Honble VERMA, J.–The present writ petition has been filed by Cement Works Karmachari Sangh, Sawai Madhopur (herein after to be referred as `Sangh) with the prayer to direct State Government for initiating action against respondent No. 3, Jaipur Udyog Limited (hereinafter to be referred as JUL) as required under Sec. 10(3) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as `Act, 1947). (2). Admittedly the JUL, a private company incorporated in the year 1948 and converted into a Public Limited Company in the year 1955 having its cement plant at Sawai Madhopur and Lime Stone Mines at Phalodi, was initially managed by Dalmia Group or its Managing Agents, M/s. Sahu Jain Limited and lastly by Shri Alok P. Jain as the Chairman of its Board of Directors. Admittedly the company was lar- gest producer of cement not only in the country, but in Asia as well and was the biggest source of revenue to the State and Central Government in the form of Sales Tax, Royalty and Excise Duty etc. etc. (3). Somehow the company started suffering losses after the financial year 1970-71 and its production of cement went down reducing day by day and ultima- tely the factory was closed in September, 1975. However, with the help of various concessions given by Central and State Governments as well as the State Bank of India, the factory was restarted from April, 1976. A Nursing Scheme was formulated in the year 1976, despite maximum help rendered the factory did not improve and it continued to suffer considerable loss year after year with the result that it was again closed on 1.7.87. The Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (herein after to be referred as `BIFR) in its meeting had taken up the matter and recorded reasons for sickness of the company which have been mentioned in Annexure-A in para No. 2.11, attached with the written statement filed by respondent No. 3. The reasons as given as BIFR seems to be in regard to supply of power, frequent tripping, voltage fluctuations, inferior quality of coal and power cuts, lack of transportation facilities, inadequacy in management and organisational set up, not filling up vacancies of senior and middle management with the result of loosing the expertisation which was required to run the factory which resulted lack of coordination amongst the functional heads, with ultimate effect on production etc. etc. etc. As a matter of fact, the reasons and responsibility given by BIFR for closing the factory were either on the Management or on the Government. (4). Another effort was made for reconstruction of the factory as required under Sec. 15(2) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 for determination of measures to be adopted in regard to present JUL, and therefore, the steps were taken under Sec. 17(3) of this Act, 1985 by appointing IRBI as the operating Agency to examine the viability and prepare a Scheme for rehabilitation/revival of the Company. The management objected the action being taken under Sec. 17(3) of the Act, 1985 and filed an appeal before appellate court. Fresh report was submitted and a further time was given to the State Government for gi- ving details of concessions, however, in the mean time M/s. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. Ltd. and another Company M/s. Dhruva Tara Co. Ltd. also submitted their proposals for taking over the management of JUL. Because of the fresh development the BIFR again directed the Operating Agency to submit before it the fresh Scheme for rehabilitation and for running the factory, which report was submitted in the month of October, 1991. It is stated that BIFR sanctioned the scheme vide order dated 21.4.921 which were later on modified vide orders dated 24.6.92 and 26.7.1992. (5). During all this period when because of the financial crisis or alleged mis- management of the heads of the company, the most sufferers were the workers of the company, who had been going without any wages. Some of the worker had ret- ired, no gratuity or retiral benefits were paid to any of them. About more than 1800 workers were on the role in the factory and were looking for rehabilitation of the factory with hopes and worries. A huge arrear of salary bill also accumulated. Under the Scheme now framed during the period when JUL was under suspension and not working, the wage bill had accumulated to Rs.1241 lacs approximately, which was required to be accepted by the workers for Rs. 300 lacs in three equal annul installments (as per averments made in written statement of respondent No. 3). (6). Under the Scheme now framed during the period when JUL was under suspension and not working, the wage bill had accumulated to Rs.1241 lacs approximately, which was required to be accepted by the workers for Rs. 300 lacs in three equal annul installments (as per averments made in written statement of respondent No. 3). (6). It is stated in the written statement that tripartite meeting was held on 30.1.91 in the office of Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Raj- asthan, Sawai Madhopur and mutually agreed settlement was again brought into being on 30.1.91. The BIFR had framed a scheme for the employees to accord for rehabilitation of the Labour force. It is the submission of petitioner that none of the agreements were actually honoured by respondent State and management of JUL and because of mismanagement there was accumulation of salary bills and no eff- ort was made to run factory. (7). The petitioner had earlier approached this court by filing the writ petition No. 2128/87 for a direction of payment of wages and salary to workers of the factory. The High Court had ordered that the wages and salary shall be paid to workman/officers of the company in 32 equal monthly instalments, the first installment to be payable along with the salary for the month of May, 1988, payable in June, 1988 and this would be continued till all the arrears were paid. The following order was passed in writ petition No. 2128/87- ``We allow both the writ petitions and direct that Jaipur Udyog Company will make the -payment of wages/salaries to the workmen/offi- cers of the company in equal 32 monthly instalments, the first installment shall be payable alongwith the salary for the month of May, 1988, payable in June, 1988 and this will be continued till all the arrears are paid. Cost made easy. (8). The petitioner Sangh alleges that even though the scheme was approved by BIFR on 21.4.92, but the promoters having failed to honour their commitments resorted to tactics of non implementation of the scheme as" scheduled, thereby, depriving the workmen of their wages and salary which remain unpaid, even as per the scheme. The workers continued suffering and there was further accumulation of the wages bill. The workers were not paid any amount towards the salary or otherwise. The matter went before the appellate authority of BIFR, New Delhi. The workers continued suffering and there was further accumulation of the wages bill. The workers were not paid any amount towards the salary or otherwise. The matter went before the appellate authority of BIFR, New Delhi. The following order was passed on 11. 