JUDGMENT 1. - In this second appeal a very short question comes for decision. It relates to the point of non-user of the premises as contemplated under Section 13(1)(j) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'). It is necessary to narrate the facts of the case. 2. Late Shah Kanchanlal filed a suit for eviction against the defendant before the Court of Civil Judge, Banswara alleging that the shop in dispute was left out on a monthly rent of Rs. 231/- and original period of lease was 11 years which expired on 12-3-85. It was further averred in the plaint that the suit premises was required for personal, bona fide use of the plaintiff as his sons Shah Paresh and Amul were unemployed and were to carry business in the suit premises. It was further averred that the defendant respondents had closed down the shop and were not carrying on business for last three years before filing of the suit. Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled for decree of eviction against the defendants. 3. The defendants denied all the averments of the plaint. So far as the issue relating to non-user of shop was concerned, the same was also denied. It was submitted that because of illness of father of defendant for a long period the shop had remained closed for few months. The trial Court framed relevant issues including the issue relating to closure of the suit premises for three years. It recorded evidence of both the parties on the issues and decreed the suit by judgment dated 5-12-89 holding that the plaintiff required the suit property for his bona fide use and also holding that the suit shop was closed for three years and no business was being carried there by the defendants, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled for decree of the eviction of shop. An appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, Banswara who accepted it and set aside the decree. This second appeal has been preferred by the appellant landlord in which the substantial question of law is whether the finding of the learned lower appellate Court on the point of non-user as contemplated under Section 13(1)(j) of the Act and the pleadings in para No. 8 of the plaint is perverse? 4. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at length. 5. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at length. 5. I have first to see as to what is averred in the plaint. In pare No. 8 of the plaint the pleading is in the following words : HINDI MATTER 367343 A 6. The ground for eviction under Section 13(1)(j) of the Act is worded as follows:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of a land lord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act unless it is satisfied. (a) to (i) .............. (j) that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit." 7. The trial Court had framed issue No. 4 and gave finding that the suit shop was closed for three years and was not used without reasonable cause for the purpose it was let out. This finding of fact was reversed by the appellate Court on the ground that the ground in pare No. 8 of the plaint was not properly pleaded and, therefore, the proof i.e. evidence could not be looked into. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in AIR 1952 SC 47 , Kedar Lal Seal v. Hari Lal Seal , question about construction of pleadings arose and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side, however, clumsily or in artistically the plaint may be worded. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what compensated for in costs. In any event, it is always open to a Court to give a plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just to the same extent as if it had been asked for, provided that occasions no prejudice to the other side beyond what compensated for in costs. He also cited Santlal v. Harbans Singh, 1982 Raj LW 274 , wherein the ground of eviction was under Section 13(1)(j) of the Act and it was held that the facts relating to non-user of premises with or without reasonable cause are within the special knowledge of tenant and the burden of proof lies upon him. He also cited AIR 1993 SC 275 , Shivlal v. Sat Prakash , in which East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act was under consideration and in the circumstances when the tenant ceased to occupy building for continuous period of four months without reasonable cause, he was held liable to be evicted. 9. So far as the relevant law on pleadings is concerned, it is provided under Order 6, Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code that every pleading shall contain only a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved and every pleading shall, when necessary, be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively, each allegation being, so far as is convenient, contained in a separate paragraph. The object of pleadings is that each side may be fully alive to the question in issue in order to be able to bring forward appropriate evidence. The rules of pleadings are also meant to help the Court in narrowing the controversies. Thus the settled law about the pleading is that the pleadings should not contain the evidence by which the pleading is to be proved and the pleading should contain the substance of the thing so that the other party may be fully alive to the question in issue in order to be able to bring forward appropriate evidence. It may be stated that in the Courts which are situated in moffusil towns pleadings may not be as artistically drafted as they may be in cosmopolitan cities. The reason being that moffusil towns are away from District Courts or High Court. It may be stated that in the Courts which are situated in moffusil towns pleadings may not be as artistically drafted as they may be in cosmopolitan cities. The reason being that moffusil towns are away from District Courts or High Court. In this case suit was filed before the learned Civil Judge, Banswara and Banswara could be said at the relevant time as a moffusil town. However, when the plaintiff has pleaded in para No. 8 of the plaint in very clear terms that the suit shop was closed for about three years and no regular business was being carried therein during this period and the suit shop was generally closed even during the time when the suit was filed and since the shop was lying continuously closed for three years and was generally closed during the days when the suit was filed, it was clearly and unambiguously pleaded in the plaint for eviction of the suit property. 10. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that it was not specifically pleaded that the suit shop was not used for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit, does not appear to be maintainable because firstly according to law of pleading the plaintiff pleaded in very clear terms that the suit shop was lying closed for three years as no regular business was carried in the suit shop for these years and secondly the shop was generally closed during the time when suit was filed. As per the object of law of pleadings the defendant respondent was fully alive to the question in issue in order to be able to bring forward appropriate evidence about this ground pleaded as per provisions under Section 13(1)(j) of the Act. When the defendant respondent was aware of it, no prejudice is caused to him because of this pleading. He has sufficient opportunity and has led sufficient evidence on issue No. 4 which related to the ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(j) of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of Santlal v. Harbans Singh (supra) is that the facts relating to non-user of premises with or without reasonable cause are within the special knowledge of the tenant and burden of proof lies upon him. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants on the basis of Santlal v. Harbans Singh (supra) is that the facts relating to non-user of premises with or without reasonable cause are within the special knowledge of the tenant and burden of proof lies upon him. So according to him it was for the defendant respondent to prove that there was a reasonable cause. According to him the defendant respondent was not able to prove any reasonable cause. 11. To this, learned counsel for the respondents replied that they were able to prove reasonable cause because the case of the defendant respondents was that they were carrying on business in the shop and the shop was open. I find that the learned appellate Judge has discussed the evidence in detail and agreed the conclusion of trial Judge that the licences of this shop were got cancelled after 1981 but he was of the view that the pleading before the trial Court in para No. 8 of the plaint was not proper in view of (1992) 1 Rajasthan LR 75, Gaurilal v. Gujarmal through his LRs., which mentions that the landlord has to plead specifically that the tenant has not made use of the disputed premises continuously for a period of six months and that such non-user is without any reasonable cause. In this citation the plaintiff had pleaded that. HINDI MATTER B 12. I find that the pleading in the suit before me was very specific when the plaintiff pleaded that the defendant had not carried out regular business in the shop for three years and kept the shop closed. No specific pleading more than this was required for the purpose of Section 13(1) (j) of the Act. Therefore, my view is that the plaintiff appellants had very specifically pleaded the ground under Section 13(1) (j) of the Act. No prejudice has been caused to the defendants respondents much so when it was for them to prove the facts which were in their special knowledge regarding the reasonable cause as per judgment pronounced in Santlal v. Harbans Singh (1982 Raj LW 274) (supra). Therefore the view of learned appellate Judge regarding pleading being unspecific is incorrect. The evidence could not have been discarded by him on the ground that there was no specific pleading. 13. Therefore the view of learned appellate Judge regarding pleading being unspecific is incorrect. The evidence could not have been discarded by him on the ground that there was no specific pleading. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents cited 1976 WLN (UC) 415, C. P. Massey v. Hira Chand , in which it was found from the evidence that the tenant had gone to Gangapur where his wife was living and that was a reasonable cause for non-occupying the premises for six months. In that suit there was no pleading for non-user of premises for more than six months and it was held that the decree for eviction could not be passed. This citation, as is obvious, is not applicable to the present case. The citation Lalaram v. LRs of Kesrimal Soni, (1991) 1 Rajasthan LR 604 , is also not applicable to the present case. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on AIR 1996 Allahabad 253, Ramdeo v. Smt. Dulari Devi , in which it was held that the logical conclusions drawn by appellate Court from circumstantial evidence upsetting findings of the trial Court was not to be interfered by the High Court in exercise of limited jurisdiction under Section 100 because such conclusion of lower appellate Court was based on finding of fact and inferences drawn on the basis of circumstantial evidence could not be said to be based on conjectures and surmises. He also relied on 1993 (1) WLC (Raj) 269, Bharat General & Seeds Stores v. Mahendra Singh . These rulings cited by the learned counsel for the respondents is also not relevant for our purpose in this case. 14. I am of the view that the learned appellate Judge committed an error of law when he came to the conclusion that the pleading in para No. 8 of the plaint was inaccurate. I have discussed the law of pleading as well as its purpose in foregoing paragraphs. The defendant very well knew from the pleadings of the plaint that there was a pleading that the shop was lying closed for three years before filing of the suit and it was a ground under Section 13(1)(j) of the Act. I hold that the learned appellate Judge committed error of law in reversing the finding of the learned trial Judge. 15. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. I hold that the learned appellate Judge committed error of law in reversing the finding of the learned trial Judge. 15. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the appellate Court are set aside and the decree of the trial Court is maintained. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.Appeal allowed. *******