N. S. Singh, J.- The judgment and order dated 26.8.96 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No, 1366 of 1994 is a subject matter under challenge in this writ appeal. 2. Initially, the present respondent No.l, namely,. Shri Jitendra Narayan Bhagawati filed a writ petition being Civil Rule No. 1366 of 1994 before this Court as against the State of Assam & 20 others including the present appellants who are arrayed as respondent Nos 5, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20 and 21 challenging the validity of an office memorandum dated 13.3.87 issued by the Joint Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Forest Department as Annexure IX to the writ petition and also Final Gradation List of the State Forest Service Officers (Class I) under the Govt. of Assam published under notification dated 20.1.94 by cancelling the earlier notification dated 19.4.93 as in Annexure XV to the writ petition by contending inter alia, that in the year 1962, the writ petitioner, respondent No.l herein was initially appointed as Forest Ranger Grade II in the Forest Department under the Govt. of Assam wef 1st October, 1962 and thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Conservator of Forests, for short ACF vide notification/order dated 29.8.86 under Regulation 4 (d) of the Assam Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulation, 1951, in short, APSC Regulation and subsequently by another notification/order dated 31.8,92 the respondent No. 1 along with other 12 persons have been promoted to the post of ACF under Rule 4 (c) of the Assam Forest Service (Class I) Rules, 1942 hereinafter referred to as the Rules, thus modifying partially the earlier notification/order dated 29.8.86 i.e. on and from 16.10.86. The appellant No. 1 (respondent No.5 in the writ petition) along with others were appointed as ACF in the month of September, 1987 on completion of their training hi the State Forest Service Training College. Likewise the appellant Nos 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9 who were arrayed as respondent Nos. 10, 12,13,14,15,17,18 and 20 were appointed on 30.10.1987 on completion of their Diploma Course Training and similarly the appellant No. 10 (respondentNo.21 in the writ petition) was appointed as ACF on 12.4.1988 on completion of his training. Likewise the appellant Nos 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9 who were arrayed as respondent Nos. 10, 12,13,14,15,17,18 and 20 were appointed on 30.10.1987 on completion of their Diploma Course Training and similarly the appellant No. 10 (respondentNo.21 in the writ petition) was appointed as ACF on 12.4.1988 on completion of his training. According to the respondent No.l (writ petitioner), the appellants were entitled only to stipend from the date of their training i.e. on and from 1.4.1986 as per recruitment policy and their appointment on regular basis was subject to successful completion of training and production of related certificates. It is also the case of the writ petitioner that a related Govt. circular dated 15.2.61 affording higher seniority to the directly recruited ACF over the promotes officer were struck down by this Court on 3.8.89 in the connected writ petition being Civil Rule No.575 of 1982. It has been urged that the Govt. issued an office memorandum (impugned order) dated 13.3.87 as in Annexure IX to the writ petition conferring higher seniority to the directly recruited officers by treating their period of training as in the service, training period to be effective from the related current initial year commencing from 1.4.1986 onwards and also treating the period of training as the period of probation for such officers who are undergoing such training. By virtue of the said office memorandum/order dated 13.3.87 a draft gradation list of officers appointed as ACF, both direct and promotee was published on 16.11.89 thus showing the names of the present appellants as seniors to the writ petitioner, respondent No 1 herein. Being dissatisfied with the said draft gradation list, the respondent No.l submitted a representation to the competent authority and thereafter the competent authority issued another draft gradation list of ACF Officers on 19.4.93, thus cancelling the earlier draft gradation list dated 16.11.89 after due consideration of the representation of the respondent No.l and as a result of which the seniority position of the respondent No.l was at SI. No. 62 which is above the present appellants whose names appears in between SI. Nos. 68 to 84 in the said list. But the date of appointment of the appellants was shown as 1.4,86. No. 62 which is above the present appellants whose names appears in between SI. Nos. 68 to 84 in the said list. But the date of appointment of the appellants was shown as 1.4,86. As the respondent No.l is not satisfied with the action of the respondent Govt., he also submitted another representation objecting the factum of showing the date of appellants and other persons similarly situated as 1.4.1986 as deemed date of appointment as seen in the documents marked as Annexure XTV to the writ petition. Subsequently, a final