11. 95 by the Appellate Authority - ``The workers have been placed in a very pathetic situation because of the non implementation of the scheme for such a long period for whatever reason it might be and there is a reasonable demand from them that their payments should be made immediately. There would be no difficulty after the starting of the functioning of the factory and the labour will be paid regularly. So far as the payment arears is concerned, that will be paid as per schedule of the Schedule but since the scheme could not be implemented, the Board of Directors will decide the method of payment of arrears in consultation with the various representatives of the Unions of workers. (9). However, ultimately the trial production was taken on 9.1.96 with almost half of the strength of the workmen out of 2200 total workman at the factory and at quarries the factory started with about 1500 workers. It is the case of petitioner that as a matter of fact the management had started removing the costly under ground copper power cables, laid in the entire plant, and other useful machineries in the name of scrap with the ulterior motive to appropriate the amount by selling it. Several fixtures and machineries were dismantled. It is stated that the material wor- th Rs. 2 crores in the name of scrap was taken out of the factory. It is further stated that the management had never, as a matter of fact, thought to bring the required material to the factory for starting the production. After the settlements of 1991 and 1995, what to talk of the previous wages, even the subsequent wages were not paid. The factory was governed by the provisions of the minimum wages as provided in cement factory, and provided by the Cement Wage Board/Mutual Settlements on National basis/Arbitration Awards etc. as is alleged by the Sangh. Variable Dearness Allowance had increased by Rs. 1452.95 per month. The new promoters had agreed to pay the same but the payments were denied and instead of Rs. as is alleged by the Sangh. Variable Dearness Allowance had increased by Rs. 1452.95 per month. The new promoters had agreed to pay the same but the payments were denied and instead of Rs. 1000/- as imprest amount, was being paid at its New Delhi Office since January, 1996 and at Cement factory and Phalodi Mines, the factory had paid only Rs. 701/- and that too, only for one month with the salary/wages for the month of January, 1996, an thereafter no amount was paid to factory workers. It Is the allegation of petitioner that the management, instead of paying wages to workers or running the factory, with ulterior motive to totally destroy the factory, started removing plants and machinery and that stage the workers had decided to protect their rights with the determination of getting the factory started. (10). The petitioner alleged that unfortunately the State authorities acted as silent spectator for the reasons best known to it and virtually no efforts were made to solve the problem or to get the agreement or MOU settlement or schemes imple- mented. The petitioner Sangh states that when it expressed its anxiety to the management to see reasonings for not starting production, as a counter blast, a notice dated 27.7.96 was issued by the management showing its intention to declare lock-out w.e.f. 12.8.96 for the reasons mentioned in the Annexure-1 (attached with the writ petition). The Management had mentioned the grounds that the petitioner Sangh and its members were not cooperating with the management. The notice dated 27.7.96 (Ann. 1) was replied by petitioner Sangh vide letter dated 5.8.96. The counter allegation was levelled by the petitioner Sangh on the management. It was stated in Annexure-2 that the intention of the management was clear from the fact that for running the plant even the basic requirements of raw materials like coal, limestone, High Grade Limestone, Gypsum Grinding Medin, Firebricks, Casting, Explosives, vital machinery parts, power etc. etc. both at factory and quarries, were not fulfilled and it was a clever step of management for not running the factory. It was alleged that it was not the workers or this Sangh who ever prevented the management or created any hurdles in procuring necessary inputs. It was further stated that even the qualified engineers and highly technical personnel, whose participation was necessary to start the factory, were not recruited. It was alleged that it was not the workers or this Sangh who ever prevented the management or created any hurdles in procuring necessary inputs. It was further stated that even the qualified engineers and highly technical personnel, whose participation was necessary to start the factory, were not recruited. Even the funds were not released for arrangement of required raw material. The Annexure-2, letter dated 5.8.96 depicts the state of affairs of the management as alleged by petitioner opposing the threat of the lock out. The petitioner Sangh had categorically stated that despite of the fact that rehabilitation scheme had been framed but the management had diverted from the main issue of functioning the factory, in such situation the petitioner Sangh could not be blamed. (11). Ultimately the dispute went for conciliation and in conciliation proceedings, a report was submitted by the Conciliation Officer, Sawai Madhopur, dated 9.8.96 (Ann. 3), which was a failure report to the effect that no negotiations were possible and no conciliation could be arrived of Factory. The failure report was received by the State of Rajasthan on 12.8.96. Vide notice dated 20.8.96 (Ann. 5) the Management had taken a decision that the Lock-out was to be affected we.f. 20.8.96, which was again protested by the petitioner Sangh vide letter dated 21.8.96 (Annex. 