ORDER 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is filed for quashing the resolution dated 17.6.1997. Annexure P/3 passed by Shiksha Sthayi Samiti, Zila Panchayat, Seoni, whereby the respondent No.3, Upendra Singh was appointed as Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I instead of the petitioner and also against the order dated 10.10.1997, Annexure P/10, passed by the respondent No. 5 Additional Commissioner, Jabalpur in appeal against the aforesaid resolution. 2. Shortly stated the facts of this case are as follows. The respondent No.4 had advertised the post of Lecturer in Sociology on 7.6.1997 for appointment of Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I in Govt. Higher Secondary School, Khami, The aforesaid post of Lecturer was reserved for other backward class. The minimum qualification for the post of Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I was post graduate in 2nd class with a condition that a candidate obtaining a degree in B. Ed. shall be preferred to other candidates. The petitioner and the respondent No.3 applied for the post with other candidates. The education committee, as per its resolution dated 17.6.1997, appointed the respondent No.3, Upendra Singh, resident of Gram Panchayat Kesala. Janpad Panchayat Barghat, District Seoni, as Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I (Lecturer) for the Higher Secondary School, Khami. The petitioner was kept in waiting list. 3. The petitioner, therefore, filed an. appeal under Rule 5 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995 before the Additional Commissioner, Jabalpur. The petitioner claimed that he had obtained more marks than the respondent No.3 in post graduate examination. He was B. Ed., whereas the respondent No.3 had not passed B. Ed. examination. 4. The learned Additional Commissioner has found in paragraph 4 of his order dated 10.10.1997, Annexure P/10 that according to the norms of selection, the petitioner was more qualified as he had a B .Ed. degree and had also obtained more marks than the respondent No.3 in post graduate examination. Despite this fact, the petitioner could not be held to be eligible candidate because the name of the petitioner is found in the voter list of Seoni, whereas the respondent No. 3 was resident of Gram Panchayat Kesala, which falls within the territory of Janpad Panchayat Barghat. It was also found that the name of the respondent No.3 was mentioned in the land revenue record of Gram Panchayat Kesala. It was also found that the name of the respondent No.3 was mentioned in the land revenue record of Gram Panchayat Kesala. The learned Additional Commissioner, therefore, held that the petitioner did not fulfil the eligibility clause because he was not the resident within the territory of Janpad Panchayat, Barghat. 5. In this petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order of the Additional Commissioner, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner is being discriminated against by the respondents only on the ground of residence and thereby the impugned resolution of Shiksha Sthayi Samiti, Zila Panchayat, Seoni as well as the order of the Additional Commissiner are violative of the Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. SlIdhir Kumar Biswai, in Civil Appeal No. 2478 of 1993, decided on 16.8.1994, reported in 1994 (II) MPWN 188 P. 249. 6. Learned Dy. Govt. Advocate for the respondent No. 6/State, on the other hand, argued that under the scheme, the preference has to be given to a candidate who is resident within the territory of Janpad Panchayat Barghat and thereafter Zila Panchayat Seoni, and in view of this matter, the respondent No.3 was rightly appointed to the post of Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I in the Higher Secondary School, Khami. The petitioner was not the resident within the territory of Janpad Panchayat Barghat and, therefore, he was not preferred in comparison to respondent No.3. 7. The sole question for determination is if the petitioner could be discriminated against only on the ground that he was not the resident within the territory of Janpad Panchayat, Barghat but resident whithin the territory of Zila Panchayat. Seoni. In this connection the Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India provides that no citizen shal1, on the ground only of religion, race caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State. Seoni. In this connection the Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India provides that no citizen shal1, on the ground only of religion, race caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State. Article 16 (3) of the Constitution of India, however, authorises the Parliament to frame a law in regard to clause or clauses of employment or appointment to an office under the government, or any legal or other authority within a State or Union Territory, in requirement as to resident within the State or Union Territory prior to such emploYlJ1ent or appointment. The learned Dy. Govt. Advocate for the respondent No. 6/State did not point out any particular law made by the ,Parliament in this behalf. There in no other provision under the Constitution of India which provides for reservation of post on the basis of residence. Therefore, neither the State Government nor the legal authority is authorised to discriminate against a candidate in the matters