JUDGMENT : Susanta Chatterji, J. - This batch of writ petitions, namely, O.J.C. Nos. 1171 of 1996, 13293 of 1996, 13294 of 1996, 2176 of 1996 and 2435 of 1997 at the instance of Larsen & Toubro Ltd. as also O.J.C. No. 854 of 1996 by Kehar Agencies have been heard analogously for great length of time. As all these writ petitions raise similar points of facts and law for adjudication these are disposed of by this comprehensive judgment. 2. Certain relevant dates and materials have been given to appreciate the background of the cases and the course of events. An Industrial Policy Resolution was introduced by Government of Orissa on December 23, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as "the IPR"). The petitioner, Larsen & Toubro Ltd. was granted a provisional registration certificate u/s 9C of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, and u/s 7(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, with effect from January 23, 1992 and August 29, 1992 respectively. Its industry was set up with a capacity of 0.7 million tonnes of cement per annum at a project cost of about Rs. 80 crores at Kramira in the district of Sambalpur on or about August 1, 1993. It applied to the Director of Industries for necessary exemption certificate under the IPR through D.I.C., Sambalpur on September 6, 1983. The petitioner's industry started its commercial production on or about September 10, 1993. The finished products, i.e., cement was first despatched to its own cement project at Hirmi in the district of Raipur as inter-State transaction on September 10, 1993. The Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, was informed by the petitioner, Larsen & Toubro Ltd. regarding the approach made by it to the Director of Industries for necessary exemption certificates under the I.P.R. on September 15, 1993 the petitioner requested the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, to convert its provisional registration to permanent registration u/s 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act w.e.f. September 10, 1993. The petitioner, however, received a copy of the letter from the General Manager, D.I.C., opposite party No. 6, addressed to the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, to the effect that the petitioner-company is a large scale industry manufacturing cement and have started commercial production on September 10, 1993. 3. The petitioner, however, received a copy of the letter from the General Manager, D.I.C., opposite party No. 6, addressed to the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, to the effect that the petitioner-company is a large scale industry manufacturing cement and have started commercial production on September 10, 1993. 3. The Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, sent notice to the petitioner for production of books of accounts in connection with the amendment of the registration certificate on September 17, 1993. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition in this Court vide O.J.C. No. 6612 of 1993 challenging the action of the Sales Tax Officer in detaining the consignments of the petitioner's goods to its plant at Hirmi in the district of Raipur and as per the interim order passed by this Court the petitioner deposited Rs. 1,00,000 on December 20, 1993. The petitioner, however, withdrew the writ petition on July 20, 1994. As necessary exemption certificate for tax was issued by the Director of Industries on July 18, 1994, the petitioner-company claimed a refund of Rs. 1,00,000 which had been deposited in this Court on October 20, 1993, Kehar Agencies of Sambalpur, a stockist of petitioner Larsen & Toubro Ltd. was assessed to sales tax under the Orissa Sales Tax Act by the Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur-I Circle, for the year ending 1993-94 although the petitioner's goods were tax-free and were taxable only at the first point and the petitioner should enjoy tax-free status in all subsequent sales in the State of Orissa as also in respect of inter-State sales as per the I.P.R. The said assessment was made on August 20, 1996. 4. The Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, disposed of the petitioner's refund application holding that the petitioner had deposited Rs. 1,00,000 on October 20, 1993 as per the interim order of this Court and the unit being exempted from payment of sales tax under the I.P.R. the petitioner was eligible to get refund of such amount or to adjust against any other payment due against it. Said communication was made on January 9, 1996. The petitioner received assessment orders dated January 9, 1996 made by the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, both under the O.S.T. and C.S.T. Acts demanding a sum of Rs. 86,43,212 and Rs. 2,18,13,874 respectively on January 17, 1996. Said communication was made on January 9, 1996. The petitioner received assessment orders dated January 9, 1996 made by the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3, both under the O.S.T. and C.S.T. Acts demanding a sum of Rs. 86,43,212 and Rs. 2,18,13,874 respectively on January 17, 1996. The petitioner received a letter dated January 29, 1996 from the Sales Tax Officer, opposite party No. 3 on January 30, 1996 being called upon to show cause on or before February 7, 1995 as to why its application dated July 23, 1994 in form "D" for exemption of tax should not be rejected because it had filed such application after a lapse of ten and half months which contravened the provisions as stipulated in Government Notification No. 27665--CTA-56/90-F dated August 16, 1990. The petitioner on February 7, 1996 filed its reply to the show cause notice dated January 29, 1996. 5. O.J.C. No. 1171 of 1996 has been filed challenging the assessment order for the year 1993-94 on February 9, 1996. The assessment order for the year 1994-95 was passed under the Orissa Sales Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act on December 30, 1996. O.J.C. No. 2435 of 1997 has been filed on February 12, 1997, challenging the assessment order as per annexures 1 and 1-A to the said writ petition. 6. The main prayers of the petitioner are : (i) For issue of direction to the Sales Tax Officer to reconsider form "D" application as per S.R.O. No. 790/90 ; (ii) To quash all orders of assessment and to direct fresh assessment ; and (iii) For compliance with both the aforesaid directions to fix time-limit. 7. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Industrial Policy Resolution in question gives the following benefits to the industries depending on their locations for specific period from the date of their going into commercial production : (a) All new, inter alia, large industrial units in different zones will be eligible for exemption for specific periods from payment of sales tax on its purchases, namely, (i) all spare parts of machineries, (ii) raw materials, and (iii) packing materials, basing on which a certificate by the Director of Industries upon furnishing a form ID where the purchasing industry will give an undertaking that it shall sell its products intra and inter-State in or export from Orissa. It is silent about branch transfer. (b) The new, inter alia, large industrial units will be allowed defer payment of sales tax collected on its finished products. Or on its exercising an option will get exemption from sales tax on the finished products in lieu of deferment for the specified years depending on their zone. 8. It is further submitted that declaration of a policy by the State brings a legitimate expectation of the promises by those who rely on it and in the event the promises are not carried out, the promisee has a right to claim the benefits. this situation is evident as the State Government has issued two separate notification u/s 6 to cover the promises in paragraphs 3(ii)(a) and 3(ii)(b) u/s 7. 9. It is submitted with great emphasis that the petitioner is licensed to manufacture cement which is taxable at the first point in view of Rule 93H of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947. 10. Greater emphasis is given in the field of promissory estoppel and public interest on a recent judgment of the apex Court reported in (1995) 6 SCC 363 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products) wherein it is reiterated : "Is it not ultimately a matter of doing equity and justice between the parties a case of holding the scales even between the parties and deciding whether in the interests of justice and equity the promissor can be allowed to resile from his promise and compensate the promisee appropriately or the promissor ought to be held to his promise and not allowed to go back since such a course is necessary in view of the change in position of promisee ?" 11. In fact, the court held that instead of hard and first rule an elastic rule should do, the objectives of which is to do justice between the parties. In fact, the court held that instead of hard and first rule an elastic rule should do, the objectives of which is to do justice between the parties. The substantive prayer is to interpret the notification u/s 7 and to direct issuance of notification u/s 6 and quash the assessments as per annexures I and 1A or in the alternative if it is found that, there is no notification u/s 6, a positive direction be given to the State to issue notification u/s 6 to cover the classes of goods manufactured, inter alia, by new large scale industries on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, so that they may be exempted from payment and quash the assessment of sales tax. Reference has been made to State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Orient Paper Mills Ltd., where the contention of the revenue that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be pressed into service to command the State Government to issue a statutory notification was negatived and the court held that the petitioner would certainly be entitled to claim exemption in terms of the assurance of the State. 12. It is highlighted that if a State has a policy and has not pleaded that it has gone back upon it at the insistence of a High Power Committee it is not a matter of equity. The State has not pleaded public interest in resiling from its promise. It only says dogmatically that due notification u/s 7 is enough, but does not say how it is implemented. 13. In support of the case of the petitioner reliance is placed on the decision Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford Vol. (1880) 5 AC 214 (13) 225 wherein it is observed : "Where a power is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised." 14. It is contended that in the case of Comptroller and Auditor-general of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and Another Vs. It is contended that in the case of Comptroller and Auditor-general of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi and Another Vs. K.S. Jagannathan and Another the Supreme Court held that the wide language of Article 226 of the Constitution is to enable the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of the country. The power of the court in England as regards the control which the judiciary has over the executive indicate the minimum limit to which the court in this country would be prepared to go. 15. Precisely it is submitted that the State has a duty to issue notification u/s 6. The petitioner seeks the relief to quash the assessments as per annexures 1 and 1A and direct to hold fresh assessment after issue of such notification. 16. In the counter-affidavit the opposite parties have controverted the allegations of the petitioner. It is submitted, on the other hand, that the plea of promissory estoppel and prayer for direction to issue a mandamus for exempting tax on the finished products, i.e. the cement, manufactured by the petitioner-company, u/s 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 is misconceived. Three ingredients have to be reckoned, namely : (a) There must be a promise, (b) The promisee must have acted on the promise, and (c) The promisee must have altered his position. There is no averment in the writ petition. In the absence of any such plea, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise such a contention. In fact, none of the aforementioned conditions exist for invoking the principles of promissory estoppel and sequence of events would show that the petitioner had in fact, acquiesced to the provisions for exemption of tax in lieu of deferment as a pioneer industry in terms of Clause 7.1.6. of the I.P.R. 17. It is placed on record that Clause 7.1.5. and Clause 7.1.6. of I.P.R. deal with deferment/exemption of tax on finished products of the types of units mentioned therein. The petitioner's unit comes within Clause 7.1.6. The petitioner had understood such provisions of the I.P.R. and made application before the Director of Industries for such exemption in lieu of deferment. The Director of Industries had issued the eligibility certificate. and Clause 7.1.6. of I.P.R. deal with deferment/exemption of tax on finished products of the types of units mentioned therein. The petitioner's unit comes within Clause 7.1.6. The petitioner had understood such provisions of the I.P.R. and made application before the Director of Industries for such exemption in lieu of deferment. The Director of Industries had issued the eligibility certificate. The petitioner had also availed of the tax exemption in respect of raw materials and machinery by using form 1-D and had submitted form D before the S.T.O. for exemption of tax in respect of its unit in lieu of deferment. All these were done by the dealer without any demur. In this view of the matter the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the contention that there was a promise for tax exemption in respect of the finished goods. 