S. Ramamurthy Naidu v. Jayaraman — 1998 DIGILAW 1267 (MAD)

Judgment :- 1. Both the above Second Appeals arise out of a common judgment rendered in A.S. Nos. 43 and 44 of 1983 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Periyakulam. The said two appeals arose out of a judgment in O.S. Nos. 127 and 586 of 1978 on the file of the District Munsif, Periyakulam. The present Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 127 of 1978 and the first defendant in O.S. No. 586 of 1978. 2. The suit in O.S. No. 127 of 1978 was filed by the plaintiff claiming declaration of his title over the suit property and for an injunction. According to him the suit property originally belonged to one Muthusamy Naidu who had executed a settlement in favour of his second wife Govindammal on 10.12.1936 giving a limited interest over the suit property with a direction that the property should be enjoyed by her till her life time and after her death the property should be devolved upon her male issue, if any was to be born and if no male issue was born to her, the suit property would devolve upon himself and his heirs. He also states that Muthusamy Naidu died without any issue in 1974 and Govindammal also died during the year 1977. The plaintiff being the brothers son of Muthusamy Naidu, was entitled to inherit the suit property as per the recitals in the said Settlement deed. He also alleged that the defendants had created documents as against his interest and the defendants were also attempting to trespass into the suit property. 3. The first defendant while resisting the suit claim, would contend that the original owner of the property, namely Muthusamy Naidu, had executed a settlement deed and that even during the life time of Govindammal she had leased the suit property in favour of the second defendant in 1973 itself. Therefore, she was holding the property as her own even during the life time of Muthusamy. After the death of Muthusamy, Govindammal had continued to be in possession and enjoyment in her own right as the only heir of Muthusamy Naidu. Thus she had become the absolute owner under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. She had executed the settlement deed in favour of the defendant in a good state of mind. After the death of Muthusamy, Govindammal had continued to be in possession and enjoyment in her own right as the only heir of Muthusamy Naidu. Thus she had become the absolute owner under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. She had executed the settlement deed in favour of the defendant in a good state of mind. The defendant would also state that the plaintiff and his children were living at Dindigul and that they came to attend the funeral ceremony of Govindammal and the plaintiff had tried to drag thee second defendant to their side and when this was objected by the defendant, the plaintiff had come forward with the present suit with false allegations. The defendant would also contend that the plaintiff was never in possession and enjoyment of the property at any point of time. The second defendant would further state that since the plaintiff and his children were attempting to trespass into the suit property, he had made a complaint to the police. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings and the evidence both oral and documentary, the trial Court held that Govindammal had become absolute owner of the property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act and also upheld the settlement made in favour of the first defendant under Ex. B.7. On appeal also the lower Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the trial Court and hence the present Second Appeal by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 127 of 1978. 5. In O.S. No. 586 of 1978, the second defendant in O.S. No. 127 of 1978 prayed for a bare injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs (his) possession of the property. He being the lessee under Govindammal, he would state that he was entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act and the defendants had no manner or right to interfere with his possession of the property. The first defendant in the suit being the appellant herein resisted the said claim raising the very same contentions as he had raised in the earlier suit. The sixth defendant who is the first defendant in O.S. No. 127 of 1978 also raised the very same pleadings contending that the property had vested absolutely with Govindammal and that by virtue of the settlement under Ex. B.7 he had became full owner of the property. The sixth defendant who is the first defendant in O.S. No. 127 of 1978 also raised the very same pleadings contending that the property had vested absolutely with Govindammal and that by virtue of the settlement under Ex. B.7 he had became full owner of the property. In the said suit also both the Courts below concurrently upheld the plea of the sixth defendant that Govindammal had become the absolute owner of the property and that the settlement in his favour under Ex. B.7 was valid. 6. The only question which arises for consideration in this present Second Appeal is as regards the effect of the settlement executed by Muthusamy Naidu in favour of his wife Govindammal and as to whether the said settlement would fall under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, so as to enlarge the limited right granted in favour of Govindammal into an absolute estate. The following is the extract of the settlement: Tamil The very document is captioned as Maintenance Settlement for Rs. 400/-. The object of the settlement being for the purpose of granting maintenance to the settlee is clear not only from the caption of the document, but also repeated the reference to the right of maintenance in the legatee at least in three places of the document. The recitals are unambiguous and make it clear that the settlement was only for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the maintenance of Govindammal. The question is whether the last clause