Honble YAMIN, J–This is a revision against the order of learned District Judge, Sirohi dated 15.12.95 by which he set aside the order of learned Munsif Abu Road dated 3.3.93. (2). I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at the admission stage of the revision petition and have gone through the record. (3). In a suit for eviction under the Raj. Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred as `the Act) defence against eviction was struck off by the learned Munsif. The order was challenged before the learned District Judge who allowed the appeal and held that the tenant did not know about the order of learned trial Court determining the rent as her counsel had not informed her. (4). Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the reason given by the tenant that she did not know about the order for 8 months was unconvincing. He submitted that the learned appellate Judge has committed jurisdictional error while condoning the delay and thereby allowing the appeal. He cited Jai Narain vs. Satya Narain (1), wherein it was held that unless delay is explained to the satisfac- tion of the Court, the tenant deserves no sympathy. He also cited Banshi @ Banshidhar Agarwal vs. Laxmi Narain (2), wherein it was observed that the ground for condonation that lawyer did not inform petitioner about date of hearing and of passing of impugned order was not convincing and the petitioner ought to have been vigilant himself and revision petition was disallowed. He also cited Ambica Quarry Works etc. vs. State of Gujarat and others (3), wherein law about precedents was explained and it was held that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically followed from it. He submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case the reasons given by the tenant are not convin- cing and the learned appellate Judge has committed error of law in condoning the delay on unconvincing ground. (5). On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents cited a number of authorities, the gist of which is that the Court should be lenient in looking in to delay in such cases. (5). On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents cited a number of authorities, the gist of which is that the Court should be lenient in looking in to delay in such cases. He cited a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in Visha ndas vs. Savitri Devi (4), in which it was held that the provision of Section 13(5) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. This Court in M/s. Sunmoon Stationers vs. Banshilal (5), has held that though the Court has power to strike out defence under Section 13(5) of the Act yet this discretion should be exercised only when default is wilful and contumacious. He also cited Prahlad Kumar & Anr. vs. Babulal (6), in which the tenant had deposited all arrears of rent except the rent for a perticular month. It was observed that the lower courts should have exercised discretion in favour of the tenant because the default committed was not a wilful default. He also cited Kishanlal Vs. Tara Chand & Ors. (7), in which the tenant had paid rent to the counsel which was not deposited by his clerk. It was held that the petitioner was not negligent and the order striking out defence was set aside. He cited Vishan Das Vs. Savitri Devi (8), in which tenant paid amount to his counsel well in advance for paying to counsel for landlord. This fact was not denied by the counsel for the landlord. It was held that no negligence or malafide was found on part of the tenant and hence a case for condonation of delay was made out. (6). On the basis of these citations, counsel for the respondents made out a case that the counsel for the respondent did not inform her about the order of determining of rent and, therefore, delay occurred and the appellate Court found it a fit case to condone the delay and, therefore, there was no error committed by the appellate court. He cited a recent judgment of Honble Supreme Court reported in N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy (9), in which it has been observed that when the delay was sufficiently explained and the trial Court has condoned it, the High Court should not have reversed the finding in revision and the trial Court was justified in condoning delay. The facts of this case are a bit interesting. The facts of this case are a bit interesting. A suit for declaration of title and ancilliary reliefs was filed by the respondent. It was decreed exparte on 28.10.91. Appellant, who was defendant in the suit, on coming to know of the decree moved an application to set it aside. The same was dismissed for default on 17.2.93. Appellant moved for having that order set aside only on 19.8.95 for which a delay of 883 days was noted. He also filed an application to condone the delay by offering explanation that a counsel was engaged for making the motion to set aside exparte decree. The advocate failed to inform him. The application was dismissed on 17.2.93. When he got summons from the execution side on 5.7.95 he approached his advocate and he was told that perhaps execution proceedings would have been taken by the decree holder since there was no stay against such execution proceedings. On the advice of the same advocate he signed some papers including a Vakalatnama for resisting the execution proceedings, besides making a payment of Rs.2000/- towards advocates fees and other incidental expenses. But the fact is that the said advocate did not do anything in the Court even thereafter. On 4.8.95 the execution warrant was issued by the Court and he became suspicious of the conduct of his advocate, he rushed to the Court from where he got disquieting information that his application to set aside the exparte decree stood dismissed for default as early as on 17.2.93 and nothing was done in the Court thereafter on his behalf. He also learnt that his advocate had left the profession and joined as legal assistant of some company. He then filed application to set aside the order dated 7.2.93. He moved against the advocate in the Consumer Redressal Forum wherefrom he got a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- besides a cost of Rs.500/-. It was held in such circumstances, that he was vigilant and was not sleeping and the delay was condoned. (7). If the matter in hand is examined, it is found that the defendant was not informed by her counsel that the rent had been determined by the trial Court. It was pleaded before the Court below that the order by which rent was determined on 26.10.91 was signed by the counsel without reading it. (7). If the matter in hand is examined, it is found that the defendant was not informed by her counsel that the rent had been determined by the trial Court. It was pleaded before the Court below that the order by which rent was determined on 26.10.91 was signed by the counsel without reading it. This cannot be accepted as there is no affidavit of the counsel to that effect. Even otherwise it will be absurd to believe it in the facts and circumstances of this case. However, the defendant was an old lady and was not attending the Court as her counsels instructions. She came to know in her locality that she will have to vacate the house if she had not deposited rent. The she approached her advocate. She filed application and also deposited all the arrears with interest as well as rent for the month of June, 1992 in advance. The learned appellate court was of the view that the tenant respondent did not commit default contumaciously and wilfully and that she had shown a sufficient cause that her counsel had not informed her about the order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned District Judge did not give a finding that there was a sufficient cause to condone the delay. In the facts and circumstances of the case when he found that the tenant had not committed a wil- ful default and her counsel had not informed her about the order, no separate finding was required in so many words that she had shown a sufficient cause. So far as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (10), it was held that the Court should adopt liberal view. To me, it appears that she had shown a sufficient cause. (8). So far as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (10), it was held that the Court should adopt liberal view. To me, it appears that she had shown a sufficient cause. (8). It might be correct in some cases that the petitioner ought to have vigilant himself but in the facts and circumstances of this case when the defendant tenant was an old lady and was asked by her advocate that she need not come on every date of hearing and as soon as she came to know about the fact that she may have to vacate the premises, she rushed to and contacted the lawyer, moved the trial Court and deposited arrears as well as some amount in advance as rent, I am of very clear view that she had explained the delay to the satisfaction of the Court. Therefore, in my view the appellate Court has not committed error in condoning the delay and allowing the appeal. (9). Consequently, this revision petition is hereby dismissed. Costs are made easy.