Judgment : M. KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS application has been filed by the petitioners to quash the proceedings initiated against them by the respondent complainant in C. C. No. 228 of 1996 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Sivakasi, for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendments) Act, 1988. ( 2 ) MR. Rajagopalan, the learned counsel for the petitioners would press into service the following contentions before this Court : (1) Though the cheque was dishonoured on 30. 3,1996, the statutory notice was despatched on 19. 4. 1996. Hence, the notice issued by the respondent is clearly beyond 15 days time as completed under the provision of Negotiable Instruments act. (ii) The cheque presented before the Court was dishonoured with the endorsement to the effect of stoppage of payment. Therefore, the provisions of Negotiable instruments Act cannot be invoked by the respondent. (iii) The power of Attorney by Mr. Samuthrakani, who is the manager of the company, on behalf of the complainant, filed before the lower Court at the time of filing of the complaint, is not a valid document. ( 3 ) THOUGH the notice was served on the respondent, there is no representation on his behalf. ( 4 ) ON a perusal of the records, I am of the view that none of the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners by the learned counsel would hold good. ( 5 ) AS regards the first point, it is contended that the notice was issued on 18. 4. 1996, even though the cheque was returned on 30. 3. 1996. According to the complaint and sworn statement, the notice was issued on 15. 4. 1996 and the return memo dated 30. 3. 1996. So, only during the course of trial, what is the actual date of receipt of the return memo by the complainant and what is the actual date of issue of notice would be known, on examination of the witnesses on behalf of the complainant. Though it is stated in the complaint that the return memo was received on 30. 3. 1996. i. e. , beyond 15 days, it cannot be said that the proceedings are vitiated. Therefore, the first ground fails. Though it is stated in the complaint that the return memo was received on 30. 3. 1996. i. e. , beyond 15 days, it cannot be said that the proceedings are vitiated. Therefore, the first ground fails. ( 6 ) AS regards the second ground, it is now settled law that merely because the cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement of stop payment, the complainant cannot be precluded from approaching the Criminal court for filing a complaint against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act. Though earlier the Apex Court held that the return of the cheque with the endorsement of stop payment would not attract the ingredients of the Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the said decision has been overruled subsequently and as such, the present law is that the complainanmt is entitled to the file the complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, even though the endorsement in the return memo would show that the cheques was returned on the reason mentioned therein as stop payment. ( 7 ) IN view of the above, I hold that the second ground also would not be a valid one. ( 8 ) AS regards the third ground, it is clear that the validity of the power of attorney which was admittedly produced by the complainant on the date of filing of the complaint before the trial Court cannot be questioned at this stage before this forum. Moreover, the power of Attorney or authorisation is only a document authorising some person to file a complaint on behalf of the company/complainant. So, it is for the trial court to go into the question whether such an authorisation was given by the complainant/company to the person who filed a complaint on behalf of the company. Therefore, in my view, this ground also would not be valid one. ( 9 ) IN these circumstances, the application seeking the relief of quashing the proceedings does not have any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly this petition is dismissed. Consequently, Cr. M. P. No. 2473/97 is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.