18. The notifications of the Finance Department as per S.R.O. No. 790 of 1990 made u/s 7 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act provide for exemption of tax in lieu of deferment. The schedule provides for the period of exemption in lieu of deferment and there are certain conditions and exceptions as to exemption of sales tax in lieu of deferment. 19. Mr. Lal, appearing for the opposite party has strongly submitted that in view of the aforementioned provisions of the I.P.R. and the notification of the finance department u/s 7, there is no scope for the petitioner to pray for exemption u/s 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The State Government having made statutory provisions in consonance with the I.P.R. in respect of large scale industries, no direction can be given to include cement in tax-free list. Cement is a taxable item and under Rule 93H it is taxable at the first point of sale. Adequate safeguard is provided in the said rule to show as to in whose hands the cement will be taxed and which point will be liable to tax. 20. Mr. Lal has drawn attention of the court to the decisions reported in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, and Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad and Others Vs. Ram Kumar and Others. 20. Mr. Lal has drawn attention of the court to the decisions reported in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, and Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad and Others Vs. Ram Kumar and Others. Besides, he has drawn attention of the court to an unreported decision of this Court in S.J.C. No. 31 of 1995 (Ganesh Industries v. State of Orissa) and the decision reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa and Another Vs. Jagannath Cotton Company and Another, . 21. He has further submitted that the Sales Tax Officer in his order of assessment in annexure-1 has noted the grounds of rejecting the claim of the petitioner, for exemption in lieu of deferment. It is pointed out that whenever exemptions are granted, Legislature is free to prescribe conditions for allowing exemption but the person enjoying such exemption must abide by the conditions. These provisions are to be strictly construed. Any liberal construction will facilitate commission of fraud and introduce administrative inconvenience. He has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. \. Commercial Tax Officer [1965] 16 STC 607. 22. Lastly it is submitted that under the O.S.T. Act cement is taxable. It has to be taxed at one point of sale. The taxing authorities are to determine which of the sales has to be treated as the sale at the first point in terms of Rule 93H. In this view of the matter, the factual aspect as to which of the dealers can be said to have effected sale at the first point and liable to be taxed has to be determined. Liability to pay tax can never be wiped away. 23. Having heard the lengthy submission made by Mr. Mohanty for the petitioner Larsen & Toubro Ltd., Mr. A.K.. Ray for Kehar Agencies and Mr. Lal for the sales tax authorities, we find that the only question to be adjudicated is as to whether by extending the principles of promissory estoppel the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of exemption consistent with the I.P.R. There is already a notification u/s 7. Within the scope of the said notification if the petitioner is entitled to any benefit on fulfilment of certain criteria, he can certainly ask for the same. Within the scope of the said notification if the petitioner is entitled to any benefit on fulfilment of certain criteria, he can certainly ask for the same. But the prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the State Government to issue a notification extending the facilities as envisaged u/s 6 of the Act appears to be quite confusing and untenable. We find the notification u/s 7 to be consistent with the I.P.R. The petitioner cannot enlarge the scope of promise as to its liking. The promise has to be understood in the proper perspective. The court cannot ask the promissor to make further promise consistent with the impression of the promisee. The scope of promissory estoppel has always to be understood in the right manner. A promise should be clear and unequivocal. The promisee must have accepted the same and changed his position. But in the instant case whatever promises were made in terms of the I.P.R. have been reflected in the Section 7 notification. 24. It is not appreciated by this Court that the assessment orders should be challenged by the petitioner on the score that a proper notification ought to have been made by the State Government giving such benefit to the petitioner. 25. The assessing authority is obviously a creature of statute. The assessing authority cannot grant any relief to the petitioner in anticipation of a prospective notification. The interpretations made by the petitioner as to the scope of I.P.R. for relief in respect of its product, i.e. cement, in the manner as highlighted in the writ petitions arc not correct. 26. The prayer for issuance of a writ commanding the State Government to issue notification u/s 6 is found to be misconceivced and the same is refused. We make it clear that we have not scrutinised the assessment order. We, however, grant leave, to the petitioner to challenge the same so far as its unit is concerned. But the point of promissory estoppel as claimed is ruled out. 27. Since cement is to be taxed at one point, if the liability is squared up by Larsen & Toubro Ltd., the other dealer Kehar Agencies cannot be asked to make double payment. With these observations and directions the writ petitions are disposed of. There would be no order as to costs. C.R. Pal, J. 28. I agree.