Judgment 1. The above criminal appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.4.1989 made in C.C.No.268 of 1986 by the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.1, Vellore, North Arcot District, thereby acquitting the accused from the charge framed against them by the trial court for offences punishable under Secs.120-B, 420 read with 511, and under Sec.196 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec.136 of and under Secs.276(c), (i) and 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. The charge against the respondents accused 1 to 3 is that, A-l is the partnership firm dealing with kerosene, the partners of which are A-2 and A-3 with equal partnership rights; that the accused are Income-tax assessees and for the assessment year 1982-83, the accused submitted the income-tax returns on 8.7.1982, showing their income as Rs.24,530 that along with the said income-tax returns, the accused also submitted their profit and loss accounts sale accounts and the stock register; that A-2 has signed those registers on behalf of the other accused; that since there were discrepancies with the accounts shown in the returns and on verification of the account books, the accused submitted their revised returns on 16.1.1983 for the same assessment year of 1982-83 by altering the amounts from Rs.24,530 to Rs.76,215 and they submitted the revised returns along with the profit and loss accounts sale accounts, stock register, etc. Since the Income tax Officials had the information that the accused have submitted false returns showing a very low income, a notice under Sec.148 of the Income-tax Act had been issued to them and later their income for the assessment year 1982-83 had been determined as Rs.93,200 and from such of the acts of the accused, it came to be known that they have not shown the actual income, but furnishing false accounts manipulating the records had showed a very meager income, which is far below than what they should have declared and hence the accused have cheated the tax officers. The said acts having been perpetrated by the accused in conspiracy with each other and they all joining hands with each other falsified the accounts in a fraudulent manner in order to cheat the department, they are liable for punishment and hence the above charge. 3. The said acts having been perpetrated by the accused in conspiracy with each other and they all joining hands with each other falsified the accounts in a fraudulent manner in order to cheat the department, they are liable for punishment and hence the above charge. 3. In proof of the above charge, the prosecution, which has been burdened with proof of the said case beyond all reasonable doubts, had examined, on its part, three witnesses as P.Ws.1 to 3 and had marked 21 documents as Exs.P-1 to P-21. On the part of the accused, the evidence submitted before the lower court was nil. 4. The Income-tax Officer concerned has been examined as P.W.I and this witness would depose that under Sec.279 of the Income-tax Act, authorisation has been granted to him by the Income-tax Commissioner to launch prosecution against the accused in Ex.P-1 that A-2 and A-3 are the partners of A-1 firm; that during the year 1982-83, the accused submitted the Income-tax returns in Ex.P-2, by showing the net income of the A-1 firm at Rs.24,530 and the second accused has verified the returns that Ex.P-2 had also been accompanied by Ex.P-3 profit and loss account, Ex.P-4 balance sheet and Ex.P-5 memo of adjustment; that the income-tax returns had been personally presented by A-2 and the Auditor of A-1 firm had filed the memo. of Adjustment that he summoned the books of accounts and the same had been submitted along with Ex.P-6 ledger and Ex.P-7 day book. 5. This witness would further depose to the effect that he perused the records and found out the difference in the cash balance and that suppressing the sales in the ledger, the respondents have inflicted the purchased and that according to Ex.P-7 day book, at pages 101 and 102 the cash balance is shown as Rs. 5. This witness would further depose to the effect that he perused the records and found out the difference in the cash balance and that suppressing the sales in the ledger, the respondents have inflicted the purchased and that according to Ex.P-7 day book, at pages 101 and 102 the cash balance is shown as Rs. 14,209.62 instead of Rs.92,876.38 and Ex.P-8 contained the relevant pages; that in Ex.P-6, at page No.53, the purchases were shown at Rs.38,303.67 and the sales were shown at Rs.34,000 and the relevant page pertaining to this is Ex.P-9; that the Income-tax Officer gave him the Report and only on verification of the same, he was deposing; that the said report had also been signed by the second accused; that Ex.P-10 is the report of the Income-tax Inspector; that the Income-tax Inspector again inspected the records and submitted another report in Ex.P-11 on 14.12.1982 and this witness would also peruse the report and decide that the accused firm was not maintaining proper accounts; that the second accused explained the circumstances for the anomalies in the accounts; that the explanation offered on the part of the second accused Ex.P-12 that according to Ex.P-12, he issued a notice to A-1 firm on 18.12.1982 to come and reconcile the accounts by 27.12.1982, as per Ex.P-13 office copy of the original notice, based on which the second accused submitted the revised Income-tax returns showing the income of the A-1 -firm was Rs.76,215 under Ex.P-14 revised returns along Ex.P-15 power of attorney and Ex.P-16 profit and loss account. But this witness did not accept the same and passed the assessment order under Ex.P-17 on 21.2.1983 fixing the income of the first accused-firm at Rs.93,200 and that in the original Income-tax returns, the