The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been preferred for issue of a writ of Certiorari directing the respondent Nos 1 and 2 to implement the judgment and order dated 3.8.90 passed by this Court in Civil Rule No.1315 of 1982 and to implement the provisions of the schemes prepared for the merger of seven Central Co-operative Banks with the Apex Bank so far they relate to the placement and service conditions of the petitioners who were employees of the erstwhile Central Co-operative Banks prior to merger. 2. The petitioners' case is that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies in exercise of powers conferred upon by sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 1949, prepared a scheme for merger of seven Central Co-operative Banks operating in the State of Assam. The scheme firsts circulated vide letter No.CF/75/167 dated 20.7.76 was subsequently modified vide order No.CF/38/75/172 dated 6.8.76. The employees of the Central Co-operative Banks through their union known as All Assam Central Bank Employees' Union submitted an objection before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies against the. proposed scheme for merger. In the meantime, the State Govt. ordered that pending merger, the Apex Bank should take charge of all the Central Banks with effect from 1.8.77 and nominated Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the officers of the Apex Bank to take over charge of the Central Banks in their respective areas. Accordingly, all the Central Banks were taken over except Sibsagar Branch which could not be taken over due to a stay granted by this Court. The Registrar vide order No.CF/25/77/1236-41 dated 23.9.77 decided that the scheme would be brought into force with effect from 1.11.77. The Secretary of the Employees Union preferred a writ petition (Civil Rule No.329 of 1977) challenging proposed merger and this Court vide order dated 24.10.77 stayed the proposed merger. But eventually the said civil rule was dismissed on withdrawal on 16.11.78. Thereafter, the Registrar vide order No. CF/25/77/244 dated 20th September, 1977 published the final order of merger and thereby the erstwhile Central Co-operative Banks except the Sibsagar Branch merged with the Apex Bank. The scheme which was published in the Assam Gazette, Extra-ordinary dated 20th September, 1977 under notification No.CF-25/77/244, provides for modes and methods of absorptions and regulating conditions of the service of the employees of the transferor Banks. The scheme which was published in the Assam Gazette, Extra-ordinary dated 20th September, 1977 under notification No.CF-25/77/244, provides for modes and methods of absorptions and regulating conditions of the service of the employees of the transferor Banks. The merger was eventually enforced with effect from 16th January, 1979. The petitioners were also absorbed as employees of the Apex Bank with effect from 16.1.79 and they were given posting along with provisional allotment of work. The writ petitioners in their erstwhile Banks were working above the rank of Assistants/Supervisors and, as such, most of the petitioners were provisionally allowed to hold corresponding rank of Accountant and Sub Accountant in the Apex Bank by the order dated 20.2.79, but they were not allowed to draw the scale of pay drawn by their counter part in the Apex Bank. The representation submitted for payment of equal pay was rejected by the Board of Directors of the Apex Bank. However, some of the employees who were absorbed below the rank of Supervisors were allowed to draw the pay as given to the employees of the Apex Bank with effect from 16.1.81. But the 32 supervisory staff, the writ petitioners, who were above the rank of Assistant/Supervisor, were not absorbed in the regular seale of pay of the Apex Bank except four of them recommended by the Sub Committee to be placed in the rank of Sub Accountant. An appeal was filed by the petitioners, but the Administrative Committee vide resolution No.3 adopted in the meeting dated 18.6.82, authorised the previous Sub Committee to review the matter. As per recommendation of the Sub Committee, staff circular No.37 dated 31.7.82 was issued and only 2 of the 4 supervisory staff were appointed as Accountants. By both the circular Nos 32 and 37, the petitioners were placed below the existing Assistants of the Apex Bank appointed prior to 16.1.81 and thus they were degraded from their posts provisionally alloted to them. A representation challenging the aforesaid action was also preferred before the Registrar, but no action was taken thereon. By both the circular Nos 32 and 37, the petitioners were placed below the existing Assistants of the Apex Bank appointed prior to 16.1.81 and thus they were degraded from their posts provisionally alloted to them. A representation challenging the aforesaid action was also preferred before the Registrar, but no action was taken thereon. Thereafter, the petitioners filed Civil Rule No. 1315 of 1982 praying for cancellation of circular Nos 32 and 37 issued by the Managing Director and for a direction to implement the merger scheme by treating the petitioners at par with the employees of the Apex Bank and to extend the benefit of equal pay to them for doing the same work. 3. The aforesaid civil rule was allowed by judgment and order dated 3.8.90 quashing the impugned circular Nos 32 and 37 and directions were issued to reconsider their case. After necessary exercise, the Bank authorities again refused the claim of the