in the settlement deed stipulating that the property shall be inherited by the settlor and his heirs in the event of the settlee dying without any male issues, would mean that the settlee was granted only a restricted estate, within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. The very provision under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act makes it very clear that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as a full owner and not as a limited owner. The Explanation to the said Section also includes properties acquired by the female Hindus in lieu of maintenance. Therefore, on the very face of the terms of the document, there can be no doubt that the document is fully covered by Section 14(1) of the Act. 7. However, Mr. The Explanation to the said Section also includes properties acquired by the female Hindus in lieu of maintenance. Therefore, on the very face of the terms of the document, there can be no doubt that the document is fully covered by Section 14(1) of the Act. 7. However, Mr. R. Sundararajan, learned counsel for the appellant would strenuously urge that Section 14(1) of the Act will not apply having regard to the various circumstances pertaining to the execution of the settlement deed in favour of Govindammal. Firstly he would contend that the condition that the settlement deed was executed as a result of her demand and her own-asking would show that it was not for the purpose of maintenance. I am not able to agree with the point so raised by learned counsel. In fact, no person can demand something over which he or she has no right. A demand for partition can be visualised. Similarly, a demand for maintenance can also be visualised. But it is not possible to visualise a demand for gratuitous gift. Therefore, the very circumstance of the settlee making a demand for the settlement would show that the demand was really pursuant to her right of maintenance which she had against the settlor. Secondly, learned counsel contends that the intention of the parties is most relevant in interpreting such document and the intention of the settlor being to the effect that the property should be ultimately inherited by a male heir, the document cannot be held to have been executed merely for the purpose of granting maintenance to Govindammal. In this context learned counsel would rely on a decision of the Supreme Court in 1994 (2) L.W. 1 (Bhura and others v. Kashiram). Reliance is placed on the observation that construction of the Will, which would advance the intention of the testator has to be preferred and as far as possible, effect is required to be given to every disposition contained in the Will. In this context it is to be borne in mind that the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a Will which takes effect only on the death of the testator, which cannot be compared to a case of settlement which takes effect immediately. In this context it is to be borne in mind that the Supreme Court was dealing with a case of a Will which takes effect only on the death of the testator, which cannot be compared to a case of settlement which takes effect immediately. In fact, in the very same judgment it has also been pointed out that the construction which would advance the intention of the testator shall not be given effect to if the law prevents such effect being given to it. Mr. Sundararajan has referred to various other decisions pertaining to the effect of Section 14(1) and 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, anissue which has been subject matter of interesting discussion by several judgments which continues even now in very many recently reported judgments. In fairness, he has also cited judgments which run contra to his submissions. Reference is made to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1994) 2 S.C.C. 511 (Gumpha v. Jaibai). That is a case of a right of maintenance under a Will and the Supreme Court held that it will be covered only by Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession ‘Act as it was not in the context of any pre-existing right. This decision was not acceptable however in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1996) 8 S.C.C. 525 = 1996-2-L.W. 63) (C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil). That was also a case of Will granting the right of maintenance to a Hindu female and the Supreme Court held that even where the property was acquired or possessed under a Will executed prior to the commencement of the Act and if the acquisition or possession was in recognition of a pre-existing right of a female Hindu, such as right of maintenance, Sub-Section (1) will operate irrespective of whether the testator died before or after the commencement of the Act. It was held that the limited estate will blossom into full ownership under Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of the Act will not apply. 8. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in (1997) 5 S.C.C. 460 (Venkamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharammarratna Ranganayakamma). It was held that the limited estate will blossom into full ownership under Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of the Act will not apply. 8. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in (1997) 5 S.C.C. 460 (Venkamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharammarratna Ranganayakamma). That was a case in which a deed of gift which was jointly executed by the widow and his son-appellant, widow acknowledging that she had only a limited interest in the property which she had obtained under an earlier compromise decree, with the condition that the property will revert back to her son after her death. It is needless to point out that no such situation arises in the present case since Govindammal was always asserting her full rights over the property and in fact in Ex. B.7, settlement deed also, she openly claims that she is the full owner of the property. 