6). The petitioner Sangh had requested the management to lift the Lock-out on the ground that it was absolutely illegal, arbitrary, unjustified and null and void. It was further addressed that the workers were entitled to get full back wages. Ultimately the notification dated 28.9.96 (Annex. 9) came to be issued in exercise of powers under Sec. 10(1)(D) read with Sec. 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by which the reference was made to Industrial Tribunal, Bharatpur for adjudication of the industrial dispute with the following terms of the Reference- (1) Whether the notice -dated 27.7.96 given by Management of JUL Sawai Madhopur to declare the Lock-out from 12.8.96 was proper and legal ? (2) Whether not recognising the settlements dated 31.1.91 and 7.9.95 by Cement Works Karmachari Sangh was proper and legal ? If not then to what amount the workers are entitled to ? (English Translation) (12). After the reference having been made in regard to lock-out, the Government does not seem to have taken into consideration the matter any further but did not get the lock-out lifted. If not then to what amount the workers are entitled to ? (English Translation) (12). After the reference having been made in regard to lock-out, the Government does not seem to have taken into consideration the matter any further but did not get the lock-out lifted. The petitioner vide letter dated 6.11.96 (Ann. 10) approached the Special Secretary and Labour Commissioner to initiate the proceeding under Sec. 10(3) of Industrial Disputes Act for prohibition of Lockout. The detailed representation was made by the petitioner but no action was taken by the respondents, and therefore, the present writ petition has been preferred for the prayer mentioned in the writ petition. (13). The reply has been filed by respondents No. 1 & 2. It is stated in the reply that the Government is seized of the situation and the enquiry is still being made and the matter is being scrutinised before passing any order under Sec. 10(3) of the Act. (14). The reply has also been filed by respondent No. 3. Past history of the circumstances prevailing in the factory have been reiterated in the reply. It is further stated that the workmen were creating difficulties for the management, and there- fore, the management had to resort to lock-out. In regard to removing of the under ground power cables, plants and machinery, it is stated that the material which was thought to be of not of any use, the management had disposed of, and therefore, nothing wrong had been done by the management. It is stated that as per the agreement entered into on 30.1.91, the increased D.A. from time to time had been paid regularly and no violation had been made by the management. It is stated that the lock-out was declared in accordance with law. (15). During the pendency of the writ petition the order dated 15.2.97 (Ann. 12) had been passed by the State Government, Labour Authorities to the effect that as the matter stands referred to Industrial Tribunal, and therefore, it shall not be proper to take any steps by the State to proceed for forcing the management to lift lock- out. The order dated 15.2.97 (Ann. 12) has been placed on record by way of additional affidavit. (16). The order dated 15.2.97 (Ann. 12) has been placed on record by way of additional affidavit. (16). The lock-out as declared with effect from 21.8.96 is still continuing, More or less the effect of lock-out is a total closure, it is so stated by the learned counsel for petitioner. (17). In view of the admitted facts about declaring the lock-out and demand notice, as given by both the parties and the matter having been referred to the Industrial Tribunal, what is required by law to be done by the State Authorities in regard to lock out or strike. The lock-out of which reference has been made to Indu- strial Tribunal, can ft be still called a lock out which has taken a permanent shape of lock-out as to term as total disclosure as enumerated under Sec. 25-O or Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whether the State is to remain silent spectator in a case where the lock-out is announced and the workers are not paid wages regularly on the one excuse or the other, is the matter to be determined by this court in the present writ petition. (18). Sec. 22, 23, 24 and Sec. 10(3) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 deal with the situation as has arisen in the present case and also in regard to situation in re- gard to strike -notice in the public utility Industry and other Industries. The present Industry is admittedly the Public Utility Industry. (19). Sec. 22 of the ID Act provides prohibition for strike and lock-out. No employer carrying on any public utility service is to declare lock-out on any of his workmen without giving them notice of lock out as provided, within six weeks be- fore locking out or within fourteen days of giving such notice or before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any of such notice or during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before the Conciliation Officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. (20). Sec. 23 of the ID Act is a general prohibition of strikes and lock outs. (21). Sec. 24 of the ID Act declares the lock-out and strikes as illegal if it commenced or declared in contravention of Section 22 or 23 or if ft is continued in contravention of an order made under sub section (3) of Section 10. (20). Sec. 23 of the ID Act is a general prohibition of strikes and lock outs. (21). Sec. 24 of the ID Act declares the lock-out and strikes as illegal if it commenced or declared in contravention of Section 22 or 23 or if ft is continued in contravention of an order made under sub section (3) of Section 10. It further provides where the strike or lock- out has already commenced and is in existence at the time of the reference of