D. P. MOHAPATRA, CJ. In these five writ petitions the petitioners have prayed for quashing the orders passed by the Dis trict Magistrate, Allahabad, on 7-10-1997 under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) directing their detention and for a direction to the respondents for their release forthwith. Since the impugned detention orders are based on the same incident, are couched in similar language and the writ petitions involve common facts and points of law, the cases were heard together with consent of learned Counsel for the parties and they are being disposed of by this judgment. For the sake of convenience Writ Petition No. 44205 of 1997 filed by Atiq Ahmad is taken as the leading case. 2. In the grounds of detention it is stated, inter alia that on 25-7-1997 at 7. 45 a. m. Sri Afaq son of Sri Shirajuddin, resi dent of Kasari Masari was going towards Chakia crossing from his house followed by his father Sri Shirajuddin, who was going to the residence of a Judge if the High Court. When they reached the turn ing of Manna Mahajan Atiq Ahmad and his associates were standing there armed with rifle and gun, when Afaq Ahmad ar rived at the spot one of the associates of the petitioners Mohd. Laeek fired at him as a result of which he fell down and thereafter the petitioner and his associates continued firing at Afaq as a result of which he died at the spot. When Shirajuddin raised an alarm attracting attention of the public, the petitioner and his association ran away towards Kasaria road firing shots in the air. It is further stated in the grounds of deten tion that the incident caused stampede and a sense of fear and terror amongst the people of the locality. People ran away leaving their vehicles. Trollies and rick shaws carrying school children left the spot. In the incident a passer-by also received a gun shot. A total desolation (Sannata) prevailed at the spot. The shut ters of the shops and doors and windows of the houses in the vicinity remained closed. Public order was disturbed. On the basis of the incident Case Crime No. 534 of 1997 under Sections 302/147/148/149,i. P. C. was registered at police station Khuldabad in the District of Allahabad and the inves tigation is continuing. The shut ters of the shops and doors and windows of the houses in the vicinity remained closed. Public order was disturbed. On the basis of the incident Case Crime No. 534 of 1997 under Sections 302/147/148/149,i. P. C. was registered at police station Khuldabad in the District of Allahabad and the inves tigation is continuing. It is also stated in the grounds of detention that the petitioners are detained in Central Jail Naini but their pairokars are making ef forts to get them released on bail. There is every like hood that after being released on bail the petitioners will again indulge in such criminal activities which will be prejudicial to public order. 3. On the basis noted above, the Dis trict Magistrate, Allahabad, as stated in the grounds of detention, was satisfied that the petitioner are likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public order and in order to prevent them from acting in such manner it is necessary that the petitioners should be detained. In compliance with Section 8 of the Act the petitioners were informed that if they want to make a representation to the State Government against the or ders of detention, they could address it to the Home Secretary of the State Govern ment and send the same through the Su perintendent of Jail as soon as possible. The petitioners were also informed that the matter will be referred to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act within three weeks of their detention and if their representations are received late the same will not be considered by the Advisory Board. The petitioners were further in formed that if they want to make a repre sentation to the President or the Central Government they could address the same to the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Home, Department of Internal Security, North Block, New Delhi and send it through the Superin tendent Central Jail as soon as possible. The petitioners were also informed that if they want personal hearing before the Advisory Board under Section 11 (1) of the Act they should specifically mention the same in their representations or in form the State Government through the Superintendent Jail. 4. The petitioners were also informed that if they want personal hearing before the Advisory Board under Section 11 (1) of the Act they should specifically mention the same in their representations or in form the State Government through the Superintendent Jail. 4. It is relevant to state here Thai the petitioners were arrested in the criminal case between 26-7-1997 and 31 7-1997 and while they were in jail the orders of deten tion under the Act were passed on 7-10- 1997. The detention orders were served on the petitioners on 9-10-1997. The orders of detention were approved by the State Government on 18-10-1997. After receipt of the report of the Advisory Board the State Government confirmed the detention orders on 26-11-1997 in which it was stated that detenu shall remain in detention for a period of 12 months from 9-10-1997. The petitioners made a representation to the State Government and also to the Central Government through the Superintendent of Naini Jail on 24-10-1997. Petitioners repre sentations were rejected by the Central Government on 5-12- 1997. The rejection orders were communicated to the petitioners on 20-12-1997. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has challenged the orders of detention mainly on the grounds:- 1. that the incident stated in the grounds of the detention relates to law and order and not public order; 2. that a solitary incident of murder without anything more cannot be the basis of an order of preventive detention under the Act; 3. that the detention orders should not have been passed against the petitioners, who were already in Jail; 4. that certain material documents, which, had a bearing on the matter and could have influenced the decision of the detaining authority in favour of the petitioners were not placed before it; 5. that the provisions in sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act was not complied with; and 6. that there was undue and unexplained delay in consideration of petitioners repre sentations and in communication of rejection orders to them on account of which continued detention of the petitioners has been rendered illegal. Points Nos. 1 and 2. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously urged, elucidating the points noted above, that the grounds of detention read as a whole refer to a single incident of crime against an individual committed out of personal animosity. Points Nos. 1 and 2. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners strenuously urged, elucidating the points noted above, that the grounds of detention read as a whole refer to a single incident of crime against an individual committed out of personal animosity. The incident, even if believed, relates to law and order which is to be dealt with under the criminal law and does not relate to public order so as to attract the provisions of the Act for preventive detention. 7. The learned Additional Govern ment Advocate, refuting the contention, submitted that even a single incident of murder could be the basis of an order of preventivedetentionundersection3 (2)of the Act. According to the learned Addi tional Government Advocate the state ments contained in the grounds of deten tion clearly show that the incident caused serious disturbance in the even tempo of life of the residents of the locality who were put in an atmosphere of fear and terror during the period. The traffic in the area was disturbed, shutters of the shops were lowered and people remained inside their houses out of fear. Such an incident, ac cording to the learned Additional Govern ment Advocate, relates to public order and not mere law and order. 8. The distinction between the two phrases "law and order" and "public order" has been subject-matter of consideration in a catena of decision of the Supreme-Court of this Court and also of other High Courts. In the case of State of U. P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini, AIR 1988 SC 208 the Apex Court ruled that whether an act relates to law and order or to public order depends upon the effect of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb or dislocate the even temp) of the life of the community, it will be an act which will affect public order. 9. 9. In the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar and another, AIR 1966 SC 740 , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, construing the provisions of Rule 30 (l) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, observed: "we have here a case of detention under R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules which per mits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the main tenance of public order. It follows that it such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic hap penings. Does the expression public order take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish public order from law and order because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise com munal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be im agined. The contravention of law always affect order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert. the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under R. 30 (l) (b) to prevent sub version of public order but not in aid of main tenance of law and order under ordinary cir cumstances. the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under R. 30 (l) (b) to prevent sub version of public order but not in aid of main tenance of law and order under ordinary cir cumstances. It will thus appear that just as public order in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those Affecting security of State, law and order also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting public order. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and_ order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State. By using the expression maintenance of law and order the District Magistrate was widening his own field of action and was adding a clause to the Defence of India Rules. " In the case of Dipak Base alias Naripada v. State of West Bengal, 1973 SCC (Cri.) 684, the Supreme Court observed: "every assault in a public place like a public road and terminating in the death of a victim is likely to cause horror and even panic and terror in those who are the spectators. But that does not mean that all of such incidents do necessarily cause disturbance or dislocation of the community life of the localities in which they are committed. There is nothing in the two inci dents set out in the grounds in the present case to suggest that either of them was of that kind and gravity which would jeopardise the main tenance of public order. No doubt bombs were said to have been carried by those who are alleged to have committed the two acts stated in the grounds. Possibly that was done to terrify the respective victims and prevent them from offer ing resistance. But it is not alleged in the grounds that they were exploded to cause terror in the locality so that those living there would be prevented from following their usual avocations of life. The two incidents alleged against the petitioner, thus, pertained to specific in dividuals, and therefore, related to and fell within the area of law and order. But it is not alleged in the grounds that they were exploded to cause terror in the locality so that those living there would be prevented from following their usual avocations of life. The two incidents alleged against the petitioner, thus, pertained to specific in dividuals, and therefore, related to and fell within the area of law and order. In respect of such acts the drastic provisions of the Act are not contemplated to be resorted to and the ordinary provisions of our penal laws would be sufficient to cope with them. " In the case ot Ramveer Jatav v. State of U. P. and others, 1987 A. Cr. R. 110, the Supreme Court laid down: ". . . . it cannot be laid down as a