B. K. SHARMA, J. This is first appeal preferred by Krishi Utpadan Samiti, Chandpur, district Bijnor against the judg ment and order dated 23-5-1989 passed by Sri Raj Pal Singh, the then II Additional District Judge, Bijnor in L. A. R. No. 149 of l987, Mangu Singh Claimant v. State of U. P. through Collector, Bijnor, Chairman Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Chandpur whereby he partly allowed the reference under Sec tion 18 of the Land Acquisition Act with proprotionate costs and directed that the claimant shall get compensation of his ac quired land of Khasra Plot No. 690m area 19360 sq. yard (four acres) situated in Town Noorupur, district Bijnor at the rate of Rs. 45/- per sq. yard together with solatium at the rate of 30% thereon and additional amount at the rate of 12% per annum for the period from the date of publication of the notification under Sec tion 4 (1) of the Act i. e. 16-7-1985 to the date of delivery of possession i. e. 15-1- 1985 and shall also get interest on the aforesaid enhanced amount of compensa tion at the rate of 9% per annum from 15-1-1986 to 16-1-1987 and at the rate of 15% per annum from 17-1-1987 till actual payment is made. 2. The claimants land of Khasra Plot No. 690m area 4 acres (19360 sq. yards), situated in Tbwn Noorpur, Fargana Boodhpur, district Bijnor, was acquired for the purposes of construction of UP Mandi Asthal, Noorpur of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Chandpur, district Bijnor. The preliminary notification under Sec tion 4 (1) of the Act was published on 16-7-1985. The notification under Section 6 (1) of the Act was published on 19-7- 1985. The possession was taken over the ac quired land on 15-1-1986. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bijnor made his award on 17-7-1987. He granted compen sation at the rate of Rs. 26,785. 71p. per acre for Gohra Awvval land and Rs. 24. 531. 24p per acre for Sawwai Awwal Aabi land together with solatium at the rate of 30% on the same and 12% addition al amount and interest. He also granted compensation of Rs. 2280/- for six Shisham trees and Rs. 10. 009/- for tube-well. 3. 26,785. 71p. per acre for Gohra Awvval land and Rs. 24. 531. 24p per acre for Sawwai Awwal Aabi land together with solatium at the rate of 30% on the same and 12% addition al amount and interest. He also granted compensation of Rs. 2280/- for six Shisham trees and Rs. 10. 009/- for tube-well. 3. The claimant alleged that the com pensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bijnor is too inade quate and much below the market price, that the acquired land is situated on the provincial High Way and within the limits of Nagar Palika, Noorpur and as such it has acquired the potential value of Abadi land; that the market value of the land acquired was in no case less than Rs. 100/- per sq. yard on the date of notification under Sec tion 4 of the Act; that there is an Ahata and Kothari in the acquired land and the market value of the construction was worth Rs. 50,000/- that there were grown up trees in the land acquired and the market value of these trees was Rs. 10,000/- and as such, the claimant claimed Rs. 7720/- as balance amount of compen sation of the trees. The claimant claimed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 100/-per sq. yard in view of the nature and quality of the land acquired and as such claimed the balance amount of compensa tion of Rs. 18,35,983. 54p. besides Rs. 50,000/- as market value of the construc tion of the Ahata and Kothari and Rs. 7720/- as balance market value of the trees and a reference was sought by the claimant. 4. The opposite party filed a written statement and contested the reference petition on the ground, inter alia, that the land acquired is Sahrai land (agricultural land) and the same is not abadi (Saknai) land; that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bijnor has awarded adequate amount of compensation on the basis of the instance of sale of the similar land and the land of the instance of sale is situated across the road from the acquired land; that there had been no construction over the acquired land; that the market value of the acquired land was not at the rate of Rs. 100/- per sq. 100/- per sq. yard; that the claimant has accepted the amount of compensation and as such, the reference petition is barred by Section 18 read with Section 31 (2) of the Act and that the reference petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid plead ings of the parties, the following issues were framed: Issues 1. Whether the Special Land Acquisition Officer has not granted fair and adequate amount of compensation, if so, what would be the fair and adequate amount of compensation ? 2. Whether the claimant is entitled to get any amount of compensation for the Ahata and Kothari as alleged in para 7 of the reference petition? 3. Whether the claimant is entitled to any amount of compensation for the trees as alleged in Para No. 8 of the reference petition ? 4. Whether the reference petition is barred by Section 18 read with Section 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act ? 5. Tb what relief, if any, is the claimant entitled ? 6. After taking the evidence and hear ing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court below held on issue No. 1 that the market value of the acquired land at the time of publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act was not less than Rs. 45/- per sq. yard and the Special Land Acquisition Officer has not granted the fair and adequate amount of compensation and the fair andadequate amount of compensation of the acquired land is determined at the rate of Rs. 45/- per sq. yard. On issue No. 2, the Court below held that the claimant was not entitled to get any amount of compensa tion for the alleged Ahata and Kothari. On issue No. 3 the Court below found that the Special Land Acquisition Officer has granted adequate and fair amount of com pensation of trees amounting to Rs. 2280/-and the claimant is not entitled to get any further amount of compensation for the trees in question. On issue No. 4, the Court below held that the reference was not barred by Section 18 read with Section 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the above findings, the Court below partly allowed the reference petition and passed the judgment and order as aforesaid. 7. On issue No. 4, the Court below held that the reference was not barred by Section 18 read with Section 31 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the above findings, the Court below partly allowed the reference petition and passed the judgment and order as aforesaid. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, Krishi Utpadan Samiti, Chandpur, district Bijnor preferred this appeal. 8. When this appeal was initially heard, relying on the case of U. P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Cyan Devi (Dead) by LRs and another, AIR 1955 Supreme Court 724, Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the Mandi Samiti appellant for whose benefit the land was acquired, was a neces sary party in the reference made to the civil Court by the Collector, but no notice was served upon the appellant by the civil Court and that the reference order was passed by the Civil Court without afford ing an opportunity of being heard to the appellant. In Gyan Devi (supra) the Court formulated a question to be answered in Para 8 at page 728 as follows: "8. The question which needs to be deter mined is whether the L. A. Act confers any right on the Board to participate at the stage of deter mination of compensation for the land which is sought to be acquired under Section 55 of the U. P. Act read with the provisions of the L. A. Act. ". 