dispute to a Board, the continuance of such strike or lock-out shall not be deemed to be illegal provided that such strike or lock-out was not at its commencement in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the continuance thereof was not prohibited under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the ID Act. Sec.10 of sub-sec. 3 provides that where a dispute has been referred to Labour Court or the Tribunal, the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of lock- out in connection with such dispute which was in existence on the date of the reference. The relevant Sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are reproduced as under- Section 22. Prohibits of strikes and lock outs - (1) No. person... (2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his (a) without giving them notice of lock out as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before locking out; or (b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or (c) before the expiry of the date of lock out specified in any of such notice as aforesaid; or (d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a Conciliation Officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. (3) to (6) ... Section 23. General prohibition of strikes and Lock outs. (3) to (6) ... Section 23. General prohibition of strikes and Lock outs. No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such workman shall declare a lock-out - (a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings; (b) during the pendency of proceedings before (a Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal) and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings; (c) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings, where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A) of Section 10-A; or (d) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award. Section 24. Illegal strikes and lock-outs- (1) A strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if - (i) if it is commenced or declared in contravention of Section 22 or Section 23; or (ii) if it is continued in contravention of an order made under sub- section (3) of Section 10 (or sub-section (4-A) of Section 10-A). (2) Where a strike or lock-out in pursuance of an Industrial dispute has already commenced and is in existence at the time of the reference of the dispute to a Board, (an arbitrator) (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal), the continuance of such strike or lock-out shall not be deemed to be illegal, provided that such strike or lock-out was not at its commencement in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the continuance thereof was not prohibited under sub-section (3) of Section 1 0 (or sub-section (4-A) of Section 10-A). (3) A lock- out declared in consequence of an illegal strike or a strike declared in consequence of an illegal lock-out shall not be deemed to be illegal. Section 10 of sub-section (3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal) under this section, the appropri- ate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference. Section 10 of sub-section (3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, (Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal) under this section, the appropri- ate Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of the reference. Section 25(o) and Sec. 25(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are reproduced as under- ``25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking- (1) An employer who intends to close down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner:" Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. (2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and persons interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interest of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration the said period, of sixty days. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (5) The appropriate Government may, either on Its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its or- der granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a tribunal for adjudication : Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused,the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had not been closed down. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order. (8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under sub-section (2) or where permission for closure is deemed to be gra- nted under sub-section (3) every workman who is employed In that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. ``25-N - Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workman – (1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that emplo- yer until, (a) the workman has been given three months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice; and (b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such au- thority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf. (2) An application for permission under sub-section (2) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the workman concerned in the prescribed manner. (3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government on the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the persons interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen. (4) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate Government or the specified authority does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days. (5) An order of the appropriate Government or the specified authority granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (6), be final and binding on all the parties con- cerned and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order. (6) The appropriate Government or the specified authority may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permis- sion under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication : Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference. (7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any retrenchment has been to be illegal from the date on which the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been gi- ven to him. (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the establishment