Honble CHAUHAN, J.–The aforesaid cases relates to the grant of permits and/or counter-signatures on inter-State routes under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called ``the Act): The facts and circumstances giving rise to these cases would be dealt with separately in the later part of the judgment. All writ petitions involve the common question of law, therefore, are disposed of by a common judgment by dealing with the following legal question first:- (i). Whether it is open to the Transport Authorities to grant and/or counter-signature the stage carriage permits on an inter- state route over and above the number of permits fixed by the inter-state agreement; (ii) Whether Section 88 (4) and the proviso appended thereto create two independent and alternative grounds/modes for the grant of counter-signature of stage carriage permits on inter- statal route; and (iii) Whether after the Amendment Act No. 54/1994, which inserted the provisions of Section 68 (3) (ca) with effect from 14.11.1994, which has taken away the competence of the transport authorities, i.e., S.T.A./R.T.A. to create a route, the authority can grant permit on an inter-State route over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement, and if the permit is not counter-signed by the other authority, whether that permit can be termed as valid in view of the provisions of Section 88(1) of the Act even for part of the route falling within the jurisdiction of the granting authority ? (2). The relevant provisions of the Act read as under :- ``88.-Validation of permits for use outside region in which granted. (1) Except as may be otherwise prescribed, a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in any other region, unless the permit has been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region, and a permit gran- ted in any one State shall not be valid in any other State unless countersigned by the State Transport Authority of that other State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned: ...................... (3) A Regional Transport Authority when countersigning the permit may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit and may like-wise vary any condition attached to the permit by the authority by which the permit was granted. (3) A Regional Transport Authority when countersigning the permit may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed if it had granted the permit and may like-wise vary any condition attached to the permit by the authority by which the permit was granted. (4) The provision of this Chapter relating to the grant, revocation and suspension of permits shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension of countersignatures of permits: provided that it shall not be necessary to follow the procedure laid down in Section 80 for the grant of countersignatures of permits, where the permits granted in any one State are required to be coun- tersigned by the State Transport Authority of another State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned as a result of any agreement arrived at between the States after complying with the requirements or Sub-section (5). (5). Every proposal to enter into an agreement between the States to fix the number of permits which is proposed to be granted or countersigned in respect of each route or area, shall be published by each of the State Governments concerned in the Official Gazette and in any one or more of the newspapers in regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by the agreement together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted, and the date not being less than thirty days from the date of publication in the Official Gazette, on which, and the authority by which, and the time and place at which, the proposal and any representation received in connection therewith will be considered. (6) Every agreement arrived at between the States shall, in so far as it relates to the grant of counter-signature of permits, be published by each of the State Government concerned in the Official Gazette and in any one or more of the newspapers in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by the agreement and the State Transport Authority of the State and Regional Transport Authority concerned shall give effect to it. (3). The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted by various High Courts from time to time expressing the conflicting views. (4). However, in Mohammed Ibrahim vs. the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (1). (3). The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted by various High Courts from time to time expressing the conflicting views. (4). However, in Mohammed Ibrahim vs. the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (1). The Apex Court has considered the provisions corresponding to the above referred to in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called ``the Old Act) and observed as under:- The combined effect of Section 63, 63-A, 63-B and 63-C is that the inter-State commission will deal with the inter-State permit. The Central Government under Section 63-C of the Act is authorised to make rules in regard to the procedure to be followed in considering an application for grant and counter-signature of permits. In the absence of specific rules, the best way of harmonising the powers and functions is to allow these inter-State authorities to exercise their respective spheres in regard to grant and counter-signature of permits by agreement and accord. (5). The