9. The Court then observed that the question aforementioned had, therefore, to be examined in the light of the provisions contained in the L. A. Act relat ing to acquisition of land for a local authority that the provisions which have a bearing on this question are contained in Section 50 of the L. A. Act. The Court continued to observe as follows: "sub-section (2) of Section 50 enables a local authority to appear in any acquisition proceeding at the stage of determination of compensation before the Collector or the refer ence Court and adduce evidence for the pur pose of determining the amount of compensa tion. The Court continued to observe as follows: "sub-section (2) of Section 50 enables a local authority to appear in any acquisition proceeding at the stage of determination of compensation before the Collector or the refer ence Court and adduce evidence for the pur pose of determining the amount of compensa tion. The object underlying the aforesaid provision appears to be to safeguard the inter ests of the local authority who would be re quired to pay the amount of compensation that would be determined by the Collector or by the Reference Court by enabling it to adduce evidence having a bearing on the amount of compensation before the Collector or the Court and thereby assist them in making a fair deter mination. Such protection was necessary be cause in the matter of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act a local authority for whom the land is acquired does not stand on the same footing as the Government. " 10. The said right can be effectively exercised by the local authority only if it has information of the proceedings which are pending before the Collector as well as the Reference Court. In other words, the right conferred under Section 50 (2) of the L. A. Act carried with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the Reference Court before whom the ac quisition proceedings are pending on the date on which the matter or determination of the amount of compensation will be taken up. Service of such a notice, being necessary for effectuating the right con ferred on the local authority under Section 50 (2) of the LA. Act can, therefore, be regarded as an integral part of the said right and the failure to give such a notice would result in denial of the said right unless it can be shown that the local authority had knowledge about the pen dency of the acquisition proceedings before the Collector or the Reference court and has not suffered any prejudice on account of failure to give such notice. " 11. It was not disputed by learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 that notice to the appellant giving opportunity of being heard was necessary. " 11. It was not disputed by learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 that notice to the appellant giving opportunity of being heard was necessary. By the submitted that when the reference was made by the Collector to the Civil Court, a copy of that reference was sent to the appellant and thereafter the appellants pairokar, namely, Sri Mansukh continued to appear before the Civil Court and, therefore, the appellant had sufficient notice of the refer ence proceedings. That was how counsel for the opposite party No. 1 submitted that no prejudice was caused to the-appellant on account of failure to give a notice by the Civil Court to the appellant. Counsel for the opposite party No. 1 has drawn our attention to the order sheet of the Civil Court which, according to him, beats sig natures of Sri Mansukh at several places. On the other hand, in the rejoinder-af fidavit filed on behalf of the Mandi Samiti before this Court it was averred that the Mandi Samiti did not participate in the reference proceedings; that no notice was given by the Reference Court to the appel lant; that it is not known in what capacity Sri Mansukh appeared before the Civil Court, that it is difficult for the deponent to say whether the signatures on the order sheet of the Civil Court were of Sri Man sukh and whether, in fact, Sri Mansukh participated in those proceedings and signed the order sheet; that it is not clear whether Sri Mansukh was authorised by the Mandi Secretary or the Chairman to appear in the reference proceedings on behalf of the Mandi Samiti; that Sri Man sukh was not instructed to appear on be half of the Mandi Samiti and to participate in the proceedings and, that the signatures of Sri Mansukh, a class IV employee of the Mandi Samiti would not show that the appellant was aware of the proceedings. 12. From the above pleadings of the appellant, the question for consideration arose whether Sri Mansukh attended the reference proceedings on behalf of the Mandi Samiti and whether he signed the order sheet of the Civil Court in a few dates ib vegakf if the Mandi Samiti and, if so, what is the effect of such findings. 13. 12. From the above pleadings of the appellant, the question for consideration arose whether Sri Mansukh attended the reference proceedings on behalf of the Mandi Samiti and whether he signed the order sheet of the Civil Court in a few dates ib vegakf if the Mandi Samiti and, if so, what is the effect of such findings. 13. The submission of counsel for the opposite party No. 1 was that Sri Mansukh being an employee of the Mandi Samiti was fully authorised to appear on behalf of the Mandi Samiti and to participate in the reference proceedings and that his ap pearance would amount to participation of the Mandi Samiti itself in the reference proceedings and, if that is so, no prejudice can be said to have caused to the Mandi Samiti, simply because no notice was is sued by the Reference Court to the Mandi Samiti. This being a, question of fact, a clear findings was required to be recorded by the Court below after perusing the en tire material on record. 14. We, therefore, remitted the fol lowing issues to the Court below: (1) Whether Mansukh was authorised on behalf of the Mandi Samiti to appear before the Civil Court during the reference proceedings and, if so, whether he signed the order-sheet of the Civil Court on behalf of the Mandi Samiti ? (2) Whether the Mandi Samiti had suffi cient knowledge of the reference proceedings ? (2) Whether the Mandi Samiti had suffi cient knowledge of the reference proceedings ? The learned Additional District Judge, after giving an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and the Mandi Samiti appellant examined aforesaid Mansukh himself from its side and then after hearing the arguments of the parties, he held that the said Mansukh was authorised pairokar of the Mandi Samiti appellant who attended the Court in proceedings of the land acquisition refer ence and kept on signing on the order sheet of the file of the land acquisition case on behalf of Mandi Samiti appellant and further after having observed that while making the reference to the District Judge, the Deputy Collector, who made the refer ence, sent a copy of the letter of reference to the Mandi Samiti appellant in which it was said that it may do pairvi in regard to the matters of acquisition at its level, noted that there is a written statement on record of the reference file from the side of Col lector and President of the Mandi Samiti-appellant; that it is also on record that the Collector is the President of the Mandi Samiti-appellant; that Mansukh kept on attending the Court on behalf of the Mandi Samiti-appellant in the reference proceedings and kept on signing the order-sheet of the file and that it has also come in evidence that Mansukh kept on doing pairvi in the matter at the verbal instruc tions of the Secretary of the Mandi Samiti-appellant. He also placed on record the finding that Mansukh has been doing Pair vi on behalf of Mandi Samiti appellant in its civil and land acquisition cases and that he is an employee of the Mandi Samiti. On the basis of these materials, he found that the Mandi Samiti appellant had sufficient knowledge of the proceedings of the land acquisition. 