or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such establishment for such period as may be specified in the order. (9) Where permission for retrenchment has been granted under sub-section (3) or where permission for retrenchment is deemed to be granted under sub-section (4), every workman who is employed in that establishment immediately before the date of application for permission under this section shall be entitled to receive, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days average pay for every complete year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. (22). (22). Counsel for petitioner relies on the judgment in case of Eenadu Press Workers Union and another vs. The Government of A.P and another (1) Harish Bijayakumar Khaitan and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2) Delhi Administration, Delhi and Workmen of Edward Keventers and another (3) and Syndicate Bank and another vs. K. Umesh Nayak (4). (23). In case Eenadu Press Workers Union (supra), the High Court of Andhra Pradesh had held that I.D. Act is designed to provide a machinery for a just and eq- uitable settlement of disputes by adjudication. Section 10(1) enables the Government to refer the dispute to a Board, the Court of Enquiry, Labour Court or a Tribunal for adjudication. Section 10(3) provides that where an industrial dispute has been referred, the appropriate Government may by an order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock out in connection with such dispute. The main object of Section 10(3) is to maintain an atmosphere of peace and calm when the matter referred to is being adjudicated upon by the Tribunal or the Labour Court. It was held that it will not be conducive to industrial peace if side by side with the adjudication of the dispute by the Tribunal, a strike or lock out continues. It would be like having a truce and a war at the same time. It was therefore, felt by the Legislature that the Government which refers the dispute for adjudication, that Government is bound to issue a show cause notice to the parties, otherwise the very object of Sec. 10(3) would be frustrated. The relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced hereunder- ``15. We are not inclined to agree with the contention of the petitioners that before an order is passed under Section 10(3) a notice to show cause why such an order should not be passed should be given to the employees or the management as the case may be. It is true that right to strike is a valuable right of the employees, but at the same time it is well settled that it is not a fundamental right. It is true that as far as possible where the rights of a party are affected by an order, the affected party must on grounds of natural justice, be given an opportunity to state its case and to show cause against the issue of any such order. It is true that as far as possible where the rights of a party are affected by an order, the affected party must on grounds of natural justice, be given an opportunity to state its case and to show cause against the issue of any such order. But there are well recognised exceptions to the application of the principles of natural justice. As has been repeatedly observed the requirements of natural justice depend upon the circu- mstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry and the subject matter and fast rule can be laid down. In Peariberg v. Varty (1971) 1 WLR 728, Lord Denning gave several illustrations. For instance the courts are often asked to pass urgent orders before hearing the other side, as in the case of an interim injun- ction or a stay of execution. It cannot be contended in such cases that the orders violate the principles of natural justice as they are made without notice to the other side. ``The Industrial Disputes Act is designed to provide a machinery for a just and equitable settlement of disputes by adjudication, by negotia- tion and by conciliation etc. instead of by a trial of strength by strikes and Lock outs. Section 10(1) enables the Government whenever an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, to refer the dispute to a Board, the Court of Enquiry, Labour Court or to a Tribunal for adjudication. Section 10(3) provides that where an industrial dispute has been referred, the appropriate Government may by an order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock out in connection with such dispute. The main object of Section 10(3) is to maintain an atmosphere of peace and calm when the matter referred to is being adjudicated upon by the Tribunaior the Labou Court. It will not be condu- cive to industrial peace if side by side with the adjudication of the dispute by the Tribunal, a strike or lock out continues. It would be like having a truce and a war at the same time. It was therefore, felt by the Legislature that the Government which refers the dispute for adjudication should be empowered to prohibit the continuance of a strike or lock out in connection with such dispute. It would be like having a truce and a war at the same time. It was therefore, felt by the Legislature that the Government which refers the dispute for adjudication should be empowered to prohibit the continuance of a strike or lock out in connection with such dispute. If it is to be held that in such circumstances the Government is bound to issue a show cause notice to the parties, as to why they should not prohibit the continuance of strike or lock out, the very object of Sec. 10(3) would be frustrated. ``The most important step is to first prevent the continuance of the, strike or lock out and the very object of Section 10(3) would be defeated if it is held that it is incumbent on the Government to issue notices to the employees and the management and to hear them, which would lead to considerable delay in passing the order prohibiting the continuance of the strike. In this connection it is to be noticed that even when a reference is made under Section 10(1) it is not contemplated that the Government should give an opportunity either to the management or to the employees to state their case be- fore making such reference. Section 12(5) provides that if on a consideration of a report by the Consideration Officer that the Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference, it