Honble Supreme Court, further in para 14 of the judgment, has laid down as follows:- ``We are, therefore, of opinion that Section 47 (3) of the Act will not apply either to grant or to counter-signatures of permits both in the case of inter-State and inter-regional permits. The relevant authorities in two States or two regions will ensure agreement and act in concert as the case may be. The number of services in the region can of course be fixed by the Regional Transport Authority but they will be for the region only. The number of services for inter-regional or inter-State routes beyond the frontier of the region will have to be de- termined by agreement. (6). The Allahabad High Court, in Writ Petition No. 294/1965, Chetan Lal vs. S.T.A.T. and others, decided on 3.5.65, held that on an inter-State route, the Transport Authorities have no competence to grant permit or counter-sign it over and above the ceiling fixed by agreement between the two States. The Court held as under:- ``It is urged for the contesting respondents that it is not necessary for the two State Transport Authorities to concur when the strength of a route is raised. This may be true, if the route lies entirely within the territories of one State. The Court held as under:- ``It is urged for the contesting respondents that it is not necessary for the two State Transport Authorities to concur when the strength of a route is raised. This may be true, if the route lies entirely within the territories of one State. Section 47 (3) empowers a Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage carriages for which stage carriages permit may be granted and does not require it to obtain the concurrence of any other authority. But the language of the sub- section will clearly show that this provision is confined to the regions or specified area or specified route within the region, over which the Regional Transport Authority has jurisdiction. It does not entitle the Regional Transport Authority to raise the limit or strength unilaterally on the route if the route passes from one Region to another. Similarly, it is difficult to hold that where a route passes from one State to another, the S.T.A. of one State alone is entitled by unilateral act to raise the strength on the route. (7). The aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 3.5.65 was approved and confirmed by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 447/1965, decided on 15.9.69. (8). In Dalip Singh vs. S.T.A.T., Lucknow (2), a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court held that if the permits are granted on the inter-State route over and above the agreement fixed by the reciprocal agreement, by a Transport Authority under the State as ``its operation would be extra-territorial and would suffer by the vice of extra-territoriality. The Court further observed that even by passing legisla- tion to that effect would not be valid. The Court held as under:- ``In our opinion, it is not within the competence of any State Legislature to take away by force of a legislation enacted by it, power of other State to enter into an agreement and to fix the number of stage carriage permits which it would permit on the portion of the inter-Sta- tal route lying within that State as such a legislation would have extra-territorial operation. (9). Similar question arose before the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. 906/1977, Nasiruddin vs. S.T.A.T. and others (3); and Writ Petition No. 163/1973, Smt. Sharda Devi vs. S.T.A.T. and others (4). (9). Similar question arose before the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. 906/1977, Nasiruddin vs. S.T.A.T. and others (3); and Writ Petition No. 163/1973, Smt. Sharda Devi vs. S.T.A.T. and others (4). Both writ petitions were dismissed by a common judgment dated 31.1.1979 holding as under:- ``(i) that the question of number of permits to be granted and countersigne is governed by the inter-State Agreement. (ii) that as the grant of counter-signature of the permits on the route is covered by the inter-State agreements, the permits are to be gran- ted and counter-signed only in accordance with the agreement and it is not permissible to grant or countersign permits above the limits fixed by the inter-State agreement; (iii) that as regard the interpretation of Section 63(3) and the proviso appended thereto, the learned single Judge held as follows:- ``It could not be the intention of the Legislature that beyond the determined strength of the route the procedure laid down in Section 57 will apply. The scheme of the Act limits the number of stage carriage. The number of services in the region or any specified area or any specified route within the region is fixed by the R.T.A. The num- ber of services for inter-regional or inter-State route is to be determined by agreement. If there is an agreement between the two participating States, then beyond the limit fixed there could be no question of operating any services. The effect of following the procedure laid down in Section 57 beyond the limit fixed would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages on the inter-State route on which the two States have previously agreed to limit the services. It could not be the intention of the Legislatures to nullify the inter-State agreements. The true combined meaning of Section 63(3) and its proviso is that the inter-State agreement envisaged by the pro- viso would make it unnecessary to follow the procedure laid down in Section 57 for the grant of counter-signature