15. He has remitted the findings aforesaid dated 8-4-1997 to this Court. On receipt of the said findings, the matter was taken up by the Bench on 1st April, 1998 and on the request made by the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant, time was given to it to file objection, if any, against the findings by 22nd April, 1998 but no objections were filed by any party against the findings aforesaid. On receipt of the said findings, the matter was taken up by the Bench on 1st April, 1998 and on the request made by the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant, time was given to it to file objection, if any, against the findings by 22nd April, 1998 but no objections were filed by any party against the findings aforesaid. Therefore, the findings and observations aforesaid remitted by the learned Additional Dis trict Judge became final between the par ties. 16. Parties counsel have been heard at length. It follows from the observations and findings submitted by the learned Ref erence Court on the remitted issues that the Mandi Samiti appellant had been sent a copy of the reference made from the side of the Collector; that it had full knowledge about the pendency of the acquisition proceedings before the Reference Court and had, in fact, participated in it and had sufficient opportunity to contest the claim of the claimant in the reference proceedings and consequently it follows that it had not suffered any prejudice on account of failure of the Reference Court to give notice in writing to it about the reference proceedings. So, the plea of the appellant that the reference order passed by the learned District Judge is vitiated for want of notice to the Mandi Samiti and want of opportunity to it to contest the claim and lead evidence. This takes us to the merit of the appeal. 17. In this appeal, the only question for determination is as to what was the market value of the land acquisitioned in this case for the purpose of awarding com pensation to the respondent No. 1. About the principles to be followed in determin ing the market value, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the follow ing authorities: (1) JT1995 (2) S. C. 339 Land Acquisition Officer, Elura etc. v. Smt. Jasti Rohini and another etc. (2) JT 1995 (3) S. C. 184 The Secretary, Karnataka Electricity Board v. Asstt. Commis sioner, Gadag and others. (3) JT 1995 (6) S. C. 92 M/s. Hasanali Khanbhai and Sons and Ors. v. State of Gujarat. (4) JT 1995 (4) S. C. 153 Rajashekar Sankappa Taradandi and Ors. v. The Asstt. Com missioner and Land Acquisition Officer and others. (5) AIR 1996 Supreme Court 531 Smt. Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India and another. (3) JT 1995 (6) S. C. 92 M/s. Hasanali Khanbhai and Sons and Ors. v. State of Gujarat. (4) JT 1995 (4) S. C. 153 Rajashekar Sankappa Taradandi and Ors. v. The Asstt. Com missioner and Land Acquisition Officer and others. (5) AIR 1996 Supreme Court 531 Smt. Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India and another. (6) Judgment dated 27-5-1997 by Hon. Palok Basu and Hon. R. K. Mahajan, JJ. in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13502 of 1992, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Mauranipw, district Jhansi through its Secretary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others. 18. From the side of respondent No. 1, the following authorities have been relied upon: (1) 1988lacc491 (SC) Chimanlal Har govinddas v. The Special Land Acquisition Of ficer, Poona and Anr. (2) (1991) 4 Supreme Court Cases 506 Bhagwanthula Samanna and others v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer. (3) JT 1996 (6) S. C. 721 G. Narayan Rao v. The Land Acquisition Officer. (4) 1998 (1) SCCR 289 U. P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Jainul Islam and another (decided by a Bench of three Hon. Judges ). 19. The basic authority Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona has been relied upon by both the sides. In this authority, the prin ciples of law on the subject have been summerised in the following words: (1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the Court cannot take into ac count the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his Award unless the same material is produced and proved before the Court. (2) So also the Award of the Land Acquisi tion Officer is not to be treated as a Judgment of the trial Court open or exposed to challenge before the Court hearing the reference. It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the Court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or afirm, modify or refer the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer as if it were an appellate Court. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal against the Award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or afirm, modify or refer the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer as if it were an appellate Court. (3) The Court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his, land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the material produced in the Court. Of course, the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. (5) The market value of land under ac quisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of notifications under Section 6 and 9 are ir relevant ). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at reasonable price. (7) In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most com parable instance which provides the index value. (8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant im provement in development prospects. (9 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) Proximity from time angle. (11) Proximity from situation angle. (9 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations: (i) Proximity from time angle. (11) Proximity from situation angle. (11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deducted by making suitable adjust ments for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be evaluated in terms of price varia tion as a prudent purchaser would do. (13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deducted by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors. (14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) and (13) has to be. undertaken in a common-sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors: Plus factors 1. Smallness of size 2. Proximity to a road 3. Frontage on a road 4. Neararness to developed area. 5. Regular shape. 6. Level vis-a-vis land under acquisition. 7. Special value for an owner of an adjoin ing property to whom it may have some very special advantage. Minus factors 1. Largeness of area. 2. Situation in the interior at a distance from the road. 3. Narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth. 4. Lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up. 5. Remoteness from developed locality. 