JUDGMENT D. RAJU, C.J.—The above two appeals may be dealt with together since they arise out of one and the same suit, civil suit No. 87 of 1985 on the file of Senior Sub-Judge, Kullu and the two appeals filed both by the plaintiffs who lost in part and by the defendant who also succeeded only to portion of the claim also came to be disposed of by a common judgment. The plaintiffs are the appellants in R.S.A. No. 417 of 1992 and the defendant is the appellant in R.S. A. No. 420 of 1992. The plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that they are the owners in possession of the suit properties and in the alternative they have sought for possession of 1/6th share of the disputed land described in the plaint. 2. The case of the plaintiffs is that one Sobhu, father of the plaintiffs and the defendant owned the properties in question, that he executed a Will on 15.4.1973 and as a matter of fact, died on 3.8.1973. Under the Will, the property has been given to the sons excluding the defendant, the daughter of late Sobhu. One of the sons, by name, Ruldu also was said to have died on 8.6.1977 and thereafter, the widow of Ruldu of name Smt. Suari inherited his estate and she was also said to have executed a Will in favour of the plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 on 24.11.1978. Aggrieved against the action of the defendant in managing to get attested the mutation of the shares of heirs of Sobhu including herself, the plaintiffs have come up with the present suit. It may also be pointed out at this stage that the plaintiffs appear to have initiated steps to have the Will executed by Sobhu and it appears that the Sub-Registrar concerned before whom the moved was initiated by his proceedings dated 30.5.1984 refused to register the Will and that thereafter the plaintiffs neither filed any appeal nor pursued further action under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. The defendant in this suit, the daughter of late Sobhu, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 68/392 of 1987/262 of 1988 on the file of Additional Distinct Judge, Kullu, the appellant in R.S.A. No. 420 of 1992 contested the suit claim contending that the suit was barred by limitation, that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the property, that the mutations effected on the basis of inheritance were quite legal and valid and unassailable and also disputed and denied the Will of Sobhu and branded it as a forged document. 3. On the above claims and counter-claims, the suit came to be tried and learned trial Judge by his judgment and decree dated 31.3.1987 held that the Will dated 15.4.1973 executed by deceased Sobhu is a valid one and has been duly and properly proved. The learned trial Judge also held that though on the death of Ruldu, one of the sons of late Sobhu, his wife Suari became entitled to the share of Ruldu in the properties, the so-called Will said to have been executed the wife of Ruldu has not been proved for reasons best known to the plaintiffs and, therefore, the defendant would be also entitled to succeed as a sharer to the estate of late Ruldu along with his three other brothers. It is on this finding ultimately the learned trial Judge has sustained the claim of the defendant for 1/16th share. As for the legality and validity of the mutation on the basis of inheritance is concerned, the learned trial Judge rejected the objection taken by the defendant on the view that those mutations were got effected behind the back of the plaintiffs and in a perfunctory manner showing the presence of a dead person long even after the death of Ruldu. As for the claim of the defendant about the unreasonableness of the Will and the challenge made to it as one vitiated with suspicious circumstances, learned trial Judge elaborately adverted to the oral and documentary evidence, to come to the conclusion that there was nothing wrong in the disposition made under the Will excluding the defendant for the reason that she was got married in a well to do family where she is supposed to be still living particularly in the teeth of the fact that she was given certain property to which a reference will be made hereinafter at an appropriate stage. On the above conclusions arrived at by the learned trial Judge, the suit filed by the plaintiff came to be decreed partly except to the extent of 1/16th share recognised in favour of the defendant. It is in such circumstances aggrieved by the judgments of the courts below, both the parties to the suit filed separate appeals objecting to the respective portions of the judgments and decrees which went against them. 4. Learned Appellate Judge, who heard and disposed of the appeals CA No. 66/245/87/261/1988 filed by the plaintiffs and C.A. No. 68/392/ 87/262/1988 confirmed the judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Judge and dismissed both the appeals. Hence, the above second appeals. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing on either side in both the appeals. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs challenged that portion of the judgment and decree granting 1/16th share in the properties in favour of the defendant. 6. So far as the learned Counsel for the defendant is concerned, it was contended that the courts below have misread the evidence and ignored the essential facts which would go to show that the suit was not filed within the period of limitation. 6. So far as the learned Counsel for the defendant is concerned, it was contended that the courts below have misread the evidence and ignored the essential facts which would go to show that the suit was not filed within the period of limitation. Learned Counsel for the defendant also contended that the findings arrived at by the courts below regarding validity of the Will executed by Sobhu are illegal and cannot be sustained in the teeth of the order of the Sub-Registrar, who held that the Will dated 15.4.1973 which was attempted to be registered, as not genuine and, therefore, could not be accepted for registration when the said order has not been challenged on appeal or in any further proceedings and that the courts below ought to have seen that such findings of the Registering Authority should stand in the way of the plaintiffs claiming any relief in the suit. Both the learned Counsel appearing on either side while inviting my attention to the relevant portions of the judgments of the courts below and some of the relevant materials on record, relied upon several decisions of the Apex Court, this Court as also other High Courts. It would be appropriate to refer to at least some of them. 7. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance upon ILR (1975) Him. Series 441, Smt. Uttami v. Shri Ram Dass, etc. where in a Division Bench of this Court held that the propounder of a Will has to prove the due and valid execution of it and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, the propounder must revive the said suspicion from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence and that once it is established in the case of an unnatural and officious Will that the testator was free and had a sound disposing mind, the Court cannot inject its own ethics of what is or is not a moral or a fair disposition The earlier decision of the Apex Court as also of the Privy Council was relied upon in arriving at such conclusion. While placing reliance upon the decisions reported in AIR 1936 Lahore 37, Ghulam Mohammad v. Samundar and AIR 1977 Cal 499, Kanailal v. Kalicharan, at attempt was made to raise the plea on behalf of the plaintiffs that where a person continues in possession of proprietary rights, inspite of certain adverse entries in the revenue papers, no question of limitation would arise and the limitation, if any, would come in when any act of the other party prejudicial to the interests of the plaintiff of which he feels aggrieved occurs. The learned Counsel for the defendant relied upon the decisions reported in AIR 1959 SC 443, H. Venkatachala lyengar v. B N. Thimmaiamma and others, which is perhaps the leading pronouncement of the Apex Court and relied upon in every one or other of the subsequent cases decided, wherein well-settled principle about the obligations of a party propounding a Will in proving the document, its due execution and the duty to clear any suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the Will before getting the relief, have been laid down. The decisions reported in 1993, Shim LC 118, Milkhi Ram and others, v. Smt Surmoo Devi and 1994 (4) Shim LJI 2767, Gumat Ram v. Smt Sukmani Devi, are cases wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court had an occasion to deal with the manner in which the due execution of the Will has to be proved and also the method of erasing the doubts in respect of the suspicious circumstances arising in a given case surrounding the execution of a Will. The case reported in 1993 Shim LC 118 (supra) is one where the testator had bequeathed his property in favour of his nephews and disentitled his only daughter who was his sole legal heir, which fact was considered to be an unnatural one on the peculiar circumstances substantiated in the case. In the decision in 1994 (4) Shim LJ 2767 (supra), the Court held from the preponderance of the record in that case that the reason given for disinheriting the daughter created a suspicion. In (1995) 4 SCC 459, the Apex Court held that the circumstance of deprivation of natural heirs by itself should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. In (1995) 4 SCC 459, the Apex Court held that the circumstance of deprivation of natural heirs by itself should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. In (1998) 4 SCC 384, Gurdial Kaur and others v. Kartar Kaur and others, the Apex Court reiterated that the burden is on the propounder of the Will to dispel the suspicious circumstance and that the conscience of the Court must be statisfied that the Will in question was not only executed and attested in the manner required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 but it should also be found that the said Will was the product of the free volition of the executant who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the Will. It was also observed that whenever there is any suspicious circumstance, the obligation is cast on the propounder of the Will to dispel the suspicious circumstance. Coming to such conclusion, the Apex Court observed as under:— “3.The law is well settled that if there is a suspicious circumstance about the execution of the Will, it is the duty of the person seeking declaration about the validity of the Will to dispel such suspicious circumstances. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Rani Purnima Dehi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, AIR 1962 SC 567. It has been held in the said decision that if a Will being registered and having regard to the other circumstances, is accepted to be genuine, the mere fact that the Will is a registered Will not by itself be sufficient to dispel all suspicions regarding the validity of the Will where suspicions exist. It has been held that the broad statement by the witness that he had witnessed the testator admitting the execution of the Will was not sufficient to dispel suspicions regarding due execution and attestation of the Will. It has been held that the broad statement by the witness that he had witnessed the testator admitting the execution of the Will was not sufficient to dispel suspicions regarding due execution and attestation of the Will. It has been specifically held that registration of the Will by itself was not sufficient to remove the suspicion Relying on an earlier decision of this Court reported in H. Venkatachala lyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 SC 443:1959 Supp (1) SCR 426, it has been held in the said decision that where the propounder was unable to dispel the suspicious circumstances which surrounded the question of valid execution and attestation of the Will, no letters of administration in favour of the propounder could be granted. 4. The law is well settled that the conscience of the Court must be satisfied that the Will in question was not only executed and attested in the manner required under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 but it should also be found that the said Will was the product of the free volition of the executant who had voluntarily executed the same after knowing and understanding the contents of the Will. Therefore, whenever there is any suspicious circumstance, the obligation is cast on the propounder of the Will to dispel the suspicious circumstance. As in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court of appeal below did not accept the valid execution of the Will by indicating reasons and coming to a specific finding that suspicion had not been dispelled to the satisfaction of the Court and such finding of the court of appeal below has also been upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment, we do not find any reason to interfere with such decision. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs." Two decisions referred to by the courts below also may be usefully referred to and the principles laid down therein will have some relevance for appreciating the competing claims before me in these appeals. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs." Two decisions referred to by the courts below also may be usefully referred to and the principles laid down therein will have some relevance for appreciating the competing claims before me in these appeals. In AIR 1982 SC 133, Smt. Indu Bala Bose and others v. Mahindra Chandra, the Apex Court while emphasising the manner of proof of a Will and the onus cast on the propounder observed as hereunder :— "This Court has held that the mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63 of the Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the Will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court The suspicious circumstance may be as to the genuineness of the testators mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of the relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testators mind was not free. In such a case, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances, the Court would grant probate, even if the Will might be an unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. (See AIR 1964 SC 529, 1959 Suppl. (1) SCR 426: (AIR 1959 SC 443) & (1962) 3 SCR 195: (AIR 1962 SC 567). If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances, the Court would grant probate, even if the Will might be an unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. (See AIR 1964 SC 529, 1959 Suppl. (1) SCR 426: (AIR 1959 SC 443) & (1962) 3 SCR 195: (AIR 1962 SC 567). As to what in a given case could be termed as a suspicious circumstance, it has been held as under:— "Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a suspicious circumstance. The circumstance would be suspicious when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person. Learned Counsel relief on the decision of this Court in the case of Rani Purnima Devi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Dev reported in (1962) 3 SCR 195 : (AIR 1962 SC 567) (supra). In this case, the Will in question gave the entire property of the testator to a distance relation of his to the exclusion of the testators widow, sister and his other relations, and even his daughter, who would be his natural heirs, but subject, of course, to the condition that the legatee would maintain the widow and the sister of the testator. The testators signatures were not his usual signatures nor in the same ink as the rest of the Will, the testator used to sign blank papers for use in his cases in Court and he used to send them to his lawyer through his servants, the testator did not appear before the Sub-Registrar for the purpose of registration of the Will but the Sub-Registrar sent only his Clerk to the residence of the testator for the purpose of registration; there were 16 attesting witnesses who attested the Will, but of them, only four interested witnesses were examined to the exclusion of disinterested witnesses. The above are undoubtedly suspicious circumstances, creating doubt in the mind of the Court. Inspite of these circumstances: it was held by the trial Court that the Will was duly executed and attested. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the order of the trial Court. On further appeal, this Court held that the circumstances were suspicious and were not satisfactorily explained and hence held that "the due execution and attestation of the Will were not proved". 8. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the order of the trial Court. On further appeal, this Court held that the circumstances were suspicious and were not satisfactorily explained and hence held that "the due execution and attestation of the Will were not proved". 8. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side on the validity or otherwise of the Will dated 15.4.1973 executed by Sobhu. There can be no serious controversy on the facts proved in this case that the due execution of the Will has been proved before the Civil Court to its satisfaction. The only other question to be considered is about the alleged suspicious circumstances said to be surrounding the execution of the Will and such suspicion was sought to be created from the disinheriting of the daughter in this case. On the piea of the defendant that the father had been discarded by the plaintiffs and it was the daughter who has taken care of him and that she had separated from her husband and children and living away from the husbands family and, therefore, the father could not have thought of denying her any share or disinheriting her, I find that these aspects have been considered extensively by the courts below by referring to the oral and documentary evidence. The materials relied upon and the conclusions arrived at by the courts below in this regard that the defendant was living only with her husband and his family as also the fact that she had been even during the life time of her father given 6.12 bighas of land of which 12 bighas were irrigated land, were considered to be justifying factors to reject the plea of unreasonableness of disposition or suspicious nature of the Will. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the courts below holding on the materials as noticed above and several other materials that there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will or in the disinheritation of the daughter on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and preferring the sons for the grant of property by the Will under challenge, are unassailable since they do not suffer from any infirmity and that too in a second appeal. Consequently, the challenge made to the Will executed by Sobhu by the defendant is rejected. 9. Consequently, the challenge made to the Will executed by Sobhu by the defendant is rejected. 9. So far as the claim of the plaintiffs chosing to completely deny any share to the defendant by relying upon an alleged Will by Ruldus wife is concerned, likewise the courts below have held that the so-called Will has not been proved in accordance with law and this factual finding also does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever to warrant interference by this Court since the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs was unable to point out any materials to undermine the concurrent findings of facts recorded in this regard. The challenge by the plaintiffs to this part of the judgments and decrees and the claim of the defendant at least to 1 /16th share, therefore, fails and stands rejected. 