Honble MADAN, J.–A suit for ejectment of a shop was filed by landlord- respondent on the grounds of (1) default in payment of monthly rent @ Rs. 125/- for a period from 1.12.1974 to 31.7.1975, (2) bonafide and reasonable need of the landlord for use and occupation for carrying on business of spare parts of motors and tractors by his son Prem Sagar who was unemployed, and (3) substantial dama- ge caused to the suit shop by the tenant-appellant. The plaintiffs suit was contested by the tenant-appellant. After framing the issues on the basis of pleadings of the parties, and leading the evidence on record and hearing the parties, the learned Additional Munsif, Kota (South) decreed the suit for ejectment on the basis of the findings arrived at on issues Nos. 2 and 2-A on the grounds of bonafide and reason- able need of the plaintiff and comparative hardship in his favour. Issue No. 1 as to the default was also decided in favour of the plaintiff holding the tenant as defaulter but the benefit of first default was given to the plaintiff. Issue No. 3 as to the substantial damage was decided in favour of the tenant and against the landlord. (2). Against the decree of ejectment, the tenant went in first appeal before the District Judge, Kota. The first appeal came to be decided by the Addl. District Judge No. 4, Kota who, dismissed the appeal. (3). Shri B.L. Agrawal contended that the ground for ejectment i.e. reasonable and bonafide necessity has been decided against the tenant appellant by the courts below without considering the evidence on record. The case of the appellant is that the First Appellate Court did not consider independently evidence of the witnesses of the parties Inasmuch as, did not arrive at Its independent conclusion but only concurred findings of the trial court and therefore, it is not a case of concurrent finding. Second contention canvassed by Mr. Agrawal is that there Is variation between pleadings and proof and to cite in this regard Shri Agrawal contended that in para 4 of the plaint it has been averred that the suit shop is required for repairs and business of spare parts whereas, in his statement PW 1 deposed that the suit shop has been needed for spare parts and PW 3 Prem Sagar deposed that he required the suit shop for repairs. Last contention urged by Shri Agrawal is that after death of Vasuram, the shop in which, Vasuram was carrying on his business has come to the share of Prem Sagar where he can carry on his business and thereby no necessity of the plaintiff exists. (4). Shri Suresh Sahni for the respondent urged that the findings arrived at by both the courts below on the ground of bonafide requirement of premises by the landlord, being concurrent, and well reasoned based on proper appreciation of the cogent evidence on record, do not have any room for interference under Section 100 CPC as they do not raise any substantial question of law as urged by the tenant in this second appeal. (5). Having considered the rival contentions of the parties and carefully perused the impugned judgments rendering concurrent findings of fact, much less involving any substantial question of law, I do not find any ground for interference in exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 CPC because on the issues of reasonable and bonafide need of the landlord as well as comparative hardship the findings arrived at by the courts below in favour of the landlord are that the plaintiff was having reasonable and bonafide necessity to occupy the suit shop so as to get his son Prem Sagar (PW 3) employed in his own independent business of spare parts of motor and tractor. In the evidence led before the trial court, the plaintiff substantiated his plea of bonafide and reasonable necessity as averred in his plaint that the suit shop was needed for selling spare parts of motor and tractor and this fact was fully corroborated not only by the plaintiffs statement but also that of PW 3 Prem Sagar who deposed that he wanted to carry on business of spare parts of motor and tractor inasmuch as, he did not have any alternative accommodation for running the said business in Kota and that in the event of the tenant not vacating suit premises, his career/prospects would be ruined. Since he was not having any independent trade or vocation in which he might be gainfully engaged, rather he had taken special training in the sale of spare parts from one Ishwar Chand who is brother-in-law of the plaintiff for last two years before the presentation of the suit. Since he was not having any independent trade or vocation in which he might be gainfully engaged, rather he had taken special training in the sale of spare parts from one Ishwar Chand who is brother-in-law of the plaintiff for last two years before the presentation of the suit. This fact was not disputed nor controverted by rebutting any eviden- ce to the plaintiffs ones. (6). On the aspect of comparative hardship, it was also deposed by the plaintiff that he had no other independent/alternative accommodation in Kota, where he could have gainfully employed himself for carrying on a business of spare parts of the motor and tractor rather, he was fully looking forward for an opportunity when the defendant could handover the vacant possession back to the landlord so that he might have allowed to carry on the business, it was pleaded rather established that if the suit shop is not evicted, he would have much greater hardship as compared to that of tenant who has got two other alternative shops available to him where he has already been carrying on his business in Kota. (7). The trial court after due scrutiny and careful examination of the evidence led by the parties decreed the suit for ejectment on the ground of bonafide and reasonable need against the tenant. Such findings of fact arrived at by the trial court stand affirmed by the First Appellate Court (8). This second appeal was heard and is being finally disposed of at admiss- ion stage itself at joint request of both the parties for consideration of the following substantial question of law formulated under Section 100, CPC- (1) Whether concurrent findings of fact on the question of bonafide need of the plaintiff-landlord deserve to be upset in this second appeal ? (2) Whether there is any illegality and perversity in the matter of appreciation of the evidence which could call for any interference by this Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC ? (3) Whether on comparative hardship of the parties, concurrent findings of fact in favour of the plaintiff deserve to be interfered with or brushed aside in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.? (9). (3) Whether on comparative hardship of the parties, concurrent findings of fact in favour of the plaintiff deserve to be interfered with or brushed aside in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.? (9). Prima-facie, I am of the considered view that in view of the well settled proposition of law that scope of second appeal as per Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited only to the substantial questions of law and also having regard to the fact that this Court in second appeal shall not go into appreciation of evidence unless some miscarriage of justice has occurred as a result of findings of fact recorded by the courts below by omitting to discuss any material aspect of the case which may warrant any interference in this appeal. I do not find any perversity or illegality committed by the courts below. I find support with regard to this proposition from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1) wherein the Apex Court has observed as under- ``Generally speaking, an appellant is not to be allowed to set-up a new case