6. Some special disadvantageous factor which would deter a purchaser. (15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of such case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Commonsense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds cannot be compared with a large track or block of land or say 10000 sq. yds or more. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Commonsense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds cannot be compared with a large track or block of land or say 10000 sq. yds or more. Firstly, while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approx. between 20% to 50% to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. This discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards. (16) Every case must be dealt with on its own pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the judge must place himself. 20. The land acquired in the present case was plot No. 690 measuring 4 acres = 19360 sq. yards situated in Town Noorpur Pargana Boodhpur district Bijnor. The relevant date was 16-7-85, the date of pub lication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant, has tried to refer to the observations made by the Special L. A. O. in his Award and criticised the judgment of the Reference Court in the light of the same. This ap proach is contrary to the position of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the authority Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra) that the reference proceedings are original proceedings and market value was to be determined by the District Judge afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. This ap proach is contrary to the position of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the authority Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra) that the reference proceedings are original proceedings and market value was to be determined by the District Judge afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. The learned District Judge has rightly relied on the testimony of the Mango Singh, Chairmant P. W. 1 before him that the acquired land was situated on Dehradun- Moradabad National High way and within the limits of Nagar Palika, Noorpur. He had also taken into account the testimony of the claimant, Mango Singh P. W. 1 that the acquired land was surrounded by Abadi in June, 1985 and further that Noorpur was making speedy progress that first it was a village and then it became Town Area and then became Nagar Palika. It was undisputed between the parties that Noorpur was Gaon Sabha in the year 1977, that it became Town Area in the year 1979 and was Municipal Board since 1981. It was elicited by the State itself in the cross- examination of this witness that there was a chak road and Abadi of Khasra No. 978 in the south of the ac quired land, that there was abadi of Kathu Singh, Lalu, Chandan and others in the North. There was also on record the tes timony of Man Mohan Lai, P. W. 2, which. was to the effect that his Abadi was situated on the south of the acquired land and that the acquired land was surrounded by Abadi in the year 1985, that there was a P. W. D. road in the east of the acquired land which went to Moradabad in one direction and in other direction went to Nehtaur, Hardwar and Dehradun. The District Judge also took into account the testimony of Trivendra Kumar Sharma, P. W. 3 that his house was situated in the north of the acquired land. He also took note of the fact that before him the opposite parties (i. e. State of U. P. and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti) did not examine any witness from their side to controvert any of these asser tions on oath coming from the side of the claimant. He also took note of the fact that before him the opposite parties (i. e. State of U. P. and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti) did not examine any witness from their side to controvert any of these asser tions on oath coming from the side of the claimant. On the basis of the above noted material, the learned District Judge held that the claimant has established that the land acquired was situated at the National Highway and within the limits of Nagar Palika Noorpur and that it had potential value as building site. 21. The learned counsel for the ap pellant has claimed that the potential value of the land cannot be taken into consideration in determining the market value of the acquired land on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. In this regard he has placed reliance on the authority Rajashekhar (supra ). In this authority, it was said that Section 24 clause fifthly prohibits taking into consideration of the future potentiality because of acquisition in determining compensation. This observa tion only meant that its future potentiality arising out of its acquisition is to be ex cluded from consideration. In other words, what the Apex Court said was that the Court, would not take into account the development which is likely to take place in the locality as a result of acquisition of the land in the locality for public purposes. In the case before the Apex Court, the land acquired was situated near the city but was acquired for extension of A. P. M. C. Yard and the evidence disclosed that the developed area was on a considerable dis tance from the acquired land and the Apex Court upheld the approach of the High Court in reducing the rate of compensa tion from RS. 5,61,7291- per acre to Rs. 55,000/- per acre in view of the fact that as on the date of notification, there was no development in that area though the land was capable for non-agricultural use and that Section 24 clause fifthly of the Land Acquisition Act prohibits taking into con sideration of the future potentiality be cause of acquisition in determining com pensation. 22. The District Judge observed in his judgment that the potentiality is a true element of value. 22. The District Judge observed in his judgment that the potentiality is a true element of value. He has further observed that the value offend in neighbourhood or adjoining areas is also to be taken into consideration for it may be relevant to a greater or lesser degree, that Section 23 of the Act lays down principles for determin ing compensation according to which the owner is entitled to receive the market value of the land, that the market value means what a willing purchaser would pay to a wiling seller for the property having regard to the advantages available to the land and the development activities which may be going on in the vacinity and the potentiality of the land. No exception could be taken to these principles. 25. In the case of Bhagwathulo Samanna (supra), the Apex Court held that the factor that the acquired land had potential value for being used as a building site was taken into consideration in fixing of the market value in law for determining the compensation. In the case of G. Narayan Rao (supra), the Apex Court ob served that the Court must consider the suitability of the acquired land for putting up building. 26. Now the learned counsel for the appellant, Mandi Samiti, has relied upon the exampler accepted by the Land Acquisition Officer. It was the sale deed dated 8-9-84 in respect of the sale 1. 120 acres of land of Khasra Plot No. 684 for a price of Rs. 30,000/- whose Lagan was Rs. 121- per acre (here-in-after referred to as the State Exempler ). The Land Acquisition Officer fixed the compensation of 839 acres of acquired land at the rate of Rs. 26,785. 