petitioners and the status sought on extraneous considerations and in gross violation of the judgment and order dated 3.8.90. It has been further stated that the qualification prescribed for the new recruits in the Apex Bank was applied to debar the petitioners from being at par with their counterpart in the Apex Bank. It is further alleged that the Bank while reconsidering the matter, has taken into consideration the volume of work and business turn over and knowledge of commercial banking which are not only inconsistent with the provisions of clause 6 (b) of the merger scheme but also in defiance to the order dated 3.8.90 by this Court. According to the writ petitioners, the authorities also acted beyond their powers hi inviting and considering representation/objections from the employees of the Bank while passing the impugned order dated 20.12.1990. 4. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondent Nos 1 and 2, it has been pleaded that though some petitioners were provisionally given placement as Sub Accountant and Accountant, they were not allowed to perform the duties as such considering their qualification and experience and they cannot be treated at par with the employees of the transferee Bank Although they would have been entitled to better service conditions only after 5 years as per scheme, but such benefits have been extended to them with effect from 16.1.81 ie two years after the date of merger. It is further pleaded that the service conditions in the transferee Bank were not similar to that in the transferor Bank. The promotion in the transferee Bank from the rank of Assistant/Sub Accountant upto the rank of Branch Manager is given on the basis of departmental examination while the rest of the posts are filled up on the basis of seniority and service record. Therefore, the claim of the petitioners for placement in the corresponding rank in the transferor bank cannot be conceded to. It is further alleged that there has been no denial of salaries to the petitioners as per prevailing scale of pay and question of payment of interest on arrear salary does not arise. According to the respondents, the fitment of the petitioners have been worked out as per provisions of the merger scheme and the transferee Bank has implemented the scheme including the provisions of clause 6 (b) in its true spirit. 5. In their affidavit-in-reply the petitioners submitted that Shri M. Duwara who had sworn the affidavit on behalf of the respondent-Bank and its Managing Director is not competent to swear the affidavit as he is not an authorised representative of the Bank. It is averred that the petitioners were not paid equal salary during the period between 16.1.79 to 15.1.81 and, as such, in Civil Rule No.1315 of 1981, the Court vide order dated 23.4.88 directed the Apex Bank to pay the differences of salary with interest. Although the Bank has paid the arrear amount but no interest was paid to the petitioners for .which they again moved this Court and the same order was reiterated by this Court on 21.4.93. 6. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners argued at length to justify that the order passed by the Division Bench has not been followed by the respondents while issuing the impugned order dated 20.12.1990 and the petitioners have been deprived of their due. 7. Before we undertake the exercise to examine the points raised by the learned senior counsel, we may, for better appreciation, reproduce the order dated August 3, 1990 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Rule No. 1315 of 1982. 7. Before we undertake the exercise to examine the points raised by the learned senior counsel, we may, for better appreciation, reproduce the order dated August 3, 1990 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Rule No. 1315 of 1982. "The Apex Bank for all the aforesaid reasons is directed to do the following : (1) Invite objections or suggestions as to how each one on the supervisory staff claim one of the five posts specified in column 3 of the above table; (2) The grounds or rights that are asserted and after receiving the suggestions or objections to notify as to how under the above merger principles in clause 6 (b) taking into consideration educational qualification, experience of the officers on January 16,1981 juxtaposed with the corresponding employees of the Apex Bank and accord them the due status which in law each individual is entitled to. All these to be done within three months after the order is received by the Bank. The writ petition is allowed with direction indicated above. No costs." 8. It is therefore, necessary to have a look into the provisions of clause 6 (b) of the scheme which reads as follows : "Where the terms and conditions of service (including provident fund, gratuity and other retirement benefits) of the employees of the transferee Bank are better than those of the transferor Bank, the transferee Bank shall on the expiry of five years from the prescribed date, or on the expiry of such extended period, as the State Govt. may deem fit to allow, grant to the employees of the transferor Bank, subject to their qualification and experience being the same as those of the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank, the same terms and conditions of service (including provident fund, gratuity and other retirement benefits) as are applicable to the employees of the transferee Bank." 9. Clause 6 (b) of the scheme provides that the transferee Bank shall on expiry of five years from the prescribed