Honble YADAV, J.–The aforesaid petitions are listed for admission, but with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, I propose to dispose them of on merits. (2). By filing writ petition No. 1554/98, petitioner Shri Suresh Bhai Bhola Bhai Jani questions the validity of warrant of authorisation dated 27.3.98 (Annex.5) under Section 132 A of the Income Tax Act 1961 (hereinafter referred as the Act of 1961) on the ground inter alia that on the information in possession of the Commissioner (respondent No.2) no reasonable person could have entertained a belief that the amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- (Rs. twelve lacs) seized on suspicion from possession of the petitioner represents undisclosed income for the block period. (3). Criminal Misc. Pet. No. 363/98 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by Income Tax Officer, Sumerpur questioning legality and validity of the order dated 4.5.98 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class and Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sumerpur District Pali, holding Shri Suresh Bhai Bhola Bhai Jani to be entitled to refund of Rs. 4,80,000/- out of Rs. 12,00,000/- seized from him by police on suspicion on the basis of insertion of Section 158BFA in Act of 1961. (4). The petitioner is also aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 4.5.98 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class and Civil Judge (J.D.), Sumerpur in exercise of his power under Section 457 Cr.P.C. and has filed S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.406/98 seeking a relief to quash the impugned order in so far as it allows Income Tax Authorities to retain 60% of the total amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- with a direction to return entire amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- seized by police on the basis of suspicion that the money was either stolen property or had been obtained through some other offence especially when police failed to prove its suspicion. (5). It is conceded by learned counsel for the parties that in the aforesaid three petitions common questions of law and facts are involved therefore these three petitions can easily be heard and disposed of by a composite order. (6). Accordingly, I propose to dispose of these three petitions by a common order treating S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1554/98 as a leading case on the basis of detail reasons discussed hereinbelow. (7). (6). Accordingly, I propose to dispose of these three petitions by a common order treating S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1554/98 as a leading case on the basis of detail reasons discussed hereinbelow. (7). The brief facts necessary for effective and complete adjudication of the controversy involved between the parties are that on 24.3.98 at about 11.30 P.M. the petitioner was travelling by Bus No. RJ 19-P-4243 from Pali to Ahmedabad. While the said bus was being checked on the way by SHO, Police Thana, Sumerpur he found cash of Rs. 12,00,000/- in possession of the petitioner and seized the same under Section 102 Cr. P.C. on suspicion. (8). It is averred in the writ petition that the said cash of Rs. 12,00,000/- carried by the petitioner was given to him for payment to one Mr. Ramesh Soni in respect of purchase of a land for which the proprietor of M/s Johnson Jewellers Shri Anil Kumar P. Soni had entered into an agreement. However, since on account of non finalisation of the deal on telephonic instructions of the said proprietor the said amount was not paid to Shri Ramesh Soni and was being taken back to the owner Shri Anil Kumar proprietor of M/s Johnson Jewellers, when it was seized by the Police Authority as aforesaid and the petitioner was arrested on 24.3.98. (9). It is further averred in paragraph 4 of the writ petition that the police officials recorded his incriminating statement under coercion wherein he stated that the aforesaid cash was collected against sale of gold and silver at Pali and Jodhpur. The petitioner had already retracted from his aforesaid statement in case No. 135/98. (10). It appears from the averments made in the writ petition that the SHO, Sumerpur after effecting the seizure of said amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- informed to the Income Tax Officer, Sumerpur District Pali who in turn approached to respon- dent No.2 and obtained warrant of authorisation on 27.3.98 (Annex.5) under Section 132A of the Act of 1961. (11). It is alleged in the writ petition that the impugned warrant of authorisation under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 has been issued by respondent No.2 mechanically without application of mind and also without satisfying the condition precedent for its exercise. (11). It is alleged in the writ petition that the impugned warrant of authorisation under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 has been issued by respondent No.2 mechanically without application of mind and also without satisfying the condition precedent for its exercise. It is further averred that there was no definable material before respondent No.2 to arrive at such a reasonable belief as is required under Section 132A of the said Act nor any such reasonable belief has been recorded by him. It is alleged in paragraph 14 of the writ petition that the Income Tax authority (respondent No.2) is not entitled to issue any direction to the Court of the learned Magistrate under Section 132A of the said Act in whose custody the money in question is lying as the Court of learned Magistrate does not fall within the definition of `officer or authority under the aforesaid Section. It is also alleged that though the warrant under Section 132A of the said Act is addressed to SHO