ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. Invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') the petitioners call in question the propriety of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhopal in criminal revision No. 227/97 whereby he has affirmed the order passed by the learned Special Railway Magistrate, Bhopal in R.T. No. 1125/96 wherein the learned Magistrate has framed charges for offences punishable under Sections 363, 342, 323 and 294 of IPC against the petitioner Nos. 3. 7 and 8 and under Sections 294, 342 and 323 IPC against the petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. 2. Sans unnecessary details the facts as have been uncurtained are that the informant Shaila Kumari lodged an FIR as PS GRP, Bhopal alleging that on 13-4-93 at about 2 p.m. when her son Sanju, a boy aged about 14 years, was playing near her house he was assaulted and taken to a bunglow by the accused persons and was kept in confinement. A case was registered by GRP, Bhopal and eventually challan was filed in the Court of Special Railway Magistrate-cum-Judicial Magistrate First Class on 13-4-96 for the offences punishable under sections 342/323/34 and 294 of IPC. At the time of consideration of charge it was contended by the accused persons that all the offences in respect of which charge-sheet was laid were punishable to the maximum extent of one year, and therefore, submission of charge-sheet was barred by limitation as enjoined under Section 468 of the Code. The learned Magistrate rejected the application holding that a case under Section 363 IPC was made out and the said offence being punishable with 7 years imprisonment the question of limitation would not arise. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order the accused persons preferred a revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Bhopal who observed that there was prima facie material against all the petitioners for constituting an offence under Section 363 IPC and hence the revision did not merit consideration. 3. Assailing the aforesaid orders it is contended by Mr. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order the accused persons preferred a revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Bhopal who observed that there was prima facie material against all the petitioners for constituting an offence under Section 363 IPC and hence the revision did not merit consideration. 3. Assailing the aforesaid orders it is contended by Mr. S.C. Datt learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the learned Magistrate by order dated 26.8.97 while considering the application on the anvil of section 468 of the Code has observed that his predecessor had already taken cognizance of the offences on 13th April, 1996 and it would be presumed that he had taken into consideration the provision under Section 473 of the Code and on the basis of that provision had passed the order taking cognizance, though a presumption in this regard is not inferable as the prosecution is required to file an application and explain the delay. It is further contended by Mr. Datt that the finding with regard to existence of primafacie material to sustain a charge under Section 363 IPC is vulnerable inasmuch as the allegations even if accepted in entirety do not constitute the alleged offences. It is also canvassed by Mr. Datt that the learned Magistrate had framed charges against some of the accused persons under section 363 IPC and, therefore, the other accused persons, who are only charged of other offences, are not required to be proceeded against in view of the fact that charge-sheet was filed after expiration of the period of limitation as far as they concerned. Mr. B.P. Athya, learned Govt. Adv. for the State supported the orders for the reasons indicated therein. He has also submitted that the petitioners are applying dilatory tactics to avoid trial and their attempt for procrastinating the trial is obvious from their conduct. 4. To appreciate the rival contentions raised at the Bar, it is essential to refer to section 468 and 473 of the Code which read as under: - 468 (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. To appreciate the rival contentions raised at the Bar, it is essential to refer to section 468 and 473 of the Code which read as under: - 468 (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be - (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. 473: Notwithstanding anything contained in the forgoing provisions of this chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions it is quite perceivable that if the period of limitation has expired the Court is debarred to take cognizance. This is of Course, subject to the power conferred under Section 473 of the Code. The competent court has the authority to extend the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that the interest of justice so demands that the delay should be condoned. It is duty of the court to see that a charge-sheet is not entertained after expiry of the period unless it is shown to the court that justifiable grounds existed for a belated approach. Interest of justice has to be given due weightage by the Court taking cognizance. It is duty of the court to see that a charge-sheet is not entertained after expiry of the period unless it is shown to the court that justifiable grounds existed for a belated approach. Interest of justice has to be given due weightage by the Court taking cognizance. It is to be borne in mind that an accused has a say in the matter in a case where a time barred complaint is entertained or cognizance is taken on the face of the bar stipulated under Section 468 of the Code. The accused has to be given an opportunity of hearing before condoning the limitation. 5. In the case at hand the learned Magistrate has held that once the cognizance was taken it was to be presumed that the period of limitation was extended in exercise of power under Section 473 of the Code. This observation is totally erroneous inasmuch as the accused should have been afforded an opportunity to contest the matter as a valuable right had already accrued to him. Needless to emphasize if an offence under Section 363, IPC is made out against all the accused persons the applicability of the embargo enjoined under Section 468 of the Code does not arise. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners the Magistrate has not framed charge under Section 363 IPC against the accused petitioners No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, hence, proceedings as far as they are concerned, was barred by time and no cognizance could have been taken against them and as a consequence thereof, no charge could have been framed. He has seriously criticised that the learned Session Judge has rejected the revision petition by making a sweeping observation that there are allegations to show a prima facie case under Section 363 IPC against the accused persons though the learned trial Magistrate had not found so and, in fact, had not called upon the said accused persons to answer to the charge under Section 363 IPC. To substantiate the aforesaid submission, Mr. Datt has taken me through the FIR lodged by the informant, Shaila Kumari and the statements of the witnesses, Harisingh, Omprakash. Sanju, Santosh Kumar and Ashok Rai. To substantiate the aforesaid submission, Mr. Datt has taken me through the FIR lodged by the informant, Shaila Kumari and the statements of the witnesses, Harisingh, Omprakash. Sanju, Santosh Kumar and Ashok Rai. On a perusal of the material I find that the learned trial Magistrate had rightly not framed the charge under Section 363 IPC against the said accused persons and the observation of the revisional Court is not on proper scrutiny of the material on record and in fact, it is based on erroneous premises that the trial Court had framed charge under Section 363 IPC against all the accused persons. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Magistrate, I find that he has taken into consideration the specific role ascribed by the prosecution to each of the accused and accordingly framed charge. I do not perceive any error in the same. 6. The issue that falls for consideration is whether the trial Court was justified in framing charge in respect of accused-petitioners No. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 when the charge-sheet was filed after the expiry of period of limitations. It is strenuously urge by Mr. Athya, learned GA for the State that Court has jurisdiction to condone delay and proceed with the matter, and hence the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity. It is a settled position in law that the Court can, if the circumstances so warrant and there are justifiable grounds, condone the delay. It is to be borne in mind that a sacrosanct duty is cast on the court to determine the question of limitation before taking cognizance. This is a statutory duty which cannot be lightly viewed. The reasoning ascribed by the learned trial Magistrate that once cognizance has been taken it is to be presumed that the concerned court has acted in exercise of power conferred on it under Section 473 of the Code, is indefensible as the settled legal position is otherwise. I may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of Krishna Sanghl and others Vs. The State of M.P., 1977 Cri LJ 90 wherein this Court has laid down as follows : - Whenever a complaint or challan is filed at the instance of any person or any police officer, the court must first see that Section 468 of the Code of 1973 is attracted or not. The State of M.P., 1977 Cri LJ 90 wherein this Court has laid down as follows : - Whenever a complaint or challan is filed at the instance of any person or any police officer, the court must first see that Section 468 of the Code of 1973 is attracted or not. If it does, it should not registered the case but give an opportunity to the person or the police officer filing the complaint or challan to satisfy it on the point of limitation for purposes of condonation of delay. As the regards the condonation of delay it should not be done as a matter of course. The delay has to be condoned with exercise of judicial discretion. Section 473 of the Code empowers the Court to condone such delay if sufficient cause has been shown of if the interest of justice make it necessary to do so. But the application of the Section would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case of which the Court would be required to exercise its judicial discretion in the matter, like an application under Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963. At this stage, I would also like to point out that the provisions of Section 473 of the Code should also be liberally construed like Section 5 of the limitation Act so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the prosecutor but cannot be construed too liberally because the Government is the prosecutor or prosecution is upon police report. After the delay is condoned by the Court on its being satisfied by the process referred to above, then alone it would register the case and proceed with the same in accordance with law. Before condoning the delay, although I do not find any provision of giving notice to the accused person in Chapter XXXVI of the Code, but natural justice demands that the accused persons must be heard before passing an order in that regard as such an order is bound to affect a valuable right which accrues to the accused and which cannot be allowed to be taken away lightly. As such they have to be heard when an application under Section 473 of the Code is moved by the prosecution before the cognizance is taken. As such they have to be heard when an application under Section 473 of the Code is moved by the prosecution before the cognizance is taken. It is worthwhile at this juncture to refer to the view of the Bombay High Court as expressed in the case of Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre and others Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1991 Cri LJ 3329 : Protection has been given to an accused person u/s 468 (1) against belated and time barred prosecutions and this is certainly a benefit given in favour of the accused. It cannot, therefore, be said the S. 468 does not confer a right on the accused persons to plead that an offence or offences disclosed in complaint filed against him should not have been taken cognizance of as the prosecution was barred by limitation. The Court is duty bound on the presentation of the charge-sheet to consider the question of limitation and to see as to whether it is competent to take cognizance and whether the limitation has expired or not. Even if the statute is silent, a very valuable right arises in favour of the accused persons on account of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and they are entitled to an opportunity, of being heard and principles of natural justice inevitably require that they should be heard on the question of extension of period of limitation by the Court. Before taking cognizance of the offence, in case the chargesheet is presented after expiry of the period of the limitation, an opportunity of being heard should be given to the accused persons before extending the period of limitation. The order condoning delay admittedly is a judicial order and it cannot be passed mechanically and without notice to accused. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is vividly clear that the prosecution is required to explain the delay and a duty is cast on a court to deal with the factum of limitation before taking cognizance. The bar of limitation to prosecute can be lifted showing good grounds for the same. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is vividly clear that the prosecution is required to explain the delay and a duty is cast on a court to deal with the factum of limitation before taking cognizance. The bar of limitation to prosecute can be lifted showing good grounds for the same. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case in hand, I am of the considered opinion that charges framed against the accused-petitioners No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 are unsustainable as the chargesheet was filed beyond the period of limitation and also charges have been framed in respect of offences where maximum punishment imposable does not exceed three years. Accordingly, order framing charge in respect of aforesaid mentioned accused-petitioners is unsustainable and cannot be given the stamp of approval of this Court. Accordingly the impugned order is set aside to that extent. However, it is open to the prosecution to file an appropriate application for cononation of delay. If such an application is filed the learned Magistrate shall deal with it keeping in view the principles laid down in the cases of 'Krishna Sanghi' and 'Sharadchandra' (supra). 7. Consequently, the application succeeds in part. Application allowed