Honble YAMIN, J.–Plaintiff Gokalchand filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 4200/- in the Court of Munsif, Bhim against the defendant appellant on the basis of a document executed by him in which he had promised that the amount would be repaid on 29.11.82. The same was not paid, therefore, suit for recovery was filed. In his written statement the appellant defendant denied the document and also pl- eaded that he was a marginal farmer within the meaning of the provisions of Rajasthan Scheduled Debtors (Liquidation of Indebtedness) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred as `the Act of 1976). He also pleaded that the plaintiff was a money lender under the provisions of the Rajasthan Money Lenders Act and he had not maintained account books as per provisions of the said Act, therefore, it was prayed that the suit may be dismissed. Learned trial Judge framed relevant issues, recorded evidence and held that the defendant appellant was a marginal farmer. The suit was dismissed on 29.4.88. First appeal was filed in which it was held that the provisions of the Act of 1976 did not apply to the transaction as admitted by both the parties. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC was submitted before the learned appellate Judge alongwith copy of a judgment dated 4.8.87 and it was submitted that the plaintiff was a money lender and since he had not complied with the provisions of Section 22 and 23 of the Money Lenders Act, suit was dismissed. This document was taken into consideration by the learned appellate Judge and was found that the judgment was not between the same parties and that there was no evidence on record of the present case that the plaintiff was a money lender, therefore, the provisions of the Money Lenders Act did not apply. The learned appellate Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. It is against this decree and judgment that this second appeal has been preferred. (2). I have heard learned counsel for the appellant Shri B.N. Kalla at length. He submitted that the appellant was a marginal farmer as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1976. The learned appellate Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. It is against this decree and judgment that this second appeal has been preferred. (2). I have heard learned counsel for the appellant Shri B.N. Kalla at length. He submitted that the appellant was a marginal farmer as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act of 1976. Counsel for the defendant had agreed before the first appellate Court that the provisions of the Act of 1976 were not applicable to the transaction because the Act came into force on 5.4.76 while the transaction related to 7.4.82, therefore, the provisions of the Act would not be applicable to this transaction. I find from Section 4 of the Act of 1976 that every debt advanced before the commencement of this Act, including the amount of interest, if any, payable by a scheduled debtor to a creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. It clearly means that the provisions of the Act were applicable only to the loans which were advanced before commencement of the Act. I agree with the learned appellate Judge that the provision is not applicable to the transaction which is admittedly dated 7.4.1982. (3). Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the provisions of Money Lenders Act were applicable and the suit should not have been decreed. Issue No.3 and 4 before the trial Court relate to the Money Lenders Act and on evidence it was found that the plaintiff was not a money lender. This finding is confirmed by the learned appellate Judge. The document which was submitted before the learned appellate Judge under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is a judgment of a case which was not between the same parties. The same was not relevant for the purpose of this case. The finding of fact cannot be interfered in second appeal. (4). In view of above discussion, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal and it is not worth admission. The appeal is hereby dismissed.