Police Thana Sumerpur, the Income-Tax Department has filed the necessary application dated 28.4.1998 (Annex.8) requesting the Court of learned Magistrate, Sumerpur in whose custody the money in question is lying, to hand over the cash to the Income-Tax Authority as per warrant of authorisation dated 27.3.98 (Annex.5). (12). After service of notice a detail reply has been filed on behalf of answering respondents No.1 to 4 emphatically denying the allegations and averments made in the writ petition. It is averred in paragraph 1 of the reply that it is wrong to say that the petitioner is working as an employee of M/s Johnson Jewellers. It is pointed out in the reply that the petitioner in his statement before the Income Tax Officer, Sumerpur on 3.4.98 had categorically denied that he is working at the shop of M/s Johnson Jewellers, Manak Chowk, Ahmedabad a true copy whereof is filed and marked as Annex.R/1 to the reply. (13). In paragraph 3 of the reply it is averred that it is absolutely wrong to say that the said amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- was carried by the petitioner to be given to Mr. Ramesh Soni in respect of purchase of the land for which the Proprietor of M/s Johnson Jewellers Mr. Anil Kumar P. Soni had entered into an agreement. In paragraph 3 of the reply it is averred that it is absolutely wrong to say that the said amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- was carried by the petitioner to be given to Mr. Ramesh Soni in respect of purchase of the land for which the Proprietor of M/s Johnson Jewellers Mr. Anil Kumar P. Soni had entered into an agreement. It is pointed out that the statement recorded of Shri Ramesh Kumar Soni by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Pali on 3.4.98 clearly show that he had not entered in any such agreement with Mr. Anil Kumar P. Soni a true copy of the statement of Shri Ramesh Kumar Soni recorded on 3.4.98 has also been filed and marked as Annex.R/2 to the reply. From statement of Shri Ramesh Kumar Soni it is further clear that he had no such telephonic talk with Mr. Anil Kumar P. Soni. Moreover he categorically denied that he ever had talk with Mr. Anil Kumar P. Soni on telephone. In paragraph 4 of the reply it is averred that the case No. 135/98 has already been decided by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sumerpur. Copy of the order passed by Judicial Magistrate is also filed which is marked as Annex.R/3. This order passed by Judicial Magistrate on 4.5.98 in case No. 135/98 has also been challenged by the petitioner as well as by Income Tax Officer, Sumerpur as mentioned hereinabove in the preceding paragraph of this order. (14). I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned warrant of authorisation under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 issued by respondent No.2 and the order dated 4.5.98 passed by learned judicial Magistrate in case No. 135/98. (15). At the first instance it is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kothari that the controversy involved in the present case is squarely covered by a decision taken by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra and others vs. Union of India and others (1). (16). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of answering respondents opposed the aforesaid argument with vehemence. It is urged by Mr. Kothari that the controversy involved in the present case is squarely covered by a decision taken by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra and others vs. Union of India and others (1). (16). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of answering respondents opposed the aforesaid argument with vehemence. It is urged by Mr. Bhandawat, learned counsel for respondents that the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case only in so far as interpretation of scope of Section 132A of the Act of 1961 is concerned but as regards interpretation of Section 158BC of the said Act it requires reconsideration in view of insertion of Section 158BFA in the Act of 1961 by way of the Income Tax (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1996 which is made enforceable with effect from 1.1.1997. According to Mr. Bhandawat, at the time of decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) the total undisclosed income of the block period was determinable under Section 158BC of the Act of 1961 and tax was leviable at the rate of 60% only free from interest or penalty whereas in view of inserted Section 158BFA now interest and penalty are also chargeable on undisclosed income of block period. It is pointed out by Mr. Bhandawat that when the decision in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) was rendered by me there was absolute certainty of leviability of tax only upto 60% of the amount so recovered in pursuance of an authorisation issued under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 whereas in view of inserted Section 158BFA even more amount than recovered can be reali- sed from the petitioner. According to Mr. Bhandawat under sub-section (2) of inserted Section 158BFA the penalty can also be increased upto three times of the amount of tax so leviable in respect of undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer under clause (c) of Section 158BC plus interest at the rate of 2% of the tax on undisclosed income. (17). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid rival contentions raised at the Bar. With the assistance of learned counsel for the parties I have gone through with care and caution all the materials available on the record. (18). In my considered opinion there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents. (17). I have given my thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid rival contentions raised at the Bar. With the assistance of learned counsel for the parties I have gone through with care and caution all the materials available on the record. (18). In my considered opinion there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents. To my mind after enforcement of Sec.158BFA of the Act of 1961 w.e.f. 1.1.1997 much water has run under the bridge. Now the Income Tax Authorities are empowered under the aforesaid Section to impose interest at the rate of 2% of the tax on undisclosed income determined under clause (c) of Sec. 158BC for every month or part of a month comprised in the period commencing on the day immediately following the expiry of the time specified in the notice. Not only this under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 158BFA of the said Act the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner (Appeals) in the course of any proceedings under Chapter XIV-B of the Act of 1961 may direct that a person shall pay by way of penalty a sum which shall not be less than the amount of tax leviable but which shall not exceed three times the amount of tax so leviable in respect of the undisclosed income determined by the Assessing Officer under clause (c) of Section 158BC. (19). Indisputably, the seizure of Rs. 12,00,000/- was done by police from the petitioner on the basis of suspicion on 24.3.98 and authorisation was issued in the present case by respondent No.2 under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 on 27.3.98 whereas mandatory provisions of Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961 were made enforceable w.e.f. 1.1.1997 therefore in view of newly inserted Section 158BFA of the said Act it can safely be held that respondents No.1 to 4 are entitled to withhold entire amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- in pursuance of warrant of authorisation issued by respondent No.2 under Section 132A of the said Act on 27.3.1998 (Annex.5) and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable. (20). From the aforesaid discussion I am of the opinion that after enforcement of Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961, the order dated 4.5.98 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate 1st Class-Sumerpur Distt. (20). From the aforesaid discussion I am of the opinion that after enforcement of Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961, the order dated 4.5.98 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate 1st Class-Sumerpur Distt. Pali also deser- ves to be quashed as I am satisfied that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sumerpur while deciding criminal case No. 135/98 under Section 457 Cr.P.C. had committed error in relying upon my decision in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra). It seems to me that the aforesaid mistake has crept in the judgment of learned Judicial Magistrate because mandatory provisions of newly inserted Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961 which were brought to the Statute book after my decision in case of Sohal Lal Mundra (supra) were not brought to his notice. (21). When learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kothari was confronted with the aforesaid interpretation of Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961 he started to make submissions that the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (Supra) even on point of scope of Section 132A of the Act of 1961 requires reconsideration in view of the decision rendered by learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Vindhya Metal Corporation and others vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax & Ors. (2), which was affirmed by Honble the Supreme Court in case of Commissioner of Income-Tax vs. Vindhya Metal Corporation & Ors. (3). (22). In reply learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Bhandawat invited my attention to paragraph 11 of the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) relating to interpretation and scope of Section 132A of the Act of 1961. According to Mr. Bhandawat the ratio of the case cited by learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kothari is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra). (23). For deeper and better understanding of the arguments advanced at the Bar it would be expedient to reproduce paragraph 11 of the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) which is bone of contention between the parties. Paragraph 11 reads thus:- ``(11). (23). For deeper and better understanding of the arguments advanced at the Bar it would be expedient to reproduce paragraph 11 of the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) which is bone of contention between the parties. Paragraph 11 reads thus:- ``(11). It is further true that when issuance of an authorisation under Sec. 132A of the Act of 1961 is challenged in a court of law, it will be opened to the petitioners to contend that on the facts or information disclosed no reasonable man could have arrived to the conclusion that the action under Sec.132-A was called for although formation of opinion under the said section is subjective. It is well to remember that jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India of this Court is very limited. In fact this Court cannot afford to act as an appellate or revisional court and as such has no justification to examine meticulously the information in order to decide for itself as to whether action under Sec.132-A was called for or not ? Suffice it to say that in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction this Court can examine whether the act of issuance of an authorisation under Sec.132-A is arbitrary or malafides or whether the subjective satisfaction which is recorded is such that it indicates