shares of the A-2 and A-3 have been shown very low. 6. But this witness did not accept the same and passed the assessment order under Ex.P-17 on 21.2.1983 fixing the income of the first accused-firm at Rs.93,200 and that in the original Income-tax returns, the shares of the A-2 and A-3 have been shown very low. 6. This witness would also further depose that he initiated action against the accused under Sec.271 (1)(c) of the Income-tax Act and by summoning the accused and their accountant, he recorded their statements; that Ex.P-18 is the statement given by the second accused in Urdu and after translating the same into Tamil and reading out the contents to him, he got the signature of the second accused in the translated copy; that the statement given by the third accused is Ex.P-19 and the statement given by the part-time accountant in the auditor office of Mr.V.T.Janakiraman, namely, Mani is Ex.P-20; that had the original returns as submitted by the second accused been accepted, a loss ranging from Rs.20,000 to Rs.25,000 would have been caused to the State exchequer and that the mistake committed by the accused is not a clerical error, but it is a deliberate suppression of purchases. 7. In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that the accounts shown to him were not written by the accused; mat only based on such propositions, the accounts were submitted to the Income-tax Department and not the books. 7. In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that the accounts shown to him were not written by the accused; mat only based on such propositions, the accounts were submitted to the Income-tax Department and not the books. At the outset, he did not entertain arty doubt that some discrepancies have occurred and he honesty thought that some mistake might have occurred in the calculation regarding the cash balance of the accused, but only after ascertaining the anomalies from P.W.2, he started issuing notice to the accused, that there is no denial of the fact mat by seeing the error that had occurred in calculation in Exs.P-6 and P-7 only, the assessment order has to be passed, he did not pass the assessment order immediately, that immediately after pointing out of the irregularities, the accused submitted the revised returns, that he could not point out anyone stating that the mistake occurred only because of him; that the revised Income-tax returns were submitted only after passing of the final assessment order; that A-2 has explained that he did not know how to maintain the accounts and it was the responsibility of his representative; that A-2 gave the statement only in Tamil, but singed in Urdu; that he could not deny that A-3 has studied upto 7th standard; that based on the Assessment Order passed for the assessment year 1982-83 only, the second accused volunteered to submit the revised Income-Tax returns for the assessment years 1979-80 and 198182 and the Assistant Commissioner of income-tax according permission, levied a minimum penalty and this witness would formally deny the suggestion that the mistake was not a deliberate suppression of facts. 8. P.W.2 is the Income-tax Inspector and this witness would depose that he renew the accused and it was P.W.1. who ordered to check-up the cash balance of the accused; that he checked-up the same on 7.12.1982 and submitted the report to P.W.1. that in Ex.P-10, A-2 has signed, that on 14.12.1982, on a second verification of the records pertaining to the first accused-firm, he submitted his report in Ex.P-11 and that Ex.P-12 is the explanation offered on the part of A-2 for Ex.P-11 report. In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that he did not seize the cash book or the day book of the accused-firm. 9. P.W.3 is the typist of the Auditor of the accused-Mr. In the cross-examination, this witness would depose that he did not seize the cash book or the day book of the accused-firm. 9. P.W.3 is the typist of the Auditor of the accused-Mr. V.T.Janakiraman-by name Mani and be would depose that it was he, who prepared the accounts of the first accused firm for the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81; that his job was a part-time job and at times, he used to go to the firm of the accused and prepare the accounts; that he would write the accounts for the accused firm once a week or once in 15 or 20 days; that Exs.P-6 and P-7 were written by him only; that he was examined by P.W.1. in the year 1985 and in the year 1986 and recorded his statement and after reading the contents of the statement, he obtained the signature of this witness, that Ex.P-20 is the statement recorded in the year 1985 and Ex.P-21 is the statement recorded in the year 1986 in the same manner. In the cross examination, this witness would depose that he has not written the accounts in any other case as authorised representative; that he noted only the points found in Exs.P-6 and P-7; that it is the duty of the accountant to see the accounts tallied; that what all he spoke in Ex.P-20 as true and this witness would formally deny the suggestion that in order to manage that he hastily prepared a false account, showing that they tallied, he was adducing false evidence. 10. The lower court, in consideration of the above evidence placed before it by the prosecution and appreciating the same in its own way, had ultimately arrived at the conclusion to acquit all the accused from the charges framed against them, thereby holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond alreasonable doubts. It is only challenging the above judgment, the Income-tax Department has come forward to file the above criminal appeal. 11. It is only challenging the above judgment, the Income-tax Department has come forward to file the above criminal appeal. 