bald proposition that one ground can never be suffi cient for founding the satisfaction of the detain ing authority for detaining a person. There are cases where one ground may be regarded as sufficient if the activity alleged is of such a na ture that the detaining authority could reasonably infer that the detenu must be habitually engaged in such activity or there may be other circumstances set out in the grounds of detention from which the detaining authority could reasonably be satisfied even on the basis of one ground that unless the detenu is detained, he might indulge in such activity in future but here the only ground alleged against the petitioner is that he, alongwith others, jointly committed murder in broad daylight. This is the only ground given in the grounds of detention without any other circumstances from which any inference could be drawn that the petitioner could be likely to commit such act, if left free. It is no doubt true that in the counter affidavit filed by the District Magistrate several circumstances have been set out which might go to suggest that the petitioner is habitually indulging in criminal activity and some instances have also been set out by the District Magistrate in the counter-af fidavit. But none of these circumstances finds a place in the grounds of detention. It is well settled that the detaining authority cannot by an affidavit filed in Court supplement what is stated in the grounds of detention or add to it. But none of these circumstances finds a place in the grounds of detention. It is well settled that the detaining authority cannot by an affidavit filed in Court supplement what is stated in the grounds of detention or add to it. It is difficult to infer from the solitary ground set out in the grounds of detention that the act alleged to have been committed by the petitioner would have disturbed public order as distinct from law and order or that one single act committed by the petitioner was of such a character that it would reasonably be inferred by the detaining authority that if not detained, he would be likely to indulge in such activity in future. " In the case of Sheshdhar Misra v. Su perintendent, Central Jail, Naini and others, 1985 All. LJ 1222, a Full Bench of this Court considered the question of distinc tion between law and order and public order under Section 3 of the Act and held: "where in a detention order the detenu" was alleged to have committed murder of an Advocate at a public place as a result of which local residents closed the doors of their houses and shops and it was further alleged to have threatened the prosecution witnesses to desist from tendering evidence in the murder case pending against him, the two grounds being intimately connected with the incident of mur der committed on account of personal animosity and there being no material on record to suggest that the detenu would have indulged into similar activities of murder, in future, it could not be said that the single act of murder had its impact on the society to such an extent as to disturb the normal life of the community, thereby rudely shocking the ordinary tempo of the normal life of the public. Merely because the local residents closed the doors of their houses and shops did not mean that the balanced tempo of the life of the general public was dis turbed as a result of which the members of the public could not carry on normal avocation of their life. The power under S. 3 can be exercised only if the detaining authority on the basis of the past prejudicial conduct of the detenu is satis fied about the probability of the detenu acting similarly in future. The power under S. 3 can be exercised only if the detaining authority on the basis of the past prejudicial conduct of the detenu is satis fied about the probability of the detenu acting similarly in future. This means that the past activity of the detenu on the basis of which such a prognosis is made must be reasonably sugges tive of a repetitive tendency or inclination on the part of the detenu to act likewise in future. A single murderous assault on an in dividual on account of personal animosity and holding out threat to individual witness to desist from deposing in Court do not justify exercise of power under S. 3 (2) of the Act for detaining the detenu. Preventive detention under S. 3 of the Act cannot be invoked to deal with the crimes and criminals who can adequately be proceeded against under the Penal Code and under other ordinary laws of the land. " 10. Similar view was taken by this Court in Arvind Kumar Shukla v. State of U. P. , 1985 ALJ (HC) 1259, in Ishtiaq Hussain Khan v. State of UP. , 1986 Cri. LJ 1448, and Dhirendra Pratap Shahi v. State of U. P. , 1986 (1) Crimes 695 . 11. Testing the facts of the case in hand on the touch -stone of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, in the decisions noted above, the inevitable conclusion to be drawn is that the single incident of murder stated in the grounds of detention, in the absence of any other circumstances, cannot reasonably form the basis of the satisfaction that the petitioners were involved in an incident relating to public order. The incident, as narrated in the grounds of detention, in the facts and circumstances and on the materials on record, cannot be said to have the effect, reach and potential of disturb ing even tempo of life of the people in general or of the people of the locality. The incident, as narrated in the grounds of detention, in the facts and circumstances and on the materials on record, cannot be said to have the effect, reach and potential of disturb ing even tempo of life of the people in general or of the people of the locality. A bald statement made in the grounds of detention that the incident caused stam pede, panic and terror in the people and people ran away leaving their vehicles and that the doors and windows of the shops in the vicinity were closed without any other material on record is not sufficient to hold that the incident in question had the potential to cause disturbance of public order or in fact caused such disturbance. From the averments made in the grounds of detention it is clear that the incident in question took place early in the morning at 7. 