of permits on the inter-State routes within the limit fixed, but once there is an agreement, inter alia, limiting the number of services on inter-State route, the main clause of Section 63 (3) ceases to operate. (10). (10). Against the said judgment, the Division Bench decided the appeal in Nasiruddin vs. S.T.A.T. (supra), and held as under:- (I) That substantive part of Section 63 (3) and the proviso thereto are two independent and alternative grounds for counter-Signature of an inter-State permit; (II) that the transport authorities of the two States can grant and counter-sign the inter-State permit above the limit of number of permits fixed by Inter-State agreement, for such an agreement does not extend beyond that number and the application of proviso to Section 63 (3) is exhausted when the number of permits agreed upon in the agreement are granted; (III) that the transport authorities can increase the number of permits on an inter-State route above the limit fixed by the Inter-State agreement and this increase of permit can be done at the time of considering the application for permit or counter-signature. (11). Subsequently, the appeal against the same judgment in Writ Petition No. 163/1973 was decided by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Smt. Sharda Devi vs. S.T.A.T. and others (supra) taking the same view. (12). The Honble Supreme Court considered the appeals against the two Division Bench judgments of the Delhi High Court in Nasiruddin and Smt. Sharda Devi (supra) in the case of M/s. Janta Motor Pvt. Ltd. vs. S.T.A.T. and others (5), wherein, under the peculiar circumstances, the appellants therein, though withdrew their appeals, the Appex Court thought it proper to lay down the law and the Court impliedly set-aside the judgments of the Delhi High Court though without saying so expressly. The Apex Court observed as under:- ``These appeals have, therefore, to be dismissed as not pressed.... We direct that until the inter-State agreement is finalised, as directed above and steps are taken for grant of permits in respect of the vacancies existing or created under the agreement, the Transport Authority of Union Territory of Delhi should re-consider the decision in the matter of counter- signatures of existing permits issued by the Transport Authority in U.P. If there be any permit already granted by the Transport Authority of Delhi, the Transport Authority in U.P. may similarly consider the question of counter-signature. If there be any counter-signature made in the manner indicated above, it would be a purely temporary measure for the convenience of the travelling pu- blic and would not confer any right for claiming preferential treatment in the matter of filling of vacancies on permanent basis. The counter- signature referred to above, if and when made, shall remain valid only upto the grant of permits on the inter-State route. (13). This Court, in Sunil Kumar Ajmera and another vs. Secretary, State Tran- sport Authority, Gwalior and others (6). Held that ``the Transport Authority draws its competence from the general provisions of law and not from the agreement and the prohibitory clause in the inter-State agreement cannot over-ride the powers available to the transport authority under the Act. The reciprocal agreement between the State cannot render the statutory provision as nugatory and observed that the authority is not restrained from issuing fresh permits over and above the scope fixed by an agreement and what the law requires is that before a person operates on the route and the limit fixed by the inter-State agreement, obtaining the counter-signature from the transport authority of other State would be a condition precedent and even if it is not done, the permit will remain operative in the territorial jurisdiction of the granting State. However, such a grant would not be against the statutory provisions. (14). While deciding the said case, the Court has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Nasiruddin (supra). This court approved the view taken by this Court earlier in Sahib Ram vs. State of Rajas- than and another, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1309/1990, decided on 28.8.1992. Same view has subsequently been reiterated in New Vijay Laxmi Bhambhu Transport Company and another vs. State Transport Commissioner & Anr. (7). However, the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Janta Motors (supra) have not been noticed by this Court while deciding either of these cases. (15). Same view has subsequently been reiterated in New Vijay Laxmi Bhambhu Transport Company and another vs. State Transport Commissioner & Anr. (7). However, the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Janta Motors (supra) have not been noticed by this Court while deciding either of these cases. (15). The Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, vide judgment and order dated 6.9.96 in Writ Petition No. 13560 of 1995, Pawan Kumar vs. State of Punjab and others, considered the similar issue and observed that the agreement entered into between the State of Punjab and Rajasthan from time to time provided that the operation of stage carriage permits on inter- State route between Rajasthan and Punjab, shall be as per the terms of reciprocal agreement and once the State has promulgated an agreement with other State while exercising its powers granted under the statute, as the said agreement is in consonance with the statutory provi- sions of the Act, there is no scope of raising the averment