11. The learned Senior Counsel Mr.K.Ramaswamy, the Central Government Standing Counsel (Income-tax cases) appearing on behalf of the appellant would give a picture of the structure of the Income-tax Laws and would contend that the Income-tax statutes are standing on a different pedestal, wherein there should be neither fabrication nor additions; that the onus (in common) is fixed on the accused; that the culpable mental state is presumed for the accused, unless contrary is proved on the part of the accused with valid evidence, he would become guilty of the offence charged. The learned counsel would further contend that the Income-tax Laws are dearer and affectionate to those who have disclosed the income but the dreaded enemy for those, who try to evade or escape the Lawful tax. 12. Sec.196 of the Indian Penal Code would deal with any one corruptly using or attempting to use as true or genuine any evidence knowingly to be false or fabricated. The learned counsel would also point out that all the accused were very much parties to the transactions, conspiracy and abatement, as given in the charge, The learned counsel would draw the attention of the court to Sec.276 of the Income-tax Act, wherein it has been contemplated that whoever fraudulently removes, conceals, transfers, or delivers to any person, any property or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property or interest therein from being taken in execution of a certificate under the provisions of the second schedule, shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a terra, which may extend to two years and shall also be liable to fine. That Explanation to clause 1 (iv) were to apply to constitute an offence under Sec.276(c)(i) of the Income-tax Act and this section would read that if any person wilfully attempts to evade tax imposable under this Act be punished with imprisonment and fine and if any person wilfully attempts to evade payment of any tax also becomes punishable with rigorous imprisonment. 13. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant in applying the above legal norms to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, would argue that in the present case, the first respondent accused is the partnership firm, of which the other two respondents accused are the partners will equal shares and they are Income-tax assessees within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act; that in the Income-tax returns submitted on 8.7.1982, the income of the first respondent firm for the assessment year 1982-83 has been shown as Rs.24,530 that it was the second accused. Who had signed the Income-tax returns on behalf of the other accused accompanied by the other documents that on verification of the account, the purchase which had been effected during the said period had been shown above Rs. 28,303 and the sale was shown below Rs.34,000 and there were also anomalies in the cash/balance and hence since the cash balance had been shown below Rs.68,666 an inspection of the accounts of the first accused-firm had been ordered and on verification, many discrepancies came to be found out, for which the accused were not able to offer proper explanation and ultimately the accused filed a revised return on 16.1.1983 by altering the income of Rs.24,530 which has been shown in the earlier returns to Rs.76,215 and ultimately the income of the accused came to be determined as Rs.93,200; He would further argue that the act of the accused in submitting the wrong income-tax Returns for the year 1982-83 was nothing but tax evasion and minimising the tax, the accused submitted false Income-tax returns on 6.7.1982 for the assessment year 1982-83 and the Income-tax officials issued a notice and thus the accused became liable for punishment under Secs.120-B, 420 read with 511 of the Indian Penal Code-read with 136 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and under Secs.276(c) (i) and 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 14. 14. On the contrary, the learned; counsel appearing for the respondents, in his reply arguments, would contend that the evidence of P.W.1 clearly shows that he has verified the accounts and since there was some mistake in totalling, he called P.W.2 and asked him to check the accounts and he did not tell him that there was evasion of tax and at the initial stage he felt that there was only a mistake in totalling; that informed P.W.2 that cash balance was not correct and gave notice to the accused stating that accounts have not been property maintained; that he admitted that it cannot be denied only on the basis of Ex.P-6 ledger and Ex.P-7 daybook, the mistake in totalling was found; that he did not pass the assessment order immediately. He would further argue that when the mistakes were pointed out, the accused submitted the revised returns that it cannot be said, who was responsible for the mistakes and before passing of the final assessment order only, the revised return was filed; that P.W.1 further deposed that A-2 has stated that he does not know to maintain the accounts and he got a representative, who was only an incharge; that P. W.3 admitted that he wrote entries in Exs.P-6 and P-7 viz., ledger and daybook and he can be proceeded with, if he writes wrong accounts and he further admits that what he had stated in Ex.P-20 is correct. The learned counsel for the respondents further argued that P.W.3 in his statement in Ex.P-20 before the Income-tax Officer has admitted that due to late working and doing the accounts work in a hurry, mistakes have crept in; that P.W.3 admits that he made those entries in order to file the returns before the end of July, 1982 and he had to hurry up with the work and some how tall the trial balance. He would further admits that the came to know about the mistakes only after hearing and examination of accounts by the end of November, 1982, that he was terminated from service the moment the mistakes came to their notice through the Auditor and a new person was appointed only then, that P.W.3 categorically deposed to the effect that the accounts were written and the totalling mistakes were committed by him and that the accused were not aware of the mistakes and there was no wilful conduct to evade tax and when once the mistakes were brought to their notice, the accused submitted the revised returns. The learned counsel for the respondents would argue that mere submissions of wrong statements or accounts with mistake will not amount to an offence and even if it is an offence under the Income Tax Act for imposing a penalty, mens reais necessary and there must be wilful evasion of tax to constitute a criminal offence. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents, would cite a judgment reported in A.Radhakrishnan v. I.T.O., City Circle A.Radhakrishnan v. I.T.O., City Circle , 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 87wherein it has been held that, “Mens reaimportant under Sec.276-C(1) of Income-Tax Act and whether there was any wilful attempt to evade tax, will necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. To prove fabricating false evidence, it must be shown that the petitioner caused certain circumstances t exist or made a false entry or made the document to contain a false statement. It must be further shown that the person did so intending that such circumstances, entry or statement should appear in evidence in a judicial proceedings, or a proceeding taken by Law. There must be attempt to evade tax, otherwise the accused cannot be made liable. The finding of the trial Judge at paras 10 and 11 at page 68 to 70 clearly shows that there is no mens rea against the appellant and the reasons given by the trial court in acquitting the accused cannot be said to be unreaonable.” 16. There must be attempt to evade tax, otherwise the accused cannot be made liable. The finding of the trial Judge at paras 10 and 11 at page 68 to 70 clearly shows that there is no mens rea against the appellant and the reasons given by the trial court in acquitting the accused cannot be said to be unreaonable.” 16. The learned counsel for the respondents would cite yet another judgment reported in Kuldip Rai Chopra, I.T.O. v. Sohan Singh Dhiman Kuldip Rai Chopra, I.T.O. v. Sohan Singh Dhiman , 110 I.T.R 521 wherein it has been held that, “If satisfactory explanation is given by the assessee for wrong figures in the return, that itself is not sufficient to make a person liable. Sec.277 of the Income-tax Act contains some crucial words in regard to the mens rea of the assessee viz., ”which either knows or believe to be false or does not believe to be, true. The intention of the legislature in incorporating these words in the section is quite obvious and that a prosecution would not follow in every case where a wrong statement is made and it has to be judged whether the assessee harboured the required mens rea.Further, in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court cannot be called upon to reasssess the, credibility of the evidence unless the view taken is patently erroneous as to cause miscarriage of justice,” 17. The learned counsel for the respondents would further argue that the decision relied on by the prosecution in Arul Prakasam v. Prema Malini Vasan Arul Prakasam v. Prema Malini Vasan , 1985 L.W. (Crl.) 70 : 163 I.T.R 487 will not apply to the, facts of the case, since there, a quash petition was filed, where it was contended that the original return was filed making certain statements and a revised version was filed before the assessment order was passed. But, the High Court dismissed the petition holding that question whether the petitioner was misled by his accountant and whether he deliberately and wilfully submitted false returns and false statements of accounts and maintained a false account is a matter which has to be gone into trial and not in these proceedings for quashing and hence this decision will not apply to the facts of the case in hand since in this case, evidence has been taken in full and the findings have been given. He would further argue that the judgment reported in 110 I.T.R 603 relied upon by the prosecution will not apply to the facts of the case in hand; that even there it has been held that a person should furnish a return was aware of the falsity of the statement and the incorrectness of the particulars of income even at the time, when he filed the original return; there was no question of that person subsequently discovering the existence of the omission creeping in or the wrong statement in the return already filed by him. So, the prosecution has to prove that even at the time of filing the original return that the accused has deliberately furnished or has been aware of the falsity of the statement and the incorrectness of the particulars, in the returns. The, prosecution has not let in evidence to that effect; and that there is no evidence to show that the accused were aware of the mistakes or written statements in the accounts at the time of filing of the original returns. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents would cite yet another judgment of the Supreme court in Uttam Chand v. I.T.O. Uttam Chand v. I.T.O. 133 I.T.R. 909 wherein it has been held that the order of the tribunal was that the assessee is a partner of the firm and firm was a genuine firm and that the prosecution based on the assessment order, which was set aside by the tribunal cannot be sustained and quashed the proceedings. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents would further argue that in Didwania and another v. I.T.O. Didwania and another v. I.T.O., (1995)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 725the point raised was, whether the prosecution can be sustained in view of the order passed by the tribunal setting aside the order of the assessing authority and that finding of the assessing authority that assessee made a false statement in respect of M/s.Young India and Transport Com-pany and that finding has been set aside by the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal; that the Supreme Court held that the criminal proceedings cannot be sustained. The whole question is whether the assessee made a false statement regarding the income,which according to the assessing authority has escaped assessment and so far as this is concerned the findings of the appellate tribunal are conclusive and therefore the Supreme Court has held that the prosecution cannot be sustained and the proceedings are quashed and while passing its judgment, the Supreme Court also referred to its decision in P. Jayappan v. S. K. Perumal P. Jayappan v. S. K. Perumal, 149 I.T.R 696. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents would cite a decision in Madras Spinners Ltd. and others v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Assessment Madras Spinners Ltd. and others v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Assessment, 203 I.T.R 282 wherein it has been held that: “Offences and prosecution - False verification -The order of assessment and Penalty set aside by Tribunal - Application for reference under Sec.256(1) rejected -Prosecution liable to be quashed Reserving right to revenue to file fresh complaint, if order of tribunal were set aside on a reference under Sec.256(2) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. 21. The learned counsel for the respondents cite yet another decision in Dr.B.Seerapani v. I.T.O. Dr.B.Seerapani v. I.T.O., 203 I.T.R. 288 wherein it was observed, “Offence and prosecution - False Verification and evasion of tax - Prosecution on the basis of assessment - Assessment set aside by tribunal -Prosecution quashed with right to file fresh complaint.” It was further held that, “In view of the setting aside of the assessment, which forms the basis for the prosecution by the tribunal, the prosecution of the assessee was liable to be quashed without prejudice to the right of the Income-tax Officer to file a fresh complaint, if so advised in the light of the result of the reassessment proceedings which are pending against the petitioners.” 22. The learned counsel for the respondents would cite another judgment in Mohammed I.Unjawalal v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Mohammed I.Unjawalal v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 1995 MLJ. The learned counsel for the respondents would cite another judgment in Mohammed I.Unjawalal v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Mohammed I.Unjawalal v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 1995 MLJ. (Crl.) 54 wherein it has been held that “the finding of the Income-tax Tribunal on the facts of the case are final and the court has no jurisdiction to go behind the statement made by the Income-tax Tribunal and therefore the criminal court is bound to accept the findings of the tribunal on the question of the fact.” In the above matter, the High Court has referred to various Supreme Court judgments in this regard at page 55 and has held that once the tribunal has accepted the facts and findings of the case, the criminal court cannot go behind to give a different finding. However, it has been held that when the assessment itself was set aside by the appellate authority, it could not be said that the assessment still continued in the eye of the Law and when the assessment itself was not in existence, the question of maintaining the prosecution did not arise. Therefore, the proceedings were liable to be quashed. The High Court elaboratedly considered Jayappan v. S.K.Perumal case Jayappan v. S.K.Perumal case 61at and distinguished the same. At page 62 it refers to the Patnaick and Company v. C.I.T wherein the Supreme Court has accepted the findings of the Income-tax Tribunal on facts as final and the court has no jurisdiction to go behind the findings of the tribunal on facts. In the Supreme Court decision in Jayappan v. S.K. Perumal Jayappan v. S.K. Perumal, 149 I.T.R. 696 the question that arose was when the reassessment proceedings are pending, proceedings before the criminal court should be quashed. The Supreme Court has held in that case that both are parallel proceedings and just because the reassessment proceedings are pending and mere expectation of success will not be a ground for quashing. In this case itself, the Supreme Court has held that the finding of the appellate authority will have a bearing on the prosecution and in appropriate cases the court may adjourn the case under Sec.309, Crl.P.C. If the court felt that the disposal of the proceedings under the Income-tax Act has a bearing on the proceedings before it, it may take into consideration the order passed thereon also. This is not a case where orders have been passed by the tribunal setting aside the assessment order and hence it will not apply to the facts of the case in hand. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents would end up his arguments by saying that in Criminal R.C.Nos.459 and 460 of 1995, dated 22.7.1997, Justice Arumugham (as he then) has considered all the above decisions and has held that. “Once an assessment order has been set aside by the tribunal, the criminal proceedings cannot be proceeded with” and hence directed dropping of the proceedings. 