Judgment :- 1. This petition is to condone the delay of 1272 days in filing the appeal. The reasons given by the petitioners for the delay are, the lower court delivered the judgment on 19.3.1987; immediately copy application was filed for the certified copy of the judgment which was made ready on 20.8.1987; the said certified copy of the judgment was forwarded to the Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Department, Cuddalore, on 26.8.1987; thereafter, the papers were submitted for obtaining the legal opinion on 8.9.1987; on 10.9.1987, the papers were sent to the Commissioners Office for getting section; on 30.9.1987, a letter was sent to the Deputy Commissioner for furnishing the necessary printed copies for filing the appeal; on 2.12.1987, a letter was addressed to the Government Pleader requesting him to send the 19 printed copies of the judgment; as there was no reply, a reminder was sent on 8.2.1989; the Government Pleader once again was contacted on 28.8.1989; by letter dated 16.9.1989. the Government Pleader requested the Department to pay a sum of Rs. 250/- towards the expenses; on 16.10.1989 a demand draft was taken for the said sum and given to the Government Pleader on 17.10.1989; the Commissioners Office sent a letter to the Deputy Commissioner, requesting him to furnish the necessary printed copies on 1.11.1989; on 7.11.1989, 5 printed copies were forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner. The Government Pleader was once again contacted and was requested to send the 19 printed copies of the judgment by letters dated 20.11.1989, 6.1.1990, 8.1.1990 and 20.1.1990; the printed copies which were received from the Government Pleader were forwarded to the Assistant Commissioner on 31.7.1990, who in turn forwarded the same to the Deputy Commissioner on 27.9.1990; the Deputy Commissioner in turn, forwarded the same to the Commissioner on 8.10.1990 and finally, the papers were forwarded to the Government Advocate, Madras on 17.1.1991; the appeals were filed on 25.1.1991 and thus, there is a delay of 1272 days in filing the appeal. 2. From the above narrated facts as stated by the petitioners, it is clear that the certified copy has been obtained on 20.8.1987 without any delay. Thereafter, the papers have been circulated to the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner, that too for the requisite number of printed copies for filing the appeal. 2. From the above narrated facts as stated by the petitioners, it is clear that the certified copy has been obtained on 20.8.1987 without any delay. Thereafter, the papers have been circulated to the Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner, that too for the requisite number of printed copies for filing the appeal. Even-though the Government Pleader was requested by letter dated 2.12.1987 for the 19 printed copies of the judgment, the petitioners did not take any action for nearly two years i.e. upto 8.2.1989 when the reminder was sent. The inaction for two years has not been properly explained. It is well known fact that some one or other from the Department of the Government will be attending the Government Pleader office either to give instructions or hand over papers or to get the old records. In such circumstances, there is absolutely no reason as to why the department people have not asked the Government Pleader or made enquiries with the Government Pleader for more than two years with regard to printed copies. Apart from this, the copies have been received by the Commissioner on 8.1.1990, after nearly three years. Thereafter, the Commissioner has taken three months to forward the papers to the Government Advocate without any explanation for such a delay especially when the limitation had already expired and inordinate delay had occurred in filing the appeal. 3. The petitioners ought to have known by themselves or at least ought to have consulted either the local Government Pleader or the Government Advocate at Madras as to whether the appeal could be filed with the certified copy. Without doing so, the departmental people have taken their own time unnecessarily and delayed the matter for nearly three years. An appeal could have been filed with the certified copy of the judgment and decree and by filing an application for dispensing with the production of a number of printed copies of the judgment. There is no explanation from the petitioners as to why the said procedure had not been followed. 4. Though the appeal has been filed on 25.1.1991, the petition for condoning the delay had been filed only on 19.3.1993, i.e. two years after the filing of the appeal. There is no explanation from the petitioners as to why the said procedure had not been followed. 4. Though the appeal has been filed on 25.1.1991, the petition for condoning the delay had been filed only on 19.3.1993, i.e. two years after the filing of the appeal. When the appeal was filed, both the petitioners as well as the Government Pleader ought to have known that the appeal is barred by limitation and as such, it should be accompanied by an affidavit as well as the petition for condoning the delay. There is absolutely no explanation on the part of the petitioners as to why such petition was not filed along with the appeal or at least immediately thereafter. The further two years delay in filing the petition is nothing but absolute carelessness in prosecuting the matter. When the decree of the lower Court is dated 19.3.1987 and the delay in filing the appeal is 1272 days — nearly 3-1/2 years. I do not think it is proper to condone the delay and entertain the appeal. 5. However, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the petitioners referred to the judgment of the apex court reported in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others ( AIR 1996 SC 1623 = 1996 2 L.W. 18), wherein it has been held as follows: “The expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking cordonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults , no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions or private individual. The law of limitation, is no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any Other litigent must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions or private individual. The law of limitation, is no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any Other litigent must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where Public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or had faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have ‘a little play at the joint’ Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condened.” 6. On the basis of the above judgment, the Government Pleader contended that when the Government have filed the petition to condone the delay, there should be some latitude and liberal consideration should be taken. 7. I entirely agree with the learned Government Pleader provided the Government officials have acted with bona fide intention. As stated already, merely keeping the matter pending by correspondence, cannot be said to be bona fide action on the part of Government officials. 7. I entirely agree with the learned Government Pleader provided the Government officials have acted with bona fide intention. As stated already, merely keeping the matter pending by correspondence, cannot be said to be bona fide action on the part of Government officials. They ought to have consulted the Government Pleader with regard to the filing of the appeal and in case the Government Pleader has stated that it cannot be done, then I can agree their attitude in delaying the matter by seeking the requisite number of printed copies of the judgment. At every stage, there was delay and it is nothing but lack of bona fides. The apex court has held that even if the public interest is involved, unless it is made out that the matter has suffered owing to act of fraud or bad faith on the part of the officers, then only, the delay can be condoned. In this cases, the petitioners did not aver any fraud or bad faith on the part of the officials. The only ground urged is there was delay in getting the requisite number of printed copies of the judgment. Hence I am of the view that the inordinate delay of 1272 days — nearly 3-1/2 years cannot be condoned. Hence the petition is dismissed.