Judgment :- 1. These revisions are filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Principal District Judge, Nagapattinam, whereby he refused permission to Nagore Dargah, a Public Trust, from alienating a property to 2nd respondent in CRP No. 1897 of 1998.2nd respondent therein has filed the other revision against the same order. 2. Before coming to the facts of this case, the historical background of the Trust is required. O.S. No. 30 of 1946 was instituted under Section 92, C.P.C. for framing a Scheme for acquisition of Nagore Dargah and its attendant institutions. Nagore Dargah is considered to be one of the most famous religious places of the Muslim community in South India, and it is one of the most wealthiest Trusts also. A detailed Scheme was prepared by the District Court, East Tanjore, and finally two appeals were taken as A.S. Nos. 289 and 576 of 1948. A Division Bench of this Court passed a decree and framed a Scheme. On the basis of the Scheme, the entire administration is vested in Board of Trustees which is also having an Advisory Board. This Court, while drafting the Scheme, has also provided that if any other Trustees or Kasupanguthars or any member of the Advisory Board filed any application to the Court for a direction, the Court shall have full power to give all such directions as may be necessary to effectuate and carry out the Scheme. The scheme also provided that the District Court of East Tanjore at Nagapattinam, and if there is no District Court at Nagapattinam, the Principal Court exercising jurisdiction under Sec. 92, C.P.C. over the Nagore Dargah shall be the Court for the purpose of the Scheme. As I said earlier, the day-to-day administration of the Dargha was vested in a Board of Trustees. A resolution was passed by the Board of Trustees on 24.7.1997 to lease out Dargah Thottams in T.S. Nos. 2373 and 2376 at Public Office Road, Nagore to the Educational Trust of Nagore for the purpose of putting up construction and starting Arts and Engineering Colleges on permanent lease basis on a monthly rent of Rs. 2,000/-, which will be raised every year, and the transaction was decided to be entered into after getting legal opinion and also after obtaining necessary sanction and approval from the Scheme Court. 2,000/-, which will be raised every year, and the transaction was decided to be entered into after getting legal opinion and also after obtaining necessary sanction and approval from the Scheme Court. When such a resolution was passed, 1st respondent in CRP 1897 of 1998 moved an Application before the District Court, Nagapattinam, on 29.4.1998, alleging that the proposed lease is a collusive transaction and the same is detrimental to the Trust. On getting such complaint, the Scheme Court issued notice to the Managing Trustee to produce one copy of the permanent lease deed for taking necessary action. Even before that, the Scheme Court has declined to grant permission to the Managing Trustee for executing any such lease. The said order was passed on 2.9.1997, and it reads thus:— “The request for permanent leasing is rejected, since there is no provision in the Scheme Decree for granting permission to such lease or to lease the property by negotiation without conducting any public auction”. In spite of this order (extracted above), the Managing Trustee seems to have executed a lease ‘ deed which is the subject matter of the complaint by the 1st respondent, and it was pursuant to the said complaint, the Court wanted the document to be produced. After the document was produced, the lower Court passed the impugned order and thereby declared that the document executed was null and void and that it is a collusive transaction, and if possession had passed to the lessee, it must be surrendered back or the property must be taken possession of, and the so called lessee will not have any right as against the Dargah. The lower Court further directed that if the so called lessee, is in any way prejudiced or suffered any loss, only the Managing Trustee will be made personally liable, and the Trust and Trust properties will not be affected in any way. It is this order that is challenged in both these revisions. 3. When the revisions came up for admission, I ordered notice of motion, and respondents also entered appearance and placed before me the typed set of papers and 1 heard the matter in detail. 4. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that CRP 1897 of 1998 is not maintainable since the Managing Trustee cannot be said to be an aggrieved person against the order of the lower Court. 4. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that CRP 1897 of 1998 is not maintainable since the Managing Trustee cannot be said to be an aggrieved person against the order of the lower Court. The argument is that as per the Scheme Decree, the District Court has given the power to give direction for the proper management of the Trust and the District Court is also given the power to give all such directions as may be necessary to effectually carry out the Scheme. The Managing Trustee is bound by the directions given by the District Court and the Court as guardian of the Trust, has given direction not to lease out the property, and it has further given a direction for getting back possession of the properties from the lessee. When the Scheme Decree provides that the Managing Trustee must act according to the directions of the District