in second appeal or raise a new issue (otherwise than a jurisdictional one) not supported by the pleadings of evidence on record and unless the appeal involves a substantial question of law, a second appeal shall not lie to the High Court under the amended provisions. In the present case, no such question of law was formulated in the memorandum of appeal in the High Court and grounds (6) and (7) in the memorandum of the second appeal only which reliance is placed did not formulate any substantial question of law." It was further observed by the Apex Court in the above matter that the High Court was, therefore, not justified in entertaining the second appeal on an altogether new point, neither pleaded nor canvassed in the subordinate courts and that too by over looking the changes brought about in Section 100 CPC by the Amendment Act of 1976 without even indicating that a substantial question of law was required to be resolved in the second appeal. To say the least, the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. To say the least, the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the Courts of law to further the clear intendment of the Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (10). From the perusal of the grounds raised in the memo of appeal and also the contentions advanced by appellants in this appeal, I do not find any question of law much less substantial question which may justify interference with, the findings recorded by the trial court on the aspect of bonafide need of the plaintiff to occupy the suit premises in question which have also been confirmed by the First Appellate Court and consequently the same are upheld. (11). In Bastichand Bhansali vs. Dharam Vir Kalia (2), the landlord who was himself living in a rented apartment and had sought eviction of the tenant on the plea of reasonable and bonafide requirement, it was observed by this Court that a landlord cannot be denied his statutory right to possess and live in the purchased property, since he was facing a great difficulty by living in a rented house. It was observed in this context as under:- ``A shelter with a roof on his head and pursuit of happiness, subject to his means, is the normal and ordinary desire of a human being. A- part from that it is the legal and statutory right of a person to actually possess the property owned by him. It would be purely against all logic to ask a landlord owner to opt for rented premises instead of his own building. (12). Likewise, in the matter of Bhanwaru vs. Jeevani (3), this Court observed, as under- ``Finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal. Sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is not a ground for interference. (13). In Navanethmmal vs. Arjuna Chetty (4), the Apex Court has laid down the parameters within which the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction in second appeal - ``Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts. In the present case the lower appellate court fairly appreciated the evidence and confirmed the conclusion of the trial court that suit was not barred by limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material. (14). Before parting with this judgment, I may observe that it is ardent wish and desire of every parents as a matter of natural inclination to see that their offsp- ring are well settled in life by getting themselves engaged in gainful profession/employment. It is rather surprising to note that in the instant case, the tenant has taken a very derogatory and unbecoming approach towards landlord by challenging his bonafide necessity on the ground that since the landlord has died, so his bonafide necessity to occupy the suit shop for gainfully employment of his son Prem Sagar (PW 3) has ceased to exist. This is a, very surprising rather shameful attitude and in my considered view, it would not help the tenant to demolish the landlords case in any manner whatsoever. Rather it has to be appreciated that in case of bereavement in the family where the head of the family has demised, the entire responsibility falls on the shoulders of his legal heirs more particularly the eldest who rather need to be given more care by the Society itself but also a compassionate approach should be adopted especially in case of the offspring of the deceased-landlord who desires to be gainfully employed in the business and what can be a better suited than to extend moral support for the welfare of the dependents of the deceased, who have been left in the state of neglect and helplessness, then to direct the ejec- tment of the tenant who is having alternative accommodation to shift as compared to dependents of the deceased- landlord who are not in possession of an alternative accommodation except to occupy the suit shop which has been in occupation of the tenant and who have apparently enjoyed enough benefit by staying there for last couple of years. In the instant case, I do not find any ulterior motive either on the part of the plaintiff during his life time or otherwise on the part of his legal representatives so as to demolish their case as regards their bonafide and reasonable necessity to occupy the suit shop and even on comparative hardship, the case of Legal Heirs of the deceased- landlord has become much stronger as compared to that of the tenant both on moral as well as legal grounds. Hence, I do not find any justification for taking a contrary view of the matter so as to interfere with concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of the evidence arrived at by the courts below. (15). From the questions of law so raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in memo of appeal, I do not find that the same fall within the ambit and scope under Section 100(1) CPC since it stipulates that save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court Subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law. From the above provisions, it is apparent that the legis- lative mandate in inserting aforesaid provision in the Code is obvious that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction while admitting or otherwise dealing with second appeal particularly where the matter stands concluded by concurrent findings of the courts below, should not admit every appeal for the sake of final hearing and thereafter to keep it pending for years together with the result that the aggrieved party did not get justice in time notwithstanding having succeeded in obtaining a decree and its confirmation from the courts below and the High Court has to observe safeguards which may be available to the aggrieved party and only in such exceptional cases which do warrant interference by it where substantial questions of law have arisen and which courts below have erroneously failed to appreciate if its findings are contrary and erroneous to the evidence on record or against canons of law, only then the High Court should exercise its powers in admitting the second appeal preferred by the aggrieved party and thereafter in the interest of justice decide the same in accordance with law. (16). Applying the legislative mandate with regard to Section 100(1) CPC, as referred to above to the facts of the present, I do not find any circumstance to take departure as against concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below in favour of the plaintiff/decree-holder so as to entertain this appeal and keep it pending thereafter for hearing. Hence, it has been thought prudent to hear both the parties finally at admission stage itself. So, as a result of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in this appeal. (17). Consequently, this second appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.