date, or on the expiry of such extended period, as the State Govt. Clause 6 (b) of the scheme provides that the transferee Bank shall on expiry of five years from the prescribed date, or on the expiry of such extended period, as the State Govt. may deem fit to allow to the employees of the transferor Bank, subject to their qualification and experience being the same as those of the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank, the same terms and conditions of service (including provident fund, gratuity and other retirement benefits) as are applicable to the employees of the transferee Bank. The Division Bench also directed the Apex Bank to consider the educational qualification and experience of the petitioners as on 16th January, 1981 and accord them status due in law. This being the position, this Court is first required to examine whether while issuing the impugned order dated 20.12.1990 (Annexure H), the authorities in any manner violated the order of the Division Bench and omitted to implement the provisions of caluse 6 (b) of the scheme in its true spirit. 10. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel for the petitioners argued that while considering the case of each of the writ petitioners, the Bank authorities committed the following irregularities: (1) The Apex Bank authorities invited and considered the objections/ suggestions from the employees of the Apex Bank which was not contemplated in the order of the Division Bench. (2) While considering the experience of the individual employees, the Bank authorities took into consideration the volume and nature of business in the transferor Bank where they had worked before merger. (3) The Bank authorities did not apply the same yardstick in respect of all the writ petitioners which resulted into erroneous decision with regard to their placement in service and insisting upon the departmental examination to be passed before they are given placement at par with the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank in respect of higher benefits. 11. Before this Court enters into a detailed discussion of the grounds agitated by Mr, Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel, it is imperative to decide the question astowhethertheprovisionsoftheBankingRegulation Act, 1949 are applicable in the instant case. This is so necessary because a number of judicial pronounce­ments of the Apex Court relating to section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 cited by the learned senior counsel for adjudication of the dispute between the parties will be determinative of the issues at hand. This is so necessary because a number of judicial pronounce­ments of the Apex Court relating to section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 cited by the learned senior counsel for adjudication of the dispute between the parties will be determinative of the issues at hand. I have also heard the contrary views advanced by Mr. SN Sarma, standing counsel for the respondents. 12. Section 3 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 reads as follows : "3. Act to apply to co-operative societies in certain cases - Nothing in this Act shall apply to - (a) a primary agricultural credit society; (b) a co-operative land mortgage bank; and (c) any other co-operative society, except in the manner and to the extent specified in Part V." 13. It would appear from clause (c) to section 3 reproduced above that nothing in this act shall apply to any other co-operative society, except in the manner and to the extent specified in Part V. Section 56 in Part V of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 provides that the provisions of the Act shall apply to co-operative societies as they apply to Banking Companies and clause (c) further provides for insertion of a clause in section 5 of the Act 4efming 'co-operative Bank' which also includes a State Co-operative Bank within its purview. In the instant case, we are concerned with the merger of the Central Co-operative in the State of Assam with the Assam Co-operative Apex Bank Ltd. The Assam Co-operative Apex Bank Ltd has been established under the provisions of the Assam Co­operative Societies Act, 1949, and the merger of the Central Co-operative has been effected in exercise of the powers conferred under section 15 (3) of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 1949 with prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India. Although basically there is no marked difference in the provisions of section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and the provisions in sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Assam Co-operative Societies Act, 1949, the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 will also be applicable in the instant case in view of the provisions in section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. This position of law has been made more clear by inserting section 5 A in the B anking Regulation Act, 1949. This position of law has been made more clear by inserting section 5 A in the B anking Regulation Act, 1949. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the provisions of section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 being applicable in the instant case, the decisions laid down by the Apex Court from time to time interpreting the provisions of section 45 as cited by Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned senior counsel will apply and be determinative of the issues involved in this writ petition, specifically when the Assam Co-operative Apex Bank Is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (ref Division Bench decision in (1989) 1 GLR 424) (1989 (1) GLJ 54). 