D. K. SETH, J. The petitioner was ap pointed on 29-12-1978 in the post of Cataloguer in the Sampurna Nand Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi. By a letter dated 23-12-1979 the petitioner ser vice was terminated with immediate effect. Thereafter, the petitioner was posted on 24-12-1990 on the Press Department of the University and after few months no work was allotted to him and the payment of salary was stopped. The petitioner made a representation on 22-8-1984 to the Vice Chancellor alleging that he had made a representation to the Vice-Chancellor on 20-7-1981. In the said representation he had pointed out that he worked in the Press Department till 25-12-1981. There after, by order dated 30-7- 1987 the State Government requested the Vice-Chancel lor to consider the petitioners application for reappointment in accordance with law. By a letter dated 20-10-1987 the University intimated the Government that no application for appointment ap pears to have been made by the petitioner to the University, there a copy may be sent to the University. Through a letter dated 29-10-1987 the University informed the petitioner with reference to his applica tion that he may apply for recruitment pursuant to the attached advertisement. The petitioner appears to have made few more representations on 25-3-1993, 5-4-1995 and 10-5-1995. The petitioner had also applied before the Chancellor on 5-4-1995 under Section 68 of the State Universities Act. By an order dated 31-5-1995 the representation of the petitioner dated 5-4- 1995 was rejected on the ground that the case of the petitioner does not come within Section 68 of the said Act. By a letter dated 5-6-1995 the Chancellor re quested the Vice Chancellor while for warding a copy of the letter dated 5-4-1995 of the petitioner with the advice to take appropriate legal action. On the basis of the above facts, this writ petition has been filed claiming the relief to the extent that the orders dated 23-12-1979, 31-5-1995 and 5-6-1995 contained in Annexures 3,15 & 16 respectively be quashed and the petitioner be reinstated in the post of Cataloguer and be confirmed and regularised in his service with consequen tial benefit and to decide the repre sentation contained in Annexures 9,11, 12 and 13 respectively in the light of the order dated 31-5-1995 and 5-6-1995 passed by the Chancellor contained in Annexures 15 and 16 respectively. 2. Mr. 2. Mr. B. B. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order dated 23-12\1979 has been passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India which is applicable even in respect of ad hoc employees. He further contends that the petitioner having been appointed in the post of cataloguer he cannot be reverted to the post in the Press Department. Neither he can be engaged in the examination depart ment of daily wage basis seasonally. He further contends that the petitioner had been pursuing his remedy consistently through representations as pointed out therein, therefore, this court should inter vene and make justice available to the petitioner which has since been denied by the respondents. He next contends that the rejection of his representation dated 5-4-1995 on the ground it does not fall within the scope of Section 68 of the Act cannot be sustained. He further contends that by reason of the order dated 5-6-1995 it was incumbent upon the Vice-Chancel lor to give appointment to the petitioner. He further contends that in view of Sec tion 35 (2) of the State Universities Act the petitioners appointment could not have been terminated without the ap proval of the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, the petitioner should be deemed to be in employment continuously since the order of termination is invalid and void ab initio. He further contends that the right to con tinue in service is a right which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution and as such the same cannot be taken away in the man ner it has been so done and the petitioner cannot be deprived of his employment during this long period of time. Therefore, the writ petition should be allowed. 3. Mr. Anil Tiwari, learned counsel for respondents on the other hand relying on the counter-affidavit filed by him that the initial appointment in the post of Cataloguer was a time bound class III post sanctioned by the University Grants Com mission for lessening the work load of the University and the post was dependent on the sanction by the University Grants Commission. As soon the sanction by the University Grants Commission of the said post was not extended, there was no ques tion of continuation of the petitioner in the said post which did not continue after the non-extension of the sanction of the grant by the University Grants Commission. In order to accommodate the petitioner, the petitioner was engaged as a seasonal clerk in the examination depart ment, which ceased automatically at the end of its season. The petitioner could not be retained in the absence of existence of the post, the sanction whereof was time bound. His subsequent engagement a daily wage labour does not confer any right on him. In reply to the letter dated 30-7-1987 sent by the Government the petitioner was informed that continuity in service was not possible but he could apply pursuant to the