of employment on the ground of his residence. If a candidate fulfils other criteria laid down for selection, he cannot be discriminated against or held ineligible only on the ground of residence. In this case, the petitioner was resident within the territory of Zila Panchayat Seoni and it is not disputed that Janpad Panchayat Barghat was part of District Seoni. The petitioner was otherwise eligible as a candidate for the post of Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I in the Govt. Higher Secondary School, Khami as a member of other backward class. It is also found by the learned Additional Commissioner that the petitioner had obtained more marks than respondent No.3 and had obtained a degree in B. Ed. which the respondent No.3 had not obtained. According to norms of selection, a candidate obtaining more marks was liable to be appointed. Moreove, the petitioner was to be preferred on account of his B. Ed. degree. In the case of State of Orissa. 1994 (II) MPWN 188 P. 249, (supra). Rule 6 (1) of Orissa District Revenue Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1983 was chal1enged on the ground that it violated Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India. It was held as follows :- "The offending portion of this rule are the words "from the candidates of the district". Rule 6 (1) of Orissa District Revenue Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1983 was chal1enged on the ground that it violated Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India. It was held as follows :- "The offending portion of this rule are the words "from the candidates of the district". Shri Panda appearing for the appel1ants has submitted in this connection that this is ordinary requirement because of the word "ordinarily" appearing in the sub-rule. We are, however, of the view that the word "ordinarily" as used and placed in the sub-rule, refers to the periodicity which is said to be annual. It has no connection with the place of residence of the candidates. As to this part of the sub-rule, it has been pointed by the Tribunal that the same is in conflict with Article 16 (2) of the Constitution, which has laid down that no citizen shall be discriminated against, inter alia, on the ground of' 'place of birth, residence or any of them". The aforesaid part of the sub-rule is thus clearly violative of the aforesaid prohibition and has, therefore, rightly been held to be ultra vires." In the case of A.V.S. Narasimha Rao and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and another, reported in AIR 1970 SC 422 , it was pointed out that the Parliament alone had power to make a law in special case as per Article 16 (3) of the Constitution of India, and that power was confined to a resident within a State and not within a particular area: Their Lordships laid down in paragraph 10 at page 425 as follows :- "Para 10. ..... We accept the argument of Mr. Gupta that the Constitution, as it stands, speaks of a whole State as the venue for residential qualification and it is impossible to think that the Constituent Assembly was thinking of residence in Districts, Taluqas, cities, towns or villages. The fact that this clause is an exception and came as an amendment must dictate that a narrow construction upon the exception should be placed as indeed the debates in the Constituent Assembly also seem to indicate. We accordingly reject the contention of Mr. Setalvad seeking to put a very wide and liberal construction upon the words 'any law' and 'any requirement'. We accordingly reject the contention of Mr. Setalvad seeking to put a very wide and liberal construction upon the words 'any law' and 'any requirement'. These words are obviously controlled by the words 'residence within the State or Union Trerritory' which words mean what they say, neither more nor less. It follows, therefore, that Section 3 of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act. 1957, in so far as it relates to Telangana (and we say nothing about the other parts) and Rule 3 of the Rules under it are ultra vires the Constitution." 8. The case of Dr. Pradeep Jain etc. v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1420 , is not applicable to this case because it deals with admission of Medical Colleges to which Article 16 (2) of the Constitution does not apply as was pointed out by P.N. Bhagwati, J. in paragraph 6 at page 1426 of the judgment. 9. It cannot be argued that merely because the aforesaid appointment professes to make reservation in the interest of other backward classes, the respondents could discriminate between the members of other backward classes on the ground of residence. Learned Dy. Govt. Advocate for the respondent No.6/State could not dispute that a Panchayat is a legal authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India as such it will be deemed to be State for the purpose of fundamental rights under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 10. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the resolution dated 17.6.1997, Annexure P/3 and the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 10.10.1997, Annexure P/10 are hereby quashed by a writ of certiorari and it is directed that the petitioner shall be appointed as a Shiksha Karmi, Grade-I (Lecturer in Sociology) in Govt. Higher Secondary School, Khami. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. No orders as to costs.,