14. Now, let us refer back to the first ground of attack recorded at para 11 of this judgment. This relates to the invitation of objections and suggestions from the original employees of the transferee Bank and consideration thereof to determine the benefits to be conferred to the writ petitioners. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned . senior counsel, referring to the impugned order No.ADMN/CR 1315/90 dated 20.12.1990 at Annexure 1, pointed out that the Managing Director invited objections/suggestions from the employees of the transferee Bank other than the writ petitioners and, on consideration of a number of objections received from them, issued the impugned order determining placement of the writ petitioners in complete negation to the direction given by the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Rule No. 1315 of 1982. A plain reading of Annexure I i.e. the order dated 20.12.90 makes it clear that objections were invited from other employees of the Bank and taken into consideration while re-assessing the placement of the writ petitioners. In view of this submission, it is therefore, necessary first to have a look into the order of the Division Bench. 15. The order of the Division Bench, reproduced hereinbefore, shows that the authorities were permitted to invite objections and suggestions and thereafter to notify due status to be given to the writ petitioners taking into consideration their educational qualifications and experiences as on January 16, 1981. The language employed in the above order is not apparently confined to the writ petitioners only and, therefore, it cannot be said that by inviting objections or suggestions from other employees, the Bank authorities have acted beyond the scope of the order passed by the. Division Bench. The language employed in the above order is not apparently confined to the writ petitioners only and, therefore, it cannot be said that by inviting objections or suggestions from other employees, the Bank authorities have acted beyond the scope of the order passed by the. Division Bench. The act of inviting objections or suggestions from them will not in itself vitiate the decision. In the impugned notification, the case of each of the petitioners has been discussed and disposed of with reasons. The notification does not give any impression that the authorities were unduly influenced by any objection received from the other employees of the transferee Bank. Therefore, this plea advanced on behalf of the petitioners holds no good and, is therefore liable to be rejected. 16. Mr. AK Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the petitioners argued strenuously that the Bank authorities while considering the experience of the individual employees at the time of placement, committed gross error in taking into consideration the volume of work and the nature of business in the transferor Bank and the individual experience of the writ petitioners in commercial banking. According to him, it is the length of service and the rank and status held by them would be determinate of the placement. In this connection, the learned counsel has referred to a decision of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & another vs. Laxmishankar Mishra, reported in AIR 1979 SC 979 wherein the Supreme Court laid down the ratio in the following words :. "... on a pure grammatical construction of the expression it would indisputably appear that the person claiming to be absorbed must have worked in the post of Head Master/Principal of a High/Higher Secondary School for a minimum period of 7 years. Emphasis is on the experience gained by working on the post of Head Master/Principal. A person incharge of the post also works and discharge the duties and functions of the post of which he has taken charge. Even an officiating incumbent of the post does discharge the functions and duties of the post..." Holding as above, the Supreme Court gave weightage to the services rendered irrrespective of the capacity in which the post was held and permitted absorption of the incumbent to the post of Head Master/Principal of the High/Higher Secondary School. But in the instant case this ratio cannot be applied. But in the instant case this ratio cannot be applied. 'Teaching' is such a matter where persons having requisite qualification are expected to attain experience more or less to the same extent which cannot be marked out for distinction. The placement of the petitioners cannot be worked out on the same footing. Acquisition of experience by the petitioners definitely depend upon the volume and nature of transaction in the Bank they have served. Merely by length of service, the experience gained in the comparatively smaller Bank cannot be equated with the experience which they would have gained by rendering services in a larger Bank. Although, neither in the relevant provisions of the scheme nor in the judgment of the Division Bench, the Bank authorities have been specifically authorised to take into consideration such factors, yet this Court cannot obviate the necessity of consideration of such matters which are so essential for efficient functioning of a Bank employee. The experience of a Bank employee cannot be compared and equated with the experience of an employee working in another Bank merely by the period of service rendered by