may make such a reference and if it does not make a reference, ft shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor. Here again the only safeguard while refusing to refer is that the Government should record its reasons and communicate them to the parties its reasons. There is no requirement that it should give an opportunity to the parties before making an order refusing to refer. Even in a case where the Government decided not to refer in the first instance and subsequently changed its mind, it has been held in Srikrishna Jute Mills V Govt. of A. P. (1 977) 2 Lab. LJ 363 : (1977 Lab. IC 988) (Andh. Pra.) that no opportunity or notice need be given to the parties. Even in a case where the Government decided not to refer in the first instance and subsequently changed its mind, it has been held in Srikrishna Jute Mills V Govt. of A. P. (1 977) 2 Lab. LJ 363 : (1977 Lab. IC 988) (Andh. Pra.) that no opportunity or notice need be given to the parties. If in such a case there is no requirement of an opportunity being given, we fail to see why it should be held that an opportunity should be gi- ven at the time when an order under Section 10(3) is passed prohibiting a strike or lock-out, especially when such an order is to be made expeditiously in the interest of industrial peace. (24). In case of Harish Bijayakumar Khaitan (supra), the Bombay High Court has held as under- ``A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, on the other hand, in Eenadu Press Workers Union and another (supra) observed that there are well recognised exception to the application of the principles of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice would depend upon the circumstances of the case, the nature of en- quiry and the subject matter that was being dealt with. The main object of S. 10(3) was to maintain an atmosphere of peace and calm when the matter referred was being adjudicated upon. It would not be conducive to industrial peace if, side by side with the adjudication of the dispute, a strike or lock out is continued. It was, therefore, felt by the Legislature that the Government which referred the dispute for adjudication should be empowered to prohibit the continuance of a strike or lock out in connection with the dispute. if it was held that in such circumstances the Government was bound to issue a show cause notice to the parties as to why it should not prohibit the conti- nuance of the strike or lock-out the very object of S. 10(3) would be responsibility of deciding the respective cases to some extent even though the main dispute was pending for adjudication. The most important step of preventing the continuance of the strike or lock-out and the very object of S. 10(3) would be defeated if it was held that it was incumbent on the Government to issue notices to the employees and the management and hear them, which would lead to considerable delay in passing the order prohibiting the continaunce of the strike." ``10. We cannot put the rational of S. 10(3) in words better than those employed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The purpose of S. 10(3) would be negated if the appropriate parties before issuance of an order thereunder. It is of relevance here that the continuance of a strike or lock out can be barred under S. 10(3) only if the strike or lock out is connected with the dispute that is referred for adjudication. ``Sri Naphade drew our attention to fact that the urgency of preventing the continuance of the strike or lockout had dispute as one of the grounds for holding an predecisional hearing was necessary. It is submitted that in the present case the lock-out was in existence for a long time when the order under Sec. 10(3) was made and was, therefore, no urgency. The fact has to be considered not in the light of the strike or lock-out commenced but in the light of when the order of reference under S. 10(1) is made. Once the order becomes imperative to require the action in the case of a strike and the employer in the case of lock-out to desist from these bargaining tactics. (25). In case of Delhi Administration, Delhi (supra), it was held that the principles of section 10(3) comes into play when the reference is made to the Labour Court . From the plain reading of Section two conditions are necessary to make section 10(3) applicable. First there must be industrial dispute existing and Second such existing dispute must have been referred to a Board for adjudication and then only the power to prohibit can be exercised. (26). In case of Syndicate Bank and another (supra) the Honbie Supreme Court had observed as under- ``The question whether a strike or lock-out is legal or illegal does not present much difficulty for resolution since all that is required to examine to answer the question is whether there has been a breach of the relevant provisions. (26). In case of Syndicate Bank and another (supra) the Honbie Supreme Court had observed as under- ``The question whether a strike or lock-out is legal or illegal does not present much difficulty for resolution since all that is required to examine to answer the question is whether there has been a breach of the relevant provisions. However, whether the action is justified or unjustified has to be examined by taking into consideration various factors some of which are indicated earlier. In almost all such cases, the prominent question that arises is whether the dispute was of such a nature that its solution could not brook delay and await resolution by the mechanism provided under the law or the contract or the service rules. The strike or lock-out is not to be resorted to because the concerned party has a superior bargaining power or the requisite economic muscle to compel the other party to accept its demand. Such indiscriminate use of power is nothing but assertion of the rules of "might is right". Its consequences are lawlessness, anarchy and chaos in the economic activities which are most vital and fundamental to the survival of the society. Such action, when the legal machin- ery is available to resolve the dispute, may be hard to justify. This will be particularly so when it is resorted to by the section of the society which can well await the resolution of the dispute by the machinery