Court, he cannot challenge its own action. When the Court gives a direction for implementation of the Scheme, it is the act of the Trust itself and the Managing Trustee who is bound to act according to the Scheme, is not competent to challenge the same.. 5. Another argument put forward by learned counsel for respondent is that the impugned order has been passed pursuant to the direction in the Scheme Decree and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a judicial order wherein inter se disputes are decided. The Court takes into consideration the benefit of the Trust and gives direction as empowered under the Trust. If that be so, the revision under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 6. I feel that tense contentions are well-founded. Before going to the correctness of these submissions, the conduct of the Managing Trustee will have to be considered initially. In the Resolution itself, it was said that a lease will be executed after getting sanction from Court. An application was filed for getting sanction. On 2.9.1997, the District Court itself refused the sanction. Thereafter, the Managing Trustee had no business to execute the lease. But violating the order of the District Court, on 10.9.1997, a lease deed was executed in the name of the 2nd respondent. The order dated 2.9.1997 has not been challenged till date. An application was filed for getting sanction. On 2.9.1997, the District Court itself refused the sanction. Thereafter, the Managing Trustee had no business to execute the lease. But violating the order of the District Court, on 10.9.1997, a lease deed was executed in the name of the 2nd respondent. The order dated 2.9.1997 has not been challenged till date. When the Resolution itself was that a lease deed shall be executed only after obtaining permission from Court, and the District Court refused permission, it is clear that the action of the Managing Trustee was against the resolution, and also against the orders of Court. He has misused the power as Managing Trustee and has betrayed the confidence reposed in him by the Trust. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on 2.9.1997, the lease deed has been executed, and it was on that day, the order was passed. Even though the veracity of the settlement is disputed, I do not want to probe into the case, for, the subsequent action by the Managing Trustee alone is sufficient to discard the document. On 2.9.1997, the document is not registered. The Registration took place only on 10.9.1997, and the document is presented for registration only on that day. When the Court has prohibited such alienation, there was no authority for the Managing Trustee to present the same for registration. I find that the conclusion arrived at by the lower Court that there is collusion between the lessee and the Managing Trustee is correct. The lease deed executed and registered by the Managing Trustee is void. He has no power to execute such document, and no right has also been obtained by second respondent on the basis of that document. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that on previous occasions also, after lease deed was executed, Court used to give sanction. He wanted this Court to take note of various instances, and contended that in this case also, he bona fide believed that the Court would grant sanction. That argument pre-supposes that the Managing Trustee is of the view that the Court also will give sanction to all his actions, in accordance with his wishes. Such an attitude on the part of the Managing Trustee cannot be appreciated by the Court. 8. Even as per the Scheme, a permanent lease cannot be granted. That argument pre-supposes that the Managing Trustee is of the view that the Court also will give sanction to all his actions, in accordance with his wishes. Such an attitude on the part of the Managing Trustee cannot be appreciated by the Court. 8. Even as per the Scheme, a permanent lease cannot be granted. That apart, under Section 34 of the Trusts Act, a lease exceeding 21 years also cannot be granted. Along with the same, the Scheme also provides that all lease transactions could only be on the basis of public auction. By negotiation, a permanent lease cannot be granted. A permanent lease means so far as the Trust is concerned, the property is lost for ever, and after buildings are put up by educational institutions, getting back the property if there is any violation of the conditions of lease will be very difficult, and ultimately it will be only the Public Trust that will be put to difficulties. When the Trust Deed provides the powers of the Managing Trustee and also as to how the properties should be managed, there is no business for the Managing Trustee to enter into such transaction. The finding of the Court below that the lease is void is correct and no ground is made out for interference. 