Judgment :- 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the learned District Judge, Salem in A.S. No. 215 of 1979 in confirming the judgment of the learned District Munsif of Sankari at Salem in O.S. No. 570 of 1976. The Government of Tamil Nadu, the fifth defendant in the suit, is the appellant in the present Second Appeal. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of plaintiffs title to the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. According to the plaintiff, the suit property originally belonged to one Sowri, who sold the said property to one Chellan on 8- 4-1929 (Ex. A2), that the said Chellan mortgaged the suit property on 30-5-1930 (Ex. A3) to one Raja Gounder for Rs. 200/- and the said Raja Gounder was in possession of the property by paying kist. The said Raja Gounder was the elder brother of the plaintiffs; father and Raja Gounder had died in 1935. The plaintiffs father got the suit property in a family partition effected between the plaintiffs father and Raja Gounder and the mortgagor Chcllan aiso died somewhere about 35 years ago and that neither Chellan nor his legal representatives ever attempted to redeem the properly. The mortgagee and his successors have been paying kists regularly to the Government. It is further stated by the plaintiff that in the year 1974, the Tahsildar, Omalur issued a notice asking the plaintiff to show-cause against the resumption and cancellation of the assignment of the suit lands on the ground that the land was conditionally assigned in favour of Chellan and be violated the condition. According to the plaintiff, the Government had not taken any steps between the years 1930 to 1974 and no notice was issued to the mortgagor Chellan for the violation of the conditions and therefore the officers were wrong in holding that the mortgagor Chellan was an assignee. The Tahsildar subsequently issued orders to resume the land and the appeal filed by the plaintiff to the Revenue Divisional Officer, District Revenue Officer, Board of Revenue and finally the Government were dismissed and according to the plaintiff all the Authorities were labouring under misconception relying on incorrect and misleading reports. The Tahsildar subsequently issued orders to resume the land and the appeal filed by the plaintiff to the Revenue Divisional Officer, District Revenue Officer, Board of Revenue and finally the Government were dismissed and according to the plaintiff all the Authorities were labouring under misconception relying on incorrect and misleading reports. The plaintiff contended that the resumption order assuming that Chellan was the person to whom the lands were assigned and he had allowed a caste Hindu to enjoy the lands was incorrect and the resumption order was therefore void abinitio . The defendants 1 to 4 tried to trespass into the suit properties on 19-10-1976 by putting up a hut. Hence, a notice was sent under Section 80 C.P.C. to the fifth defendant. 3. In the written statement by the third defendant, the contentions of the plaintiff were denied. According to him, one Kaveri and Kandan, sons of Lakshmanan who are harijans were in possession and enjoyment of about 1-1/2 acres of land in and around the odai. The defendants 1, 2 and 4 have perfected their title to the suit properties by adverse possession. The fifth defendant/appellant, in their written statement denied that the suit properties originally belonged to Sowri. The suit properties stood registered as A.D. and conditional patta dry lands in the name of one Chellan was issued as could be seen from the Revenue records. There are no records to show that the suit properties were mortgaged or delivered possession to one Raja Gounder and that even if there was any such mortgage, it was void and not binding on the fifth defendant. There were also no records to show that the alleged mortgage or his successors having been paid any kist to the Government. The claim of adverse possession was also denied. The assignment was properly resumed and the lands were ordered to be treated as assessed waste dry as per the rules and the action in having converted the lands into the assessed waste dry was done in accordance with the rules. The occupation of the suit lands by the plaintiff as well as by the defendants 1 to 4 are encroachments and the proceedings were being taken against them as per rules. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the learned trial Judge held that though under Ex. The occupation of the suit lands by the plaintiff as well as by the defendants 1 to 4 are encroachments and the proceedings were being taken against them as per rules. 4. On the basis of the said pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the learned trial Judge held that though under Ex. B5, the property was shown as AD the land said to have been assigned to Chellan conditionally, there was nothing to show that an order of as signment was really made in favour of the said Chellan on the basis of any conditions. There fore, according to the learned trial Judge, there was no proper proof of the conditional assignment in favour of Chellan and that therefore, the plaintiff having filed documents to show that the property was mortgaged by Chellan, the suit was liable to be decreed. As against the said judgment, A.S. No. 215 of 1979 was filed before the District Court, Salem and the learned Appellate Judge has also dismissed the appeal filed by the Government. Though the learned appellate Judge found that the public records clearly show that it was a grant in favour of a harijan, and that the first respondent was only a mortgagee and that the plea of adverse possession by the third party has no substance however, the learned appellate Judge took into account the fact that the defendants 1, 3 and 4 had earlier filed A.S. No. 211 of 1978 as against the very same judgment in O.S. No. 570 of 1976 and that the appellate Court by its judgment dated 22-12-1978 had dismissed the appeal. The appellant-Government was one of the contesting respondents and being a party to A.S. No. 211 of 1978, the decision in the said judgment having been rendered by a competent Court, would operate as against the Government in the present appeal also. On the basis of the said circum stance, the appeal filed by the Government was dismissed and hence the present Second Appeal. 5. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the Government contends that the finding of the appellate Court that the appeal filed by the Government was barred by res ju-dicata, was not valid and that since the Government filed an independent appeal, the lower Court ought to have considered the appeal on merits. 6. 5. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the Government contends that the finding of the appellate Court that the appeal filed by the Government was barred by res ju-dicata, was not valid and that since the Government filed an independent appeal, the lower Court ought to have considered the appeal on merits. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents states that the finding of the lower appellate Court that the decision in A.S. No. 211 of 1978 would operate as res judicata was valid and hence the decision of the lower appellate Court requires to be sustained. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the following judgments:— 1. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1061 (Stale of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee and others). In that judgment, the Supreme Court has held that a wrong decision by the Court having jurisdiction was as much binding between the parties and could be superseding only by the appeals to higher tribunals. The said judgment has no relevance to the issue raised in the present Second Appeal. ii) A.I.R. 1947 Madras 170 (Ramamani v. Basavayya). This is also a case which arose between co-owners in a partition suit. It was held that in the previous suit one of the parties having definitely asked for her share in the properties, that party must have deemed to be the plaintiff in the previous suit and the alliance is to be the defendant in the said suit. It was held that if the parties were so arrayed there was no question about the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata. That decision has no relevance to the present Second Appeal. iii) The decision reported in A.I.R. 1950 Privy Council 17 is also a case between co-defendants and the said ruling has no relevance to the present Second Appeal. iv) The decision reported in AIR 1963 S.C. 385 (Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikan-darkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai) also has no relevance to the present Second Appeal and that is a case which dealt with the issue as to whether the final decision based on findings of more than one issue would be sufficient for the ultimate decision. iv) The decision reported in AIR 1963 S.C. 385 (Vithal Yeshwant Jathar v. Shikan-darkhan Makhtumkhan Sardesai) also has no relevance to the present Second Appeal and that is a case which dealt with the issue as to whether the final decision based on findings of more than one issue would be sufficient for the ultimate decision. It was held that where the final decision in any matter at issue between the parties was based by the Court in its decision on more than one point, each of which by itself would be sufficient for the ultimate decision and would operate as res-jiuiicata. I fail to understand as to how the said judgment has any relevance to the present Second Appeal. v) The decision reported in AIR 1971 S.C. 442 is also a similar decision to the decision rendered in AIR. 1963 SC 385 and as such of no use for the present Second Appeal. 7. The point in issue in the present Second Appeal is that one suit was filed against the Government, namely, OS. No. 570 of 1976 and the same was dismissed by the trial Court. Two separate appeals were filed by the defendants in the suit. Defendants 1, 3 and 4 filed A.S. No. 211 of 1978 impleading the fifth defendant also as respondent in the appeal and the said appeal was dismissed, confirming the findings of the trial Court. A separate appeal was filed by the fifth defendant/appellant herein in A.S. No. 215 of 1979 and the question is as to whether the dismissal of A.S. No. 211 of 1978 would operate as against the case of the fifth defendant in the separate appeal filed by the fifth defendant. 8. The issue is covered directly by a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1953 SC 419 (Narhari and others v. Shanker and others). In that case, from the decree of trial Court in favour of the plaintiff two separate appeals were taken by two sets of the defendants and both the appeals were dismissed. Therefore, two decrees were prepared and the plaintiffs have filed two appeals. But one of the appeal was dismissed as time barred and on the principle of res judicata. The High Court dismissed the other appeal also. Therefore, two decrees were prepared and the plaintiffs have filed two appeals. But one of the appeal was dismissed as time barred and on the principle of res judicata. The High Court dismissed the other appeal also. The Supreme Court has held that it was not necessary to file two separate appeals and that the question of res judicata arose only when there were two suits. As there was only one suit and both the decrees were with reference to the same case and based on the same judgment, the matter decided concerned the entire suit and the principle of res judicata will not apply. 