71 P. per acre, which was also the same quality of land and for the rest of the acquired land its quality being "sawai Awwal Aabi" whose Lagan was lesser i. e. 10. 99 per acre, the Land Acquisition Officer, determined a proportionately lesser rate of Rs. 24,531. 24 P. per acre in accordance with lesser amount of Lagan. However, the Dis trict Judge rejected this exampler. 27. 99 per acre, the Land Acquisition Officer, determined a proportionately lesser rate of Rs. 24,531. 24 P. per acre in accordance with lesser amount of Lagan. However, the Dis trict Judge rejected this exampler. 27. Now for determining the com pensation by reference to the price which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser as on the date of the notification published under Section 4 (1), the Court has to take into consideration bona fide sales but not manipulated sales of land in the neigh bourhood possessed of same or similar quality and having the same or similar advantages. Further, it is settled law that the said sales must not only be proved but also be bona fide transactions and that these factors must be established as a fact by examining either the vendor or the ven dee. Marking of certified copies of sale deeds are not proof of either the contents or the circumstances in which it came to be executed. These observations are to be found in the authority Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru etc. v. Smt. Jasti Rohini and another, JT1995 (2) S. C. 339 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant itself. 28. In the authority G. Narayan Rao-v. Land Acquisition Officer, JT 1995 (6) SC 721, it was similarly said "that either the vendor or the vendee should be examined in proof of the documents to establish passing of the real consideration under the documents, the nature of the respective lands and whether the documents are genuine documents etc. It is for the Court to consider all the relevant facts to accept the correctness of the sale deeds and then consider whether they should form basis to determine compensation. In the absence of proof of above facts that would be no evidence for the Court to place reliance on untested documents. " 29. In this case neither the vendor nor vendee of this sale deed (the State exempler) was examined on oath before the Reference Court (District Judge) to show that it was a bona fide sale transaction, between a willing seller and willing pur chaser. " 29. In this case neither the vendor nor vendee of this sale deed (the State exempler) was examined on oath before the Reference Court (District Judge) to show that it was a bona fide sale transaction, between a willing seller and willing pur chaser. So the District Judge was entitled to reject this sale deed on this ground alone that neither the vendor nor the ven dee has been examined in this regard by the U. P. State or Mandi Samiti, but here the District Judge has even recorded some minus points in respect of this land. The learned District Judge has placed reliance on the testimony of the Claimant Mango Singh P. W. 1 that the land of State Ex empler was not suitable for Abadi as four High Tension Power Electricity Lines are passing over the said land in the State Exempler and that while the level of the acquired land was similar to i. e. at par with the level of the road adjoining it (i. e. ad joining the acquired land), the level of the land of the State Exempler is four feet lower than that of the level of the said land. There is the evidence of Man Mohan Lai, P. W. 2 also that High Tension Electricity lines are passing over the land comprised in the State Exempler. He consequently rightly held that the State Emempler dated 28-9-1984 relied upon by the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not represent the true market value of the acquired land and that it cannot be considered to be the proper instance of sale for determination of the market value of the acquired land. 30. Before the learned District Judge, the claimant claimed that the market value of the acquired land was in no case less than Rs. 100/- per sq. yard on the date of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Mangu Singh claimant testified before the District Judge that the market value of the ac quired land was Rs. 200/- per sq. yard and that this rate was decided by Nagar Palika, Noorpur and that the District Magistrate, Bijnor vide his order dated 12-4-1985 declared the market value of the land ad joining the road at Rs. 200/- per sq. yard. 200/- per sq. yard and that this rate was decided by Nagar Palika, Noorpur and that the District Magistrate, Bijnor vide his order dated 12-4-1985 declared the market value of the land ad joining the road at Rs. 200/- per sq. yard. However, since the claimant has not filed a copy of the alleged order dated 12- 4-1985 passed by the District Magistrate, Bijnor and has also not filed the circle rate of Nagar Palika, Noorpur, the District Judge ignored the claim that the market value of the acquired land should be determined at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. yard on the basis of the alleged order of the District Magistrate or the alleged circle rate of Nagar Palika, Noorpur. The claimant also examined Mohan Lai (P. W. 2) in his favour who testified to have transferred 270 sq. yard of land in favour of Murti Devi at the rate of Rs. 125/- per sq. yard. However, since the sale deed was not filed and proved, the learned District Judge left it out of consideration. 31. The Claimants exemplar (Ext. 1) related to transfer of 149. 40 sq. metre land vide sale deed dated 25-9-1984 executed by Nathu and others in favour of Trivendra Kumar Sharma (P. W. 3) and others of Khasra plot No. 691/2-M situated in Noor pur, Pargana Bhoorpur, Tahsil Dhampur, District Bijnor for a consideration of Rs. 12,000. This sale deed was registered in the office of Sub-Registrar on 23-11-1984. Trivendra Kumar Sharma (P. W. 3) testified before the District Judge that he pur chased this portion of land of Khasra plot No. 691/2-M for Rs. 12,000/- from Nathu and that there was a dilapidated aged hut over the said land. The learned District Judge has found that there was no am biguity revealed in his cross-examination. 32. The learned District Judge noticed that Khasra number of the ac quired land is 690 and consequently the land of claimants exemplar plot No. 691/2-M was situated adjacent to the ac quired land. He also held on the basis of the oral evidence led by the claimant against which no oral or documentary evidence was led from the side of the State of Mandi Samiti, that the acquired land was similar in nature and quality with the land of the claimants exemplar Ext. 1. He also held on the basis of the oral evidence led by the claimant against which no oral or documentary evidence was led from the side of the State of Mandi Samiti, that the acquired land was similar in nature and quality with the land of the claimants exemplar Ext. 1. The learned District Judge also took note of the fact that the claimants exemplar was dated 25-9-1984 which was about ten months before the notification/publica tion under Section 4 (1) of the Land Ac quisition Act. He also took notice of the evidence from the side of the claimant that the price of the land has increased in 1985, having become just double in 1985 in com parison to 1984. He, therefore, accepted the claimants exemplar for determining the market value of the acquired land. He observed relying upon the claimants ex emplar that the amount of compensation of the acquired land comes to Rs. 67. 