24. In paragraphs 8 to 11 of the judgment of the lower court, the learned Magistrate has vividly, dealt with the points for consideration and has testified the contentions offered on the part of the respondents herein, thereby arriving at the ultimate conclusion that the submission of the revised returns being one voluntary done on the part of the respondents, no motives or intention or knowledge of the irregularities could be attributed to the respondents. 25. It is relevant, at this juncture, to bear in mind the principles as laid down by the Apex Court in case of an appeal preferred against the acquittal judgment of the lower court, in S.Madhavan Nair v. State of Kerala S.Madhavan Nair v. State of Kerala , 1975 MLJ. (Crl.) 239at243 wherein it has been held that, “In an appeal under Sec.417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against an order of acquittal, the High Court has full power to, review at large the evidence on which the order of acquittal was found and to reach the conclusion that upon the evidence, the order of acquittal was found and to reach the conclusion that upon the evidence, the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusion upon facts, the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to such matters as, (1) the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any real and reasonable doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge, who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. The High Court should also take into account the reasons given by the court below in support of its order of acquittal and must express its reasons in the judgment which lead it to hold that the acquittal is not justified. Further, if two conclusions can be based upon the evidence on record, the High Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. It would follow as a corollary from that if the view taken by the trial court in acquitting the accused is not unreasonable, the occasion for the reversal of that view would not arise.” 26. It is further relevant to note that Like every other criminal case, a case arising out of the income-tax laws is also subject to the rule that the accused is presumed innocent and that the burden to discharge the said innocence is paramountly on the prosecution. However strong the suspicion against the accused is, if every reasonable opportunity of innocence has not been excluded, he is entitled to acquittal. Whatever circumstances arise, they must be proved and not by themselves presumed. No single item of evidence can be picked out and given prominence, nor the accuseds theory of the case can be withdrawn from consideration. If, therefore, the evidence regarding the crime committed, leaves room for doubt and does not displace the presence of innocence wholly, the charge cannot be said to have been established. The presumption of the existence of the culpable mental state for the accused being a buttable one unless the case is preliminarily established, such presumption cannot be formed as decided in many judicial pronouncements. The presumption of the existence of the culpable mental state for the accused being a buttable one unless the case is preliminarily established, such presumption cannot be formed as decided in many judicial pronouncements. 27. From the above propositions of Law and from the very nature of the criminal jurisprudence, it is clear that the prosecution has not put up a case worth trying, since as admitted by the prosecution witnesses, that the respondent have submitted the income-tax revised returns for the year 1982-83 voluntarily of their own accord, explaining the mistakes said to be detected at the time of their filing of the returns and prior to the sending of the notice under Sec.148 of the Income-tax Act by the income-tax officials and well prior to the passing of the assessment order by them. It is pertinent to note that only on approval by their auditor and with his signature, the income-tax returns have been submitted by the respondents and if at all anything wrong had taken place, it is the bounden duty of the auditor to point out the same to the respondents. But, the auditor has also not cared to look into such a fair, Since the said auditor has neither been examined by the income-tax department nor examined in lower court, the true state of affairs, prevailing at that time, are not able to be ascertained and the typist of the auditor is not a competent person to speak of such things, which go under the seal and signature of the auditor. Hence, the prosecution is also to be blamed for not adducing the best evidence in refraining from examining the auditor of the respondents, who actually submitted the income-tax returns, in person, having approved the same to be true. If at all anything knowingly or intentionally had gone wrong, as it is accused of by the prosecution, it could not have taken place without the knowledge of the auditor of the respondents, who is supposed to know every minute detail regarding the income of the first respondent firm in which event even the auditor becomes liable to be proceeded against for professional misconduct. 28. 28. In the above circumstances, it can only be held that neither the prosecution has put up a valid case nor the same had been projected before the lower court, in the manner warranted by the Law, nor the same got proved with such standard of proof as prescribed by Law, i.e., proof beyond all reasonable doubts and hence, the lower court for valid reasons assigned, has not committed any error in arriving at the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt of the accused, so as to warrant a conviction, thereby the lower court having been left with no option, but to arrive at the decision to acquit the accused. 29. In result, the above criminal appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. The judgment dated 24.4.1989 made in C.C.No.268 of 1986 by the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.1, Vellore, North Arcot District is hereby confirmed.