Honble MITAL, J.–This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 1st June, 1996 passed by learned District Judge, Jalore in Civil Suit No. 11/94 under Order 37, Civil Procedure Code. (2). To appreciate the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the necessary facts may be stated briefly as under:- (3). Respondent Smt. Gheesi wife of Sukhram Mahajan, resident of Ahore brought a civil suit under order 37 C.P.C. for realisation of Rs. 2,67,960/- (principal amount Rs. 1,74,000/- + interest Rs. 93,960/-) in the Court of District Judge, Jalore stating in the plaint that the appellant Lalchand is the friend of her husband, who needed money for expanding his business. He requested her on 14.10.91 at Ahore to advance Rs. 1,74,000/- to him. On account of his acquaintance and friendship with her husband, she agreed to give a loan of Rs. 1,74,000/- to the appellant and the amount was paid to him by a bank draft payable to M/s. Lalchand & Company. The bank draft issued by State Bank of India, Ahore was given to the appellant on 14.10.91 at Ahore which was got encashed by him through his bank State Bank of India, Jodhpur. The appellant agreed to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The appellant did not pay the interest and also did not refund the principal amount despite registered letter dated 13.6.94. and legal registered notice dated 20.9.94. Thus, the plaintiff respondent claimed in the suit a decree for the principal amount of Rs. 1,74,000/- and interest from 14.10.91 to the date of filing of the suit at the rate of 18% Rs. 93,960/- i.e. Rs. 2,67,960/-. (4). On service of the notice, the appellant submitted application through his counsel for leave to defend which was rejected being barred by time prescribed in Rule 3 of Order 37 C.P.C. The trial Court also held that the facts disclosed by the defendant did not indicate that he had a substantial defence to raise in his favour. Ultimately the learned trial Court passed the impugned judgment and decree under Order 37 C.P.C. (5). Ultimately the learned trial Court passed the impugned judgment and decree under Order 37 C.P.C. (5). The appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and the decree on the ground that the respondents suit on the facts stated by her in the plaint was not maintainable under Order 37 C.P.C. and on the basis of a bank draft alleged to have been given by her in favour of the appellant for loan transaction. It is further argued that the respondent also stated about a contract with the appellant for payment of interest at the rate of 18% but such contract must be in writing and without a written contract the respondents suit was not maintainable for claiming the interest. Thus, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit summarily under Or- der 37 C.P.C. The notices were not also duly served with a copy of the plaint. The appellant was also entitled to leave to defend because he emphatically denied the fact of taking loan whereas the respondent did not produce any written contract. (6). The learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment and decree that the respondents suit based on the bank draft encashed by the appellant was maintainable. The suit was filed for recovery of debt or liquidated demand of money payable by the defendant. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that the learned trial Court has given very cogent reasons for rejecting the application for leave to defend and therefore the appeal deserves to be dismissed. (7). Order 37 C.P.C. provides summary procedure in respect of certain classes of suits where the defendant has no right to defend the suit like in ordinary suits without the leave of the Court which has to be obtained by him by filing an application within the prescribed time on the service of summons. Such leave is granted by the Court only when the application and the affidavit filed by the defendant discloses facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. The Court can refuse the leave to defend if it is revealed that the defendant has no substantial defence to raise or the defence put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious. Such leave is granted by the Court only when the application and the affidavit filed by the defendant discloses facts sufficient to entitle him to defend. The Court can refuse the leave to defend if it is revealed that the defendant has no substantial defence to raise or the defence put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious. The object of providing summary procedure under Order 37 is to discourage the defendants who have no defence and only intend to put unreasonable obstruction and cause delay in the trial of the suit. Hence Order 37 has been made applicable only to speci- fied classes of suits mentioned in Order 37 Rule 1 Sub-rule (2), which runs as under: ``(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1), the Order applies to the following classes of suits, namely :- (a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes; (b) suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquida- ted demand in money payable by the defendant, with or without interest, arising,- (i) on a written contract; or (ii) on an enactment, where the sum sought to be recovered is fixed sum of money or in the nature of a debt other than a penalty; or (iii) on a guarantee, where the claim against the principal is in respect of a debt or liquidated demand only. (8). A bare look at the aforesaid provision reveals that subject to the provisions of sub-rule (1) the summary procedure is applicable in respect of only two classes of suits; firstly suits upon bill of exchange, hundies and promissory notes; secondly the suits for recovery of debt or liquidated demand in money which is payable by the defendant out of written contract or an enactment or guarantee given in respect of a debt or liquidated demand. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the bill of exchange, hundies or promissory notes must have been drawn in favour of the plaintiff and then only he can file the suit upon such negotiable instrument. It is further urged on behalf of the appellant that summary procedure cannot be made applicable for the recovery of any debt or liquidated demand with or without inte- rest if there is merely an oral contract. It is further urged on behalf of the appellant that summary procedure cannot be made applicable for the recovery of any debt or liquidated demand with or without inte- rest if there is merely an oral contract. It is submitted that the plaintiffs suit is not covered in any of the aforesaid clauses, therefore, the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to apply the summary procedure under Order 37 C.P.C. (9). Now, therefore, the important question arises whether the plaintiff respondents suit is covered in any of the above clauses for being maintainable under Order 37 C.P.C. We have already described the averments made by the respondent in the plaint, which clearly show that the relevant bank draft was drawn by State Bank of India Branch, Ahore for payment to M/s Lalchand & sons i.e. to the defendant by State Bank of India, Jodhpur. According to the plaint, the defendant received and utilised this amount as a loan from the respondent. It is categorically pleaded in the plaint that the appellant demanded an advance of Rs. 1,74,000/- and it was given to him as a loan with the stipulation to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum. This loan amount was paid to the defendant appellant by bank draft and the plaintiff has instituted the suit on the basis of such bank draft drawn in favour of the defendant. I am unable to agree with this contention that the plaintiffs suit is covered under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Order 37 C.P.C. because the bank draft is not in favour of the plaintiff. In my opinion, the bill of exchange, Hundi or promissory note upon which suit is filed, should be drawn or held by the plaintiff in his favour i.e. drawn by other party in order to attract the summary procedure under Order 37 C.P.C. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 2, Order 37 C.P.C. provides a strict proce- dure for preventing the defendant to defend the suit unless he enters appearance. In default of appearance the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for suit money mentioned in the summons with pendente lite interest and costs. Similarly, it is mandatory for the defendant under sub-rule (5) or Rule 2 to apply for leave to defend within ten days from service of such summons for judgment. Similarly, it is mandatory for the defendant under sub-rule (5) or Rule 2 to apply for leave to defend within ten days from service of such summons for judgment. The court has a discretion to grant leave to defend unconditionally or on certain terms on being satisfied that defendant has a substantial defence to raise or such defence cannot be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious. This shows that where a suit is based on bill of exchange, hundi or promissory note or on written contract, an enactment or a guarantee, ini- tial presumption is taken about the genuineness of the claim unless the Court grants leave to defend on satisfying by the defendant the substance of his defence. Such initial presumption cannot be drawn where a loan transaction is pleaded by the plaintiff by payment of loan amount by bank draft in favour of the defendant. This presumption can be taken only where the suit is based on bank draft, bill of exch- ange, hundi or promissory note drawn in favour of the plaintiff where he has a right to claim the payment of the amount from the defendant. i am in agreement with the view taken in Syed Moosa Emami vs. Sunil Kumar Gilani & Anr. (1). In the instant case the plaintiffs suit cannot be called a suit based on a bill of exchange, hundi or a promissory note. (10). It is crystal clear from the pleadings in the plaint that there is no written contract between the parties for the alleged loan transaction and the payment of interest at the rate of 18% per annum claimed in the suit. The bank draft cannot be treated as a written contract between the parties as it does not disclose and rightly never discloses the terms and conditions and the rate of interest. The plaintiff has claimed interest only on the basis of oral agreement. Such suit which is for recovery of debt or liquidated demand in money with interest cannot be termed as arising out of a written contract. The plaintiff has claimed interest only on the basis of oral agreement. Such suit which is for recovery of debt or liquidated demand in money with interest cannot be termed as arising out of a written contract. In view of the above discussion, I am clearly of the view that the plaintiffs suit is neither covered under clause (a) nor clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, Order 37 C.P.C. The documents produced by the plaintiff in the suit i.e. notices dated 20.9.94 & 13.6.94, pay- in-slip dated 14.10.91, certificate by the Bank dated 10.11.94 and the letter by State Bank of India, Ahore dated 6.5.96 do not make out a case of a suit arising out of a written contract. (11). Consequently, it is held that the plaintiffs suit could not be entertained and tried under O. 37 C.P.C. and the impugned judgment and decree being against the provisions of law deserves to be set aside. The impugned judgment and decree dated 1.6.96 passed by District Judge, Jalore is hereby set aside. The respondents suit is remanded to the trial Court for trial and decision in accordance with law by treating it as a regular suit. Record be sent immediately. No order as to cost.