that the agreement cannot over-ride the statutory provisions. The Court observed as under :- ``On a perusal of the provisions, as noticed above, we are of the view that where there is a reciprocal agreement between the States and the number of permits to be granted and to be counter-signed, no additional permit can be granted to the operators in respect of the route covered by the agreement, otherwise the entire exercise, as undertaken in pursuance of Section 88(5) and (6), would become wholly unnecessary. (16). The Punjab High Court, also, considered the judgments of Delhi High Court in Nasiruddin and of this Court in Sahib Ram and Sunil Kumar Ajmera (supra) and observed as under :- ``Regratefully, though respectfully, we have our reservations about the view expressed by Their Lordships of Delhi and Rajasthan High Courts. We are of the view that the intention of the Parliament in pro- viding for lengthy procedure under Clauses (5) and (6) of Section 88, was only to extend that every person interested in operation on the inter-State route, on which the number of permit was proposed to be specified, should be heard before proposal is finalised. Once the number has been specified, it would not be possible for the Authority to entertain any application. Once the number has been specified, it would not be possible for the Authority to entertain any application. It was with this intention that even the procedure of Section 80 was not required to be followed in cases where the permits were being counter-signed in pursuance of an agreement. However, it does not mean that once an agreement is concluded, it can never be changed. If on public demand or other- wise in view of increase in the number of passengers the Authority feels that the number of permits need revision, it may make a proposal and finalise it after following the procedure prescribed in Clause (5). However, till the agreement is in operation, the number of permits to be issued or counter-signed cannot exceed that number which has been specified in the agreement otherwise the very purpose of entering into an agreement would be defeated. Surely, it cannot be the intention of the Legislature that even parties to the agreement shall not be bound by the terms thereof, or that they should be permitted to violate it......We hold that in a case where the two States enter into a reciprocal agreement, permits in excess of the specified number on a particular route can neither be issued nor counter-signed. (17). A view similar to that of Punjab & Haryana High Court has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.891/1989, Jhamaklal Balmukund vs. Secretary, S.T.A. Gwalior, decided on 22.8,89 (8), and Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. Nirmal Kumar (9). In M.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. Nirmal Kumar, the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that ``any permit granted over and above the strength fixed by the inter-State agreement would be invalid and without jurisdiction for the reason that ``the Legislature has itself made an exception to the provision in the three provisos of the said Section only on the prescribed circumstances. The Court went further and examined the scope of the proviso to Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, whole or in part, arose for the exercise of such power, and held that the Madhya Pradesh High Court was competent to quash any grant of counter-signature over and above the agreement of the permits granted by the authority in Rajasthan as the ``permits lacking jurisdictional validity, could not be presented for counter-signature and the same would not be validly counter- signed by the Transport Authority of Madhya Pradesh. (18). The Apex Court has taken a consistent view that the provisions of Sections 47 (3) and 43-A of the Old Act and Section 80 of the Act have no application in cases of inter-State routes for the reason that grant of permit on inter-State routes is governed by inter-State agreement. (19). In Mithlesh Garg vs. Union of India and others (10), the Apex Court has, also, observed as under:- ``It has been contended in the writ petitions that different yard-sticks have been provided for inter-region, intra- region and inter-State permits under the Act. According to the petitioners the imposition of limit for grant of inter-State permits is permissible under Section 88 (5) of the Act whereas no such limit can be imposed in respect of intra-region permits. The contention is that the provisions are discriminatory and are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are not impressed by the argument. The three categories of per- mits- seekers cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class. Different criteria have been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories. (20). We are not impressed by the argument. The three categories of per- mits- seekers cannot be considered to be belonging to the same class. Different criteria have been provided under the Act for granting permits in respect of each of the categories. (20). If the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mithlesh Garg and Janta Motor Transport (supra) are read together and their cumulative effect is considered, one may reach the irresistable conclusion that grant of permits on inter-State route is governed by an entirely different and special procedure, i.e., inter-State agreement and further puts an embargo on the Transport Authorities not to grant any permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement and if an authority grants a permit over and above the ceiling limit, it would be invalid for the want of competence and the other Authority is not bound to consider the application for grant of counter-signature. (21). Mr. R.L. Jangid, learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana has submitted that the transport authority in Haryana is bound by the law laid down by Punjab & Haryana High Court in Pawan Kumar (supra) wherein it has categorically been held that application for the grant of counter-signature cannot be considered if the permit is granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-State-agreement, and the transport authorities in Haryana, shall not comply with the directions issued by this Court if it is contrary to the law laid down by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. Similar situation may arise in Madhya Pradesh & Uttar Pradesh where- in the transport authorities may feel constrained to consider the application for grant of counter- signature in such fact-situation as the said authorities shall also be inclined to observe the law laid down by their respective High Courts. (22). Mr. S.P. Arora, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Janta Motor Transport (supra) appe- ared to have been delivered in special facts and circumstances existing therein, in exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and the same cannot be treated as a law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court which is binding on all courts under the provisions of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. (23). (23). Submission in this regard seems to be preposterous for the reason that the directions issued by the Honble Supreme Court were not limited only to the extent that the reciprocal agreement arrived earlier be revised and permits be granted under the revised strength and counter-signature be made according to revised agreement. The fact remains that the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Nasiruddin and Smt. Sharda Devi (supra) stood set-aside impliedly as it was clearly observed that permits granted in favour of the contesting respondents be considered for grant of counter-signatures temporarily and such temporary grant would not give them any preferential right at the time of grant of permit and/or counter-signature under the revised agreement. The counter-signature granted on their res- pective permits would come to an end automatically when the process stands completed under the revised agreement. This view is further fortified by another order of the Supreme Court dated 13.6.94 while dismissing the Special Leave Petition No. (Civil) 10188/1994, Kailash Narain Rai vs. State Transport Authority and others, wherein the Honble Apex Court has up-held the Division Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) dated 29.4.94 passed in Writ Petition No. 5721/1993, wherein the High Court reiterated its earlier view that there can be no grant of permit/counter-signature over and above the limit fixed by the inter-State agreement. The writ petition was filed for seeking direction to the transport authorities for grant of counter signatures on the permits issued by the transport authority of Madhya Pradesh over and above the ceiling of the agreement. The Court issued directions to give strict adherence to the terms of the reciprocal agreement and not to grant counter-signatures on such permits as the permits issued by the authorities of Madhya Pradesh were found to be in deviation of the terms of the reciprocal agreement which was not permissible. The Honble Supre- me Court held as under :- ``The petition for special leave is dismissed. If any further or fresh rights have been conferred by the new inter-State Agreement, said to have been entered into between the States of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, it is always open to the petiti- oner to agitate his rights on that basis, according to law. (24). If any further or fresh rights have been conferred by the new inter-State Agreement, said to have been entered into between the States of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, it is always open to the petiti- oner to agitate his rights on that basis, according to law. (24). Thus, it is apparent that the Honble Supreme Court approved the law laid down by the Allahabad High Court that no permit/counter-signature can be granted over and above the ceiling fixed by inter-State agreement and further clarified that if the strength is revised by reaching a fresh inter-State agreement, the permit can be granted/counter- signed strictly in accordance with the terms of revised agreement. (25). Be that as it may, the cases are required to be analytically examined from another angle, also, i.e., 3rd issue. The Central Amendment Act No. 54/1994 provided for addition of a new provision, i.e., Clause (ca) to Sub-section (3) of Section 68 and it came into force w.e.f. 14.11.94. The effect of the amendment is that now the Act empowers the Government to formulate the rules for playing stage carriages. In other words, the transport authorities, i.e., S.T.A./R.T.A. have been deprived of the competence to establish a new route and it now falls exclusively within the domain of the Government. The said provision of Section 68 (3) (ca) have been considered by the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Mithlesh Rani vs. S.T.A.T. (11), wherein the Court held that after the said amendment, State Government is the only