Research › Browse › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

1998 DIGILAW 1256 (RAJ)

Jasraj v. Board of Revenue

1998-11-26

B.J.SHETHNA

body1998
Honble SHETHNA, J–There would be no better case of dishonesty then the present one. The persons like the present petitioner, who managed with S.D.O. to get the Khatedari right of `Gochar land in his name as a sub-tenant of `Gopal Gaushala has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and challenged the order passed by the Board of Revenue setting aside the order passed by the S.D.O. on 16.10.1979 (Annex.6) in exercise of its suo moto powers under Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act by an order dated 28.5.92 (Annex.3) and also rejecting review petition by an order dated 19.10.1993 (Annex.5). (2). Learned counsel Shri Samdariya for the petitioner relying upon the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in case of Karan Singh vs. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan (1), submitted that the Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act (for short ``the Act) when appeal lies before it. In Karan Singhs case (supra) the facts were totally different. In that case the order of ejectment passed by the S.D.O. was challenged which was an appealable order before the Board of Revenue as an appellate authority. While summing up that case the Division Bench of this Court, on the facts and circumstances of the case, observed that, ``in cases, where the appellate and revisional powers are not exercised, the Board may exercise its powers of superintendence and control in the interest of justice in appropriate case, but in this case the Board has appellate jurisdiction and it could not, therefore, make use of its powers of superintendence and control and the order of Board cannot be held proper with reference to Section 9 of the Revenue Act. Thus, the Division Bench of this Court itself made it clear in Karan Singhs Case (supra) that in the interest of justice in appropriate case, the Board can always exercise its superintendence power. Going to the facts of this case, it prima facie appears that the present petitioner had managed with the S.D.O. in getting the impugned order dated 16.10.1979 (Annex.6) passed by the S.D.O. by which as a sub- tenant of ``Gopal Gaushala he got the Khatedari rights transferred in his name, which is persi illegal. when it is a `Gochar land then there is no question of cultivating the same. when it is a `Gochar land then there is no question of cultivating the same. Such order was not only totally dishonest, but also without jurisdiction and against law. Such order cannot be allowed to stand even for a minute by any court. It may be stated that passing of such illegal order without jurisdiction was brought to the notice by a third party by way of appeal. The said appeal was accepted by the successor in the office of S.D.O. by his order dated 5.7.1982 and he set aside the mutation. Aggrieved of the subsequent order passed by the S.D.O., the present petitioner filed appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, which was also came to be dismissed on 30.3.1984. The said order was challenged by the present petitioner in a revision petition before the Board of Reve- nue. The Board of Revenue on a technical ground of limitation accepted the revision as an appeal filed against the order of Tehsildar attesting the mutation entry No. 218 dated 17.11.1979. Accordingly, it also set aside the order of S.D.O. dated 5.7.1982 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner and also the order passed by R.A.A. on 30.3.1984. However, the Board of Revenue being conscious about the fact that fraud was played by the petitioner, therefore, it ordered to call for the file scrutinized the reasons on the basis of which the mutation order dated 16.10.1979 was passed without hearing the State and the Gram Panchayat by invoking its suo moto jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act. Accordingly, the record of S.D.O., Ratangarh was called in which the order dated 16.10.1979 was passed and the hearing was kept on 30.3.1990 by the Board of Revenue. After hearing the petitioner, the Board of Revenue by its order dated 28.5.92 set aside the impugned order dated 16.10.1979 (Annex.6) passed by the S.D.O. in exercise of its powers under Section 9 of the Act. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed review petition before the Board of Revenue on the ground that without the record available before it, the Board of Re- venue set aside the order passed by the S.D.O. However, from the review order dated 19.10.1993 (Annex.5) it clearly appears that after considering the entire record before it, the order was passed, therefore,the review petition was rejected and in my opinion rightly so. (3). (3). Thus, the first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected. (4). Second submission was that there was a gross delay on the part of the Board of Revenue in exercising its suo moto powers under Section 9 of the Act, therefore, the order passed required to be set aside. It is true that the impugned order (Annex.6) dated 16.10.1979 was passed by S.D.O. Ratangarh which was set aside by the Board of Revenue only in 1992 i.e. after about 13 years. Prima facie this submission looks attractive, but if we scrutinize it closely, then it is clear that order (Annex.6) passed by the S.D.O. in 1979 was set aside in appeal filed by III party way back in 1982. Against which the appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by R.A.A. In revision, the Board of Revenue set aside that order on technical ground of limitation. Thus, this second submission regarding delay in exercising the jurisdiction is also rejected. (5). Last submission was that in absence of the record, the Board of Revenue should not have decided the revision petition filed by the petitioner has no substance. From the review order at Annex.5 it is clear that entire record was before the Board of Revenue. While deciding the review petition, the Board of Revenue was not required to give detailed reasons, if in its opinion no case is made out to review its earlier order passed by it or the record available before it, then this Court cannot interfere with such order in exercise of its superintendence power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (6). Though this petition is labelled as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but strictly speaking it is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the scope of which is very narrow and limited. As held by the Supreme Court in a case reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. page 38 (2), even an error on law cannot be corrected by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. (7). In view of the above discussion, I do not find any substance or merit in this petition. Accordingly, it fails and is hereby dismissed. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier shall stands vacated forthwith.