responsibilities. 18. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Madan Mohan Sen, decided on 3-2-1993, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 243, it was held that fact of similarity in academic qualifications and physical requirement are not decisive for applying the doctrine. The question is as to whether they perform similar duties, functions and respon sibilities. If the persons are governed by different service conditions, in that event, it cannot be said that there is similarity in duties, functions and responsibilities. 19. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Hari Narayan Bhowal, decided on 16-3-1994, 1994 (4) SCC 78 , it was held that if pay scales are fixed by expert bodies like pay commission, then judicial interference is warranted only on the ground of violational of Article 14. In the case of Prin cipal, Industrial Training Institute v. Abhay Kumar Srivastava, decided on 26-7-94, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 617, the principle was held inapplicable where there is con troversy as to sameness of duties between two types of instructors. Whereas in the present case, functions and respon sibilities are altogether different. 20. In the case of Chandigarh Ad ministration Anita Sood, decided on 6-9-94, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 613, even in respect of teachers, classification on the basis of academic qualifications, ex perience, quality and standard to teaching, has been held to be permissible where the doctrine may not be attracted. Whereas in the present case, the nature of work itself are completely different while the two groups are being governed by two different service conditions requiring two kind of qualifications, which is a feature distin guishing in the matter of application of the doctrine. 21. In the case of State of Haryana Jasmer Singh, decided on 7-11-1996, 1996 (11) SCC77, itwas:. ield that application of the principle is not always easy since it involves evaluation of the work performed by the persons holding different jobs. In the absence of mala fides, evaluation of such jobs by expert bodies must be ac cepted. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organization or even in the same organisation. In the absence of mala fides, evaluation of such jobs by expert bodies must be ac cepted. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organization or even in the same organisation. There may be differences in educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on the skills which the holders bring to their job although the designation of the job may be the same. There may also, be other considerations which have relevance which to efficiency in service may justify differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations which may have a bearing on efficient per formance in a job. The evaluation of such jobs for the purposes of pay scale, there fore must be left to expert bodies unless there aremala fides. 22. Having regard to the chronologi cal development of law in respect of various aspects of the doctrine as dis cussed above, applying the test laid down therein, it seems that in order to attract the doctrine certain conditions are to be ful filled. First, there must be similarity in the nature of functions and duties and in the discharge of responsibilities. Secondly, the person who is claiming benefit under the doctrine, has to discharge the burden of proving such similarity. Thirdly, the condi tions of service should be identical. Fourthly, the qualifications, experience, technical skill required for the two com parative jobs should be similar. Fifthly, that evaluation of the respective value judgment is possible atid there is no mala fide in such value judgment and that there is no rational nexus in the classifications which suffers from unreasonableness, Sixthly, that where classifications has been undertaken by expert bodies like pay Com mission, the court is not supposed to inter fere, unless Article 14 is shown to have been violated and lastly that in order to bring the case within the ambit of the con ditions mentioned above, there must be clear materials to arrive at a conclusion. 23. 23. Once these test are satisfied, even though the doctrine is not a fundamental right, the same can be zealously enforced by reason of its interpretation having been given by the Apex Court to be read with the Principle enshired in Articles 14 and 16 and not in isolation thereof. 24. In the light of the above discus sion, now let us examine as to how far in the present case, the said doctrine could be attracted, having regard to the discussion made above. 25. Having regard to the statement made in paragraph 7 of the writ petition as well as the pleadings in other paragraphs, it appears that main contention of the petitioner is that the post of Tracer at one point of time was conferred with the same scale of pay which was given to Lekhpals and therefore there cannot be any earthly reason to grant them lower scale of pay that those of Lekhpals. But the fact remains that the Tracers are recruited and are governed by the rules known as U. P. Consolidation Department Ministerial and Drawing Staff Service Rules, 1980, whereas Lekhpals are recruited and governed by the U. P. Consolidation Lekhpals Service Rules, 1978. The Draw ing Staff Service Rules, 1980 prescribes academic qualification of Tracers that he must have passed at least the High School examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. or an examination recognised by the Govern ment as equivalent thereto with drawing as one of the subject. Whereas the Lekhpals Service Rules prescribes the qualification that he must have passed High School examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education or an ex amination recognised by the Government as equivalent thereto and must have work ing knowledge of Hindi written in Devanagri script and must have obtained Patwari or Lekhpal school certificate or undergone Lekhpal training at the train ing centre for Consolidation Lekhpals and if he is an untrained consolidation lekhpal, he must have completed more than three years continuous service in the department in case such person has been appointed without above qualification before commencement of these rules; Thus, there appears a vast difference in the prescribed qualifications required for the purpose of appointment in the post of Tracers and in that of Lekhpals after the respective Rules have come into force. The writ petition was filed long after these Rules have been framed. 