15 per sq. yard. He then took note of the fact that admittedly the acquired land was four acres in area while the land comprised in the claimants exemplar was only 149. 40 sq. meter. He relied on the authority reported in AIR 1984 Allahabad at page 321 in which it was held that for determin ing the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property, deduction should be given which may vary from 1/4 to 1/3 of the value on the rate of the smaller property. In that case 1/3 deduction was made and following that authority, the learned District Judge gave 1/3 deduction in the present case on ac count of the larger area acquired. Conse quently making a deduction of 1/3 on the market value of Rs. 67. 15 per sq. yard, he determined the compensation at Rs. 45/-per sq. yard and concluded that this was the rate at which compensation should have been awarded and that the compensation actually awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was not fair and adequate. 33. Now the main attack of the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant is that the claimants exemplar being of a small piece of land, the large tract of land of the claimant acquired in this case for the Mandi Samiti cannot be valued on its basis for the purposes of compensation. 33. Now the main attack of the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant is that the claimants exemplar being of a small piece of land, the large tract of land of the claimant acquired in this case for the Mandi Samiti cannot be valued on its basis for the purposes of compensation. Reliance was placed on the authority Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru etc. v. Smt. Jasti Rohini and another etc. (supra) in which it was said in para 7 that bona fide sale or series of sales of small pieces of land do not furnish the sole basis of determine market value. In that authority, two cases were dealt with in one 9. 49 acres of land was acquired, in the other 14. 10 acres of land was acquired. The exemplar. was about 120 sq. yards land with a value at Rs. 133/- per sq. yard and the fixing of market value solely on its basis was not approved and the market value was fixed at Rs. 65. 000/- and Rs. 80,000/-per acre respectively in the two cases con sidering all the factors. 34. Next reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti appellant on the authority The Secretary, Karnataka Electricity Board v. Assistant Commissioner, Gadag and others (supra ). In this case, there was evidence led by the land-owner himself to show the yield of the land and so the market value was fixed as per capitalisation method and in this back ground, the Apex Court rejected the deter mination of the market value on the basis of a sale deed relating to a very small piece of land particularly because the exemplar was relating to a plot within the municipal limits and had abutted to main road while the acquired land was situated beyond the limits of the municipality. 35. Reliance was also placed on the authority M/s Hasanali Khanbhai and Sons and others v. State of Gujarat (supra ). In this authority it was said: "it is seen that the sale instances referred and relied on by the High Court in Survey Nos. 334 and 335 are small pieces of land; they do not offer as comparable sales. 35. Reliance was also placed on the authority M/s Hasanali Khanbhai and Sons and others v. State of Gujarat (supra ). In this authority it was said: "it is seen that the sale instances referred and relied on by the High Court in Survey Nos. 334 and 335 are small pieces of land; they do not offer as comparable sales. This Court in Ad ministrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, AIR 1988 SC 943 has settled the law that when sales of small lands are found to be germane sales in developed area between will ing purchaser and willing vendor but not too anxious buyer, the value of small developed plots cannot directly be adopted in fixing the price for large extent of lands. However, if it is found that large extent to be valued admits of and is ripe for use of building purposes, that building lots could be laid out on the land could be good selling proposition and that valuation on the basis of method of hypothetical layout could with justification be adopted. Then in valuing such small layout any such valuation as included in the sales of comparably small sites in some area at the time of notification would be relevant in such cases. Necessary deduction for the extent of trite land required for the formation of the roads and other civic amenities requires to be made. In that case 50% was deducted. " In this authority, it was also said: "after due evaluation, taking into account all relevant and germane facts into considera tion, the Court must answer as to what would be the just and fair market value. " 36. In the circumstances of that case, deduction of 60% of value as per exemplar was upheld. In that case, the acquired land was far away from the outer municipal limits and there was possibility of restric tions to be imposed by the State under Section 74 of the Highways Act always present apart from the fact that the land acquired was of vast extent. In that case, 7 acres and 28 gunthas of land was acquired but it was not clear as to what was the total area comprised in each exemplar set up by the claimant. 37. In that case, 7 acres and 28 gunthas of land was acquired but it was not clear as to what was the total area comprised in each exemplar set up by the claimant. 37. Much reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant on the authority Smt. Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India and another (supra) in which the Apex Court has said that it had repeatedly deprecated the method of evaluating the compensa tion on the basis of square foot. In this case 17 acres 57 cents land situated within the municipal limits was acquired. However, in this authority full facts are not available and it was not clear as to whether there were exemplars and if so about how much and what type of land. The Apex Court accepted the valuation of Rs, 90,000/- put on the total land by the Reference Court and thereby partly allowed the appeal from both sides in its term. Therefore, this authority is hardly of any help to us for deciding this appeal. 38. The learned counsel for the Mandi Samiti-appellant has also relied on an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13502 of 1992, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Mauranipurv. State of Uttar Pradesh and others decided on 27-5-1997. Before the Division Bench, an authority Special Land Acquisition Officer and another etc. v. Sri Sidappa Omanna Tumari and others etc. , JT1994 (7) SC 257 was cited and the Division Bench observed thus: "it was observed in this case that deter mination of the value of large extent of acquired lands on the basis of the prices fetched by smaller plots must be a matter of last resort and should be adopted when there is no possibility of determining the market value on the basis of comparable transaction of larger extents. The Court is thus not always bound to determine the market price of such large extent on the basis of the price fetched by small extents of land. " 39. The Division Bench also referred the case of Smt. Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India discussion of which we have already made. The Court is thus not always bound to determine the market price of such large extent on the basis of the price fetched by small extents of land. " 39. The Division Bench also referred the case of Smt. Indumati Chitaley v. Government of India discussion of which we have already made. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the Division Bench made a deduction of 60% of the exemplar but each case will depend on its own facts while coming to the question of deduction on the exemplar. 40. In Smt. Kausafya Devi Bogra and others etc. v. Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad and another, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 892, the Apex Court has observed: "when large tracts are acquired, the trans actions in respect of small properties do not offer a proper guideline. Therefore, the valua tion in transactions in regard to smaller property is not taken as a real basis for determining the compensation for larger tracts of property. For determining the market value of a large proper ty on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property a deduction should be given. " 41. The learned counsel for the claimant-respondent No. 1 has relied on the authority Bhagwathula Samanna and others v. Special Tahsildar and Land Ac quisition Officer Visakhapatnam Municipality (supra ). In this authority, it was said: "while comparing the price shown in the transactions all variables have to be taken into consideration. The transaction in regard to smaller property cannot, therefore, be taken as a real basis for fixing the compensation for larger tracts of property. But the proposition that a large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not an absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. . . . . . . . . In fixing the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for a smaller property, generally a deduction is given taking into consideration the expenses required for development of the larger tract to make smaller plots within that area in order to com pare with the small plots dealt with under the sale transaction. However, in applying the prin ciple of deduction it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. " 42. However, in applying the prin ciple of deduction it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. " 42. The High Court of Gujarat in the authority State of Gujarat v. Shree Devji Bechar, AIR 1991 Guj. 187 , 191 has said:- "it is true that it is a well-recognised prin ciple of valuation of lands not to value large areas of land on the basis of sales of small areas without making suitable deductions from sale price of small plots of land on account of the largeness of the size of the land sought to be evaluated with reference to the said small plots. . . . . . . . . . . . a large plot of land may, in a given case, justly be valued on the basis of the sale instance of a small plot of land after making suitable deductions and allowances from the sale price of the small plot of land on account of the largeness of the size of the land sought to be evaluated. " 43. In Gulzara Singh v. State of Punjab 1993 (4) SCC 245 , it was said: "the Court in the first instance has to determine as to which of the sale deeds are relevant, proximate in point of time and offer comparable base to determine market value. Thereafter the average price has to be worked out and further deductions to be made in fixing just and, fair market value when a large chunk of the land was acquired. Sale deeds of small ex tents being retail price do not offer comparable basis to fix compensation when a large block of land is acquired. " 44. Then in the authority P. Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, 1995 (2) SCC 305 , the Apex Court has said: "then, the market value of the acquired land has to be determined with reference to the value fetched by sale of small plots by making allowances for various factors, such as loss of land required out of the acquired land to be used for roads, drains, parks, the expenditure involved in forming the layout, waiting involved in sale of plots and several other factors which will necessarily reduce the wholesale price of the acquired land. Thus, how far the value fetched by sale of small extents of lands could form the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land has to inevitably depend upon the allowances to be made for factors which distin guish the acquired land from the plots of land sold and the sale value of which is relied upon as the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land. " 45. The learned counsel for the claimant-respondent No. 1 has relied on the authority of the Apex Court rendered by Hon. S. C. Agrawal, Hon. B. N. Kripal and Hon. V. N. Khare, JJ. in the case of J. P. A. E. V. P. v. Jainul Islam, 1998 (1) SCCR 289. In it the Apex Court has said: "the area of the land acquired is more than 200 acres. It lies within the municipal limits of the city of Meerut and is adjacent to Indira Nagar, Shiv Shakti Nagar and Shiv Sagar Colony. The Land Acquisition Officer deter mined the market value at Rs. 30/- per sq. yard. The land owner cought reference claiming that the market value was Rs. ISO/- per sq. yard. Seven exemplars were filed. The examplar relied upon by the Parishad was a sale deed dated March 31, 1982 in respect of 16 Biswas and 1 biswa of land situated in Mohalla Indira Nagar which showed a price of about Rs. 40/-per sq. yard. The exemplars filed on behalf of the land owners were in respect of plots measur ing from 22. 22 sq. yard to 260 sq. yard. The Civil Court fixed the market value at Rs. 150/- per sq. yard and made a deduction of 10% for develop ment. . . . . The High Court has pointed out that admittedly, the acquired land was not developed and it may only have the potentiality of develop ment to be used as building sites and while facilities for drainage, electricity supply, water supply and pucca road are available in those developed areas, the land which is acquired measuring more than 200 acres does not have such advantages. The High Court was, however, of the view that as the acquired land is within the principal limits and is surrounded by developed area with buildings and pucca roads and other facilities and has the advantage of road passing by the side, it has potentiality of developing though it cannot be treated to have similar advantages as the land in developed areas. The High Court has also taken note of the fact that the entire acquired area was used for the purpose of agriculture even in 1983 when the surrounding areas has already developed. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances the High Court held that the rates available for land in developed area could not be adopted for deter mination of market value of the acquired land though they can be used of guidance to deter mine the market value by taking note of other circumstances as available on record. Referring to the exemplar dated February 24,1983 relied upon by the land owners in respect of a plot measuring 260 sq. yards which reflected a rate of Rs. 110/- per sq. yard, the High Court has stated that the said land was below 4 to 5 ft. of road level and that in the absence of any material as to any other disadvantages, this disadvantage of a piece of land could be given due weight to hold that such small strips of an area of 260 sq. yards in the acquired land would also have to be valued at the rate of Rs. 110/- per sq. yard. The High Court, therefore, fixed the value of the acquired land at Rs. 110/- per sq. yard. As regards the development charges, the High Court held that normally when a big area is acquired for housing project and rate for small strip of land having equal advantage is available this Court normally provides for deduction of one third from the rate and, therefore, it would not be unreasonable to deduct one third from Rs. 110/- to arrive at the market value. The High Court has, therefore, fixed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 73/- per sq. yard. The said determination by the High Court has been assailed by the learned counsel for the Parishad as well as for the land owners. " 46. 