lack of application of mind of the appropriate authority. According to me the reason to believe must be based on definable material or materials and if the information or the reason to believe has no nexus with the belief or there is no definable materials or tangible information for formation of such belief then in such a case action taken under Section 132-A of the Act of 1961 would be treated as illegal. (24). The facts of the case of Vindhya Metal Corporation (supra) rendered by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court reveal that the Corporation filed the writ petition questioning validity of the warrant of authorisation issued by the Commissioner under Section132A of the Act of 1961. (24). The facts of the case of Vindhya Metal Corporation (supra) rendered by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court and affirmed by the Supreme Court reveal that the Corporation filed the writ petition questioning validity of the warrant of authorisation issued by the Commissioner under Section132A of the Act of 1961. It is held in that case by learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Allahabad High Court that on the information in the possession of the Commissioner no reasonable person could have entertained a belief that the amount in the possession of the petitioner represented undisclosed income which ought to have been disclosed by him for purposes of the Acts and the writ petition was allowed. Against the aforesaid finding of fact the Commissioner Income Tax appealed to the Supreme Court and the Apex Court affirmed the aforesaid finding recorded by learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Vindhya Metal Corporation (supra). (25). In my humble opinion the ratio decidendi of the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) about interpretation of scope of Sec. 132A of the Act of 1961 is in full consonance with the ratio decidendi laid down by learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Vindhya Metal Corporation (supra) which is affirmed by the Supreme Court hence it does not require reconsideration. I see no reason to differ from the ratio decidendi laid down by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) in so far as it relates to the interpretation of scope of Sec.132A of the Act of 1961 and it deserves to be reiterated in the light of the decision rendered by the learned Judges constituting Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Vindhya Metal Corporation (supra) which is affirmed by the Apex Court. (26). I feel it necessary at this stage to observe that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra), interpreting scope of Section 132A requires reconsideration is wholly misplaced. (26). I feel it necessary at this stage to observe that the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra), interpreting scope of Section 132A requires reconsideration is wholly misplaced. It is to be noticed that in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) origi- nal record regarding information was produced before me by the Income Tax Department and on careful scrutiny of the same I was satisfied that there definable material available before the Income Tax Commissioner to issue warrant of authorisation under Section 132A of the Act of 1961. It is further borne out from perusal of paragraph 13 of the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (Supra) that from scrutiny of the original file produced by the Income Tax Department it was found that on the basis of definable materials available before the Income Tax Commissioner such belief was entertainable by a prudent man. After recording the aforesaid finding it was held in aforesaid case that while the sufficiency or otherwise of the information cannot be examined by the Court yet existence of informa- tion and its relevance to the formation of the belief can be considered. It was also found from perusal of original file that the existence of information and its relevance to the formation of belief by the Income Tax Commissioner was successfully demonstrated therefore I refrained to examine the sufficiency or otherwise of the information produced before the Income Tax Commissioner before issuing warrant of authorisation under Sec. 132A of the Act of 1961. Thus interpretation relating to scope of Section 132A of the Act of 1961 still holds water and does not require reconsideration, however, it is held that in view of newly inserted Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961 the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) relating to refund of 40% amount seized in pursuance of an authorisation issued under Section 132A of the said Act does not hold water hence it is overruled to this extent only for the reasons given hereinbelow at appropriate place. (27). (27). It is next contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that even if the decision rendered by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) does not require re- consideration with regard to interpretation of scope of Section 132A of the Act of 1961 even then whenever issuance of an authorisation under the aforesaid section is challenged in a Court of law it will be open for the petitioner to contend that on the facts or on information disclosed, no reasonable man could have arrived at a conclusion that the action under Sec. 132A of the Act of 1961 was called for although formation of opinion under the said section is subjective. In the present case source of tangible information disclosed to respondent No.2 on the basis of which authorisation under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 has been issued by him deserves to be investigated by this Court. (28). There is substance in the aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the