CHIDANANDA ULLAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal filed by the insurance company to challenge the Order dated 22-10-1993 in case No. Wca/cr-79 of 1980-81 passed by the labour officer and commissioner for workmen's compensation, dak- shina kannada sub-division-i, mangalore, whereunder while allowing the claim of the respondent 1, the labour officer and commissioner for workmen's compensation had awarded a sum of Rs. 21,000/- together with interest at 6% p. a. payable by the respondent 1-employer and the appellant-insurance company. ( 2 ) I heard the learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company, Sri chinnappa k. Kambeyananda and the learned counsel for the respondent 2, Sri s. s. sripathy. The respondent 1 having been served with notice in the appeal, had remained absent. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company, Sri chinnappa k. Kambeyananda while taking me through the facts of the case and further urging the solitary ground in the appeal memorandum argued that the impugned award passed by the commissioner is totally opposed to law and therefore is liable to be set aside by this court in allowing the instant appeal. He pointedly argued that the respondent 2 herein who had filed a claim petition before the labour officer and commissioner for workmen's compensation, dakshina kannada sub-division-i, mangalore (henceforth in brief as 'commissioner') was not at all entitled to maintain the same as she was not a dependant as defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (henceforth in brief as the 'act' ). He had drawn my attention to the averment made in para 5 of the claim petition, wherein it had been averred by the respondent 2 that the deceased had no parents, sister or brother and she was the sole surviving dependant of the deceased and that she was entitled to for compensation. Sri kambeyananda has taken me through the definition of the dependant as defined under Section 2 (1) (d) of the act. He pointed out that the respondent 2 before the commissioner was only an aunt (sister of the mother of the deceased) and that an aunt does not occur anywhere therein to be termed as a 'dependant'. Therefore, he prayed that the impugned award passed by the commissioner be set aside by absolving the liability of the respondent 1-employer as well as the liability of the appellant-insurance company. Therefore, he prayed that the impugned award passed by the commissioner be set aside by absolving the liability of the respondent 1-employer as well as the liability of the appellant-insurance company. ( 4 ) SRI kambeyananda had also cited a decision reported in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, wherein while dealing with Section 110-a of the motor vehicles act, it was held that the expression 'legal representative' has not been defined in the motor vehicles ACT and as such that expression ordinarily means a person who represents the estate of the deceased person or a person on whom estate of the deceased devolved upon the death of an individual. I have gone through the above decision cited. I don't think the same is having any bearing on the case in hand. ( 5 ) PER contra, the learned counsel for the contesting respondent 2, Sri s. s. sripathy argued that the respondent 2, who had filed a claim petition before the commissioner was a foster-mother for it is she who had brought up the deceased while he was young and that it is therefore she had filed the claim petition as a 'dependant' before the commissioner. According to him, when she had asserted in the claim petition before the commissioner that she was the dependant, it had to be construed that she had filed the claim petition as a dependant as contemplated under Section 2 (1) (d) of the act. Sri sripathy had also tried to substantiate his argument by referring to the dictionary meaning of the word 'mother' as it was relied upon by the commissioner in passing the impugned Order, for the dictionary meaning of the word 'mother' includes the foster-mother. Therefore, Sri sripathy submitted that the impugned Order passed by the commissioner is in consonance with law and therefore not called for to be interfered with by this court. ( 6 ) IN the light of the above submissions made, the only point that arises for my consideration is whether the respondent 2-claimant before the commissioner was a dependant within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (d) of the ACT or not. ( 7 ) IN consideration of the same, it can beneficially be quoted Section 2 (1) (d) of the ACT wherein the term dependant has been defined. The same reads as hereunder:. ( 7 ) IN consideration of the same, it can beneficially be quoted Section 2 (1) (d) of the ACT wherein the term dependant has been defined. The same reads as hereunder:. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent 2 had pointed out that the claim of the respondent 2 falls under Section 2 (1) (d) (iiixb) wherein it is referred to a parent other than the widowed mother. In the ACT the word 'parent' has not been denned. Therefore, in my considered view, the dictionary meaning of the word 'parent' be looked into. To look into the meaning of the word 'parent' in the chambers dictionary, the same reads as hereunder:it is interesting to note here that the meaning of the word 'parent' does not include the foster-parent. If it is the claim of the respondent 2 that she was the foster-parent, in my considered view, she does not fall within the meaning of the word 'parent'. In passing the impugned Order, the learned commissioner had treated the respondent 2 as the mother of the deceased and thus tried to find out the dictionary meaning of the word 'mother' and referred to and relied upon the meaning of the word 'mother'. I do not think that exercise by the commissioner is just and proper in view of the fact that it is not the 'mother' who had occurred in Section 2 (1) (dxiii) (b) of the ACT but the 'parent'. It is therefore obvious that, the respondent 2 does not occur in the scheme of the ACT particularly in Section 2 (1) (d) of the act. ( 9 ) YET another aspect of the case, I have to point out here is that the respondent 2 in filing the claim petition before the commissioner did not say that she was either wholly or partially dependant upon the deceased, for all that she had stated in para 5 of the claim petition is that she was the sole surviving dependant of the deceased. I do not think that will take the respondent 2 anywhere near to file the claim petition before the commissioner as she did in the instant case in hand. I do not think that will take the respondent 2 anywhere near to file the claim petition before the commissioner as she did in the instant case in hand. ( 10 ) THAT being the legal position, I am of the view that the impugned award passed by the commissioner is not in consonance with law and that he had entertained the claim petition of the respondent 2 under the misconception that she was entitled to for the compensation, probably he was actuated to do so for the reason that the respondent 2 in her evidence deposed that she was the foster-mother. Therefore, I find every merit in the instant appeal filed by the insurance company and therefore the same is liable to be allowed as against the respondent 2. ( 11 ) AT this stage, the learned counsel for the respondent 2 prayed for leave of this court for preferring a claim petition before the motor accident claims tribunal. I do not think such a leave can be granted by this court, for if it is permissible for her to resort to such a claim before the mact she can do that in future too if it is so permissible under law. ( 12 ) IN the result, I pass" the following: Order (i) the impugned Order passed by the commissioner awarding a compensation of Rs. 21,000/- together with interest by the respondent 1-employer and the appellant-insurance company is set aside. (ii) the application of the respondent 2-claimant before the commissioner stands dismissed. ( 13 ) THE appeal there fore succeeds and accordingly allowed. No cost. --- *** --- .