110/- to arrive at the market value. The High Court has, therefore, fixed the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 73/- per sq. yard. The said determination by the High Court has been assailed by the learned counsel for the Parishad as well as for the land owners. " 46. In this authority after the case of the parties and view of the High Court were narrated as above the Apex Court has observed in paras 25,26 and 27 as under: "25. As regards the grievance of the land owners regarding the determination of the market value of the acquired land, we are of the view that no case is made out for interference with the said determination by the High Court. In fixing the value of the acquired land at Rs. 110/- per sq. yard the High Court has placed reliance one of the exemplars submitted by the land owners which was in respect of an area of 260 sq. yards showing a price of Rs. 100/- per sq. yard. We do not find any ground to interfere with the determination by the High Court fixing the value at Rs. 110/- per sq. yard. 26. The direction about deduction of one third of the said price towards cost of develop ment for the housing scheme involving con struction or roads and other amenities is in con sonance with the various decisions of this Court wherein this Court has allowed one third deduc tion in the price towards cost of development. 27. In Kaushalya Devi Bogra and other (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the claimants, this Court has laid down that for determining the market value of a large property on the basis of sale transac tions for a small property a deduction should be given and that while in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinaryam Setty, 1959 Supp. (1) SCR 404, a deduction of 25% was indicated, there certain other cases where the view taken is that the deduction should be to the extent of one third. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention that the deduction of one third which has been allowed by the High Court on the value of Rs. 100/- per sq. yard, calls for interference by this Court. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention that the deduction of one third which has been allowed by the High Court on the value of Rs. 100/- per sq. yard, calls for interference by this Court. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the appeals that have been filed by the land owners assailing the determination of the market value at Rs. 73/- per sq. yard by the High Court. " 47. The Apex Court accordingly dis missed the appeals filed by the Parishad and also the appeals filed by the Land Acquisition Officer. 48. So this latest authority of the Apex Court holds the field. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court, as above, we do not see there is may ground made out to interfere with the judgment of refer ence Court in this appeal, as noted above, the claimant- respondent No. 1s exemplar was executed on 25-9-1984 which was about ten months before the publication of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act which was made on 16-7-1985. The claimants evidence in this case is that there was continuous rise in price of land in Noorpur between 1984 and 1985. The State exemplar relied by the Land Acquisition Officer was dated 28-9-1984 which was just three days after the date of the execution of the claimants exemplar. The Reference Court has given good reason for rejecting the State ex emplar. There was nothing on record to suggest that the claimants exemplar was a manipulated sale in anticipation of the acquisition of land. As noted above the purchaser of the sale deed (claimants ex emplar) had been examined and nothing has come in his cross-examination to doubt his claim that it was a bona fide sale between a willing seller and buyer in ac cordance with the prevailing market rate of similar land. 49. Then the acquired land as also the land comprised in the claimants exemplar were potential building sites. In fact, the evidence on record is dictates that the ac quired land was similar in nature and quality with the land of the claimants exemplar Ext. 1. The Khasra number of the acquired land was 690 while the plot num ber comprised in the claimants exemplar was 691/2-M which showed that the ac quired land and the land comprised in the claimants exemplar were adjoining lands. 1. The Khasra number of the acquired land was 690 while the plot num ber comprised in the claimants exemplar was 691/2-M which showed that the ac quired land and the land comprised in the claimants exemplar were adjoining lands. The acquired land was situated on Dehradun-Moradabad National Highway and within the limits of Nagar Palika Noorpur and was surrounded by abadi even in June, 1985 i. e. even before the date of notifica tion under Section 4 (1) of the Land Ac quisition Act. There was a chak-road and abadi of Khasra plot No. 978 to the south of the acquired land. The abadi of Natthu Singh, Kalu, Chandan and others are situated to the north of the acquired land. There was the evidence of Manmohan Lal (P. W. 2) that his abadi is situated on the south of the acquired land; that there was P. W. D. road towards east of the acquired land which went to Moradabad; that in the west direction, it goes to Bijnor, Muzaffarnagar Panipat etc. and in the north direc tion, it goes to Nahtaur, Haridwar, Deh -. radun. There was also the evidence of Trivendra Kumar Sharma (P. W. 3) to the effect that his house was situated to the north of the acquired land. This factual position was not controverted by the State or Mandi Samiti-appellant before the Ref erence Court by examining the Lekhpal or any other person acquainted with the spot position. 50. In regard to the claimants ex emplar, we would ignore the assertion of Trivendra Kumar Sharma (P. W. 3) pur chaser that there was dilapidated hut over the land purchased by him but then there is on record the undisputed evidence of this witness on oath that the Primary Health Centre Noorpur is situated to the north to his said land at a distance of about 100 meters; that there is road situated to the east of his land. He also stated that there is a road intervening between his land and the Primary Health Centre. A reference to the certified copy of the claimants ex emplar shows that P. W. D. road is shown in the boundary in the east which goes from Noorpur to Nahtaur. 51. We have already noted that the two lands were adjacent. There is also evidence that the level of both the lands was the same. A reference to the certified copy of the claimants ex emplar shows that P. W. D. road is shown in the boundary in the east which goes from Noorpur to Nahtaur. 51. We have already noted that the two lands were adjacent. There is also evidence that the level of both the lands was the same. The Reference Court has given 1/3 deduction on the basis that claimants exemplar is for a small piece of land as compared to the acquired land which area was comparatively much larger. In our view the deduction was proper and adequate. 52. Consequently, there is no force in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed and the judgment and order of the Reference Court is upheld. Costs shall be easy. Appeal dismissed. .