petitioner. At the risk of repetition it is reiterated that while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution the High Court is required to examine in each case whether the act of issuance of authorisation under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 is arbitrary, malafide or whether the subjective satisfaction which is recorded is as such that it indicates lack of application of mind of the app- ropriate authority. It is to be examined in each case with care and caution that the reason to believe must be based on definable material or materials and if the information or the reason to believe has no nexus with the belief or there is no definable material or tangible information for formation of such belief then in such a case action taken under Sec.132A of the said Act would be treated to be arbitrary and illegal. Judicial review conferred upon High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to be held to be basic feature of the Constitution with an avowed object to ensure that High Court is to act as bulwark for protection of rights of citizenary and it would check on the vagaries negligence and mistakes of the executive or high handedness of the party before it against another on the anvil of rationality and reasonableness. (29). (29). With the aforesaid introspection let us examine the facts of the present case whether reason to believe is based on tangible and credible information having nexus with such belief for taking action under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 by way of issuing authorisation under the said Section. (30). In the present case also on behalf of answering respondents, original record relating to information is produced before me and on careful scrutiny of the original file produced by the Income Tax Department on the basis of which warrant of authorisation has been issued under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 I am satisfied that there were definable materials available before respondent No.2 to issue war- rant of authorisation under the aforesaid section and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable. The act of issuing authorisation by respondent No.2 on 27.3.98 (Annex.5) in the present case cannot be said to be based on hunch or incredible information. The act of respondent No.2 in issuing authorisation under Section 132A of the said Act cannot said to be arbitrary or malafides. The order of authorisation passed by respondent No.2 in the present case cannot be termed to have been passed without application of his mind to the credible information in his possession. Since the order of authorisation envisaged under Section 132A of the Act of 1961 is subjective in character hence I decline to investigate the sufficiency or otherwise of the information produced before respondent No.2 before issuing of warrant of authorisation under the aforesaid Section. (31). It goes without saying that in view of inserted Section 158BFA by the Income-tax (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1996 which is made enforceable w.e.f. 1.1.1997 the decision taken by me in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) issuing a direction to the respondents to refund balance of 40% amounting to Rs. 3,92,000/- to the petitioner out of total amount of Rs. 9,80,000/- does not hold water. In case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) the Income Tax Department failed to justify withholding of total amount of Rs. 9,80,000/- whereas in the present case in view of newly inserted Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961 the respondents have succeeded to de- monstrate before me that they are entitled to withhold the total amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- of the petitioner for the reasons given hereinabove. (32). 9,80,000/- whereas in the present case in view of newly inserted Section 158BFA of the Act of 1961 the respondents have succeeded to de- monstrate before me that they are entitled to withhold the total amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- of the petitioner for the reasons given hereinabove. (32). In view of the aforesaid discussion I am of the opinion that the instant petition is liable to be dismissed subject to and without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to show cause and explain before the Income Tax Authorities that no part of Rs. 12,00,000/- is his undisclosed income. The order dated 4.5.98 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class and Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sumerpur District Pali in misc. case No. 135/98 in exercise of his power under Section 457 Cr.P.C. releasing Rs. 4,80,000/- to the petitioner and remaining amount of Rs. 7,20,000/- to the respondents, relying upon my decision in case of Sohan Lal Mundra (supra) also deserves to be quashed for the reasons discussed hereinabove. (33). Upshot of the aforementioned discussion is that the instant writ petition No. 1554/98 and S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 406/98 filed by the petitioner lack merit and as such are hereby dismissed subject to and without prejudice to his right to show cause and explain before the Income Tax Authority that no part of Rs. 12.00.000/- is his undisclosed income S.B. Cri. Misc. Petition No. 363/98 filed by the Income Tax Officer, Sumerpur is hereby allowed with a direction to the learned Judicial Magistrate Sumerpur to release entire amount of Rs. 12,00,000/- to the Income-tax Department. The assessing authority is directed to conclude the proceedings against the petitioner under Chapter XIV-B of the Act of 1961 within a rea- sonable period, preferably within six months from today. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case costs are made easy.