26. That apart, the Tracers are re quired to undertake different kind of job admittedly being the drawing staff, whereas the job of Lekhpals is altogether a different one which is concerned with revenue realisation in the field and certain other matters requiring certain technical skill or knowledge, for which such training or certificate of training meant for Lekhpals, is necessary. Even those who had already been appointed prior to 1978 Rules as Lekhpals, even they were required to obtain such-training to continue on such appointment provided he had the qualification if he was appointed prior to 1978 as was prescribed in the relevant Rules effective on the date of appoint ment. 27. On these grounds, it is very dif ficult to concede the argument advanced by Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, to the extent that the job of Tracers are similar to those of Lekhpals or that the Tracers carries on the same responsibilities and nature and kind of job as the Lekhpals. There being two different service conditions for Tracers and that of Lekhpals and the two recruitment rules for them being different and admittedly the nature and job being carried out by Tracers and Lekhpals being altogether dif ferent, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be attracted. 28. So far as the question of promo tion is concerned, it appears from the Drawing Service Rules, 1980 that Tracers are eligible for promotion to the post of Draughtsmen provided he is possessed of qualification of diploma of draught smashup from the Institute recognised by the Government. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is absence of promotional avenues altogether. But then if a Tracer does not possess the qualification as indi cated above, in that event, if he stagnates, the same cannot be gone into by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. These are the matters which are highly technical and require special knowledge and special skill with detailed exercise which is re quired to be undertaken and can only be undertaken by the expert bodies like Pay Commission. Therefore the question of absence of promotion or stagnation can not be a ground for claiming grant of same scale of pay with those of Lekhpals. 29. Therefore the question of absence of promotion or stagnation can not be a ground for claiming grant of same scale of pay with those of Lekhpals. 29. So far as the question of grant of different scale of pay to the Tracers in agricultural department is concerned, the same can also be gone into by the Pay Commission on the same analogy as ob served earlier. This Court cannot enter into such question. But then in the mean time another Pay Commission have been appointed and it had published its report. What has happened to these questions, whether these questions were raised and so if raised, whether decided or not, are not before this Court, therefore, it is not possible to enter into any such question. 30. Mr. Agrawal had relied on the decision in the case of Union, of India v. Shridebashiskar and others, 195 (3) ESC 94 (SC), delivered by the Apex Court wherein it was held in paragraphs 14 and 15 as quoted below: 14. "the tribunal has observed that the scheme of training of Draughtsmen at ATS Ambranath was laid down in the Ministry of Defences letter of November 14, 1969 which prescribes the various entrance qualifications and the curriculum and the period of training and that the entrance qualification is matricula tion with two years practical experience in Tools Room or 1-1/2 years Draughsmans course of ITI and that after selection 2-1/2 years training is given which includes six months working in fac tories and that according to clause 10 of the Scheme a Draughtsmen trainee will be graded either for the post of Senior Draughtsman or Draughtsman and that the scheme nowhere lays down that those trainees can be posted as Tracers. According to the Tribunal, the qualifica tions prescribed for Draughtsman in Ordinance Factories are similar or equivalent to those prescribed for recruitment in CPWD. The Tribunal has held that the decision of the Ordnance Factory Board based on the sub-Committee report that the applicants (respon dent herein) should be equated with the Tracers and Draughtsmen Grade III of CWPD was fal lacious. The Tribunal has held that the decision of the Ordnance Factory Board based on the sub-Committee report that the applicants (respon dent herein) should be equated with the Tracers and Draughtsmen Grade III of CWPD was fal lacious. In this context, it would be relevant to mention that as per the pay scales fixed on the basis of report of the First Pay Commission of 1947 there was no difference in the pay scales of Draughtsman and Tracers in the Ordnance Fac tories and the pay scale of Draughtsman and Tracers in CPWD Senior Draughtsman in the Ordnance Factories and Draughtsman in the CPWD were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 150-225, Draughtsman in the Ordnance Factories and Assistant Draughtsman in CPWD were placed in the scale of Rs. 100-185 and Tracers in Ordnance Factories as well as in CPWD were placed in the scale of Rs. 60-150. On the basis of report of the Second Pay Commission in 1959 there was a slight modification in the pay scale of Senior Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories. Tracers in the Ordnance Factories and CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 110-200 and Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories and Assistant Draughtsman CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 150-240. Senior Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories were placed in the pay scale-of Rs. 205-280 while Draughtsman in CPWD were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 180-380. By notification dated Sep tember 1, 1965 there was change in the designa tion of posts of drawing office staff in CPWD and Draughtsman was designated as Draughtsman Grade I, Assistant Draughtsman was designated as Draughtsman Grade II and Tracer was designated as draughtsman Grade III. Thereafter on the basis of the report of the third pay commission in 1873, Tracer in the Ordnance Factories and Draughtsman Grade III in CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 260-430, Draughtsman in Ordnance Fac tories and Draughtsman Grade II in CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 330-560, Draughtsman and senior Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories and the Draughtsman Grade I in CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 425-700. 