subsequent advertisement. But the petitioner had never applied. He contends further that the petitioner has been in the habit of making representation succes sively. Since he has not resorted to any (sic) appointed by law making of succes sive representations would not be a remedy appointed by law whereby the petitioner intends to explain the delay of almost 14 years in approaching this court. The representation dated 20-7-1981, which was alleged to have been made in his representation dated 22-8-1984 was ad mittedly made after the period stipulated in Section 68. Inasmuch as the order of termination was passed on 23-12-1979 whereas the representation was made on 20-7-1981. On these facts he contends that the petitioner has not been able to estab lish a legal right which he could enforce through this writ petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Mr. Pauls conten tion appears to be contradictory when he on one breath says that the orders dated 31-5-1995 and 5-6-1995 should be quashed and in the same breath he says that the petitioner should be given appointment pursuant to the order dated 5-6-1995. If he prays for quashing of an order he cannot seek enforcement thereof in the same breath. 5. So far as application of Article 311 of the Constitution of India as contended by Mr. Paul is concerned, it appears that it is not a case where Article 311 could at all be brought into effect. If he prays for quashing of an order he cannot seek enforcement thereof in the same breath. 5. So far as application of Article 311 of the Constitution of India as contended by Mr. Paul is concerned, it appears that it is not a case where Article 311 could at all be brought into effect. In order to attract application of Article 311 it is necessary that the person must hold a civil post. A post in this context denotes an office. A post under the State is an office or a posi tion to which duties in connection with the affairs of the State are attached, an office or a position to which a person is ap pointed and which may exist apart from and independently of the holder of the post. A post is an employment, but every employment is not a post. Expression used in Article 310 (2) permitting abolition or requiring vacation of post, other than those mentioned therein emphasises the idea of existence of the post independent of the person. A causal labour is not a holder of a post. A person can be said to have right to a post only when he is sub-stantively appointed to it. The State may create or abolish a post. The power to abolish a post is inherent in the right to create it. Whether or not a post should be retained or abolished is essentially a mat ter of policy decision. But such decision is required to be taken in good faith ar,i shall not be a pretence taken to get rid of an inconvenient incumbent. Article 311 (2) deals with cases of dismissal or removal as a measure of penalty. 6. Reference may be had to the decisions in the cases of State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884 ; Superintendent of Post Offices v. P. K. Rajamma, AIR 1977sc 1677; G. S. Gill v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1898 ; K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1982 SC 1107 , Mathuradas Mohanlal Kedia v, S. D. Munushaw & Ors. , AIR 1981 SC 53 ; State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshavlalsoni,alr 1954 SC 181. 7. , AIR 1981 SC 53 ; State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshavlalsoni,alr 1954 SC 181. 7. The facts of the present case, as discussed hereafter, does not satisfy the test of civil post in order to attract applica tion of Article 311 since the post had no existence independent of the petitioner. It stood abolished due to non- extension of the sanction. The abolition was neither mala fide nor a pretence to ease out the petitioner nor a penalty in disguise. 8. Mr. Pauls attempt to extend of Article 311 in the facts of the present case, as discussed hereafter, would be stretching the principle too far, which is otherwise impermissible on the basis of the law set tled. In the case of K. Rajendran (supra) it was held that Articles 38 and 43 of the Constitution insists that the State should endeavour to find sufficient work for the people so that they may put their capacity to work into economic use and earn a fairly good living. But these article does not mean that everybody should be provided with a job in the service of the State and if a person is provided with one he should not be asked to leave it even for a just cause. The question whether a person who ceases to be a Government servant according to law should be rehabilitated by giving an alternative employment is as the law stands today, a matter of policy on which the court has no voice. 9. The statement made in paragraph Nos. 2 and 5 of counter- affidavit with regard to the time bound sanction of the post has since been dealt with in para graphs 3 and 4 of the rejoinder-affidavit respectively. In the said paragraph the fact that the post was time bound and that the sanction for the said post was not extended by the University Grants Commission has not be denied or disputed. Therefore, the said fact as stated in paragraph Nos. 2 and 5 of the counter-affidavit has not been controverter which is presumed to be cor rect. Unless there is a post, there cannot be any question of appointment or regularisation. If the sanction is a time bound one and the sanction is not ex tended in that event the post automatically ceases. 2 and 5 of the counter-affidavit has not been controverter which is presumed to be cor rect. Unless there is a post, there cannot be any question of appointment or regularisation. If the sanction is a time bound one and the sanction is not ex tended in that event the post automatically ceases. In case the service is terminated on account of abolition of the post on account of non-extension of sanction in that event there is no scope for continuing the petitioner. In such circumstances the provision of Section 35 (2) of the State Universities Act cannot be attracted. Then again the petitioner himself had accepted the job in the Press Department as well as in the examination Department which fact is also not in dispute. Therefore, there are every reason to believe that the petitioner had waved his right. 10. Be that as it may. The petitioner did not challenge the order dated 23-12-1979 until this writ petition was filed. Even if he had made a grievance against the said order the same was alleged to have been made out in his representation dated 22-8-1994 wherein he has pointed out that the first representation was made on 20-7-1981. This representation dated 20-7-1981 and the representation dated 22-8-1994 were addressed to the Vice-Chancellor and as such they were not a representation within the meaning of Section 68 of the State Universities Act. Even if it was a representation within the meaning of Section 68 of the said Act it should have been made within three months from the date of the cause of action viz. ; 23-12-1979 as is provided as time limit in Section 68, first proviso. The representation to the Vice-Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act appears to have been made on 5-4- 1995 which was beyond time. Whether the mat ter comes within the purview of Section 68 or not may be not be necessary to go into because the same has not been made within the time limit and the Chancellor having not entertained the reference suo motu after expiry of the period, the repre sentation is not maintainable. Even if it is refused on different ground it may not be necessary to go into in view of the above facts. 11. Even if it is refused on different ground it may not be necessary to go into in view of the above facts. 11. The fact remains that in view of successive correspondences as referred to here in the before, the petitioner was in formed to apply pursuant to the advertise ment but admittedly he had never applied for any such post. Then again the repre sentations which are being made from time to time as appears from the facts disclosed were not a remedy provided by a law. Successive representations seeking a relief is not a remedy appointed by law and therefore, cannot be a ground on which the delay can be explained, a held follow ing the decisions of the Apex Court as discussed in Motilal Jain v. Director Techni cal Education U. P. & Ors. , 1996 (3) UPLBEC 2077 . The petitioner is out of employment admittedly since after 1981 and the petitioner waited till 1995 to espouse his cause though he had referred to a decision by the Tribunal in case of another employee which was decided on 28-4-1986 yet he had not resorted to legal remedy available to him during all these periods. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any relief on account of the delay in seek ing remedy. 12. In the circumstances, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned orders. This writ petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost. Mr. B. B. Paul learned counsel for the petitioner at this stage contends that since the petitioner has served for almost three years his case may be considered in terms of the order dated 5-6-1995 passed by the Chancellor. The order dated 5-6-1995 is an administrative order which specifies that the petitioner case may be considered for appointment or reappointment. Mr. Paul has not been able to show that under which provision such an order could be passed by the Chancellor and how it would be binding on the Vice-Chancellor. When the Chancellor refused to exercise his power under Section 68 it is not open to issue any such order. There is nothing in the State University Act which empowers the Chan cellor to issue such an order. Neither there is any provision in the said Act which makes such order binding on the Vice Chancellor or enforceable in law. When the Chancellor refused to exercise his power under Section 68 it is not open to issue any such order. There is nothing in the State University Act which empowers the Chan cellor to issue such an order. Neither there is any provision in the said Act which makes such order binding on the Vice Chancellor or enforceable in law. The court cannot grant the relief of giving appointment of the petitioner in view of the facts and circumstances stated above. However, in case the petitioner applies pursuant to any advertisement against any vacancy in that event it will be open to the respondents to consider the petitioners case in accordance with law, if necessary by relaxing his age along with other can didates provided the petitioner is other wise eligible. Petition dismissed. .