authority having competence to create a route and after 14th November, 1994, the transport authorities under the State cease to have any competence of creating the route. The Court further observed as under:- ``However, if literal meaning of the word and the context in which they have been used in Sub-clause (ca) is taken then to my mind it empowers the State Government to lay down principles for the route for playing of stage carriages.... Word `formulate has its origin from word `formulae. Formulate means an exact method or form of words prescribed as a guide for thought, action, expression, or statement; fixed rule or set form. In legal terminology it has the sense of directions sent by the Magistrate to the Judge for the disposition of cases, with respect to which the le- gis actions (forms of actions) were inadequate. (26). Formulate means an exact method or form of words prescribed as a guide for thought, action, expression, or statement; fixed rule or set form. In legal terminology it has the sense of directions sent by the Magistrate to the Judge for the disposition of cases, with respect to which the le- gis actions (forms of actions) were inadequate. (26). Same view has been taken by this Court in Dharma Chand vs. S.T.A.T. and others (12) as it held that the transport authority cannot assume the competence to create a new route. The Court observed as under:- ``Opening of a new route by the R.T.A. in the case on hand tentamou- nts naked usurption of power of the State Government by it which is impermissible within the meaning of newly inserted clause (ca) of Sub-section (3) of Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. (27). The said judgments have a direct bearing on the issue in question for the reason that if a permit is granted by the transport authority over and above the cei- ling fixed by the reciprocal agreement, which will be subject to the grant of counter-signature by the other transport authority, in case the other authority does not grant counter-signature on it, the effect would be that by virtue of the provisions of Section 88 (1) of the Act, the said permit will remain valid within the territorial jurisdiction of the authority granting the permit and by this process the route, on which the permit was granted, stood automatically curtailed and the permit shall be deemed to have been granted on the curtailed route, which had never been created by the State. Thus, permit shall be deemed to have been granted by the Transport Authority on a non-existent route for the reason that authority has no competence to create a route and such permits shall be invalid for all purposes. (28). Even prior to the amendment, the Madhya Pradesh High Court considered the issue in M.P. State Road Transport Corporation (supra) and observed as under :- ``............ the grant of permit under the agreement aforesaid was contemplated with respect to the route Indore-Jaipur; and not Indore- Raipur.......the effect of agreement cannot be ignored and its scope cannot be enlarged to confer jurisdiction on the Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, to grant a permit for a `route not contemplated under the agreement. (29). the grant of permit under the agreement aforesaid was contemplated with respect to the route Indore-Jaipur; and not Indore- Raipur.......the effect of agreement cannot be ignored and its scope cannot be enlarged to confer jurisdiction on the Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, to grant a permit for a `route not contemplated under the agreement. (29). Moreover, it will be prejudicial to the interest of other State, which is a party to the agreement and would amount to changing the terms of agreement unilaterally. (30). The submission made by Mr. Arora that this interpretation would render the provisions of Section 88 (1) of the Act to otios, lacks merit. All the provisions of the Act have to be read together and required to be construed harmoniously. Thus, the provisions of Section 88(1) of the Act are to be read that in case the permit is granted by a Transport Authority within the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement, it will remain valid within the territorial jurisdiction of the Transport Authority granting the said permit till it is counter-signed by the corresponding Transport Authority. However, in case the permit is granted over and above the cei- ling, it will be nullity for want of competence. (31). Thus, in view of the above, the interpretation given by this Court in Sahib Ram, Sunil Kumar Ajmera and New Vijay Laxmi Transport Co. (supra) and by the Delhi High Court in Nasiruddin and Smt. Sharda Devi (supra) has no significance after the commencement of the Amendment Act into force w.e.f. 14.11.1994 for the reason that what cannot be done ``per direcctum is not permissible to be done per obliquum, meaning thereby, what is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous conrivance on the principle of ``quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud. (32). In Jagir Singh vs. Ranbir Singh (13). The Apex Court has observed that an authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by ``shift or contrivance. While deciding the said case, the Honble Supreme Court placed reliance on the judgment in Fox vs. Bishop of Chester, (14), wherein it has been observed as under:- ``To carry out effectually the object of a Statute, it must be construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circutious manner that which it has prohibited or enjoined. (33). (33). Thus, once the Statute has deprived the Transport Authorities to have competence of establishing a new route, it cannot be permitted to have it by granting permits over the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement. (34). There is, also, one more aspect of the case, which requires consideration. Various schemes have been placed on record wherein the agreement of the States provides that the grant of stage carriage permits shall be regulated in terms and on conditions set-out in the agreement as has been mutually agreed by the parties. In agreement dated 14.7.97, Clause IV provides that reciprocal agreement with regard to the stage carriages on inter- State route between Rajasthan and Haryana shall be as per Annexures 1 and 2. Annexure 1 provides for the schedule of inter-State routes, on which only Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Haryana Roadways shall ply their vehicles being the notified routes. If a permit is granted in violation of the agreement, it will be violative of the Scheme approved under Section 68-D (3) of the Old Act or corresponding provisions of Section 100 (3) of the Act. (35). There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that once a route has been notified under the provisions of Section 68-D (3) of the Old Act or under Section 100 (3) of the Act, 1988, no person other than those who have specifically been per- mitted under the Scheme are permitted to ply their vehicles on the route for the reason that a Scheme under the said provisions of the Act is a law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Constitution Benches of the Supreme Court in H.C. Narainappa vs. State of Mysore (15) and Chaudhary Khazan Singh vs. State of U.P. and others (16) and by virtue of the provi- sions of Section 68-B of the Old Act and its corresponding provisions of Section 98 of the New Act, the Scheme of Nationalisation would over-ride the other provisions of the Statute. (Vide T.N. Raghunatha Reddy vs. State Transport Authority (17); and S.A. Abdul Khaddar Sahib vs. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and others (18). The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Adarsh Travels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others (19) held that no person other than those authorised under the Scheme, can ply the vehicle on the notified route. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Adarsh Travels Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and others (19) held that no person other than those authorised under the Scheme, can ply the vehicle on the notified route. In Sumer Chand Sharma vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (20), the Apex Court has observed that provisions of the Scheme require strict adherence and authorities are required to comply with the terms of the Scheme and consider the applications for grant or renewal only in consonance with the Scheme. Same view has been taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Smt. TPK Thilagavathy vs. R.T.A. Periyar District (21). In Gajraj Singh vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. (22), the Apex Court has held that the approved Scheme is a ``self-contained and self-operative scheme. It is law by itself. (36). A Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Writ Petition No. 15416/1995, Rajinder Prasad vs. State of Haryana and others, decided on 29.11.97, dealt with the issue in respect of inter-State route Bhadra-Fatiabad via Modakheda route (involved in Writ Petition No. 1621/1998) and considered the terms and conditions of the inter-State agreement and held that the State of Haryana had published the Scheme and notified the route in question under Section 100 of the Act. Thus, the permit granted by the State of Rajasthan was in violation of Section 104 of the Act. A person cannot be permitted to ply his vehicle contrary to the terms of the Scheme and there can be no scope of considering the counter-signature because the permit issued was over and above the the scope of the agreement and, thus, the application was liable to be rejected without being considered. The Court further observed as under :- ``The permit granted to the petitioner was against the above Scheme and was in violation of Section 104 of the Act. As per Annexure R.1, all inter-State routes which fall in the share of Haryana, as per the inter-State agreement, had been monopolised to the extent of 100 per cent. In this view of the matter, the petitioner cannot take benefit of the provisions of Section 80 of the Act........ (37). The Scheme once approved, becomes law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution. The Statutory Authority cannot grant permit in contravention of the terms of the Scheme. In this view of the matter, the petitioner cannot take benefit of the provisions of Section 80 of the Act........ (37). The Scheme once approved, becomes law within the meaning of Article 13 of the Constitution. The Statutory Authority cannot grant permit in contravention of the terms of the Scheme. Even the Court cannot issue direction to the Transport Authorities either to refrain from enforcing the law or to act contrary to law. (Vide Union of India and another vs. Kerlosker Phenumatic Co. Ltd.(23); State of U.P. and others vs. Harish Chandra and others (24); and Vice Chancellor, University of Allahabad and others vs. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra and others (25). (38). The Schedule to the agreement further provides for the number of the trips and number of permits. Therefore, the transport authorities, by no means, can grant permit in violation of the Scheme. (39). Thus, after the commencement of the Amendment Act, the picture becomes crystal clear providing that the statutory provisions provide for a scheme limiting the number of permits on inter-State routes and the grant of permits counter-signature is to be regulated by the inter-State agreement. If a permit is granted and/or counter-signed over and above the number fixed by the agreement, it would render the agreement nugatory and whole exercise of entering into an agreement would prove futile. Law does not permit a party to an agreement to vio- late the terms of such an agreement. The agreement does not deprive the transport authorities to exercise their powers under the Act, rather it would provide for an smooth exercise of their powers. Thus it is held that it is not open to the transport authority to grant and/or counter-sign the stage carriage permit on a inter-State route over and above the ceiling fixed by an inter-State agreement. Thus it is held that it is not open to the transport authority to grant and/or counter-sign the stage carriage permit on a inter-State route over and above the ceiling fixed by an inter-State agreement. The provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 88 and the proviso appended thereto do not provide for an alternative ground/ mode for grant of counter-signature on stage-carriage permits on an inter-State route; if the Transport Authority grants a permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter- State agreement, it will be invalid for want of competence of the authority to grant permit and the other authority shall not be bo- und to consider the application for grant of counter signature; and if authority, in view of the increase in number of commuters on the route, comes to the conclusion that there is a need of more vehicles, it must revise the agreement providing for a larger number of permits/vehicles and grant permit/counter-sign in accordance with the revised agreement. (40). In all these four cases, the petitioners are holding the permits on Ganganagar-Abohar, Jhunjhunu-Delhi, Tijara-Delhi via Sohana-Gurgaon and Bhadra-Fatiyabad visa Modakheda, respectively. Shri Maheshwari submitted that the number of permits fixed under the inter-State agreement for the said routes have already been exhausted as both the States have granted and/or counter-signed the permits under the agreement. It is further urged by Mr. Maheshwari that a large number of applications have been filed for grant of permits on the said routs and the petitioners apprehend imminent danger of permits being granted over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement. (41). On the other hand, Mr. Arora has vehemently opposed the petitioners on the ground that the petitions have been filed on mere apprehension of grant of permits on the said routes, however they have not filed any document substantiating their apprehension. The petitions, being pre-emptive and filed in anticipation without any basis and that too presuming that what would happen would be contrary to law, are liable to be dismissed and the Court should not entertain these petitions. (42). It is settled proposition of law that every authority, with whom the Statute has reposed the power, is presumped to act in consonance with law for the reason that statutory provisions, rules and regulations are binding on it. (42). It is settled proposition of law that every authority, with whom the Statute has reposed the power, is presumped to act in consonance with law for the reason that statutory provisions, rules and regulations are binding on it. An Authority is bo- und to take the decision within the frame-work of known principles of law, which are predictable or atleast a person, who is going to be affected by the order may assess where he stands. Statutory Functionaries cannot be permitted ``to play fast and loose with powers vested in them. In the instant case, the Statutory Authorities have faced a unique and unprecedented legal problem as is evident from the judg- ment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rajinder Prasad (supra). In pursuance of the consistent view taken by this Court that the Authorities can grant permit over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement, the permit was issued; however it was not counter- signed by the corresponding authority in Haryana and the High Court of Punjab & Haryana has, also, turned-down the prayer of issuing direction for granting counter-signature. Mr. R.P. Dave, learned counsel appearing for the Authorities has submitted that the Authorities had a very blurred vision of law and they had rightly felt that they could certainly issue such permits on the mandate issued by this Court from time to time. In the changed circumstances, the interpretation given by this Court has become irrelevant and the provisions require re-interpretation to comport with the provisions of the Amendment Act. (43). Thus, in this fact-situation, it is desirable that the petitions be disposed of by issuing direction to the Authorities not be consider any application for grant of permit and/or counter-signature over and above the ceiling fixed by the inter- State agreement. The petitions are disposed of accordingly. However, the Authori- ties are directed to consider the applications pending for grant of permit/counter-signature, if any, within the ceiling fixed by the inter-State agreement. No order as to costs.