JUDGMENT Defendant Rao Mahendra Singh has filed this L.P.A. now assailing the judgment of the first appellate Court amongst others on the ground that the first appellate Court had wrongly ordered exclusion of time for the period suit No. 1164/51 was pending adjudication and that the Limitation Act of 1963 was not attracted in terms of its section 31 as the limitation period provided for the suit had already expired under the old Act. We have examined the two judgment passed by the trial Court and the first appellate Court and we feel convinced that the trial Court had proceeded on a wrong track by holding the suit time barred on the ground that plaintiffs were out of possession for more than 12 years on the date of institution of the suit. The Court had strangely neither referred to provision of the old or new Limitation Act and nor had given any congent reasoning for dismissing the suit on the point of limitation. In case it had drawn upon Article 142 of the old Act, it has certainly fallen in error, because, suit No. 26-A/72 was filed when Limitation Act of 1963 was in force. Therefore, it was governable under the relevant provisions of this Act, Article 65 whereof prescribed limitation period in case of a suit for possession. Under this Article the period of limitation was to run from the date of the possession of the defendant became adverse to the plaintiff. But for this defendant had to specifically plead and pad to assert his title openly and hostile to the title of the plaintiff to his knowledge. It is a beaten law that person who claims adverse possession must set up title hostile to the title of the true owner and to his knowledge. In other words there should be necessary animus on the part of such person who intends to perfect his title by adverse possession. Mere continuous possession does not become adverse possession unless the person in possession puts up his own title hostile to the title of the original owner and to the knowledge of such owner. The possession, therefore, becomes adverse only on that date when the person in possession puts up his claim of adverse possession, disputes the title of the original owner and does so to his knowledge. The period of limitation prescribed by Article 65 would run then from that date. The possession, therefore, becomes adverse only on that date when the person in possession puts up his claim of adverse possession, disputes the title of the original owner and does so to his knowledge. The period of limitation prescribed by Article 65 would run then from that date. [See 1997 (7) SCC 567 ]. In the present case appellant had not advanced his claim of adverse possession at any stage even from the date he had purchased the disputed house in execution proceedings of suit No. 14 on 10.10.1955. He appears to have done so for first time while taking objection to the execution proceedings in suit No. 1164/51 on 29.11.1962. As such the period of limitation was computable from that date and the suit was within the period of limitation prescribed by any calculation. Viewed thus the first appellate Court had rightly dealt with the matter in this perspective. It is a different matter that it had alternatively found the suit within the prescribed period of limitation by taking recourse to exclusion of time taken by the plaintiff in prosecuting suit No. 1164/51. That by itself would not detract from the fact that the suit was falling within the limitation zone otherwise also under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. we accordingly concur with the reasoning adopted by the first appellate Court regarding application of Article 65 of the suit and hold it within the period of limitation and hold that limitation period and in a suit for possession or immovable property would run from the date the party in possession asserts his title hostile to the original owner and to his knowledge. Appellants' reliance on section 31 of this Limitation Act seems also misconceived. Because this section only provided that the expired cause of action in a suit, appeal or application that had already become time barred under the old Act of Limitation on 1st January, 1964 could not be revived by resort to the provisions of the Act of 1963 providing for a longer period of limitation. As a matter of fact the position contemplated by section 31 was not attracted to the present case at all. Because civil suit No. 26-A/72 was filed on 24.12.1972 and was to be governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 which was already enforced. As a matter of fact the position contemplated by section 31 was not attracted to the present case at all. Because civil suit No. 26-A/72 was filed on 24.12.1972 and was to be governed by the Limitation Act, 1963 which was already enforced. For the reasons given this appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court passed in F.A. No. 112/72 is affirmed.