him. The word 'experience' as per Chamber Twentieth Century Dictionary means, 'test', trial, experiment (obs.) : practical acquaintance with any matter grained by trial : long and varied observation, personal or general: wisdom derived from the changes and trials of life: the passing through any event or course of events by which one is affected ..." etc. This definition runs contrary to the views expressed on behalf of the petitioners. In my opinion, the Bank authorities did not any error in taking into account the volume of business and nature of transaction of the transferor Bank including the individual experience and knowledge gained by the petitioners in commercial banking. This consideration can in no way be said to have vitiated the decision either in contravention of the provisions of the scheme or in deviation of the order of the Division Bench. This aspect of the matter does not, in my view, render the impugned order defeasible. 17. The learned counsel further argued that the Bank authorities did not apply the same yard stick at the time of placement of the petitioners, discriminated in extending financial benefit and unjustly insisted upon departmental examinations to be passed before such higher benefits are given to the petitioners. 17. The learned counsel further argued that the Bank authorities did not apply the same yard stick at the time of placement of the petitioners, discriminated in extending financial benefit and unjustly insisted upon departmental examinations to be passed before such higher benefits are given to the petitioners. According to the learned counsel, this has been prejudicial to the interest of the petitioners and thus they have been unduly deprived of their legitimate expectations (of their entitlement) as per the provisions of the scheme. The learned counsel further argued that the petitioners have to be treated at par with their counter-part in the transferee Bank in view of the provisions of the proviso (H) to section 45 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. To justify the above stand, the learned counsel also cited the following decisions of the Apex Court: (i) State Bank of Travancore vs. Ellas Elias & others, (1970) 2 SCC 761 ; (ii) Mohd Sahabuddin & others vs. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 929 ; (iii) Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg & another, AIR 1977 SC 747 ; (iv) State of Orissa & another vs. NN Swamy & others, (1977) 2 SCC 508 ; (v) SB Patwardhan & another vs. State of Maharastra & others, AIR 1977 SC 2051 ; (vi) Smti RR Venkataraman vs. Union of India & another, AIR 1979 SC 49 ; (vii) Canara Bank, Bangalore vs. MS Jasra & others, (1992) 2 SCC 484 . Referring to the decison in the State Bank of Iravancore (supra), the learned counsel argued that the rank and status enjoyed by the petitioners before merger have to be maintained in the transferee bank. However, the law laid down in the above case is no longer in force. In Canara Bank, Bangalore vs. MS Jasra & others (supra), at paragraph 12, the Apex Court while interpreting section 45 of the Act, has made it clear that the 'terms and conditions of service' shall not be construed as extending to the rank and status of employees. Mr. In Canara Bank, Bangalore vs. MS Jasra & others (supra), at paragraph 12, the Apex Court while interpreting section 45 of the Act, has made it clear that the 'terms and conditions of service' shall not be construed as extending to the rank and status of employees. Mr. SN Sarma, learned counsel for the respondents while making submissions contrary to the above, relied on Associate Bank Officers Association vs. State Bank of India & others, reported in AIR 1988'SC 32 and argued that the Apex Court refused to equate the officers of the -subsidiary Banks with thatx>f the officers of the State Bank of India, and applying the same analogy, the petitioners in the instant case, cannot be equated with the employees of the transferee Bank. The Apex Court, in paragraphs 15 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment observed as follows : “15. The narrow question which we have to consider is whether looking to the nature of the relationship between the State Bank of India and each of the subsidiary Banks can the employees of the subsidiary Banks be considered as employees of the State Bank of India? In view of the clear provisions of section 50, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that the employees of the subsidiary Banks are, for all practical purposes, employees of the State Bank of India. Even dehors section 50, looking to the scheme of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, it is quite clear that each of the subsidiary Banks is set up as a separate Bank. Each subsidiary Bank has its own capital structure, its own operations. Each of the Banks has its own staff with its own terms and conditions of service. Therefore, the employees of the subsidiary Bank cannot be treated as the employees of the State Bank of India. The employees of the subsidiary Bank are not entitled to claim the same benefits as the employees of the State Bank of India on the ground that they are, in effect, the employees of the State Bank of India. 19. With regard to pay-scales, the grievance which is made before us as of now, is only with regard to four increments which are given to the officers of the State Bank of India at the time of joining though the pay-scales are the same, this is not done in the subsidiary Banks. 