9. In Ram Kali v. Choudhri Ajit Shankar (1997) 9 S.C.C. 613 ) while the Supreme Court dealing with a case of inheritance under a Will in lieu of maintenance allowance and the widow was given only a right to reside in the suit house during her lifetime and was also debarred from alienating the same, the Supreme Court held that the property having been given to her in recognition of her pre-existing right of maintenance, her limited estate got enlarged into an absolute one. 10. In Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa (1997) 10 S.C.C. 673 ) the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the property was bequeathed to the wife by the husband under the Will with a right to enjoyment during her life time, it was held that the property has to be construed as acquired by the wife in lieu of her right to maintenance and hence by virtue of Section 14(1), she would become the absolute owner of the property. 11. All the above decisions deal with cases of Will and even in the case of a Will except for the decision of the Supreme Court in Gumphas case (1994) 2 S.C.C. 511 ) supra, which was decided by two learned Judges, all the subsequent judgments rendered by the larger Benches of the Supreme Court have positively held that the limited right given to the widow would enlarge into an absolute estate. In fact, strictly speaking the present case is not even covered by those judgments which deal with a Will, the present case being an outright settlement in favour of the settlee. As stated earlier, the settlee stands in a better footing than a Hindu female who is to obtain property under the Will only alter the death of the testator. In the present case of settlement, the vesting has taken immediate effect even during the life-time of the settlor. She has been put in possession of the property and she had also been dealing with the property in her own capacity and leasing it out in favour of the second defendant. Therefore, the present case stands even on a better footing than a case pertaining to properties obtained by a Hindu female under a Will. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant will also attack the validity of the settlement made in favour of the first defendant under the document dated 21.12.1975. According to him, it was not proved in a manner known to law. In this context both the Courts below have examined the issue in detail, and have recorded a positive finding that the settlement under Ex. B.7 which was under the registered document was proved adequately by D.W.2. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant also contends that the very document will show that the settlor had only limited interest and that therefore, the settlement under Ex. B.7 shows that Govindammal had positively asserted her title to the property which has been specifically mentioned in the document to the effect that as she had acquired the property towards her right of maintenance, the property had become her own. Therefore, I am unable to sustain the points raised by learned counsel for the appellant. 14. In the context of right of a female Hindu to inherit the property vested in her and as to whether such a vesting would fall under Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act, it is not disputed that leading judgment on the said issue reported in (1977) 3 S.C.C. 99 = 90 L.W. 89 S.N. (V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddi) continues to hold good and the views expressed in the said judgment have not been set aside or varied in any of the subsequent judgments. In the said judgment it has been repeatedly held that the Hindu females right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife. The said right had been recognised under Sastraic Hindu Law, itself. It was also further held that Section 14(1) of the Act and the Explanation thereto have been incorporated in the widest possible terms and therefore, must be liberally construed. 15. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that having regard to the expressions contained in the document itself, showing very clearly that the purpose of the grant was only for the maintenance of Govindammal, it is only section 14(1) which would apply to the facts of the present case and with the result the judgments of the Courts below have to be confirmed. ‘ 16. As far as the Second Appeal arising out of O.S. No. 586 of 1978 also, the tenancy granted in favour of the plaintiff in the said suit has to be upheld in view of the conclusion that Govindammal had every competence to deal with the property as her own and hence the induction of the plaintiff as a tenant was valid. 17. It is true that the first defendant in O.S. No. 127 of 1978 would contend that the plaintiff cannot claim right of tenancy over the suit property. In this context the Courts below have taken note of the fact that in the proceedings before the Revenue authorities under Record of Tenancy Act, both the contesting parties have been impleaded as parties and that it was seen from Ex. B.5, the order passed by the tenancy Tahsildar Periakulam was confirmed by the District Revenue Officer, Madurai in R.P. No. 9/81 and that therefore, if any one was aggrieved, it was up to him to have taken further proceedings under the provisions of the Act. The Courts below have also rightly held that the aggrieved persons have to work out their remedy under the provisions of the Act and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain any claims pertaining to the rights declared under the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, the said Second Appeal also is liable to be dismissed. The Courts below have also rightly held that the aggrieved persons have to work out their remedy under the provisions of the Act and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain any claims pertaining to the rights declared under the provisions of the said Act. Therefore, the said Second Appeal also is liable to be dismissed. The judgments of the Courts below deserve to be confirmed. 18. With the result, both the Second Appeals are dismissed. No costs.