9. This judgment was followed in a sub sequent ruling reported in 1976 (3) S.C.C. 528 (Loanankutty v. Thomman and another). On the facts of that particular case, there were originally two suits on which separate appeals arose. The Supreme Court while holding that separate appeals should be filed, referred to the earlier judgment reported in AIR 1953 S.C. 419 and held that the said decision was distinguishable on the ground that in the earlier judgment, the appeals arose as against one suit and not out of two different suits. 10. Therefore, the lest in the present case is as to whether the two appeals were from one and the same suit or from different suits. As slated earlier, on the facts of the present case, it is obvious that A.S. No. 211 of 1978 filed by the other defendants in the suit and A.S. No. 215 of 1979, the subject matter of the present appeal filed by the fifth defendant/appellant arose from and out of one and the same suit. Therefore, this situation is fully covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court re ported in A.I.R. 1953. S.C. 419. In fact, a perusal of the two judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents would show that those two judgments were with reference to two separate suits and therefore, the Supreme Court had held that the findings in one suit would operate as res judicata , which are as follows:— i) AIR 1966 S.C. 1332 (Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar). ii) AIR 1993 S.C. 1202 (Premier Tyres Ltd. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation). 11. ii) AIR 1993 S.C. 1202 (Premier Tyres Ltd. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation). 11. Therefore, the ground on which the first appeal by the appellant was dismissed cannot be sustained and the judgment of the appellate Court has to be set aside. On the merits of the suit, as stated earlier, the appellate Court has found in favour of the appellant herein. The Court has positively found that the plea of adverse possession by the plaintiff/respondent was not acceptable and that the plaintiff was holding the property only as a mortgagee and that the right of the Government in seeking resumption of the land cannot be resisted by the plaintiff. The said finding being a pure question of fact cannot be interfered with in this Second Appeal. Therefore, even though the ground on which the appeal by the fifth defendant was dismissed is to be set aside, there is no necessity to remand the appeal for fresh disposal to the lower appellate Court in as much as on facts, the lower appellate Court has found against the plaintiff after adequate analysis of the evidence. 12. Even in this Court while considering the evidence independently as to whether the plaintiff had proved adverse possession, it is seen that the Ex. A3 kist receipt pertaining to the year 1936 has been issued in the name of Chellan. Likewise. Ex. A4 kist receipt pertaining to fasli 1371 has also been issued only in favour of Chellan. Ex. A5 pertaining to fasli 1375 bears no name and therefore, cannot be relied upon by the plaintiff. It is only in Ex. A6 (fasli-1374) to Ex. A12 (fasli 1386), the name of the plaintiff is shown as the person in possession of the land. Those kist pertain to the years 1965 to 1977. It is to be borne in mind that the land has been resumed by the Government in 1974 itself and classified as A.D.. The subsequent appeals filed by the plaintiff have all been dismissed. Exs. A13 to A15 patta books issued in favour of the plaintiff would also show that they have been issued only in the year 1974 and therefore, could be of no use to the plaintiff. 13. On the defendants side also, kist receipts have been filed for the years 1975 and 1976. Exs. A13 to A15 patta books issued in favour of the plaintiff would also show that they have been issued only in the year 1974 and therefore, could be of no use to the plaintiff. 13. On the defendants side also, kist receipts have been filed for the years 1975 and 1976. This would render the plaintiffs claim of being in possession of the land on the date of suit, unacceptable or at least doubtful. Therefore, considered from any angle, the plaintiff has not established the adverse possession over the suit properly as on the date of the suit and hence the said claim has to be rejected. 14. Even ignoring the lack of evidence to prove adverse possession, it is to be borne in mind that Chellan had no right to encumber the property by a mortgage and his acts of violating the conditions of assignment cannot be upheld. Therefore, the plaintiff being only a mortgagee from a person who had no right to mortgage the properly, cannot plead adverse possession or resist resumption of the land by the Government. The order of resumption was challenged by the plaintiff before all the appellate and revisional authorities and concluded against him. The classification of the land has also been converted as “Assessed waste Dry”, and has not been set aside in a manner known to law. Assignments of public lands are not to be usually done except under certain stringent conditions and it would be against public interest and public policy to entertain or to uphold objections of adverse possession as against the State. 15. In the result, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the Second Appeal is