19. With regard to pay-scales, the grievance which is made before us as of now, is only with regard to four increments which are given to the officers of the State Bank of India at the time of joining though the pay-scales are the same, this is not done in the subsidiary Banks. The State Bank of India has submitted that in order to attract suitable persons, looking to the scale of their operations and responsibilities involved; this has been done. The subsidiary Banks are not in a comparable position. Nor are their scales of operation comparable to the State Bank of India. The responsibilities of their officers are not comparable in view of the extent of operations of the subsidiary Banks. In these circumstances, if the State Bank of India has offered increments to persons joining the State Bank of India, the same cannot be given to the officers joining the subsidiary Banks." 18. From the decision in Associate Banks Officers' Association (supra) read with decision in Canara Bank, Bangalore (supra) it would appear that the question of parity will come only when the employees of one Bank are comparable with the employees of the other Bank in respect of qualification and experience. The learned counsel for the respondents further argued that the decisions in Associate Banks Officers Association vs. State Bank of India & others, AIR 1988 SC 32 and Canara Bank, Bangalore vs. MS Jasra & others, (1992) 2 SCC 484 negate the claim of the petitioners for parity in rank, status and pay in the given circumstances. There is force in this contention. The principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to above do not contemplate equality if the qualification and experience do not match. 19. After appreciating the arguments advancedxm behalf of both the parties and taking into consideration the above ratio laid down by the Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that status quo in respect of rank and status and claim for equal benefits cannot be maintained unless they are favourably comparable with their counter-part. Therefore, the impugned notification, wherein the qualification and experience duly taken note of within permissible limit, cannot be faulted with on the above counts. 20. Therefore, the impugned notification, wherein the qualification and experience duly taken note of within permissible limit, cannot be faulted with on the above counts. 20. The next point argued that the notification cannot be sustained as the benefits due to the petitioners under the scheme cannot be withheld on the ground that the petitioners are required to qualify in the departmental examinations. It would appear from the impugned notification that the B ank authorities have insisted upon departmental examination while giving necessary fitment. It is important to note here that we are now concerned with the benefits to be given to the petitioners under clause 6 (b) of the scheme. The initial fitment which was given with effect from the date of merger is not in dispute in this case. What is required to be considered in this case is whether the benefits i.e. equalisation of the writ petitioners with the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank after expiry of 5 years, which has been preponed by 3 years in this case, has been given due effect. The Division Bench also ordered juxtaposition of the writ petitioners with the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank and to accord them due status as per their entitlement. In the instant case, the impugned notification does not show that this aspect of the matter was given due consideration by the Bank authorities. What is required to be done is to identify the employees'of the transferee Bank who were at par with the writ petitioners on their initial fitment and to take note of rank and status they were holding on expiry of 2 years from the date of merger arid to place the writ petitioners at par with them with effect from the date. This fitment should be allowed by virtue of the operation of clause 6 (b) of the scheme without insisting for departmental examination and new rules, if these do not apply in case of the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank, The impugned notification nowhere points'out that this aspect was taken into consideration by the Bank authorities and juxtaposition was done as ordered by the Division Bench, the impugned notification although does not display any other infirmity, but because of this omission, this Court has no alternative but to conclude that the exercise undertaken by the Bank authorities is incomplete and in violation of the order of the Division Bench. Therefore, that notification cannot be sustained. 21. In the result the writ petition is allowed. The impugned notification dated 20.12.90 is hereby quashed, the respondent are directed to review the entire matter in the light of the discussions above and to issue a fresh notification according the benefits to which each of the writ petitioners is entitled. If the corresponding employees of the transferee Bank who were at par with the writ petitioners on their initial fitment are holding any of the ranks claimed by the writ petitioners in the writ petition, such rank and status with all pecuniary benefits should also be allowed to the writ petitioners subject to their educational qualification and experience being equal on and from the expiry of 2 years from the date of merger, i.e. 16.1.1981. The respondents are further directed to give effect to the order dated 21.4.93 passed by this Court within one month from today.