10. The contention on behalf of the defendant about the mutation attested in this case and the legality and propriety of the same, in my view, has been dealt with by the courts below in the right perspective and reasons assigned therein by the courts below to reject them as illegal and void having been brought about not only behind the back of the plaintiffs but also made in a suspicious manner disclosing the presence and name of Ruldu when he had long before died, cannot be said to be in any way either illegal or perverse to be interfered in my hands. The challenge made by the learned Counsel for the defendant in this regard has no merit and is hereby rejected. In view of this, the challenge with reference to the plea of limitation urged on behalf of the defendant also has to fail. The suit is not one for setting aside the revenue entry or attestation of mutation. In a suit for declaration of title by the lawful heirs who claim succession to their father, there is no impediment in seeking for such declaratory right as long as it is shown that they have not lost their title and proprietary rights of possession they are entitled to declaratory relief as prayed for and the suit cannot be said to be beyond the period of limitation. This objection on behalf of the defendant also, therefore, fails and shall stand rejected. 11. This objection on behalf of the defendant also, therefore, fails and shall stand rejected. 11. One other question which has been strongly urged for the defendant by the learned Counsel appearing is about the legality and propriety of the Civil Court, in the present proceedings accepting the Will propounded on behalf of the plaintiffs ignoring the order of the Registering Authority refusing to register the very Will as not genuine, without getting such order set aside in the manner known to law. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the defendant on the provisions contained in Sections 73 and 77 of the Registration Act. It is the plea of the learned Counsel for the defendant that whether the document in question required registration compulsorily or not, the plaintiffs having moved for registration and failed to get it registered on the ground that it was not a genuine Will, thereafter there is nothing left for them to claim any right on the basis of the said Will when the said order has not been got annulled in the manner known to law. Attractive as the submission may appear to be, fail to comprehend the legal consequences thereof and it is not as though the statute accords any finality to the order so as to preclude an independent proceedings seeking for any declaratory relief in respect of a property, depending upon the very Will, registration of which has been declined by the Registering Authority. It is not as though in this case further action has been persued after the order of rejection by the Registering authority till the stage of filing suit and in such suit a competent Civil Court has adjudicated the claim either way on the genuineness or otherwise of the Will. 12. In AIR 1932 All 96, Bal Kishan Dass and others v, Bechan Pandey, the said High Court held that a failure of suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act does not operate as res-judicata in subsequent suit for specific performance. 12. In AIR 1932 All 96, Bal Kishan Dass and others v, Bechan Pandey, the said High Court held that a failure of suit under Section 77 of the Registration Act does not operate as res-judicata in subsequent suit for specific performance. In AIR 1946 Pat 62, Jhaman Mahton v. Amrit Mahton and others, a Division Bench of the said High Court has held that in a case where Registrar refused to register a sale deed, it was open to the aggrieved party to either bring suit under Section 77 of the Act or he may sue for specific performance of contract of sale and in such suit the unregistered sale deed was also admissible as evidence of contract of sale. In AIR 1960 Mad 244, K. Veeran Ambalam v. Vellaiammal and others, a learned Single Judge of that High Court has held that the remedy provided under Section 77 of the Registration Act, is a lesser remedy when contrasted with the normal remedies available under the ordinary laws of the country and the same cannot take away the larger remedy provided for under the Specific Relief Act. In AIR 1959 AP 626, Padala Satyanarayana Murthy v. Padala Gangamma and others, a Full Bench of the /Andhra Pradesh High Court held in the context of the registration of the Will being refused that Section 77 of the Registration Act is no bar to the devisee to recover the property by having recourse to the Civil Court availing normal remedies. A similar view was also taken by a Division Bench of Orissa High Court in AIR 1959 Orissa 74, Rajan Patro v, Akur Sahu and others, 13. A careful consideration of the principles laid down in those decisions will go to show that the omission to get a document which otherwise not compulsorily register able or a perfunctory attempt made to get it registered before the Registering Authority with no further remedies under the Registration Act being availed of, cannot stand in the way of a person claiming before the ordinary Civil Court the property or other rights available to him under the ordinary laws. This line of approach appears to have been obviously adopted for the simple reason that no finality as such has been given under the Act to an order of the Sub-Registrar or the order passed an appeal by the Registrar denying registration and that in the absence of any such finality accorded to such an order, the plaintiffs in this case cannot be nonsuited on the ground that they have not pursued further remedies against the order of the Sub-Registrar refusing to register the Will on the ground that it is not a genuine Will in the teeth of the categorical findings of both the courts below that the due execution and attestation has been properly proved and that the Will did not suffer any infirmity on the ground of any surrounding suspicious circumstances in relation to its execution or in the manner of disposition effected under the Will. 14. For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the judgments and decrees of the courts below are in accordance with law and do not call for any interference in my hands. The appeals, therefore, fail and shall stand dismissed. Appeal dismissed.