provided for the same. The strike or Lock-out as a weapon has to be used sparingly for redressal or urgent and pressing grievances when no means are available or when available means have failed, to resolve it. It has to be resorted to, to compel the other party to the dispute to see the justness of the demand. It is not to be utilised to work hardship to the society at large so as to strengthen the bargaining power. It is for this reason that industrial legislation such as the Act places additional restrictions on strikes and Lock-outs in public utility services." (27). Counsel for the respondents relies on the judgments in the case of National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (5) The Management Hotel Imperial New Delhi and others vs. Hotel Workers Union (6) State of Bihar vs. D.N. Ganguly & Ors. Counsel for the respondents relies on the judgments in the case of National Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. State of Raj. & Ors. (5) The Management Hotel Imperial New Delhi and others vs. Hotel Workers Union (6) State of Bihar vs. D.N. Ganguly & Ors. (7) and Delhi Administration vs. Workmen of Edward Eventers and another (8). (28). However, the judgments now being relied by the respondents are to the effect that when the matter is referred to the Tribunal during the continuance of the reference proceedings, it is the Tribunal that is seized of the dispute and which alone can exercise jurisdiction in respect of it, and the appropriate Government stands outside the reference proceedings. All Judgments are to the effect of passing any interim award or order by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court during the pendency of the Industrial dispute on the merits of the dispute so referred to such Tribunal, none of the judgment quoted is on the powers to be exercised by the Government under Sub- section (3) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. (29). In the case of Delhi Administration (supra) as has been already discussed above, it was held by the Supreme Court that the prohibition order which was required to be passed under Section 10(3), come into play when the basis of the strike is covered by Section 10(1) and the prohibition of strike on other demands is impermissible. Meaning thereby that if a contract in question between the parties had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal in regard to the dispute referred and the matter relating to the dispute referred, the Government is competent to pass an order under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (30). Coming to the facts of the present case once again as soon as the lock out and the settlement of the agreement dated 31.1.1991 and 7.9.1995 were referred, it was the duty of the respondent State to have examined the matter for exercising the power under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (30). Coming to the facts of the present case once again as soon as the lock out and the settlement of the agreement dated 31.1.1991 and 7.9.1995 were referred, it was the duty of the respondent State to have examined the matter for exercising the power under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The conciliation which were held by the parties were in regard to only two matters i.e. the lock-up and the aforesaid agreement and on having submitting the failure report and ultimately referring the matter for adjudication on 28.9.1996, the non-consideration of the case of the petitioner in proceeding for taking action under Section 10(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not valid nor-appropriate on the part of the Government. It was only when the petitioner had sent an representation on 6.11.1996, with a request to the Government for prohibiting the continuance of the lock-out as per Section 10(3) of the Act that the Government had moved and ultimately the Government vide order dated 15.2.1997 had declined to pass any order in regard to prohibiting the lock-out. The reason given by the respondent State in the order dated 15.2.1997 is that because of the reference having been made about the lock-out and implementation/ non-implementation of the agreement dated 31.1.1991 and 7.9.1995, the matter is to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal and, therefore, there is hardly and necessity to pass any order under Section 10(3) of the I.D. Act prohibiting the lock-out. (31). Record was also called. From the record it is revealed that except noting of the fact by the Government that because of the reference had already been made, there was no necessity to pass any order under Section 10(3) of the I.D. Act as stated in the order Annexure 12, no reasons have been given by the Governmental authorities for not taking any action under Section 12(3) of the I.D. Act. (32). To my mind to say that because of the reason that the matter in dispute had been referred to the Industrial Tribunal, no order under Section 10(3) of the I.D. Act should be passed by the State is totally setting at naught the statutory provisions as contained u/S. 10(3) of the I.D. Act itself. This provision of the statute comes into play only when the reference in regard to strike or the lock-out is made to the concerned Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. This provision of the statute comes into play only when the reference in regard to strike or the lock-out is made to the concerned Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. Only and only then the State Government/Labour Authorities are duty bound to consider and analyse the fact that in the given circumstances when the matter in regard to the lock-out or strike stands referred to the Industrial Tribunal, it would be appropriate or not to pass an order of prohibiting the continuance of strike or lock-out as the case may be. To say otherwise would amount to saying good-bye to the statutory duties cast by the provisions of the statute in this regard. There may be circumstances which are to be analysed and by giving reasons the State Government may not pass any order under the relevant provisions of Section 10(3) of the Act but it is hardly any reason for the State Government to say that because of the reason the matter stands refe- rred to the Industrial Tribunal, therefore, it