gradation list was published on 20.1.94 wherein the name of the writ petitioner (respondent No. 1) appears at SI. No.78 whereas the name of the present appellants appear in between SI. No.62 to 76 by taking into account their date of appointment as 1.4.86 as in Annexure XV to the writ petition. According to the respondent No.l (writ petitioner) the respondent Govt./competent authority had defied related Rule 4,6 and 15 of the Rules thus conferring higher seniority to the direct recruitees ACF over the promotees ACF and rather the impugned office memodandum dated 13.3.87 as Annexure IX was issued illegally and without jurisdiction and as such the final gradation list which is based on the impugned order of 13.3.87 is violated of the relate^ Rules mentioned above. The writ petitioner also urged that as per Rule 6 of the Rules a candidate for direct recruitment to the post of ACF is required to undergo training before he is appointed to the service and such training consists of initial training for 6 months under Divisional Forest Officer, and if he is found suitable during this period, he is selected to undergo 2 years training course at Dehradun, Coambatore or Barnihat and during the course of training, a candidate is not paid salary, but stipend and even the period of training is not counted as probation and as such a candidate is directly recruited to the post of ACF only upon satisfactory completion of the course of training under Rule 6 of the Rules. 3. 3. The present appellants and other respondents in the writ petition contested the suit of the writ petitioner by filing affidavit-in-opposition by contending inter alia, that the writ petition is defeated by delay and laches on the main ground that the impugned office memorandum/order dated 13.3.87 as in Annexure IX had not been challenged during last several years during which the respondent Nos 6, 7 and 19 in the writ petition had been promoted to a higher post and their seniority position had also been finally decided by the said notification dated 20.1.94. According to the appellants, Rule 6 of the said Rules did not prescribe that the period of training of ACF should not be treated as in service, but only the related note to the statutory Rule 6 mentioned that the period of training should not be treated as service which could not have binding effect as it did not form a part of the rule and rather the policy decision of the Govt. cannot be challenged in a writ petition. It is also the case of the appellants that Regulation 4 (d) of the APSC Regulation provides for officiating appointment for a period not exceeding one year and such Regulation is applicable in exceptional circumstances and as such, the persons appointed under the said Regulation to officiate do not have any right to the said post even though their continuance in the post is beyond the period of one year, 4. Upon hearing the parties and also on perusal of the materials on record, the learned Single Judge opined that the direct recruitees like appellants cannot be treated as on probation during the period of training as Rule 8 specifically deals with the period of probation in their cases. Supporting this finding, the learned Single Judge has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Prafulla Kumar Swain vs. Prakash Chandra Misra & others, reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC181 wherein the Apex Court held thus : "Recruitment is just an initial process. That may lead to eventual appointment in the service. But, that cannot tantamount to an appointment. No doubt, Rule 5 talks of recruitment to Class II service. We consider these are two sources of recruitment. Nowhere in the recruitment Rules of'1959 it is specified that the services of a direct recruit under the Govt. That may lead to eventual appointment in the service. But, that cannot tantamount to an appointment. No doubt, Rule 5 talks of recruitment to Class II service. We consider these are two sources of recruitment. Nowhere in the recruitment Rules of'1959 it is specified that the services of a direct recruit under the Govt. shall be reckoned from the date of selection in the competitive examination. On the contrary, Regulation 12 (c) is very clear that the period of training is not to be reckoned as Govt. service. It is admitted before us that after the successful completion of training when the appointment order is issued the direct recruits are put on probation. Similar is in the case of the promotees. Both of them undergo probation. Therefore, in the light of these provisions it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the direct recruits that their seniority must be reckoned from the date of their appointment." 5. It has also been held by the learned Single Judge that the Govt. had no right or jurisdiction to bye pass the statutory provisions by taking into account of the impugned order as in Annexure IX to the writ petition as the same is violative of the related statutory provisions under the Rules. The learned Single Judge also observed that the notification dated 31.8.92 affording promotion to the writ petitioner along with other 12 Forest Ranger in the post of ACF from the date of their joining in the post in their respective place of posting in pursuance of the earlier officiating appointment dated 29.8.86 have not been challenged by any of the parties including the appellants and as such under the circumstances no order can be passed regarding the validity of the said notification and rather the said notification dated 31.8.92 cannot be regarded as invalid. 