9. Regarding the legal contentions raised by learned counsel for respondents, I feel that CRP 1897 of 1998 is not maintainable. As I said already, the Managing Trustee or the Trust Board is bound to act according to the dictates of the District Court. When the District Court passes an order taking into consideration the benefit of the Trust, it amounts to an act of the Trust and the Managing Trustee who is himself a part of it, cannot challenge it. The revision is, therefore, not maintainable for that reason also. 10. Regarding the second contention, namely, maintainability of the Revision, I do not think that the contention of the learned counsel can be accepted. When the Court declares that the document is void, that affects the civil rights of a person. There is an adjudication to a certain extent that the document is void. That can be done only by a Court of law while exercising its judicial functions. Learned counsel compared this order with an order giving sanction to file a suit, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is an adjudication to a certain extent that the document is void. That can be done only by a Court of law while exercising its judicial functions. Learned counsel compared this order with an order giving sanction to file a suit, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I do not think that the said comparison could be accepted as valid. When a Court exercises the power under Section 92, C.P.C., and permits the institution of a suit, it is an order before the rights are adjudicated. After filing the suit, the very same matter is again construed, and that is why the Court has held that there is no bar of res judicata, and the order is purely administrative. It has also been declared by the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court that the rights of any person are not affected while granting the sanction. Even the matter which has been dealt with by that order, rould again be reagitated when the suit is instituted pursuant to the permission. In regard to the impugned order, the same is pursuant to a decree and where a Scheme is prepared. While the Court exercises a power as a Trustee of a Public Trust, the rights are also adjudicated. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that no civil consequence will follow on the basis of the impugned order, and it cannot be said that it is only an administrative order. That contention cannot be accepted. 11. At this juncture, the Revision Petitioner in CRP 2113 of 1998, who has taken the lease, contended that his client was not heard before the impugned order was passed. I do not think that the said contention can be accepted for a moment. As I said already, the resolution itself was passed subject to orders of Court, regarding its implementation. The so called lessee was well aware of the resolution and he took the lease only pursuant to that resolution: It was only at his instance, permission was sought from District Court. For seeking permission, the lessee is not a party. The Court has to take into consideration only the advantage and interest of the Trust. The Court refused permission. That means, there was no effective resolution enabling the Trustees to alienate the property. Thereafter, the lessee took the document at his risk. For seeking permission, the lessee is not a party. The Court has to take into consideration only the advantage and interest of the Trust. The Court refused permission. That means, there was no effective resolution enabling the Trustees to alienate the property. Thereafter, the lessee took the document at his risk. There is no question of any violation of Principles of Natural Justice. Petitioner therein is also not entitled to be heard. It is not a case where the petitioner therein was not aware of the proceedings before the District Court. No notice is also required in such cases. The lower Court has rightly held that it is a collusive transaction between the two petitioners in the respective Revision Petitions. I hold that the finding of the lower Court is only to be upheld. 12. When the resolution itself was passed empowering the Managing Trustee to execute the lease deed pursuant to orders of Court and when no permission was granted by Court, the Managing Trustee has no authority to file even the Revision Petition, viz . CRP No. 1897 of 1998. The Trust funds cannot be utilised for fighting such vexatious litigations. The Managing Trustee has not come to this Court in his personal capacity. The Dargah represented by Managing Trustee is the petitioner in this case. The Managing Trustee has unnecessarily dragged the Dargah to this proceeding, for his satisfaction. I, therefore, hold that the revision is liable to be dismissed, and the costs of this revision (CRP No. 1897 of 1998) shall not be paid from the Trust funds, and the same shall be paid by the Managing Trustee personally. 13. It is apparent from the acts of the Managing Trustee that he’ has flouted even his authority and also the orders of the District Court. The District Court, on receipt of a copy of this order, is directed to consider whether the Managing Trustee is entitled to continue as such since he has abused his position. The Court shall issue notice to the managing Trustee and also the Board of Trustees, and orders will be passed regarding disqualification of the Managing Trustee. I direct the District Court to consider this and pass necessary orders within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. In the result, both the Revision Petitions are dismissed with costs. I direct the District Court to consider this and pass necessary orders within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. In the result, both the Revision Petitions are dismissed with costs. In CRP No. 1897 of 1998, the Managing Trustee is personally made liable for the costs. No portion of the Trust Fund shall be utilised for conducting this litigation. Connected C.M.Ps. are also dismissed consequently.