has virtually no jurisdiction to pass any order in regard to prohibition of continuance of the strike or the lock-out. The aims and objects for enacting such provision In Section 10(3) was not only to maintain the peace in the industries, but also to see that the production which is vital for the growth of the nation continues and the workers report back on their duties in case of prohibitions of strike and the management opens the gate of the factory and starts production in case of lock out. On having such order passed by the appropriate Government, the continuance of the strike or lock-out is rather rendered illegal. (33). Here in the present case, the Management had virtually played with the livelihood of the workers because of its mismanagement, the factory was closed in the year 1975 and again in the year 1987. The financial institutions and the State had come up to assist the Management. Schemes for rehabilitation were made. Money was floated with the offer to the Management to enable it to run the factory. The Management tried to function only for one day that too for 8 hours only and then declares the lock-out on the allegations that the workers are putting hinderan- ces to the functioning of the company. When did the company function at all. Money was floated with the offer to the Management to enable it to run the factory. The Management tried to function only for one day that too for 8 hours only and then declares the lock-out on the allegations that the workers are putting hinderan- ces to the functioning of the company. When did the company function at all. Wages and salary of the workers were blocked for years together. Agreements were entered into. Workers say that the agreement was not honoured. Wages were freezed. Wages had accumulated to crores and crores of rupees. Locking out at this stage when the company had been rehabilitated with assistance would have negated the rehabilitation scheme itself. The matter was taken up by the Labour Authorities. The lock out matter and other settlement matters which were borne of contention between the parties were referred for adjudicating. Immediately after the reference it was utmost duty of the Government to have scrutinised the case for prohibiting the lock out which was a statutory duty cast on it. The Government did not move at all. The workers put in the representation in November 1996 which were decided on 15.2.1997 and rejected on the ground that during the pendency of the reference, no prohibition orders can be passed. This reason goes contrary to the provisions of the language of Section 10(3) of the Act itself. As a matter of fact the provisions of prohibition as envisaged in Section 10(3) are to be enforced only when a reference has been made by the Government, to act contrary would be a reversal of the statutory provisions. After all there is difference between the lock out and the closure. For the purpose of closure, there are certain statutory and mandatory formalities which are to be complied with as required u/S. 25-O and 25-N of the I.D. Act in the case of public utility services. The Government has not considered this aspect. The lock-out is continuing since August.1996. This type of lock-out would amount to closure Itself without complying with the mandatory provisions of the Act. It is not permissible under the law. The State Authorities in the order Annexure-12 and also on the file which had been seen by me has not referred to any circumstances as to why after the rehabilitation scheme having been enforced by the BIFR, the management should be allowed to continue the lock-out. It is not permissible under the law. The State Authorities in the order Annexure-12 and also on the file which had been seen by me has not referred to any circumstances as to why after the rehabilitation scheme having been enforced by the BIFR, the management should be allowed to continue the lock-out. Only because of the reason that the workers have thought that the management company, in the garb of removing scrap, was actually removing plants and machinery and copper wires which were material for running of the factory, it cannot be said that a permanent case of lock-out had been made out in favour of the management. After all the management was also owing certain duties for keeping up the production and also to the workers for their livelihood and to implement the agreements and also the rehabilitation scheme. These are some of the considerations which should have been analysed by the State. The State would have also considered the fact whether the production of the cement which was vital for the growth of the economy of the State as well and continuance of the working of the factory was beneficial or not. On the one hand the State was taking all the steps to rehabilitate the factory, was giving financial assistance which does not seem to have been utilised for the purpose as the factory had never worked or functioned and on the other hand there is no order passed for prohibiting the lock out, meaning thereby, on the one hand the State wanted the factory to run and schemes are framed in this regard with supply of finance etc. and on the other hand lock out is allowed to continue. This is the contradiction in itself which is not the object of Section 10(3) of the I.D. Act. (34). For the reasons and discussions mentioned above, the omission on the part of State authorities to consider the case under Section 10(3) and to ultimately pass the order on 15.2.1997, refusing to pass any order u/s 10(3) of the Act cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as the reasons given by the State in passing the order Annexure-12 are not germane and are extraneous and are set-aside. It is clarified that pendency of the reference cannot be made a ground for not passing the orders under Section 10(3) of the I.D. Act even if the pendency is on the same demand. The State Government is directed to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made above and pass an appropriate order under Section 10(3) the I.D. Act within two months in accordance with law. (35). For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed with the above observations with cost of Rs. 5,000/- to be shared by the State and the respondents equally.