45 a. m. and the manner in which the incident is alleged to have taken place shows that it was a case of murder of an individual probably on account of per sonal animosity. Such an act, as held in the decided cases noted above, should be handled under the Indian Penal Code and other laws of the land and is not a case for passing an order of detention under the preventive detention law. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Ad vocate that on the materials available on record the single incident stated in the grounds of detention relates to public or ders and not law and order. Point No. 3. 12. Another point, which needs con sideration, is whether in the facts and cir cumstances of the case as available on record a case for passing a detention order against persons who are already in jail has been made out. As noted earlier, in the grounds of detention it is stated that at present the petitioners are detained in Central Jail, Naini, but efforts are being made by their pairokars to get them released on bail and there is every likelihood that after being released on bail they will again indulge in such criminal activities which will be prejudicial to the public order. 13. 13. In the case of Smt. Shashi Aggarwal v. State of U. P. and others, 1988 SCC (Cri.) 178, the Supreme Court ruled: " Every citizen in his country has the right to have resource to law. He has the right to move the Court for bail when he is arrested under the ordinary law of the land. If the State thinks that he does not deserve bail the State could oppose the grant of bail. He cannot, how ever, be interdicted from moving the Court for bail by clamping an order of detention. The possibility of the Court granting bail may not be sufficient. Nor a bald statement that the person would repeat his criminal activities would be enough. There must also be credible informa tion or cogent reasons apparent on the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially to the interest of public order. That has been made clear in Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, (1986)4 SCC 416 ,421: a bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fun damentals freedoms of our citizens. " 14. In the case of Anand Prakash v. State of LIP. and others, 1990 SCC (Cri.) 96, the Court laid down:- "thus the detaining authority though can take into account the possibility of the detenu being released on bail in the criminal proceedings, has to be satisfied having regard to his past activities or by reason of the credible informa tion or cogent reasons, that if he is enlarged on bail, he would indulge in such criminal activities. In the present ease except the bald statement that the detenu would repeat his criminal ac tivities after coming out of the jail, there is no credible information or material or cogent reasons apparent on the record to warrant an inference that the detenu if enlarged on bail would indulge in such criminal activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of essential ser vices. There must be something more than what is found in the record here to come to the conclusion that this is not a case of solitary incident but a case of the detenu indulging in business of receiving stolen electric wires. On the other hand it ap pears to us that the detention order has been made in order to supplant the criminal prosecu tion which is not permitted. " 15. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedhussain Shaikhhiissain alias Ahmed Kalio v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, 1990 SCC (Cri.) 86. 16. In the case of Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 SCC (Cri.) 1691, the Supreme Court, consider ing the aforementioned question, ob served as follows: "the question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already in custody has had been engaging attention of this Court since it first came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shawv. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334 : (1964) 1 Cri. LJ 257. To eschew prolixity we refrain from detailing all those causes except that of Dharmendm Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 : 1990 SCC (Cri.) 249, wherein a three-Judge Bench, after considering all the earlier relevant decisions in cluding Rameshwar Shaw answered the ques tion in the following words: SCC p. 754, para 21 : the decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validity passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such deten tion despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression compelling reasons in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must he cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in pre-judidal activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. " 17. In the present case except a bald statement in the grounds of detention that the pairokars of the petitioners are making efforts to get them released on bail and if they are released on bail there is likehood of their indulging in criminal activities detrimental to public order, ho other credible informa tion or cogent reasons have been stated in the order of detention in support of the said statement. No such material accompanying the grounds of detention was also brought to our notice. Therefore, applying the prin ciples laid down by the Supreme Court in the decided cases noted above, the conclusions is inevitable that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that if released on bail the petitioners are likely to indulge in criminal activities detrimental to public order is unsustainable. 18. In view of our findings on the points noted above, it is not necessary to consider the other contentions raised by learned Counsel for the petitioners. 19. On the analysis and the discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs, the writ petitions are allowed. The deten tion orders passed on 7-10-1997 are quashed and the respondents are directed to release the petitioners forthwith if their detention in jail is not required in any other casc. No costs. Petition allowed. .