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1998 DIGILAW 12 (ORI)

SABITRI JENA v. SOMANATH JENA

1998-01-09

D.M.PATNAIK

body1998
D. M. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THE present appeal is against the judgment of the'civil Judge (Senior Division), Parlakhemundi dismissing the plaintiffs' suit against the husband for maintenance for herself and children. ( 2 ) PLANTIFF's case is, she married defendant No. 1 on the Akhatrutiya day i. e. on 30. 5. 1976. After the marriage both lived as husband and wife. Two daughters were born out of the wedlock one on 15. 8. 1978 and the younger on 15. 10. 1981. Before the birth of the second child for about 4 to 5 months she stayed with her parents. Four to five days after delivery she came back to the defendant's house. But unfortunately she was treated with cruelty in various ways as alleged in the plaint. The in-laws picked up quarrel on the issue of not having brought gold ornaments for the newly born child. Further she found her husband to have developed illicit connection with his sister-in-law (brother's wife, a widow ). On one Saturday in the month of March, 1982 her husband and other members of the family picked up severe quarrel with her and drove her out from the house. Since nothing was paid for her maintenance she filed the suit. ( 3 ) OPPOSITE party No. 1 filed the written statement denying material facts pleaded in the plaint. He took the plea that neither he nor his family members ill-treated, or neglected her nor treated with cruelty. According to him it was the plaintiff who did not adjust with him and rather picked up quarrel and behaved with the defendant in a nasty manner and left the house out of her own accord without informing him. This was on 15. 3. 1982. Though he made several personal attempts the plaintiff did not join his company. The defendants therefore claim, dismissal of the suit on the ground of voluntary dessertion of the plaintiff. Though as many as ten issues were framed by the lower court, on going through the impugned judgment it is found that the decision has embraced mainly two points, first point being dessertion of the plaintiff and second is non-maintainability of the suit under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. ( 4 ) NONE appears for the respondent-husband though the matter was also heard-in-part yesterday i. e. on 8. 1. ( 4 ) NONE appears for the respondent-husband though the matter was also heard-in-part yesterday i. e. on 8. 1. 1998 and posted today for further hearing in presence of the defendant's counsel. Miss Panda learned counsel for the plaintiffs strenuously submits that the lower court has committed gross error in accepting the evidence of husband that he was not responsible for driving out the plaintiff from his house. It is further submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff failed to prove dessertion by the defendant, yet it was a duty cast on the court to analyse the case of the parties as reflected in their pleadings and evidence adduced and to hold whether the statutory obligation of the husband to maintain the wife has been discharged. . In other words, according to the learned counsel even though plaintiff failed to prove dessertion by the husband, yet it was also equally incumbent on the part of the defendant to prove that circumstances existed were such that it did not justify the wife to leave the house. ( 5 ) I have gone through the impugned judgment. So far as finding relates to the non-maintainability of a mere suit for maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act, 1956 is concerned, the lower court has held that such suit is not maintainable in absence of a prayer for decree for either divorce or judicial separation. This view is not backed by any case law. There is nothing to interpret Section 18 in that way. The claim of maintenance by wife from the husband is a statutory claim and can be enforced under law. Provisions of Civil Procedure Code is wholly applicable in this case. The dispute being a civil nature, the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit cannot be said to be barred. That apart reference may be made to the following cases wherein decisions have been rendered while dealing matters before the civil courts touching similar issues arose in the case of Jagat Krishna Das and Anr, v. A/it Kumar Das and Ors. 1, a Full bench decision of this court in the case of khadal Penthi v. Hulash Dei and Anr. and in the case of Smt. Court Gupta Chaudhury v. Tarani Gupta Chaudhury. 1, a Full bench decision of this court in the case of khadal Penthi v. Hulash Dei and Anr. and in the case of Smt. Court Gupta Chaudhury v. Tarani Gupta Chaudhury. In the case of Jagat Krishna (supra), the suit was one for partition and admittedly there was no question of' either a claim for divorce or judicial separation, yet question arose whether claim for wife's maintenance under section 18 (1) of the Act would be maintainable. The court held in para-II. of the judgment that onus was on the husband to prove that she is not entitled to maintenance. In the Full Bench decision in the case of khadal Penthi (supra), the suit was also not a suit for either divorce or judicial separation, but was for recovery of immovable properties and for maintenance. The court held that the interim maintenance even though not specifically provided under Section 18 (1) of the Act could be passed in a suit by resorting to the provisions under Sections 9 and 15 of the civil Procedure Code. In the case of Gouri Gupta (supra), Calcutta high Court while dealing with the suit for maintenance held that once-the relationship of husband and wife is established, the wife gets maintenance as a matter of course arid it is only under Section 18 (3) that the said obligation is completely extinguished. Therefore, decision of the lower court that in the absence of specific prayer for a decree for judicial separation or divorce, mere suit for maintenance under Section 18 (1) is not maintainable is not correct and is therefore set aside. ( 6 ) SO far as the other point regarding dessertion by opposite party is concerned, the lower court committed error by wrongly applying the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. It has proceeded on the footing that under the provisions of that section, the plaintiff-wife is to prove various grounds mentioned thereunder from sub-clauses (a) to (g) to substantiate a case of dessertion. But this is not correct. On a bare reading of sub-section (2) of Section 18, it is crystal clear that a Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance. This provision under sub-section (2) is not meant for laying a claim for maintenance, but only for laying a claim for separate residual. On a bare reading of sub-section (2) of Section 18, it is crystal clear that a Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance. This provision under sub-section (2) is not meant for laying a claim for maintenance, but only for laying a claim for separate residual. In other words, wife's claim for maintenance can be disallowed only under sub-section (3) of section 18 which lays down that a Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion. She is entitled as of right to be maintained by the husband, either she remains with him or away from him. Under sub-section (2) of Section 18, she can lay a claim to live separately and in that case alone the court would try to find out whether any of the grounds enumerated under sub-clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 18 have been satisfied so that the court may judge whether it will be justifiable under the circumstances to allow the wife to live separately from the husband. But certainly while considering the case of allowing maintenance those grounds are not to be considered. But that does not necessarily mean that claim for maintenance cannot be denied by the husband. In other words, if the husband can prove that she is not entitled to maintenance because of circumstance existing as provided under Section 18 (3) or that she is not entitled to maintenance because of various other reasons which cannot be catalogued in a general manner but would depend on facts and circumstances in each particular case, which the husband may justifiably prove. This finding is also set aside. ( 7 ) BY interim order dated 12. 2. 1988 this court had directed to pay a sum of Rs. 150 per month to the appellant No. 1 and Rs. 100 to appellant No. 2 to be paid by 7th of each month. ( 8 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed. Lower court judgment is set aside. The case is remitted back to the lower court to calculate and quantify the amount of maintenance to be paid since the same is not done in this judgment and let the lower court to fix the amount. ( 8 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed. Lower court judgment is set aside. The case is remitted back to the lower court to calculate and quantify the amount of maintenance to be paid since the same is not done in this judgment and let the lower court to fix the amount. However, until disposal of the matter by the lower court as per interim direction of this court, the husband should continue to pay the amount to the appellants. No costs. Appeal allowed. Judgment of Lower court set aside.