260-430, Draughtsman in Ordnance Fac tories and Draughtsman Grade II in CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 330-560, Draughtsman and senior Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories and the Draughtsman Grade I in CPWD were placed in the same pay scale of Rs. 425-700. This would show that Tracer in Ordnance Factories has all along been treated as equivalent to Tracer/draughtsman Grade III in CPWD and Draughtsman in Or dinance Factories has all along been treated as equivalent Assistant Draughtsman/draugh tsman Grade II in CPWD. As a result of the revision of pay scale in CPWD on the basis of the Award of the Board of Arbitration, the pay scale of Draughtsman Grade III was revised to Rs. 330-560. While that of Draughtsman Grade II was revised to Rs. 425-700 and of Draughtsman Grade I was revised to Rs. 550-750. The denial of similar revision of pay scale of Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories would result in their being down graded to the level of Tracer/draughtsman Grade III in CPWD. Of fice Memorandum dated March 13, 1984 can not in our opinion be construed as having such a effect. 31. Shri N. N. Goswami, the learned Senior Counsel appearing in support of the appeals as well as the Special Leave Petitions and the Review petitions, has urged that the channel of promotion in Ordnance Factories is different from the channel of promotion in CPWD inasmuch as in CPWD there is no further promotion after a person reaches the scale of Draughtsman Grade I, while in Ordnance Factories a Draughtsman is entitled to be promoted as Chargemn Grade II and thereafter as Chargemen Grade I and as Foreman and that the post of Chargeman Grade II which is the promotional post for Draughtsman was in the pay scale of Rs. 425-700 and that placement of Draughtsman in the said pay scale of Rs. 425- 700 would result in Draughtsman being placed at the same level as the promotional post of Chargeman Grade II and therefore the benefit of the revision of pay scale under office memorandum dated March 13, 1984 cannot be extended to the Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories. On behalf of the respondents it is disputed that there are no promotional chances for Draughtsman Grade I in CPWD. On behalf of the respondents it is disputed that there are no promotional chances for Draughtsman Grade I in CPWD. This question was not agitated in any of the matters before the Tribunal and we are therefore unable to entertain this plea urged by Sri Goswami on behalf of the appellants/petitioners. As regard the post of Chargemen Grade II being a promotion post for Draughtsman in Ordnance Fac tories and it being in the scale of Rs. 425-700 at the relevant time, we are of the view that merely because the promotional post for Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories was in the scale of Rs. 425-700 cannot be justification for denying the revision of pay scales to Draughtsman and their being placed in the scale of Rs. 425-700 on the basis of the Office Memorandum dated March 13, 1984 if such Draughtsman are otherwise entitled to such revision in the pay scale on the basis of the said Memorandum. Moreover, the provision regarding promotion of Draughtsman as Chargeman Grade II in the Ordnance Fac tories was introduced by the Indian Ordnance Factories Group C Supervisory and Non-Gazetted Cadre (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1989 issued vide notification dated May 4, 1989. The said Rules are not retrospective in operation. Here we are concerned with the revision of pay scales with effect from May 13, 1982 on the basis of the office Memorandum dated March 13, 1984 and at that time the said Rules were not opera tive. Therefore, on the basis of the aforesaid rules Draughtsman in Ordnance Factories cannot be denied the benefit of revisions of pay scales on the basis of the office Memorandum dated March 13, 1984. The appeals and the SLPs as well as Review Petitions relating to draughtsmen in Ordnance Factories are, therefore, li able to be dismissed. 32. There the question was the dif ference between Draughtsmen in CPWD and those in Ordnance Factories. Natural ly comparison was between Tracers and Draftman in two departments. Whereas the question in the present case is about different scale in the Agricultural Depart ment and Consolidation Department was brought to the notice of the Pay Commis sion and what has been held by it, being not before this Court, it would not be wise to go into that question in the absence of any such materials. Whereas the question in the present case is about different scale in the Agricultural Depart ment and Consolidation Department was brought to the notice of the Pay Commis sion and what has been held by it, being not before this Court, it would not be wise to go into that question in the absence of any such materials. Therefore, this aspect of the matter is being left open for being decided by the appropriate authority at appropriate stage if the petitioner raises such question in future, provided the cause of action still survives. 33. In that view of the matter, I do not find any reason to interfere with the writ petition as indicated above. The writ peti tion, is thus dismissed with the above ob servations. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .