JUDGMENT P.K. Palli, J.—The following question has been raised and referred by our learned brother Khurana, J. for decision by a larger Bench: "Whether the agreement referred to in Section 85(2)(a) of the Act of 1996 for the purpose of applicability of the said Act to the pending arbitral proceedings which had already commenced under the Act of 1940 is one necessarily to be entered into after the commencement of the Act of 1996 or any clause to that effect in an agreement already entered into between the parties before the enforcement of the Act of 1996 would sufficient for that purpose." 2. It would be most appropriate at this stage to take notice of the facts, circumstances and law on the point necessitating this reference. An agreement had been arrived at between the parties bearing Nos. 6-15 in respect of the work "Construction of Trench Weir, Desilting Tank, Water Conductor System, Fore-bay-cum-Storage Tank, Penstock Trench including Anchor Blocks, Power House (Civil Works) and Toil Race Channel”. One Mr. Jaswal, who was then Chief Engineer (Designs), came to be appointed an arbitrator to go into the disputes that were raised by the parties in order to make an award. In sequence of his appointment, the arbitrator entered upon the reference and having gone through the rival claims of the parties and on appraisal of the record, made an award on February 23, 1996. Indisputedly, the award was made under provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 and stands thereafter filed before this Court for making it a rule of the Court. 3. The Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, who happens to be the defendant in the proceedings, has filed objections under Sections 16,30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and objects to the award being made rule of the Court. It is being agitated before this Court that the arbitrator has misconduct himself and the proceedings and, the award made, deserve to be set aside. 4. The plaintiff, in reply, has denied the allegations of misconduct and contentions are being raised to the effect that objections being devoid of merit, should be dismissed. It has been further sought to be said by the plaintiff that the objections filed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 are not maintainable particularly in view of the coming into operation of the new law, i.e. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It has been further sought to be said by the plaintiff that the objections filed under the provisions of the Arbitration Act of 1940 are not maintainable particularly in view of the coming into operation of the new law, i.e. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The aforesaid controversy resulted in framing of issue No. 2-A reproduced hereunder : "2-A Whether or not the objection petition is maintainable in view of the coming into force of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?" This issue, during the course of trial, was proposed to be disposed of first as it shall directly effect the maintainability of the objections which the defendant has filed under Act of 1940. 5. It also deserves to be noticed that the arbitration proceedings between the parties were initiated much earlier to the coming into force of the 1996 Act as the said Act came into force with effect from January 25, 1996. The award, of course, came to be made on February 23, 1996, i.e. after coming into force of Act of 1996. 6. It is at this context that the provisions contained in Section 85 of the Act of 1996 deserves to be noticed : "(1) The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal,— (a) the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before this Act came into force unless otherwise agreed by the parties but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after this Act comes into force; (b) all rules made and notifications published, under the said enactments shall, to the extent to which they are not repugnant to this Act, be deemed respectively to have been made or issued under this Act." 7. It is clause (a) of sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provisions which is sought to be interpreted by each learned Counsel appearing for a party in his own manner. 8. Admittedly, the proceedings between the parties, as noticed above, were pending before the new Act came into operation. It is clause (a) of sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provisions which is sought to be interpreted by each learned Counsel appearing for a party in his own manner. 8. Admittedly, the proceedings between the parties, as noticed above, were pending before the new Act came into operation. It is further an admitted position that no fresh agreement between the parties has come on the surface during the pendency of these proceedings agreeing to the applicability of Act of 1996 to resolve the controversy between them. We are, thus, left to interpret Clause 25 of the admitted Agreement between the parties where a provision for arbitration has been made. Our learned brother Khurana, J. has taken out the material portion out of the said clause which is absolutely necessary for resolving the controversy involved. It reads like this: "Subject to the provisions of the contract to the contrary as aforesaid, the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to all arbitration proceedings under this clause." 9. Our learned brother has further referred to two judgments of this Court, one given in the State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jagdish Chand Gupta, (OMP (M) No. 14 of 1997, decided on July 2, 1997) wherein a similar question had arisen. This judgment has been given by the same learned Judge and it has been held therein that in view of the provisions contained in Section 85 of Act of 1996, in absence of an agreement between the parties as to the applicability of Act of 1996, the provisions contained in the Act of 1940 would apply to arbitral proceedings already pending on the date of the coming into force of Act of 1996. Another judgment which has been taken note of in the reference order, is the one given by A.K. Goel, J. in Ram Narain Madan v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (OMP (M) No. 21 of 1997, decided on December 4, 1997). In the latter judgment, a contrary view has been taken while interpreting the arbitration clause as appearing in the agreement in that case. Indisputedly, the clause is identical with the one presently in controversy. In the latter judgment, a contrary view has been taken while interpreting the arbitration clause as appearing in the agreement in that case. Indisputedly, the clause is identical with the one presently in controversy. It was held that there was already a provision in the agreement between the parties as to the applicability of the provisions of Act of 1996, and as such, Act of 1940 shall have no application even when proceedings between the parties were already pending on the date when the new Act came into force. Since there was seemingly a conflict in the two views in the two judgments each rendered by the learned Single Bench of this Court, our learned brother is of the opinion that the matter requires to be decided by a larger Bench. It is in this situation that the matter has come up before this Bench. 10. Mr. Surinder Desai, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff, has taken us through the arbitration clause appearing at page 43 of the paper book. It is sought to be contended that the parties had agreed in unequivocal terms that subject to the provisions of the contract to the contrary, as aforesaid, the provisions of the 1940 Act or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereafter and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause. 11. It is next sought to be argued that the parties had already agreed to bind themselves so as to be governed by the new legislation for the purposes of making the award a rule of the Court or for the purposes of deciding objections filed, they would be governed by the provisions contained in Section 85 of Act of 1996 and not the provisions contained in Act of 1940, as language employed in Clause 25 of the agreement was clear and admitted no other interpretation. 12. The learned Counsel has then taken us through the two judgments noticed above which are said to contain conflicting views. We have further been taken by the learned Counsel through Sections 11,13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 proviso, 25 and 26 in order to emphasise the meaning given to the words "to agree" and "unless agree otherwise" appearing in these Sections. We have further been taken by the learned Counsel through Sections 11,13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 proviso, 25 and 26 in order to emphasise the meaning given to the words "to agree" and "unless agree otherwise" appearing in these Sections. The emphasis is being laid on the phraseology used in Section 85 of Act of 1996 where the words "unless otherwise agreed by the parties" appear in clause (a) of sub-section (2). We have also been taken through the scope of the Act read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act where the meaning of the words "unless otherwise agreed” is explained. 13. It is sought to be contended that the provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are not something automatic and these have to be read vis-a-vis Section 85 of the new Act which < has already been reproduced above. 14. The learned Counsel contends that even if the applicability of the provisions of 1940 Act have been saved in the new Act and it would not be proper to say that there is a wholesome repeal of the 1940 Act. It is further being argued that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which the request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration, is received by the respondent. Emphasis in this respect is laid on Section 21 of the new Act and it is contended that there is no notice given by the defendant under this provision that the provision of 1996 Act would apply. 15. The question further arises as to whether the parties have j to arrive at a fresh agreement or if the provision is already made in the existing agreement, what would be the position? 16. It is sought to be argued that the parties are at liberty and there is no impediment for their agreeing as to how they would be governed in a different set of circumstances. Distinction is further being sought to be drawn between the proceedings before the Court and the proceedings which are held before the arbitrator and the argument is that both the proceedings are absolutely different. Distinction is further being sought to be drawn between the proceedings before the Court and the proceedings which are held before the arbitrator and the argument is that both the proceedings are absolutely different. In further support of the contention, reliance is being placed on an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) in Civil Revision No. 165 of 1997, M/s. Reshma Constructions v. State of Goa, decided on March 12, 1998 by the, learned Single Judge of that Court. 17. Learned Counsel further relies on AIR 1955 SC 84, State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh; 1996 (5) SCC 60, State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal; AIR 1969 Bombay 151, Sir Dinshwa Manekji v. G.B. Badkas and others and AIR 1975 Calcutta 130, State of West Bengal v. Nandlal Dey. 18. In brief, what is sought to be urged by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff is that the words "otherwise agreed by the parties" as these words appear in Section 85 (2)(a) of Act of 1996, would include an agreement which has already been arrived at between the parties prior to coming into operation of the Act and would also include an agreement if the one has been entered upon between the parties after coming into operation of the Act. The argument has also been noticed by our learned brother Khurana, J. that the expression "otherwise agreed" does not refer to the time factor but it refers to the intention of the parties regarding the applicability of the provisions of Act of 1940 or Act of 1996. 19. Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the defendant, in reply, contends that issue No. 2-A came to be framed on the oral submissions made in that respect. Our attention has been brought to sub-section (1) of Section 85 where the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1937, Arbitration Act, 1940 and Foreign Awards Act, 1961 stand repealed. It is sought to be argued that the repeal of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1), is a wholesale repeal and has the over-riding effect. Our attention has been brought to sub-section (1) of Section 85 where the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1937, Arbitration Act, 1940 and Foreign Awards Act, 1961 stand repealed. It is sought to be argued that the repeal of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1), is a wholesale repeal and has the over-riding effect. The learned Counsel then has laid emphasis on the principle of reading down the provision and it is sought to be argued that the plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 85 (2)(a) of Act of 1996 does not leave any doubt that the agreement for the purposes of the applicability of the provisions contained in the 1996 Act should be arrived at only after the provisions of the new Act have come into operation. 20. Emphasis is further laid on the non-obstante clause appearing in sub-section (2) Section 85 of the new Act. As contended by the learned Counsel, it has the over-riding effect and completely saves the applicability of Act of 1940 particularly in respect of the proceedings which have already commenced before the new Act came into operation. 21. It is further being argued that the objector has a legal as well as valuable right vesting in it under Clause 25 of the Agreement and that right could not be said to have been waived when it was not known as to what kind of legislation would be brought in on the repeal of Act of 1940. 22. The Parliament, according to the learned Counsel, has given an option and the departure has been left to the will of the parties. According to Mr. Ganguli, the intention of the parties the governing factor and this intention has to be gathered and seen from the language employed by them while agreeing on the terms of the contract. 23. The learned Counsel is at pains to stress "unless the parties otherwise agreed" as used in the provision, the question of the applicability of the new Act would not be attracted even remotely. How can a party pre-suppose or anticipate the change in law which is yet to come on the surface and waive its existing rights. 23. The learned Counsel is at pains to stress "unless the parties otherwise agreed" as used in the provision, the question of the applicability of the new Act would not be attracted even remotely. How can a party pre-suppose or anticipate the change in law which is yet to come on the surface and waive its existing rights. It was not known as to whether the new law or the change in law would give another option to the parties to agree or not to agree in respect of the applicability of the new Act or the old Act to an agreement which they have already arrived at much before the commencement of the new Act. 24. The parties to the existing agreement, on the coining into operation of the new Act, are given an option to decide that they agree to be governed by the provisions of Act of 1996 and for that purpose, a fresh agreement has to be entered into and if the option is not exercised or the new agreement is not entered upon by them, they would be fully saved from application of Act of 1996 as the proceedings had already started under Act of 1940. 25. The learned Counsel has then taken us through the relevant context of the interpretation of the statutes by several authors to add further emphasis to the arguments advanced by him. 26. While concluding, reliance is placed on the case law reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409, (M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others); AIR 1970 SC 833, (Satish Kumar and others v. Surinder Kumar and others); 1997 (1) Arb. L.R. 701, (First Security Bank of Utah v. East West Travel & Trade Links Ltd.); and election 28 of the Contract Act. 27. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties at a considerable length and after giving our thoughtful consideration to the question posed, relevant provisions of the new as well as old Acts and also Clause 25 of the existing Agreement between the parties, we find ourselves unable to agree with the interpretation and submissions raised by Mr. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/claimant. 28. We would like to express our sense of appreciation for both the learned Counsel for assisting us very ably to resolve the question posed. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/claimant. 28. We would like to express our sense of appreciation for both the learned Counsel for assisting us very ably to resolve the question posed. Both of them in their own way argued the matter with clarity and ability. 29. With utmost respect to our learned brother Khurana, J., we are of the opinion that the question posed for reference has not been happily worded. We are, thus, left to find out the question to be answered by us from the language employed in the question itself or to say, read in between the lines. 30. In our view, a thoughtful meaning is required to be given to the words "unless otherwise agreed by the parties" as appearing in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 85 of Act of 1996. The question, thus, requires the interpretation of these words keeping in view sub-section (1) which repeals the earlier enactments, non-obstante clause appearing in sub-section (2) and further clause (a) which saves the applicability of Act of 1940 in the given situation. 31. The plain reading of Section 85 of Act of 1996 in its subsection (1) has repealed the three Acts given therein, i.e. the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (45 of 1961). Immediately, next following is sub-section (2) which starts with the non-obstante clause "Notwithstanding such repeal, the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before this Act came into force". There is, thus, a saving clause in relation to the provisions of the old Act in respect of the proceedings which are pending. In view of the saving clause in sub-section (2) (a) "unless otherwise agreed by the parties", it would simply mean that the position would be entirely different when the parties have agreed that the provisions of the new Act would apply to the proceedings which have already commenced and are pending at the time of the coming into force of the new Act. 32. To be more clear, unless the parties have otherwise agreed for the applicability of the new provisions, the provisions of 1940 Act would be applicable. 32. To be more clear, unless the parties have otherwise agreed for the applicability of the new provisions, the provisions of 1940 Act would be applicable. Sub-clause (b) of sub-section (2) further makes it clear that all rules, notifications published under the said enactments to the extent to which they are not repugnant to the Act, be deemed respectively to have been made or issued under this Act. In ordinary situation, the moment the new legislation is brought in repealing the old one, there is no difficulty in finding that it would be the provisions of the new Act that would apply. Sub-section (2), though repeals the old Act, yet under clause (a) the applicability of the old Act is saved in respect of the proceedings which are pending. 33. As per well-established principles of law of interpretation, a person in whom a right has come to vest in a particular proceedings or by an Act and at a later stage, the procedure is altered, such person shall proceed according to the new legislation. The saving clause appearing in Section 85 is an exception and runs contrary to this view. The Exception provided by the saving clause is in respect of the applicability of the old Act to pending proceedings subject, however, to agreement to the contrary between the parties to the proceedings. It would, thus, mean that the provisions of the old Act would apply to pending proceedings unless the parties otherwise agree. 34. It is at this stage that Clause 25 of the Agreement has also to be kept in view. It provides that the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply to all arbitration proceedings under this clause. This clause is being interpreted by learned Counsel appearing for the parties in their own manner. 35. It provides that the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply to all arbitration proceedings under this clause. This clause is being interpreted by learned Counsel appearing for the parties in their own manner. 35. The version as put forth from the side of the claimant is that the words "or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to all arbitration proceedings under this clause" would mean that the parties had agreed that in case the position is altered through a statutory modification or re-enactment, it would be the altered position which shall govern the rights and liabilities of the parties and not the old Act. 36. As we look at this clause, we find that in case the exception had not taken care of the old Act in the saving clause, the parties to the agreement could not have entered into an agreement contrary to the saving clause and assuming they had entered, it would be void under Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. 37. It, thus, follows that the option to agree in order to come out of the situation created by the saving clause can be exercised only when the Act has come into operation and not earlier. We are, thus, of the opinion that the agreement postulated by the Exception of the saving clause, as it appears in Section 85(2)(a), could only be subsequent to the coining into operation of the new Act. 38. A situation can be examined where the parties had agreed to be governed by any future law, could the agreement be termed valid as the parties cannot determine the law which would be applicable to them as this lies exclusively in the domain of the Legislature. Again, if the parties are left to make a choice in the event of the new law, the agreement opting for such a choice can only be subsequent to the new law and not prior to it. 39. How can a person anticipate or would know or be aware that law to be made in future would give an option to be governed by either law. 39. How can a person anticipate or would know or be aware that law to be made in future would give an option to be governed by either law. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said or suggested that the parties had already arrived at an agreement in respect of the option that is contemplated by the subsequent enactment as the option already stood exercised even when the parties did not know as to what option is to be exercised and in what situation. 40. It would, thus, follow that in the absence of a clear agreement to the contrary, the provisions of the new enactment would not apply. The saving clause, thus, preserves the valuable rights and obligations of the parties which have come to vest in them under Act of 1940 and these valuable rights are to be maintained in continuity in the proceedings under that Act. 41. The question of waiver would arise only if the parties, in the given situation, have altered their position by agreeing that the provisions of Act of 1996 would be applicable to the proceedings between them. In order to apply the principles of waiver, it has to be kept in mind that the parties intended to waive their rights with complete knowledge of the consequences as well as law. Unless these pre-requisites for the applicability of the waiver are available, it cannot be said that a party shall be deemed to have waived its rights because of the new legislation. 42. The question can be seen from another angle also, that is, could a party enter into an agreement specifying that the provisions of Act of 1940 would not be applicable, such an agreement would be completely void. It is in this situation that Clause 25 of the Agreement is to be examined. The clause states that it would be the law for the time being in force, which would apply to them. It would, thus, be the law which was in force at the time when the reference was entered upon which would govern such proceedings. In our view, this would be the only interpretation we would like to put so far as Clause 25 of the Agreement is concerned. 43. The provisions of a statute are to be construed and interpreted harmoniously in the context of reasons and objects for which it is intended. In our view, this would be the only interpretation we would like to put so far as Clause 25 of the Agreement is concerned. 43. The provisions of a statute are to be construed and interpreted harmoniously in the context of reasons and objects for which it is intended. Nothing contained in it should be read in isolation. 44. The words "subject to an agreement between the parties", "unless otherwise agreed by the parties” and "parties are free to agree" appear in Act of 1996 in its various provisions and these do indicate that the Parliament, in its wisdom, has given a free will to the parties to agree to the procedure in respect of the proceedings for the purposes of arbitration. The procedure prescribed is not only fair and efficient but takes care of all situations, and is further aimed to give finality to the proceedings and awards so as to keep away even least interference by Courts of Law. The words are important but the context in which they are used, is not less important. 45. For the purposes of application of the new provisions, the parties shall have to enter into another agreement deciding to agree for the applicability of the new provisions to the proceedings. The parties, thus, in the given situation, shall have an option either to proceed on the basis of an agreement having already been arrived at between them and follow the procedure as prescribed in the Act then in force, and in case they want to opt for the applicability of the new provisions, a fresh agreement has to be brought on the surface. 46. The language used in Clause 25 of the Agreement "or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder for the time being in force shall apply", would certainly not mean that the parties had already agreed upon the fact that in case a new law is to be introduced then the provisions of the new law alone would apply. 47. The new Act has made drastic changes and there is a complete departure in respect of several provisions which were there in the old Act. The award given under the new Act is now enforceable as a decree. 47. The new Act has made drastic changes and there is a complete departure in respect of several provisions which were there in the old Act. The award given under the new Act is now enforceable as a decree. There is no scope for filing objections to the award nor the award need be filed in the Court for the purpose of making it a rule of the Court. 48. When the proceedings between the parties have been held under the old Act and the award made, and subsequently, objections are filed under the old Act where the scope of inquiring into the objections is wider than what is prescribed under the new Act, it would certainly cause prejudice to a party, particularly to the objector, when the provisions of the new Act are sought to be enforced on the pending proceedings taking away his right. The parties may, in their wisdom, agree to be governed in the altered situation but for that matter, they shall have to agree again. 49. No contrary intention of the parties is spelt out from the terms of the Agreement so as to deny to any of the parties the benefit of the saving clause appearing in Section 85(2)(a) of Act of 1996. 50. Exceptions are meant to exempt something from the scope of the general words appearing in the statute which would otherwise be within the scope and meaning of such several words. Existence of an Exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute would apply in all cases and not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction. 51. It can, thus, safely be held that in the absence of the new agreement between the parties relating to the applicability to pending proceedings, the provisions of the new Act cannot be made applicable to them. 52. It may be noticed that the Agreement in question is dated March 30, 1988. The award was handed down on February 23, 1996. On March 11, 1996, the award was filed in the Court by the arbitrator for making it a rule of the Court under the provisions of Act of 1940. Objections have, admittedly, been filed by the defendant-Electricity Board on April 14, 1996 and these have been filed under Sections 30 and 33 of the old Act. On March 11, 1996, the award was filed in the Court by the arbitrator for making it a rule of the Court under the provisions of Act of 1940. Objections have, admittedly, been filed by the defendant-Electricity Board on April 14, 1996 and these have been filed under Sections 30 and 33 of the old Act. The new Act has been given retrospective effect and comes into operation with effect from January 25, 1996. 53. We have gone through the case law cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties at the Bar. It may be stated that there is no direct judgment on the point in question except the one given by the learned Single Judge of the Goa Bench of Bombay High Court in Civil Revision No. 165/97, (M/s. Reshma Constructions v. State of Goa) (supra). A contrary view has been taken though the clause appearing in the agreement in that case was the same. A similar view has been taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court, A.K. Goel, J. in an unreported judgment OMP (M) No. 21 of 1997, (Ram Narain Madan v. State of H.P.) (supra). The agreement in that case was also identical with that of the present case. Having given our thoughtful consideration to both these decisions, we are unable to agree with the reasonings and observations made therein for the view taken is not, in our opinion, correct. 54. In the judgment given in the Delhi case in 1997 (1) Arb. L.R. 701, (First Security Bank of Utah v. East West Travel & Trade Links Ltd.),, which is again a Single Bench decision, the parties there had agreed for the appointment of the arbitrator under Section 20 of Act of 1940 and subsequently, when clarification was being sought, it was held that it was not open to any of the parties to contend that the applicant in that case shall approach the arbitrator under Section 17 of the Ordinance. 55. One Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1944 Bombay 12, (Apollo Mills Ltd. v. Babubhai Chandulal and others) has come to our notice. The dispute between the parties in that case was referred for arbitration in 1938 under the old Act which was then prevailing. In the meantime, Arbitration Act of 1940 came into force on July 1, 1940. The dispute between the parties in that case was referred for arbitration in 1938 under the old Act which was then prevailing. In the meantime, Arbitration Act of 1940 came into force on July 1, 1940. The award was made by the arbitrators on July 15, 1940 and a suit was brought to enforce that award. No challenge was made to the award on merits. A plea was, however, raised that the award having been given after the new Act had come into operation, the suit would be barred under Section 17 of the Act. Reliance was placed by the defendant in that case on Section 48 of Act of 1940 which provides that all references pending at the commencement of the new Act are saved and the provisions of the new Act shall not apply to those pending reference and the law in force immediately before the commencement of the new Act shall apply to those pending references. An argument was raised that only references had been saved and not the award which would be governed by the provisions of the new Act. Repelling this contention, the learned Single Judge held that such an interpretation would lead to extraordinary result that while a pending reference would be saved from the application of the new Act, but as soon as the reference is terminated and the award is made, the provisions of the new Act would apply to such an award. In this situation, it was held that the Legislature could not have intended to such an extraordinary result and it was further found that, in general, which is the result of a reference which was pending at the date of commencement of the Act, is saved from the application of the new Act, and the provisions of the new Act do not apply to such an award. 56. We have also gone through the other case law cited at the Bar and we do not think it necessary to burden this judgment further since we find that none of these judgments is helpful to us for the purposes of answering the question posed. 57. 56. We have also gone through the other case law cited at the Bar and we do not think it necessary to burden this judgment further since we find that none of these judgments is helpful to us for the purposes of answering the question posed. 57. As a result, in the light of detailed discussion above, it is held that with regard to arbitration proceedings commenced before coming into force of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (referred in the judgment as new Act or Act of 1996’), the rights and procedure would be governed by Arbitration Act, 1950. It would, however, be open to the parties to agree in any matter to be governed by the new Act. 58. For the reasons stated, the wording of Clause 25 of the Agreement in this case does not admit of interpretation that this case is governed by Act of 1996. The reference is answered accordingly. The case may now be put up before the learned Single Bench for disposal in accordance with law. Order accordingly. -