6. Sri A. Sarma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants assisted by Ms. 6. Sri A. Sarma, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants assisted by Ms. B. Dutta submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the appellants' submissions that the respondent No. 1 had no right to question, in any manner, the appellants' appointments inasmuch as the officiating appointment of respondent No. 1 under Regulation 4 (d) of the APSC Regulation was made without following the procedure prescribed under 4 (c) of the Rules and as such it does not confer any right to the respondent No.l to the substantive post of ACF. It is also contended by Sri Anil Sarma, learned senior counsel that the learned Single Judge had failed to see that the notification dated 31.8.92 cannot confer any right upon the respondent No.l, more particularly the right to seniority above the appellants with retrospective effect. According to Sri Anil Sarma, under Regulation 4 (d) of the APSC Regulation, no regularisation is possible and even if regularisation is made following the Rules, such regularisation from the earlier date cannot grant any right in favour of the respondent No.l so as to enable him to claim seniority over the persons legally appointed under the related Rules by direct recruitment or by promotion. Urging all these points Sri Sarma submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge is not tenable in the eye of law and the same deserves to be aside. 7. At the hearing Sri CK Sharma Baruah, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, writ petitioner urged that Rule 6 (ii) of the Rules provides that the period of training would not be counted as Probation and during the period of training, only a stipend would be given. Learned counsel further argued that the impugned office memorandum dated 13.10.87 as in Annexure IX cannot override the provisions of the Assam Forest Service (Class I) Rules, 1942 i.e. the Rules. It is also urged that the respondent- Govt. cannot afford seniority to the appellants in violation of the Rules 4, 6 and 15 of the said Rules. 8. Learned counsel further argued that the impugned office memorandum dated 13.10.87 as in Annexure IX cannot override the provisions of the Assam Forest Service (Class I) Rules, 1942 i.e. the Rules. It is also urged that the respondent- Govt. cannot afford seniority to the appellants in violation of the Rules 4, 6 and 15 of the said Rules. 8. Now we are to examine as to whether the learned Single Judge had acted illegally or with material irregularity while passing the impugned judgment and order and also whether the impugned office memorandum as in Annexure IX treating the period of training as period of probation for those officers who were undergoing such training and giving effect of the appointment to the appellants and such similarly situated incumbents from the date of training and also impugned notification relating to final gradation list as in Annexure XV are tenable in the eye of law or not. 9. For better appreciation in the matter, we are to refer the related Regulation 4 (d) and the proviso thereof of the APSC Regulation which is quoted below : "4. Promotion - It shall not be necessary to consult the Commission on the principles to be followed in making promotions or on the suitability of candidates for promotion in the following cases : (d) Officiating promotion for a period which is not likely to last for more than one year: Provided that if the period of officiating promotion is extended beyond the term for which it was originally sanctioned, the period of promotion shall, for purpose of this regulation, be reckoned from the date when the promotion originally took effect and not from the date of the extension of the period." 10. On bare perusal of this Regulation 4 (d) and the proviso thereof, it is established that the competent authority may extend the period of officiating promotion beyond the term for which it was originally assigned/given and such period of promotion if extended, the same shall be reckoned/counted from the date when the promotion originally took effect and not from the date of extension of the said officiating period. The writ petitioners in respondent No.l has been allowed to continue his officiating promotion for a long time till he has been given regular promotion to the post of ACF under Rule 4 (c) of the Rules wef the date of joining in the post of ACJ in his place of posting in pursuance of his initial appointment dated 29.8.86, vide notification/order dated 31.8.92 as stated above. This notification dated 29.8.86 has/had not been challenged by any of the parties till today and as such in our considered view this notification dated 31.8.92. conferring promotion of the writ petitioner, the respondent No. 1 herein in the post of ACF from the date of his joining in the said post on 16,10.1986 is still valid and has value of it in the eye of law. Note 1 of Rule 6 of the Rules specifically provides that the direct recruitee during his/her such period of training, such period will not count as probation and the candidate will be paid such stipend and travelling allowance as may be fixed by the Govt.. In view of this statutory provisions, the respondents/ Govt. had committed illegalities and irregularities while treating the period of such training as a period of probation for such officers like the present appellants who had undergone such training. Rule 8 of the said Rules , deals with the period of probation to be undergone by the members of the service either appointed by promotion under Rule 4 (c) or a member of service directly recruited under Rule 4 (a) (b) of the Rules. In this regard we are of the view that the learned Single Judge had dealt with this point/issue exhaustively and made a reasoned finding in the related paragraph Nos. 13 to 18 of the impugned judgment and order. 11. It is well settled that the terms 'recruitment' and 'appointment' are not synonymous and connote different meaning. Hence, concept of recruitment is quite different from the concept of appointment. Probation period is being afforded only after the appointment is given to a particular individual/person as a condition of service. A person who is selected for training precedent to appointment in a particular post grade and not being appointed till the completion or, passing of the training. In view of this established principle, how his training period can be treated as probation period. A person who is selected for training precedent to appointment in a particular post grade and not being appointed till the completion or, passing of the training. In view of this established principle, how his training period can be treated as probation period. If it is done so, it is not tenable in the eye of law. The same thing has happened in the instant case under the related impugned order/ notification of 13.3.87 as in Annexure IX to the writ petition which is our considered view, the impugned notification dated 13.3.87 as in Annexure IX is against the service jurisprudence. 12. So far the question of delay and laches in filing the writ petition by the respondent No. 1 as raised by the appellant is concerned, we are of the firm view that there are no laches or delay in the instant case for the following reasons : 13. The writ petitioner (respondent No. 1) had initially been given promotion in the post of ACF on officiating basis in the year 1986 vide notification dated 29.8.86 without assigning any period of such appointment. It is also an admitted position that the related Govt. circular dated 15.2.61 conferring higher seniority to directly recruited ACF over promotee officers was struck down by this Court on 3.8.1989 under Civil Rule No.575 of 1982 and during the pendency of the said civil rule, the respondent Govt. issued the impugned office memorandum dated 13.3.87 as in Annexure IX to the writ petition conferring higher seniority to the directly recruited officers over the promotee officers in the post of ACF and also treating the period of training as the period of probation for those direct recruit officers commencing from 1.4.1986 and on the basis of it a draft gradation list of those officers was published on 16.11.89 showing these appellant and some others as seniors to the writ petitioner. In this regard, the writ petitioner filed representation and on the basis of it another draft gradation list of ACF officers had been published on 19.4.93 cancelling the earlier draft gradation list dated.16.11.89. In the said revised draft gradation list, the writ petitioner was given due seniority over the appellants and other respondents in the writ petition. The writ petitioner also objected the factum of snowing the deemed date of appointment of the appellants and others as 1.4.1986 by filing another representation. In the said revised draft gradation list, the writ petitioner was given due seniority over the appellants and other respondents in the writ petition. The writ petitioner also objected the factum of snowing the deemed date of appointment of the appellants and others as 1.4.1986 by filing another representation. But later on, on 20.1.94 the impugned final gradation list as in Annexure XV was published thus showing the writ petitioner as junior to the appellants and others. Therefore, in our considered view, the cause of action has been continued till the date of publication of the impugned final gradation list dated 20.1.1994 and as such no question of delay or laches as contended by the appellants over arose at any point of time. 14. For the reasons and observations made above, we hereby opine that the appellants could not make out a case to justify the interference in the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the result, this writ appeal is devoid of merit and accordingly it stands dismissed thus affirming the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. No costs.